Let’s see now. Suppose you are a trustee of the Houston Community College system.
You are confronted with a chronically underfunded system that is operating in a region where golf courses are overbuilt and will do most anything to attract customers.
What would you do?
Well, I don’t know about you, but I wouldn’t be approving the construction of a three-hole, par 3 golf facility to provide “a new and unique opportunity for residents of northeast Houston to learn or improve skills in the age-old sport of golf.”
The Houston Press’ Richard Connelly has the story.
Monthly Archives: July 2006
Is this a new A&M recruiting video?
I recognize that football recruiting at Texas A&M has not kept up with Big 12 competitors such as Texas and Oklahoma. The Coach Fran era has not gone as expected, and even the sacred 12th Man tradition is under attack. So, drastic measures are required to turn things around.
But a rap music video extolling the virtues of Bryan-College Station? Let’s just say I’m still partial to the Aggie War Hymn.
Former A&M football coach Bear Bryant is turning over in his grave. Old Army will never be the same. Hat tip to the Burnt Orange Nation for the link.
Have a safe and happy 4th!
The random nature of movie success
This fascinating Leonard Mlodinow/LA Times special (registration req.) explains why I am utterly incapable of predicting which movies will be successful. In reality, nobody can:
The magic of Hollywood successóhow can one account for it? Were the executives at Fox and Sony who gambled more than $300 million to create the hits “X-Men: The Last Stand” and “The Da Vinci Code” visionaries? Were their peers at Warner Bros. who green-lighted the flop “Poseidon,” which cost $160 million to produce, just boneheads?
The 2006 summer blockbuster season is upon us, one of the two times each year (the other is Christmas) when a film studio’s hopes for black ink are decided by the gods of movie fortuneónamely, you and me. Americans may not scurry with enthusiasm to vote for our presidents, but come summer, we do vote early and often for the films we love, to the tune of about $200 million each weekend. For the people who make the movies, it’s either champagne or Prozac as a river of green flows through Tinseltown, dragging careers with it, sometimes for a happy, wild ride, sometimes directly into a rock.
But are the rewards (and punishments) of the Hollywood game deserved, or does luck play a far more important role in box-office success (and failure) than people imagine?
We all understand that genius doesn’t guarantee success, but it’s seductive to assume that success must come from genius. As a former Hollywood scriptwriter, I understand the comfort in hiring by track record. Yet as a scientist who has taught the mathematics of randomness at Caltech, I also am aware that track records can deceive.
That no one can know whether a film will hit or miss has been an uncomfortable suspicion in Hollywood at least since novelist and screenwriter William Goldman enunciated it in his classic 1983 book “Adventures in the Screen Trade.” If Goldman is right and a future film’s performance is unpredictable, then there is no way studio executives or producers, despite all their swagger, can have a better track record at choosing projects than an ape throwing darts at a dartboard.
That’s a bold statement, but these days it is hardly conjecture: With each passing year the unpredictability of film revenue is supported by more and more academic research.
Read the entire highly entertaining article. The money quote comes from Art DeVany, who really should have been an expert witness for the plaintiffs in Disney-Ovitz:
“Today’s Hollywood executives all act like wimps,” [DeVany] says. “They don’t control their budgets. They give the actors anything they want. They rely on the easy answers, so they try to mimic past successes and cave in to the preposterous demands of stars. My research shows you don’t have to do that. It’s just an easy way out, an illusion.”
“[A] careful study reveals that no strategy the studios devise is going to give them any kind of advantage at all. So any studio executive getting paid more than the salary of a comparable executive at your local dairy is getting paid too much.”
Larry Ribstein, who knows a thing or two about the movie business and the way in which it portrays business, comments on the article here.
Playing high stakes poker at Refco’s Bermuda unit
Wall Street Journal reporters Carrick Mollenkamp, Ian McDonald and Peter A. McKay have authored this article of the day ($) in updating the fascinating story on the bankrupt, New York-based brokerage firm. Refco, Inc. (prior posts here). This WSJ report focuses on Refco’s unregulated Bermuda unit, which Refco allegedly used as sort of a piggy bank to make loans to customers on high-risk bets and to cover up losses on those bets. When Refco went into the tank after an Enronesque experience, the Bermuda unit — called Refco Capital Markets — was supposed to have at least $3.7 billion in customer account assets, but had only $1.9 billion in such assets. Now the customers who played such high-stakes poker with Refco are scrambling to pick up some scraps on their gambling losses in Refco’s bankruptcy case.
As an “exempt” Bermuda company, Refco Capital Markets wasn’t required to keep customers’ money seperate from Refco’s company funds, so customer and company money was routinely commingled in the Bermuda unit’s accounts and commonly used by various Refco entities to pay bills, make loans and finance investments. Apparently, even other Refco units routinely sent funds to the Bermuda unit to invest. According to the article, some investors are contending in the bankruptcy court that they were surprised by the Bermuda unit’s practices:
“That is not a business model of which I am familiar with,” Mr. [Richard] Deitz, the Moscow-based hedge-fund manager, said at a bankruptcy-court hearing. “It’s something that I think is more in common with three-card monte.”
I would suggest that Mr. Dietz was playing the equivalent of three card monte with Refco and that he knew it.
Stros 2006 Review, Part Five
Well, the Stros (39-42) are halfway through their 2006 season and the first half of the season reminds us again of just how much expectations shape our perception of how likely it is for the club to contend for another playoff run.
Remember this same time in 2004? Pessimism surrounded the club. The hitting was lousy and the pitching staff was reeling from the loss of Wade Miller and the sore elbow of Andy Pettitte. However, after reaching a season-worst 56-60 on Aug. 14, the 2004 Stros won an incredible 36 out of their next 46 games (including a 12 game winning streak and nine out of their last 10 to close out the regular season) to take the National League wildcard playoff spot and come within a game of the 2004 World Series.
And remember this time last season? After starting the 2005 season with an atrocious 15-30 record amidst the worst hitting in the club’s history, that Stros club came to the halfway point of the season on a totally unexpected 29-13 run that had everyone brimming with cautious optimism. Of course, that club went on to post a 45-30 record for the remainder of the season to make the playoffs, won the National League Championship Series over the Cardinals and made it to the club’s first World Series.
What about this year? Well, after getting hopes up by blowing out of the gate with a 19-9 record, the 2006 Stros have gone into a 20-33 tailspin that has exhibited not only chronic inconsistent hitting, but also pitching that has been far below the levels of the 2004 and 2005 Stros. As a result, no one seems to be particularly sanguine at this time about the prospects for the Stros making a third straight playoff run.
But you know what’s interesting? The Stros 39-42 record to date this season is not materially different from the 44-43 record at the All-Star break for the 2004 Stros or the 44-44 All-Star break record of the 2005 club. And just like the Stros clubs of the past two seasons, the 2006 Stros have the ingredients to contend for a playoff spot in the second half of the season if certain players elevate their performance to past levels. See what I mean about expectations?
The amazing Roy Oswalt
Roger Clemens is one of the greatest pitchers in Major League Baseball history, so he rightly gets most of the publicity among Stros pitchers. However, Roy Oswalt is currently the best pitcher on the Stros’ staff, one of the best pitchers in the National League and is well on his way to becoming the best Stros pitcher ever.
As noted in this recent post on Clemens, the statistic “runs saved against average” (“RSAA) is one of the best measures for evaluating a pitcher’s true effectiveness because it is based on the two most important things for a pitcher in winning baseball games — that is, not giving up runs and getting hitters out. RSAA measures the number of runs that a pitcher saves for his team relative to the number of runs that an average pitcher in the league would give up while obtaining an equivalent number of outs for his team. Inasmuch as the hypothetical average pitcher’s RSAA is always zero, a player can have an RSAA that is either a positive number — which indicates he is an above average pitcher (i.e., Clemens and Oswalt) — or an RSAA that is a negative number, which means he is performing below average (i.e., remember Brandon Duckworth and Tim Redding?).
Moreover, RSAA is a the best measure for comparing pitchers who played during different eras. Inasmuch as RSAA measures a pitcher’s ability against that of an average pitcher in the pitcher’s league for each particular season, a pitcher’s lifetime RSAA measures how that pitcher performed against the average pitcher of his era. That’s really the best way to compare pitchers from different eras because comparing other pitching statistics — such as earned run average, wins and hitting statistics against — is often skewed between pitchers of hitter-friendly eras (i.e., the era in which Clemens and Oswalt have pitched) versus pitchers of pitcher-friendly eras (i.e., such as the late 1960’s and early 70’s).
In pitching a complete game the other day against the Tigers, Oswalt attained another milestone by reaching 150 RSAA for his career. Roy O is easily the Stros career leader in RSAA:
The Lay-Skilling forfeiture motion
In the least surprising post-verdict motion to date, the Washington Post’s Carrie Johnson reports that the Enron Task Force filed its forfeiture motion yesterday against former key Enron executives Ken Lay and Jeff Skilling. A bookmarked pdf copy of the motion can be downloaded here.
As expected, the Task Force requests that the remaining net worth of both Skilling and Lay be forfeited to the government to satisfy the Task Force’s contention that the two should pony up about $183 million as the undeserved fruit of the securities fraud for which the two were convicted. In addition to the defendants, the Task Force’s forfeiture request will probably generate opposition from various parties in the civil litigation still swirling around the Enron case, which parties are also seeking compensation from Lay and Skilling on various business and securities fraud claims. Finally, both Lay and Skilling owe substantial amounts to their respective defense teams, so the claims of those firms will also need to be sorted out in connection with the Task Force’s forfeiture claim. Lay and Skilling have requested that U.S. District Judge Sim Lake schedule a bench trial regarding forfeiture issues sometime this fall, but it remains unclear at this time just how Judge Lake will handle the Task Force’s forfeiture request.