Two years into its aimless chapter 11 case, UAL Corp. finally requested that the Bankruptcy Court allow it to reject its existing labor contracts with six unions if the company cannot reach consensual agreements on modifications to the contracts by January, 2005.
Better late than never, but geez United, let’s get on with it.
In its motion, United disclosed that it needs an additional $725 million in annual savings from its 62,000 workers in order to maintain sufficient liquidity to avoid a default under its interim bankruptcy financing even though United employees provided wage cuts valued at $2.5 billion a year earlier in the case. United now needs to generate additional savings because the airline business has been hammered even further by a compbination of low ticket prices, competition from discount airlines, high fuel prices, and unfunded pension obligations.
Moreover, UAL used the filing to remind the Court that it must also reduce its pension liabilities in order to secure exit financing to fund a plan of reorganization in its chapter 11 case. Consequently, unless consensual modifications of those liabilities are obtained, United will request that the Court approve United’s termination of its four pension plans, which would foist a substantial portion of the unfuned pension liabilities onto the federal Pension Benefit Guaranty Corp., which is not exactly in great shape itself.
United’s proposals are meeting with angry opposition in its chapter 11 case from the various unions and the PBGC. As a result, it appears that United will probably be required to endure a prolonged court battle on its motion to reject the labor contracts. Under the Bankruptcy Code, United has to prove that the rejections are necessary to permit the company to reorganize, that they are fair, and that the company bargained in good faith with the unions.
Legacy airlines are doomed to failure in the current airline industry absent change that will allow them to compete with the discount airlines. Nevetheless, the glacial progress in United’s chapter 11 case reflects the difficulties involved in changing a legacy airline’s culture. Although perhaps not best for United and its various parties-in-interest, the best thing that could happen to the airline industry as a whole would be for the Bankruptcy Judge in United’s case to issue an order requiring United’s parties-in-interest to show cause why United should not be liquidated. Only that type of industry shattering event is likely to shake the intractable view of airline unions that the past largesse of the legacy airlines is sustainable in the future.
Meanwhile, in this Wall Street Journal ($) op-ed, three authors involved in airline industry/bankruptcy issues provide the following proposal for dealing with unfunded pension obligations of the various legacy airlines:

We believe that the airlines, airline unions and the administration should work together to propose to the Congress a new alternative to the “lose-lose-lose” Chapter 11 approach. This would present an airline and unions with the following new choice: First, management and a union would need to agree collectively to freeze an existing defined-benefit pension plan. Importantly for the PBGC, its liability as guarantor of the plan would be capped as of the freeze date and would decrease over time. Second, the unfunded liability of the frozen plan then would be amortized over a specified time period that would be longer than what current law allows. Here’s where compromise is needed — the PBGC will want a shorter period for the unfunded pension liability to be paid; the airlines will want longer. One thing is clear: The existing pension funding law, particularly the so-called deficit-reduction contribution provisions, so accelerate the funding of significantly underfunded pension plans as to make the freeze option unrealistic absent a longer time period to satisfy the unfunded liabilities. Finally, management and labor would negotiate and agree upon a new, replacement defined-contribution pension plan.