In a matchup of fading teams that are dropping like rocks from wild-card contention, the Mets ended a three-game losing streak and handed the Stros their fifth loss in six games, 7-3 at Shea Stadium on Monday night.
Other than Berkman‘s solo yak, there is nothing for the Stros to talk about from this one. Several of the Stros — particularly Kent and Ausmus — appear to be going through the motions at this point. Munro and Redding were particularly bad as a weak hitting Mets club without Piazza lit the Stros’ pitchers up for 10 hits and 17 total bases. In the most merciful move of the year to date, the Stros optioned Redding to New Orleans after the game and recalled long-awaited Carlos Hernandez.
At least it was nice to see former Stro Richard Hidalgo double in a run. I suspect most of the Stros enjoyed seeing him do well, too.
The Stros have a chance tomorrow night as Roy O is pitching. But the way the Stros hit, Oswalt better be thinking shut out.
Daily Archives: August 10, 2004
Nigerian Barge case postponed again
The Enron Task Force’s recent decision to re-indict the defendants in the Enron-related Nigerian Barge case has caused another postponement of the trial in that case.
The trial, which was scheduled to begin on either August 16 or 17th, has been pushed back by U.S. District Judge Ewing Werlein until September 20. That trial schedule would still make it the first criminal case involving former Enron executives actually to go to trial since Enron’s collapse almost three years ago.
The government decided to re-indict the defendants recently because of concern over the U.S. Supreme Court’s recent Blakely decision (prior posts here), which has called into question the Constitutionality of both state and federal sentencing guidelines, particularly in cases in which the jury did not consider the alleged loss caused by the alleged crime.
Included in the new indictment in the Nigerian Barge case are allegations that a scheme to pretend Enron sold Nigerian barges caused the loss of more than $80 million, which, if proven, would add years to a sentence under the federal sentencing guidelines.
However, I am not following the governement’s theory of the case here. Neither Enron nor Merrill Lynch lost any money on this transaction, which was a relatively small deal in Enron’s world involving about $12 million in profits for Merrill Lynch. Moreover, the alleged illegal accounting treatment for the deal was not discovered until after Enron was well into its bankruptcy case, so public disclosure of that alleged impropriety had no market impact on Enron’s already worthless stock. Accordingly, I am still trying to figure out the government’s theory that the deal caused damages of $80 million. Oh well, maybe I’ll try to ask Jamie Olis.
At any rate, defense attorneys in the Nigerian Barge case had asked for the postponement because they said new expert financial testimony is necessary and new defenses need to be developed. The government asked Judge Werlein for a bifurcated trial in which the jury hears only about the alleged crimes in the first part and then, if there is a conviction, the jury would hear evidence of sentencing factors in the second stage.
Whose Constitution Is It, Anyway?
In this Wall Street Journal ($) book review, Northwestern University Law Professor John O. McGinniss reviews Stanford Law Dean and Professor Larry Kramer‘s new book — “The People Themselves” — in which he argues that the notion that the judiciary is the sole true arbiter of the Constitution under the American government is a fairly new and inaccurate view. As Professor McGinnis notes from Professor Kramer’s work:
. . . the men who wrote the Constitution would have been aghast at a judicial monopoly on its interpretation. At the time, judges did not claim some exclusive power of constitutional settlement. They believed that judicial review stemmed from their duty to interpret all relevant laws in the course of litigation. But they did not dispute that the White House and Congress had their own duty to interpret the Constitution in the course of their own official actions.
Only later, when the Federalists feared that they would be voted out of office, did the doctrine of judicial supremacy come into play, to insulate Federalist court decisions from correction. But Mr. Kramer shows that presidents from Jefferson to Lincoln refused to yield all authority to judges. They embraced “departmentalism” — each branch of government claiming an equal right to discover the Constitution’s true meaning.
Professor Kramer notes that the doctrine of judicial supremacy has serious implications to American government and society:
Because the court is selected from a narrow social class, he notes, it tends to reflect the views of a modern “aristocracy.” Only the willingness of other branches to disagree with the court prevents our constitutional republic from degenerating into a constitutional oligarchy — with a priestly caste ruling, in effect, by fiat.
Mr. Kramer goes even further. He believes that “the people themselves” should be principal enforcers of the Constitution, as they long enforced the British Constitution through such devices as jury nullification and mobbing — i.e., disturbing the peace. But the American Constitution differs from that of George III. In the U.S., the people themselves can reconstitute all branches of the government — by voting for certain candidates instead of others, of course, and by thus affecting political appointments. Electoral accountability is the essence of popular constitutional control. Thus Americans have not typically resorted to mob violence. The contrast with the British Constitution is striking.
But Professor McGinnis is not completely sold on Professor Kramer’s theory that varied interpretations of the Constitution protect our society against the tyranny of the majority:
The American Constitution also differs from the (unwritten) British one in its source of authority. In 1789 the Framers drafted a specific text that the people themselves ratified in every state. It is this consensus that gives the Constitution its power and justifies the disregard of even democratically made laws that conflict with it. But the meaning of that consensus can be discovered only by referring to the words themselves and to their historical context — not by relying on the “political-legal” interpretation that Mr. Kramer suggests. Constitutional interpretation based on politics places the people’s own considered judgments at the mercy of rash and temporary majorities. Only a document fixed by law — and subject to strict rules of amendment — can protect, in the words of Justice David Brewer, “Peter Sober from Peter Drunk.”
Read the whole piece. Good stuff.
El Paso announces restatement of earnings from 1999-2003
Houston-based El Paso Corp. announced today that an internal review of its accounting has prompted the company to restate quarterly earnings from 1999 to 2003. El Paso noted in its announcement that stockholders’ equity would be reduced by the move, but that “cash flow” would not be affected. As if this latter assurance is going to make creditors any more willing to provide credit to El Paso!
It has not been a good year for El Paso, which has been the subject of an overstatement of reserves scandal and multiple resulting investigations. Here are the previous posts on El Paso’s troubles.
The restatement will result in increases and decreases in El Paso’s quarterly earnings at its merchant energy and production units, and that earnings at the parent company level will also be restated. El Paso also noted that it had received waivers under its $3 billion revolving-credit facility giving it a Sept. 30 deadline to file its 2003 10-K, which the company believes it will be able to meet. An El Paso spokesperson contended that the restatements would not cause the company to default on any debt covenants.
The bankruptcy watch for El Paso continues, and there is nothing in this latest announcement that indicates that such a result is any less likely.