Cubs continue treating Stros like the Stros treat the Phils

Brandon Backe came crashing back down to earth after his winning firt starting performance of last week as the Cubs cruised past the Stros 8-3 in the clubs’ first game of a four game weekend series in Chitown.
Backe gave up seven runs and nine hits in three innings, which is more like he pitched when he was a reliever. Beltran did whack his fourth yak in four games and Bags nailed one, too. But the Stros left 12 men stranded, most of them while Mark Prior was pitching. Prior was primed to be beat today, but the Stros could not put together the big inning necessary to chase him.
Roy O and Kerry Wood renew their beanball rivalry in an another afternoon game tomorrow. The over-under on batters beaned tomorrow is 3.

Grocer’s Supply to buy Fiesta

A couple of independent Houston grocery institutions decide to merge.

Father of HSA’s condemns Kerrycare

John C. Goodman is a health care finance expert who was one of the leading advocates of Health Savings Accounts (explained here), which is one of the only positive pieces of health care finance legislation that has been enacted in years.
In this Wall Street Journal op-ed, Mr. Goodman reviews the Kerry Campaign’s health care plan, and he is singulalry unimpressed with what he sees:

Mr. Kerry is seeking to completely transform the health-care system. The changes are far more radical than even he has let on. If he is successful, millions of middle-income families will enroll in Medicaid, the federal-state health program for the poor. Millions more will get their insurance through a system of managed competition, similar to what Hillary Clinton proposed more than a decade ago. Most people would be unable to remain in the private health plan they have today.

Mr. Goodman then reviews the goals of Kerrycare and how it proposes to achieve them:

The ostensible purpose of the proposal is to insure the uninsured. By some estimates, as many as 44 million people lack health insurance at any one time. The Kerry goal is to insure about two-thirds of them.
How well will all of this work? More than half the money in this plan will be spent expanding Medicaid and the S-CHIP program (for low-income children). Emory University professor Kenneth Thorpe, Mr. Kerry’s health adviser, estimates that as many as 26 million new people will be enrolled. However, as the public sector expands, the private sector will surely contract.
Even Mr. Kerry assumes that for every 10 people who sign up, three people will lose private insurance from an employer; and it could be much worse. Studies in the 1990s found that every additional dollar spent on Medicaid led to a reduction in private insurance of 50 to 75 cents. More recent evidence suggests that private sector crowd-out is approaching one-to-one: Each new Medicaid enrollee is offset by one less person with private insurance. Moreover, most of the private sector subsidies will go to people who are already insured; and employers get their subsidies even if they fail to insure a single additional employee. Bottom line: It is entirely possible to spend $1 trillion and achieve no reduction in the number of uninsured!

And Mr. Goodman is not sanguine about the quality of care that would result from Kerrycare:

Quality of care will suffer under the Kerry proposal. People who go from employer plans to Medicaid will have fewer choices of doctors, longer waits for care, and inevitable health-care rationing. Those who join the system of managed competition will experience a different problem: Health plans will face perverse incentives to overprovide to the healthy and underprovide to the sick.

Which leads to the $64,000 question: How much will Kerrycare cost? Mr. Goodman comments:

In order to keep spending down in the latest 10-year projection, the Kerry team delays implementation for one year, so the first year’s costs can be zero. They also claim phantom savings that basically amount to the perennial promise to eliminate waste and inefficiency.
Counting the first full 10 years in operation and only savings that seem likely to be real, I put the actual cost in excess of $1 trillion, almost $1,000 per year for every household in America. Versus the budget Mr. Kerry has promised to balance, this cost is more than three times the new revenue Mr. Kerry hopes to get from high-income earners.
This estimate may be low. The reason: People will face perverse incentives to overinsure and overconsume. For example, faced with virtually no out-of-pocket costs, the 26 million new enrollees in Medicaid will have no reason to show restraint. The bills all go to someone else. Premium caps mean that a poverty enrollee under managed competition will pay no more than $600 or $700 a year, with the remainder paid by Uncle Sam. If they insure at all, they will tend to pick the most expensive plan. Why choose a Volkswagen when you can have an Aston Martin at no extra cost?
Whatever the cost, the plan will almost certainly lead to a new round of health-care inflation. Federal spending alone will increase by more than $100 billion a year. But since there will be no increase in supply, the bulk of this new spending will buy higher prices rather than more health care.

Mr. Goodman then asks the following common sense questions regarding Kerrycare:

A major problem with the current system is that tax subsidies for health insurance are arbitrary and unfair. But rather than move to a fairer system that treats equals equally, Mr. Kerry would create a slew of new subsidies that would make the system even more arbitrary.
The structure of the Kerry health plans raises a number of intriguing questions:

? Why spend billions on subsidies to small businesses if they join an insurance system that doesn’t even exist yet, while denying them those same subsidies if they buy insurance that is readily available in the marketplace?

? Why pay the cost of premium caps and other subsidies to individuals if they buy insurance that doesn’t yet exist, while denying them any relief if they buy insurance that is already available?

? And why spend billions enrolling middle-income families in Medicaid instead of using those same dollars to help them enroll in employer plans and individually-owned policies which they would probably much prefer?

Mr. Goodman concludes that there is only one logical answer to these questions:

The real purpose of this plan is not to insure the uninsured. The real purpose is to radically change our health- care system.

Read the whole piece.

Bank of NY tees off on Citigroup over Enron-related instruments

This Wall Street Journal ($) article reports that Bank of New York Co. sued Citigroup Inc. earlier this week over the sale of financial instruments related to Enron Corp. The lawsuit could involve as much as $2.5 billion in liability for Citigroup.
The lawsuit is particularly interesting because it involves credit insurance, which has become one of the trendiest new financial products over recent years. Such insurance provides investors a hedge against the risk of insolvency for their investment, and the Bank of New York – Citigroup dispute focuses on whether banks involved in the market may have superior knowledge to other participants.
The suit alleges Citigroup knew (or presumably “should have known”) Enron’s debts were far greater than the numbers presented in its public financial statements between 1999 and when Enron went into bankruptcy in early December, 2001. The suit alleges that Citigroup just could not get enough of Enron’s business and that by 1999, Citigroup’s exposure to Enron totaled a staggering $1.7 billion, which was four times Citigroup’s internal limit on exposure to Enron. Bank of New York alleges that Citigroup’s exposure increased over the next two years as Enron entered a series of financial deals with Citigroup that enabled Enron to mask debt as cash flow on its financial statements.
In short, Bank of New York alleges that Enron was a Ponzi scheme and that Citigroup knew it. The lawsuit alleges that the only reason Citigroup did not cut Enron off from new financing was because Citigroup knew that Enron would collapse before Enron could pay it back.
So, the lawsuit alleges that Citigroup approached major institutional investors to reduce its Enron exposure by promoting an investment in “Yosemite” securities, a series of notes with a total face value of $2.4 billion that were linked to the creditworthiness of Enron. So long as Enron remained financially viable, the investors in the Yosemites would receive interest payments that were more attractive than the interest rate on Enron bonds. If Enron defaulted on any debt obligations or filed for bankruptcy protection, the lawsuit alleges that Citigroup was supposed to replace the Yosemites with Enron bonds that would likely be worth far less than 100 cents on the dollar to investors, but which would rank relatively high in claim priority in an Enron bankruptcy.
As sad stories go, this dispute was triggered because Enron and its other creditors are asserting that the investors ought should be subordinate to other creditors in Enron’s claim priority ranking because of Citigroup’s involvement in the deception that helped cause Enron’s bankruptcy. If Enron’s position is sustained and the claims of the Yosemite securities holders go to the bottom of the Enron claim totem pole, then those investors will likely get nothing on their claims.
Such a result will not make the holders of those claims happy. Most of those Yosemite securities claims are now held by distressed-debt investors — a notoriously hard-knuckled group in insolvency cases — who bought the securities from the original holders at discounted prices between 10 to 50 cents on the dollar.
Just another $2.5 billion aftershock of the Enron financial earthquake. This one should be interesting.