The real A-Rod tragedy

a-rod As predicted here last year, the names of the MLB players who tested positive for steroids or other performance-enhancing drug use in MLB’s 2003 survey test of 240 players are finally being leaked to the media (previous posts on PED use in sports are here).

That survey test was done under a deal between MLB and the MLB Players’ Association for the purpose of encouraging voluntary and confidential disclosure of PED use by players so that MLB and the Players’ Association could develop a productive program for helping the players get off the juice and monitor future use.

With the leaking of A-Rod’s name and the ensuing public outcry, so much for the notion of encouraging players to get help by assuring confidentiality.

Predictably, the mainstream media and much of the public are castigating Rodriguez, who is an easy target.

Of course, much of that same mainstream media and public contribute to the pathologically competitive MLB culture by regularly reveling in players who risk career-threatening disability by taking painkilling drugs so that they can play through injuries.

But players who used PED’s in in an effort to strengthen their bodies to avoid or minimize the inevitable injuries of the physically-brutal MLB season are pariahs. Go figure.

Meanwhile, the fact that MLB players have been using PED’s for at least the past two generations to enhance their performance is not even mentioned in the mind-numbingly superficial analysis of the PED issue that is being trotted out by most media outlets. Sure, Barry Bonds hit quite a few home runs during a time in which he was apparently using PED’s. But should Pete Rose be denied the record for breaking Ty Cobb’s total base hits standard simply because he used performance-enhancing amphetamines throughout his MLB career?

As noted here last year in connection with release of the Mitchell Commission report, witch hunts, investigations, criminal indictments, morality plays and public shaming episodes are not advancing a dispassionate debate regarding the complex issues that are at the heart of the use of PED’s in baseball and other sports. On a very basic level, it is not even clear that the controlled use of PED’s to enhance athletic performance is as dangerous to health as many of the sports in which the users compete.

A truly civilized society would find a better way to address these issues.

The potential consequences of being tricky

Fuld It’s rarely pleasant for a businessman to have his personal affairs splashed across the front page of the New York Times business section.

But it has to be particularly unsettling for the businessman when he is already the target of numerous civil lawsuits and, quite possibly, a criminal prosecution.

Frankly, I’ve never understood the reasoning of lawyers who advise their clients at the center of such a litigation firestorm to transfer assets to their family members. Fuld and his wife are reportedly quite wealthy, so maybe they have legitimate estate planning reasons for Fuld to transfer his interest in a multi-million dollar home to his wife for nominal consideration.

But Fuld is also subject to numerous civil lawsuits in connection with the Lehman Brothers meltdown. Those lawsuits seek hundreds of millions in damages, and the company’s officers and directors’ insurance likely will not come close to covering those damages. Thus, the fact that Fuld is transferring a valuable interest in an asset to his wife for nominal consideration at this particular time will be of more than passing interest to the plaintiffs in those lawsuits.

Inasmuch as Fuld is the only person in his family who has any civil liability in those lawsuits, why subject other family members to possible fraudulent transfer liability?

Similarly, in the unlikely — but certainly possible — event that Fuld’s litigation problems force him into a personal bankruptcy case, why take the risk that his legal right to a discharge of personal liability for claims against him would be denied because of the transfer to his wife?

However, beyond the civil liability concerns, the main reason that Fuld should not have engaged in this type of transfer under his particular circumstances is simply that it looks bad. Real bad. Not only to potential creditors, but more importantly, to prosecutors who will make the decision on whether to indict Fuld. And, most importantly, to jurors who will decide Fuld’s fate.

For example, remember the criminal case against former Enron chairman, Ken Lay? The prosecutors conceded (bragged?) afterward that it was a very weak case. So, rather than focus on the supposed criminal conduct, the prosecutors hammered away on Lay’s indiscrete use of his personal line of credit with the company. As noted in my concluding post on the seventeen-week trial:

[I]f there was a defining moment in the trial that sealed the defendants’ fate, then it likely came in Week Fourteen during Task Force prosecutor John Hueston’s cross-examination of Lay over the use of his company line of credit.

Although Lay’s line of credit was legal and the company disclosed his use of it in accordance with applicable law, Lay’s repayment of the large draws on the line with Enron stock at a time when he was encouraging employees and the market to buy company stock was an apparent contradiction that the jurors could easily grasp.

Similarly, Lay’s decision to draw down $1 million on the line five days before Enron’s bankruptcy [to help pay off the mortgage on Lay’s condominium] was a disastrous decision for the defense. Although done on advice of counsel, Lay’s last-minute draw as the company was sinking into insolvency looked so bad that reference to that testimony by leaders of the jury during deliberations was probably enough to seal any wavering non-leader juror’s view on whether to convict.

If Fuld is indicted, then you can rest assured that prosecutors will bring his recent transfer to his wife to the attention of the judge during proceedings over the amount of his bond pending trial. And although the transfer has nothing to do with the probable criminal charges against Fuld (i.e., violating the obligation to throw in the towel), prosecutors will try to use it anyway to make him look tricky in the eyes of jurors.

You see, such a transfer plays right into the real presumption these days in business crime prosecutions — Fuld is wealthy and his company collapsed, so he must be guilty of some crime in connection with his company’s demise.

Sadly, being proven greedy is often enough to be convicted of a crime.

 

Skilling fires back

Jeff Skilling As noted earlier here, the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals panel decision in former Enron CEO Jeff Skilling’s appeal of his criminal conviction was unusual in several respects.

For example, even though the three-judge panel reversed Skilling’s sentence and remanded that part of the case to the U.S. District Judge Sim Lake for re-sentencing, the part of the panel’s decision affirming the conviction was oddly superficial in a number of key respects.

In particular, the panel’s decision failed to reconcile its reasoning in upholding Skilling’s conviction for honest services wire-fraud under 18 U.S.C. § 1346 with the Fifth Circuit’s earlier decisions on the same issue in the Nigerian Barge and Kevin Howard cases.

Similarly, despite finding that Judge Lake had improperly failed to grant Skilling a presumption of community prejudice for purposes of establishing the correct venue and in selecting jurors, the panel turned around and affirmed the conviction anyway by reasoning that Skilling had waived his juror argument by failing to object to the seated jurors (except one) and by finding that Judge Lake had overcome the presumption of prejudice against Skilling by conducting an "exemplary" voir dire.

Now it’s time for Skilling’s team to fire back at the Fifth Circuit panel’s decision.

Yesterday, Skilling’s lawyers zeroed in on the unusual aspects of the panel’s decision by filing this Petition for Panel Rehearing and this Petition for Rehearing En Banc in front of the entire Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals (Kristen Hays’ Chronicle article is here). As with the panel’s earlier decision, the copies of Skillings’ petitions provided in this post are bookmarked, key arguments are highlighted, and a few of my comments are included.

The Petition for Rehearing En Banc is the meatier of the two pleadings in analyzing the alleged defects in the panel’s decision.

First, Skilling hammers the panel’s creation of a "following orders" exception to rationalize affirming Skilling’s conviction on the honest services wire-fraud charge even though that decision is inconsistent with the Fifth Circuit’s previous decisions in the Nigerian Barge and Kevin Howard cases and other appellate decisions on the same issue. In short, Skilling argues that the only discernable “rule” that can be gleaned from the Fifth Circuit’s conflicting decisions on the issue is that an employee cannot be convicted for honest services wire fraud if the conduct charged was in furtherance of the corporate interest (Nigerian Barge decision) unless the employee is a senior executive (Skilling decision) except in certain unspecified circumstances (Howard decision).

Skilling rightly asks: How could "any employee .  .  . know under existing circuit precedent what conduct will subject him to prosecution for honest-services fraud?"

Heck, maybe we all ought to be signing up for this.

Moreover, Skilling argues that the panel simply misread the trial record in finding that Skilling had "failed to challenge for cause all but one of the jurors." The panel used that key finding to conclude that Skilling had "waived most of his argument" regarding improper venue and juror bias.

This is important because of the panel’s finding that the District Court committed error in failing to find presumed community prejudice against Skilling. In effect, the panel’s waiver analysis relieved the Enron Task Force of its burden to show that each juror was impartial. Instead, the panel required Skilling to show that each juror was biased, which confuses an actual prejudice case (in which Skilling would bear the burden of proving bias) with a presumed prejudice case, where the prosecution is required to fulfill the tough burden of proving that each juror is impartial.

Inasmuch as Skilling’s appellate petitions specify in the trial record where he challenged the entire jury and objected specifically to at least seven seated jurors, Skilling’s request for rehearing on this ground appears to be solid. Frankly, if it is not clear error for the District Court to have denied Skilling’s motion to change the venue of his trial because of the unprecedented community bias against him, then there is simply no longer a legal basis to change the venue of a trial on that basis within the Fifth Circuit.

Finally, Skilling argues that the panel was wrong to affirm the District Court’s (i) jury charge on the definition of “materiality” for purposes of securities fraud, and (ii) its refusal to dismiss “puffing” statements that are normally dismissed as immaterial in civil securities fraud cases.

It is well-settled in securities law generally that reasonable investors rely on facts in assessing the value of a company’s stock and not mere expressions of optimism from company spokespeople. Consequently, Skilling argues that the panel was wrong to affirm the District Court’s decision that Skilling’s misstatements had to be submitted to the jury even though they were indistinguishable from misstatements that the Fifth Circuit has routinely ruled could not sustain a securities fraud claim. In fact, Skilling relies on a Fifth Circuit decision in a recent Enron-related civil case as support for his argument.

So, where does all this leave Skilling?

Well, on one hand, it’s never easy winning a case on appeal in the best of circumstances, and it’s hard to imagine a worse political climate than the present one for a formerly wealthy businessman to be pursuing sympathy from an appellate court in regard to the way in which he was prosecuted for alleged business crimes.

On the other hand, the prosecution of Skilling stinks to high-Heaven. Moreover, there are a number of Fifth Circuit judges with first-rate business law experience who could very well be uncomfortable with the way in which the Department of Justice is attempting to convict businesspeople such as Skilling by placing the square peg of the honest services wire-fraud charge in the round hole of a non-kickback, non-bribery business crime case.

My bet is that Skilling has a better than normal chance of the full Fifth Circuit taking a good, hard look at his appeal.
Stay tuned.

An entertaining upcoming week in Houston

ribstein No one in Houston this week can complain about lack of opportunity for intellectual stimulation.

First, well-known legal blogger and Clear Thinkers favorite Larry Ribstein will be lecturing on Thursday afternoon from noon to 2 p.m. at the University of Houston Law Center as the first speaker of the semester in UH Law Professor Lonny Hoffman‘s “Colloquium” course that brings noted legal scholars from around the country to UH each year to give presentations on the scholar’s work in progress.

Great teachers are a popular topic on this blog (see here and here), so I’m particularly pleased that Professor Ribstein is taking the time out of his busy schedule to visit Houston. As regular HCT readers know, Professor Ribstein is one of the premier business law scholars in the country.

The holder of the Mildred Van Voorhis Jones Chair at the University of Illinois College of Law, Professor Ribstein’s widely-read Ideoblog has been at the forefront of the blawgosphere’s enormous impact on legal analysis and education, literally pushing legal scholarship from what had been mostly closed conversations between fellow academics into a hugely valuable resource that is now readily available to anyone over the Web. Already the leading expert in the U.S. in the area of unincorporated business associations, Professor Ribstein is also one of the blawgosphere’s most insightful thinkers on corporate governance issues and the effects of regulation on markets and business. His blog has contributed as much to the understanding and appreciation of business law issues over the past five years as any resource of which I am aware.

Professor Ribstein’s talk on Thursday will be on this paper that he co-authored with George Mason University law professor Bruce Kobiyashi that examines the empirical factors that influence limited liability companies’ choice of where to organize. Seating for the talk is limited, so contact Professor Hoffman at Lhoffman@central.uh.edu or 713.743.5206 as soon as possible to reserve a seat. The lecture will be held in the Heritage Room of the UH Law Center.

Meanwhile, on Wednesday from 11:30-1:30 p.m., popular author and journalist Malcolm Gladwell will be giving a talk on his new book, Outliers, at the Hilton-Americas Houston hotel (Chron article here). Tickets are $75 and include a copy of the book and the luncheon, which is co-sponsored by Inprint, the Greater Houston Partnership and Brazos Bookstore. Contact Jill Reese at 713.844.3682 or jreese@houston.org to make reservations, the deadline for which is noon on Tuesday.

Finally, author and former Houstonian Larry McMurtry — the pre-eminent Texas writer of the past 30 years — will be giving the lecture on Wednesday evening from 7-8:00 p.m. in Rice University’s Distinguished Lecture series. The lecture will be held in the Grand Hall of Rice’s Ley Student Center and is open to the public.

The Criminalization-of-Business Lottery

The owners of Long Term Capital Management may have been the earliest winners in the most recent era of what Larry Ribstein has coined the criminalization-of-business lottery.

On the other hand, Jamie Olis may have been the biggest loser.

Martha Stewart lost, but at least never lost her business enterprise. Frank Quattrone also lost, but then he won, although I suspect that he believes that he lost overall.

Subsequently, Theodore Sihpol won while Bill Fuhs and his family lost a year of his life before he won, too. But he and his family will never get that year back.

Then, Ken Lay lost big even though he had a reasonable basis for believing that he should have won. Same with Jeff Skilling.

Meanwhile, mainstream media darlings Steve Jobs and Warren Buffett won, although several of Buffett’s associates did not fare as well. Neither did relative media unknown Greg Reyes.

But General Motors CEO Rick Wagoner appears to be a winner, even though those two Bear Stearns executives probably aren’t.

And who knows about those Lehman Brothers executives — they may be winners, after all? I mean, everyone was doing it, right?

Finally, for awhile, it looked as if David Stockman was going to be a big loser. But in a startling turnaround, Stockman is now a winner.

Just as with a gambling lottery, there is no rhyme or reason as to who wins or loses in the criminalization-of-business lottery.

But in this lottery — which does little or nothing to deter the true business criminals of the world — the losers and their families give up much more than merely money.

A truly civil society would find a better way.

Can Judge Kent receive a fair trial in Houston?

Judge Kent By now, most folks have heard that the government has filed a superceding indictment against U.S. District Judge Sam Kent alleging sexual abuse against a second federal employee and also obstruction of justice in connection with the Fifth Circuit’s previous investigation into the allegations. The previous posts on Judge Kent’s case are here.

As this Mary Flood/Chronicle article notes, Judge Kent faces an enormously difficult fight for his life in the upcoming trial. Given the latest allegations, my sense is that his chances are remote of finding a Houston jury that is not tainted by the lurid local news reports on the case.

As of this date, Judge Kent’s formidable defense attorney — Dick DeGuerin — has still not requested a change of venue. Should he now?

Although Racehorse Haynes is still trying cases well into his 70’s, DeGuerin is now widely regarded as having accepted the baton from Haynes as being the dean of Houston’s outstanding criminal defense bar. Given the difficulty of the case against Judge Kent, could this case be DeGuerin’s equivalent of Hayes’ career-defining T. Cullen Davis case?

Stay tuned.

Another Angry Mob

mob_ The Fifth Circuit’s decision yesterday reminded us of the angry mob that lynched Jeff Skilling.

Now, as this timely Roger Parloff/Fortune article notes, an even larger mob is gathering to lynch the businesspeople who were attempting to save their companies in the wake of last year’s financial meltdown on Wall Street:

The level of fury surrounding these inquiries is of a different order from what we saw with, say, the backdating scandals or the Enron and WorldCom failures. Today’s credit collapse has already vaporized about $9 trillion in investment capital, while ripping another trillion in assorted bailout money from the pockets of enraged taxpayers – also sometimes known as "jurors."

Based on the Fifth Circuit’s Skilling decision, those targeted businesspeople would be wise not to rely on the courts for protection from the mob.

Those pesky unexpected consequences

AA017907 On the heels of this post from a couple of days ago that addressed Tyler Cowen’s recent NY Times op-ed that speculated that expectations generated from the 1998 government bailout of Long Term Capital Management hedge fund were not such a good thing, this W$J article on the Lehman Brothers bankruptcy case bemoans the enormous cost attributable to lack of reorganization planning in connection with the Lehman Brothers case:

As much as $75 billion of Lehman Brothers Holdings Inc. value was destroyed by the unplanned and chaotic form of the firm’s bankruptcy filing in September, according to an internal analysis by the company’s restructuring advisers.

A less-hurried Chapter 11 bankruptcy filing likely would have preserved tens of billions of dollars of value, according to a three-month study by the advisory firm, Alvarez & Marsal. An orderly filing would have enabled Lehman to sell some assets outside of federal bankruptcy-court protection, and would have given it time to try to unwind its derivatives portfolio in a way that might have preserved value, the study says. [.  .  .]

"While I have no position on whether or not the federal government should have provided further assistance to Lehman, once the decision was made not to provide further assistance, an orderly wind-down plan should have been pursued. It was an unconscionable waste of value," said Bryan Marsal, co-chief executive of the advisory firm who now serves as Lehman’s chief restructuring officer.

Mr. Marsal estimates that the total value destruction at Lehman will reach between $50 billion and $75 billion, once losses from derivatives trades and asset impairment are combined.

Losses are a natural part of the risk allocation that occurs in big reorganization cases. But anyone who has been involved in such cases knows that it takes at least a couple of months to prepare a big reorganization case properly.

Friends who are closely involved in the Lehman Brothers case have confided to me that Lehman CEO Richard Fuld never in his wildest imagination thought, after the precedent of Bear Stearns, that the Fed and the U.S. Treasury would fail to bail out Lehman Brothers. When that proved wrong, Lehman Brothers had to file its chapter 11 case on a relatively unplanned, emergency basis. That miscalculation cost creditors even more than they would have lost had Lehman’s management taken the normal step of planning the case when they saw the writing on the wall. I’ve got my doubts that the additional losses are $50-75 billion as suggested by the consultant’s report (could the Lehman-related parties be using that report as a liability shield?), but there is little question that an emergency bankruptcy filing generally costs creditors more than a properly planned one.

As John Carney notes, maybe the conventional wisdom is wrong that the Fed made matters worse by failing to bailout Lehman Brothers.

It’s hard enough to evaluate the risk of insolvency in regard to a trust-based business under normal circumstances. It becomes a real crapshoot when there exists an expectation that the federal government will provide stop-gap financing for a big trust-based company’s losses. And crapshoots generate some pretty bad risk-taking.

It really isn’t rocket science.

Lessons of LTCM

Marginal Revolution’s Tyler Cowen makes a similar point in this NY Times op-ed about the 1998 federal bailout of the Long-Term Capital Management hedge fund that this earlier post made about Enron and the current Treasury bailout:

At the time, it may have seemed that regulators did the right thing [in bailing out LTM]. The bailout did not require upfront money from the government, and the world avoided an even bigger financial crisis.

Today, however, that ad hoc intervention by the government no longer looks so wise.

With the Long-Term Capital bailout as a precedent, creditors came to believe that their loans to unsound financial institutions would be made good by the Fed — as long as the collapse of those institutions would threaten the global credit system. Bolstered by this sense of security, bad loans mushroomed. [ .  .  .]

The major creditors of the fund included Bear Stearns, Merrill Lynch and Lehman Brothers, all of which went on to lend and invest recklessly and, to one degree or another, pay the consequences. But 1998 should have been the time to send a credible warning that bad loans to over-leveraged institutions would mean losses, and that neither the Fed nor the Treasury would make these losses good.

Absent allocation of risk consequences to the parties who entered into transactions with financially-troubled companies, markets have a difficult time accurately pricing risk in regard to future investment and transactions. Such indecision plays a big part in delaying recovery in financial markets.

Similarly, without cleaning up the balance sheets of troubled companies (and putting the hopelessly insolvent ones out of their misery), extending additional credit to financially-strapped companies only makes them an even poorer risk for investment. That doesn’t facilitate recovery in the financial markets, either.

Amidst many blunders, the Bush Administration’s failure to tap corporate reorganization experts in connection with its policy-making regarding the financial crisis was one of the worst. Hopefully, Obama’s advisors note the mistake and correct it in the next Administration.

Update: Barry Ritholtz agrees with Tyler and me.

Any connection?

business_lawyers As Bill Henderson notes, many big law firms are going to have trouble surviving in these turbulent financial markets.

Financial markets aside, though, I wonder whether this type of news is an even larger part of big law’s problem?