Francis Fukuyama, professor at the Paul H. Nitze School of Advanced International Studies at Johns Hopkins and award winning author, writes this excellent op-ed in today’s Wall Street Journal ($) in which he analyzes the tough issues that the United States will be facing in the next stage of reconstruction in Iraq. First, Professor Fukuyama addresses the non-issues (the June 30 deadline, more international involvement, etc.), which seem to get more media play than the real issues, but then turns to the four major issues, the first of which is security:
Once we get past these nonissues, there are at least four very large problems that have to be solved before we get to a democratic Iraq. The first is so obvious that it does not need to be stressed here: security. A great deal of the good nation-building work of improving the electricity supply, roads, schools, and hospitals, as well as the billions of dollars the U.S. has dedicated to these tasks, are now stuck in the pipeline because many of the thousands of aid workers and contractors there find it too dangerous to leave their fortified compounds. At the same time, there is good reason to think that much of the recent violence will subside. Muqtada al-Sadr, the violent Shiite cleric whose Mahdi militia caused so much trouble throughout southern Iraq, miscalculated in staging a grab for power earlier this month. He is in the process of being isolated by his fellow Shiite clerics, and will likely be disarmed though a combination of negotiations and force.
The second issue is preserving the state’s “monopoly on legitimate violence”:
Much less easily solved is the second major problem, that of Iraq’s other militias. If the classic definition of a state is its monopoly of legitimate violence, then the new Iraq is not going to qualify for statehood anytime soon. We have seen in the past two weeks the deficiencies of the new Iraqi army, civil defense corps, and police, all of which have had units that have remained passive, refused to obey orders, or even switched to the other side. If you are a Kurd or Shiite today, it would take a great leap of faith to trust the security of your family to these new institutions.
It is thus not surprising that all of the major Shiite groups and not just Sadr’s followers have been frenetically building their own militias over the past few months. The Badr brigades, which are associated with the Iranian-influenced Supreme Council for the Islamic Revolution in Iraq, and the armed cells of the al-Dawa party, are potentially more powerful than the Mahdi militia. They are biding their time and building strength even as their political wings participate in the Iraqi Governing Council. The Kurds, for their part, have had their own Peshmerga forces to defend their interests for the past decade now.
The Coalition Provisional Authority is deep into a negotiation over what is called “demobilization, disarmament, and reintegration” — DDR, in nation-building lingo — which would dismantle these militias and fold them into the new national institutions. But the Shiite groups won’t disarm unless the Kurds do so as well, and in the current climate of violence it is very hard to see what kinds of incentives the U.S. can offer to bring this about.
The third problem is that of Kurd-Shiite relations:
The third major problem has to do with long-term Kurdish-Shiite relations. The Transitional Administrative Law that was signed in early March contains a provision that any article of the new constitution can be vetoed by a two-thirds vote in any three of Iraq’s 18 governorates, effectively giving the Kurds veto power over the entire constitution. The Kurds want this because they remain deeply suspicious that the Shiite groups, including those associated with Ayatollah Sistani (who up to this point has been a force for moderation), will seek to impose Sharia law once the constitutional process is under way. Mr. Sistani, for his part, has been equally vehement that this provision be removed. If the Kurds and Shiites cannot figure out how to share power, it is hard to see where the political basis for the new Iraq lies.
Finally, the fourth is how best to integrate the Sunni’s into the Iraq government:
The final problem has to do with how to integrate the Sunnis who are at the center of the current troubles in cities like Fallujah and Ramadi. Contrary to some media reports, it is not clear that a Sunni “silent majority” could not one day find representation in political parties willing to contest power via the ballot box rather than the gun. But after the demise of the Baath Party, they are the least politically developed of all of Iraq’s major groups. Prior to the Marines’ Fallujah offensive, various democracy-promotion groups such as the National Democratic Institute and the International Republican Institute had been making some headway in organizing democratic Sunni political parties. How the Fallujah standoff will be resolved, and what will remain of any residual Sunni goodwill toward the new Iraq in its aftermath, are open questions now.
Then, Professor Fuyukama concludes with words of prudent wisdom regarding the task at hand:
If we make progress in solving these four problems, and if we get through the two elections outlined by President Bush, we should not kid ourselves about what will emerge at the end of the process. The new Iraqi state will be more legitimate than any other state in the Arab world, but it will also likely be very weak and dependent on outside assistance. It may be an Islamic Republic, in which religion plays a more significant role than the U.S. would like; its armed forces may be a hodgepodge of militias that will crack apart under stress; it will likely face a continuing violent insurgency fed by outside terrorists; its writ is unlikely to extend to important parts of Iraq.
Thus if part of the vision being offered to the American people is the prospect that we will be able to disengage militarily from Iraq in less than two years, the administration should think again. It will be extremely difficult to stick to the timetable outlined by the president, and even if the U.S. do it will have big lingering commitments. The American public should not be blindsided about the total costs of the reconstruction, as it was about the costs of the war itself. For all of the reasons offered by President Bush, it is absolutely critical that America stay the course and ensure that Iraq becomes a stable, democratic country.
Given the incessant criticism during the political season regarding America’s mission to clean up the Iraq mess, it is refreshing to read the constructive thoughts of Professor Fuyukama regarding the tough issues that need to be addressed and resolved.
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