The politics of statutes at UT

This NY Times article reports on the squabble that has arisen over the University of Texas at Austin’s decision to honor famed Houston trial lawyer Joe Jamail with his second statute on the UT campus:

Of the more than a dozen statues peppering the University of Texas campus here, one glorifies the first native-born governor, two pay tribute to deceased American presidents, and others honor Confederate leaders.
Another statue is poised to join the cast on Friday, honoring a graduate who is a successful trial lawyer.
The subject, Joe Jamail, a Houston alumnus who has donated $21.7 million to the university and its athletic programs, already has one bronze likeness at the law school and his name is on several campus sites. The newest statue of Mr. Jamail, who won billions of dollars for Pennzoil in a landmark suit in the 1980’s, is scheduled to be unveiled inside the football stadium before the annual game against archrival Texas A&M.
But not everyone looks forward to another likeness. The statue, . . makes Mr. Jamail the only person with two on the 350-acre campus, university officials say, and that distinction has rankled some faculty members.
“One is enough, with due respect to whoever,” said a journalism professor, Gene Burd.

The 78 year old Jamail is most famous (notorious?) for persuading a Houston state court jury in 1985 to award a record $11 billion in damages against Texaco for tortiously interfering with Pennzoil’s attempted acquisition of Getty Oil. The subsequent judgment prompted Texaco to file a chapter 11 case, which eventually resulted in a settlement of Pennzoil’s claim for $3 billion in 1987. Already a wealthy plaintiff’s lawyer, Mr. Jamail took the case on a contingency fee, so his piece of the settlement made him one of the wealthiest attorneys in the world.
Over the past 20 years, Mr. Jamail has become a philanthropist, and UT has been the main beneficiary of his philanthropy. Sites at the university named for Mr. Jamail include the swim center, the football field, the law school pavilion that contains the first statute of him, and the law school’s legal research center. The newest statue of Mr. Jamail planned for a corner of the football stadium will be placed near a new statue of the former national champion football coach and UT legend Darrell Royal. By the way, Mr. Jamail paid for the statute of Coach Royal.
To this day, the Pennzoil-Texaco case is most remembered in Houston legal circles for the catastrophic trial decision that Texaco’s general counsel made. Texaco’s main defense was that it was justified in competing with Pennzoil for Getty Oil and, thus, could not have tortiously interfered with Pennzoil’s takeover attempt. However, in support of an alternative defense, Texaco’s trial counsel recommended that Texaco put on expert testimony that would contradict Pennzoil’s evidence of alleged damages. Texaco’s general counsel decided that putting on countervailing damages testimony would be a signal to the jury that Texaco did not confidence in its primary defense, so he directed Texaco’s trial counsel not to put on any expert damages testimony.
Consequently, when the jury found in favor of Pennzoil on the liability issue, the only damages evidence in the trial record was Pennzoil’s. Thus, the $11 billion jury verdict ensued, and the trial record contained inadequate evidence upon which an appellate court could base a decision to reduce the damages.
As they say in defense circles, “Ouch!”

Oh great! Cell phone viruses?

Your cell phone may be the victim of the next wave of viruses.

Krispy Kreme = Boston Market

This Floyd Norris’ NY Times column does a nice job of explaining the developing debacle of Krispy Kreme, the share price of which peaked at $49.74 in the summer of 2003, but which has fallen as low as $9.35 recently. An earlier post on the company’s developing troubles may be reviewed here.
What happened? Easy. Most Krispy Kreme franchises don’t make money:

Krispy Kreme’s company-owned stores report an operating profit, but not one large enough to cover corporate overhead. The real profits have come from the company’s dealings with its franchise vendors. The franchises pay royalties of 4.5 percent to 6 percent of sales, plus 1 percent for advertising and public relations. And they must buy all their supplies from the parent – paying hefty markups that provide 20 percent profit margins for Krispy Kreme.
All that would be fine if the franchises were doing well. But many are not, and some are turning to Krispy Kreme as the lender of last resort. Some of these borrow from the parent and others sell their franchises back to it. One lucky operator had a deal that forced Krispy Kreme to buy at a price set in more optimistic times. In other cases, the parent bought for reasons the S.E.C. may be looking into, since its insiders held stakes in franchises the company purchased.
Until recently, it had been hard to tell how the franchises were doing. But the combination of additional investments in franchises and new accounting rules – imposed as a result of the Enron scandal – has forced the company to disclose more. In the quarter ended in October, the joint ventures lost $2.1 million after coming close to breaking even a year earlier.

The lesson of Krispy Kreme is simple, and it is the same one that the Boston Market bankruptcy of the 1990’s should have taught us. If the people who actually sell the product are not doing well, then neither is the enterprise.
Put Krispy Kreme on your bankruptcy watch list for 2005.

United finally seeks to reject CBA’s

Two years into its aimless chapter 11 case, UAL Corp. finally requested that the Bankruptcy Court allow it to reject its existing labor contracts with six unions if the company cannot reach consensual agreements on modifications to the contracts by January, 2005.
Better late than never, but geez United, let’s get on with it.
In its motion, United disclosed that it needs an additional $725 million in annual savings from its 62,000 workers in order to maintain sufficient liquidity to avoid a default under its interim bankruptcy financing even though United employees provided wage cuts valued at $2.5 billion a year earlier in the case. United now needs to generate additional savings because the airline business has been hammered even further by a compbination of low ticket prices, competition from discount airlines, high fuel prices, and unfunded pension obligations.
Moreover, UAL used the filing to remind the Court that it must also reduce its pension liabilities in order to secure exit financing to fund a plan of reorganization in its chapter 11 case. Consequently, unless consensual modifications of those liabilities are obtained, United will request that the Court approve United’s termination of its four pension plans, which would foist a substantial portion of the unfuned pension liabilities onto the federal Pension Benefit Guaranty Corp., which is not exactly in great shape itself.
United’s proposals are meeting with angry opposition in its chapter 11 case from the various unions and the PBGC. As a result, it appears that United will probably be required to endure a prolonged court battle on its motion to reject the labor contracts. Under the Bankruptcy Code, United has to prove that the rejections are necessary to permit the company to reorganize, that they are fair, and that the company bargained in good faith with the unions.
Legacy airlines are doomed to failure in the current airline industry absent change that will allow them to compete with the discount airlines. Nevetheless, the glacial progress in United’s chapter 11 case reflects the difficulties involved in changing a legacy airline’s culture. Although perhaps not best for United and its various parties-in-interest, the best thing that could happen to the airline industry as a whole would be for the Bankruptcy Judge in United’s case to issue an order requiring United’s parties-in-interest to show cause why United should not be liquidated. Only that type of industry shattering event is likely to shake the intractable view of airline unions that the past largesse of the legacy airlines is sustainable in the future.
Meanwhile, in this Wall Street Journal ($) op-ed, three authors involved in airline industry/bankruptcy issues provide the following proposal for dealing with unfunded pension obligations of the various legacy airlines:

We believe that the airlines, airline unions and the administration should work together to propose to the Congress a new alternative to the “lose-lose-lose” Chapter 11 approach. This would present an airline and unions with the following new choice: First, management and a union would need to agree collectively to freeze an existing defined-benefit pension plan. Importantly for the PBGC, its liability as guarantor of the plan would be capped as of the freeze date and would decrease over time. Second, the unfunded liability of the frozen plan then would be amortized over a specified time period that would be longer than what current law allows. Here’s where compromise is needed — the PBGC will want a shorter period for the unfunded pension liability to be paid; the airlines will want longer. One thing is clear: The existing pension funding law, particularly the so-called deficit-reduction contribution provisions, so accelerate the funding of significantly underfunded pension plans as to make the freeze option unrealistic absent a longer time period to satisfy the unfunded liabilities. Finally, management and labor would negotiate and agree upon a new, replacement defined-contribution pension plan.