As I’ve noted many times, the Chronicle’s coverage of the Stros is pretty pathetic overall. But markets are wonderful things, so the blogosphere has quickly developed into a far superior source of analysis about the Stros than the mainstream media. Although several blogs provide good information about the Stros (see the link list on the right), I have particularly enjoyed reading Lisa Gray’s analysis of the Stros over at The Astros Dugout, where Lisa blogs a post on every Stros game. Her insight is excellent and she writes in an engaging and clever manner.
Lisa is now branching out a bit and she recently posted this Hardball Times article on the state of the Stros. Despite the fact that I disagree with her on a few things (I think she is a bit harsh on Drayton McLane, who is the best owner that the Stros have ever had), Lisa’s article is the best I’ve seen on the mistakes that have been made in the Stros organization since the club’s 2005 World Series appearance. Check it out.
Bill James coined the “Law of Competitive Balance” to explain the trend that teams that win tend to slack off in the following year because team management doesn’t work as hard, don’t take risks to make the team better and think defensively. For example, Stros management reacted to the playoff appearances in 2004-05 by rationalizing that “if we won with Ausmus and Everett in those seasons, then why can’t we do it again this year.” Such complacency almost always is reflected in a poorer won-loss record, and the Stros gradual decline over the latter stages of the Biggio-Bagwell era is powerful evidence of the truth of the Law of Competitive Balance.

I am not as sure as most that Drayton McLane made the right move in firing General Manager Tim Purpura the other day. However, there is no doubt that Baseball Prospectus’ Joe Sheehan thinks that McLane screwed the pooch in canning Purpura. In this article ($) entitled “Tim Purpura Gets Screwed,” Sheehan lays into McLane’s management of the Stros:

Firing Purpura, as McLane did yesterday, is an act of incompetence. Not only was it Purpuraís workóhe ran the Astrosí player-development operations for seven years prior to becoming GMóthat built the pennant winner, but with the expensive problems he inherited and the meddling of McLane, it was impossible for him to move the Astros in the direction they needed to go. He was essentially a caretaker, needing to preside over a rebuilding process and never being allowed to do so, and heís now out of a job largely because his employer has returned to being completely irrational about what his team is.
Purpuraís performance as a GM was a mixed bag. He made his share of missteps, such as the [Jason Jennings] trade and the Woody Williams contract. However, he showed a terrific ability for making the smaller moves that add value at very little cost. In three seasons, Purpura made something-for-nothing pickups such as Mike Lamb, Aubrey Huff, and Mark Loretta. The player-development program he built continues to generate contributors such as Luke Scott, Wandy Rodriguez (check out his peripherals this year), Chad Qualls, and Troy Patton. If left to his own devices, I have no doubt that Purpura would have limited the Astrosí rebuilding process to a few short seasons, and come out on the other side with a team prepared for a long run of success.
Instead, heís out of a job. Tim Purpura isnít to blame for the Astrosí disappointing 2007 season, and that heís being fired for it is ridiculous. Drayton McLane set these events in motion by abandoning what had worked for close to a decadeóstaying out of the baseball staffís wayóand instead making his own bad decisions about what the Astros needed. McLane wanted a year-long coronation of Craig Biggio, and he got it. He couldnít have that and a contending baseball team, however, and his refusal to see thatóand his subsequent dismissal of Purpura and Phil Garner as scapegoats for his own mistakesóranks as one of the gameís great embarrassments of 2007.
Tim Purpura was one of the gameís top GM candidates when he landed the Astrosí job, and standing on the unemployment line today, he regains that description. If heís out of work for longer than a couple of days, the industry is making a terrible mistake. Purpura is a better GM than a dozen guys who hold that title at the moment, and I sincerely hope he gets an opportunity to do the job correctly, an opportunity that was denied him in Houston.

Here’s a counter-perspective.

Stros owner Drayton McLane finally pulled the plug and fired General Manager Tim Purpura and Manager Phil Garner on Monday as the Stros continue their spiral downward into last place in the National League Central. Although the timing of the firings was somewhat surprising, the fact that McLane let Purpura and Garner go was not.
The decision to fire Garner was actually the easier decision. As noted several times earlier, Garner is not a particularly good manager, although he is far from the worst that the Stros have had (for example, Jimy Williams). Inasmuch as a new general manager will likely want to hire his own manager and Garner is nothing special in that role, letting him go at the same time as firing the GM is a logical move.
Curiously, the tougher decision was on whether to let Purpura go. Although the Stros are enduring their worst season since 2000, this is only the second season over the past 16 in which the club will finish with a losing record. In fact, Purpura has been a key part of a management team for the past 14 years that helped construct the most successful era in the club’s history. He was a part of the player development division of Stros management that produced such star players as Lance Berkman, Richard Hidalgo, Carlos Guillen and Freddy Garcia, and developed a starting pitching staff early this decade that looked at the time as the best young staff in MLB (Roy Oswalt, Carlos Hernandez, Wade Miller and Tim Redding). It certainly wasn’t Purpura’s fault that that potentially fine staff was undermined by injury (Hernandez and Miller) and stunted progress (Redding).
Moreover, Purpura’s GM tenure certainly started out with a bang. In his first season after replacing Gerry Hunsicker, the Stros improbably won their first National League pennant and went to their first World Series. But that World Series season masked a gradual decline in the Stros’ performance level that had been taking place since 2001, and the results of that decline started to appear the following season — the Stros had to finish fast just to eke out a winning record (82-80). Similarly, the 2007 club has deteriorated further as it has struggled all season behind one of the worst performances by a pitching staff in Stros history.
Thus, to a certain extent, Purpura is bearing the fallout from a trend that began long before he replaced Hunsicker as GM. Along those same lines, Purpura probably had nothing to do with the club’s decision to indulge Craig Biggio’s quest for 3,000 hits, an indulgence that has negatively affected the development of younger players such as Chris Burke and Jason Lane (see here and here).
But that’s not to suggest McLane didn’t have any reasons to cut Purpura loose. It appears that Purpura bungled the due diligence on the Jason Jennings trade, and the Woody Williams deal has turned out badly. After giving up the club’s top two picks in this season’s draft in the Williams and Carlos Lee deals, Purpura failed to sign the Stros two top choices (third and fourth round draft choices), further depleting a farm system that has been in decline since 1997. Finally, with this season’s club going nowhere, Purpura was unable to swing a meaningful trade before this season’s trading deadline, which further cemented the perception locally that he was in over his head in the GM’s post.
Despite all this, Purpura leaves the Stros in decent, if not pristine, shape. Yes, the farm system is a mess as far as position players go, but there still are a decent number of pitching prospects who have the potential to contribute to the major league club. Moreover, Purpura locked up stars Oswalt, Berkman and Lee to long-term contracts that, with the possible exception of Lee’s, are well-under current market conditions. Purpura also resisted the temptation to dedicate enormous resources to re-sign fading superstars Andy Pettitte and Roger Clemens, so the club’s payroll is positioned for a new GM to bid for a couple of free agent pitchers this winter to shore up the pitching staff. The free agent pitchers available after this season are not particularly talented, but at least Purpura leaves the Stros with the financial flexibility to get involved in the market if they so choose.
So, who will McLane hire as the new GM? I don’t have a clue, but my sense is that it will be someone with a strong background in player evaluation and development. McLane realizes by now that the Stros’ current decline is the inevitable result of poor draft choices during the period from 1997-2002. Moreover, the lack of class “A” prospects in the current farm system does not bode well for the selections made in the 2003-2006 drafts, although it is still a big early to evaluate those drafts completely. The Stros franchise has increased in value considerably during the Biggio-Bagwell era and its GM job is now among the more attractive in MLB, but the club is unlikely ever to be the type of franchise that will be able to compete year in and year out with the big-market clubs for free agent talent.
Thus, the lifeblood of the Stros is their farm system, and my bet is that McLane will hire a baseball executive who has the background and expertise to turnaround the erosion in player evaluation and development that has led to this year’s bad season. With a nucleus of Berkman, Oswalt, Lee and Pence, the good news is that it’s not going to take a major overhaul to make the Stros competitive again for the National League Central title.

As the Stros (54-67) close in on the three-quarters pole of the season, I can’t decide whether it’s more of a reflection of the sad state of baseball analysis in local mainstream media outlets, or simply the remarkably mediocre nature of the other National League Central Division teams, that some media pundits believe that the Stros are still in the race for a playoff spot after posting a 10-10 record over their sixth 20 game segment of the season (prior periodic reports are here).
The reality is that the Stros’ playoff goose was cooked for this season long ago when club management decided to indulge Craig Biggio’s (-11 RCAA) quest for 3,000 hits and to continue playing as regulars such unproductive players as Brad Ausmus (-14 RCAA), Adam Everett (-12 RCAA) and recently Mark Loretta (-7 RCAA). Although it’s fun to try and make it more complicated than it is, baseball is a simple game in which successful teams have hitters who create more runs than opposing hitters and pitchers who save more runs than the opposition’s pitchers. Thus, by adding a club’s runs created against average (“RCAA“) and runs saved against average (“RSAA“), you can quite quickly determine which team is most likely to prevail in a pennant race.
Taking the NL Central as an example, the top four teams all have major deficiencies. The Brewers (62-59) hit well (61 RCAA), but their pitching has fallen off badly (-31 RSAA), so their net 30 RCAA/RSAA score has allowed the other teams in the division to stay close despite playing even worse than the Brew Crew (a precisely average National League team would have an RCAA/RSAA score of 0). The Cubs (61-59) cannot hit a lick (-39 RCAA), but have one of the better pitching staffs in the National League (64 RSAA) for a 25 RCAA/RSAA. The third place Cardinals (58-60) and the fourth place Stros (54-67) are almost precisely the same, average hitting teams (Stros: -3 RCAA; Cards: 5 RCAA) and simply dreadful pitching overall (Stros: -73 RSAA; Cards -76 RSAA) for RCAA/RSAA scores of -76 and -71. That the Cards have won a few more games than the Stros is attributable mainly to luck and the generally poor game management skills of Stros skipper, Phil Garner.
So, what does this all mean? At this point, the Brewers and the Cubs continue to be the favorites to win the NL Central, with the Cubs having the edge because of their superior pitching. Unless the Cardinals’ pitching improves dramatically, their hot streak of late will probably cool off quickly, while the Stros have shown no dramatic improvement in either hitting or pitching performance that would indicate that they are capable of vaulting into contention for the NL Central lead. If Soriano can come back off his injury and nudge the Cubs hitting back toward NL average and the Cubs’ pitching remains strong, my sense is that they will win the playoff spot from the NL Central. If the Cubs don’t win it, the Brewers blend of hard hitting and below-average pitching almost certainly will.
Alas, what the foregoing analysis shows with regard to the Stros is that they have become a far below-average National League club overall. With a minor league system almost devoid of position player prospects at the upper levels, and for a club that is not doing a particularly good job of drafting and signing minor league prospects, the Stros are going to have to look to the free agent market to attempt to salvage another few title runs out of the Berkman-Oswalt-Carlos Lee era. And attempting to rebuild through free agent acquisitions is an expensive and highly risky proposition.
Will Drayton McLane let General Manager Tim Purpura open the pocketbook over this coming offseason and buy the free agent pitching talent that the Stros need to compete for a playoff spot next season? No one but McLane knows the answer to that question. Thankfully, the Stros are no longer burdened with huge financial obligations to Bagwell, Clemens and Pettitte, so McLane is in a financial position to make some moves. But whether he has the confidence to do so is another question entirely. And if he does not, the Stros are going to waste another season or more of Berkman, Oswalt and Lee’s most productive years without having any meaningful shot at playing in the post-season.
As an aside, in the “do you have confidence in Purpura’s transactions” category, former Stros 3B Morgan Ensberg (3 RCAA/.314 OBA/.636 SLG/.951 OPS) and new Stros 3B Ty Wigginton (3 RCAA/.407 OBA/.489 SLG/.896 OPS) have produced at almost precisely the same level since the Stros made the trade for Wigginton and cut Ensberg loose to the Padres? What was the reason for that trade again?
After a weekend in San Diego (64-55), the Stros return home for a ten game homestand against the Nationals (55-66), the Pirates (50-69) and the Cardinals (58-60). With school beginning next week and the football season beginning shortly thereafter, Stros management is about ready to see the smallest crowds of the season as the Stros play out the string. There are simply not enough retirement ceremonies on the horizon to maintain the public’s interest in this edition of the Stros.
The season statistics for the Stros to date are below, courtesy of Lee Sinins‘ sabermetric Complete Baseball Encyclopedia. The abbreviations for the hitting stats are defined here and the same for the pitching stats are here. The Stros active roster is here with links to each individual player’s statistics:

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Drayton McLane may have allowed the Stros franchise to decline steadily on the field over the past couple of seasons, but he rarely misses an opportunity to make a buck with his baseball franchise. That’s why I’m a bit surprised that he has not picked up on this idea. Looks like a natural, particularly given the proximity of the Corpus Christi and Round Rock minor league clubs.

As noted here earlier this week, Art DeVany has written extensively on the specious basis of the conventional wisdom that Barry Bonds’ steroid use allowed him to break the Major League Baseball home run records. DeVany responds again here:

[The conventional wisdom that Bonds’ steroid use allowed him to break the MLB home run records] does not fit into any standard model or argument that has been offered as an explanation for his “departure” from the norm. There is no norm, which [the conventional wisdom] and most others advances.
Genius does not follow a process that can be normed. My argument is simple and is in the paper. Basically, most people are using an implicit normal distribution model of HRs and they claim that his performance cannot come from the model. Hence, he must have taken something. This is wrong. His performance is within the natural variation of HR hitting, but the model is not a normal distribution. Why should it be? A normal distribution applies when most people are close to the average. This has nothing to do with HRs. If you role snake eyes three times in a row, do you think there has to be an explanation? No, it is in the variation. Just chance. The dice are not on steroids.
What is worse is that people who claim “he did it and it worked” don’t know much about the physiology of steroids. They weaken connective tissue and interfere with concentration when they are taken in large doses. They primarily increase protein synthesis is ST muscle fibers, which are no good for hitting HRs. Lastly, most people who formulate the argument do not have a falsifiable hypothesis, and this is not science. They take his performance, which no one else has ever done, and claim that you cannot prove that it was not due to steroids. “He took steroids and therefore hit 73 HRs” cannot be falsified. Because the conclusion is true, the statement is vacuous. It is true no matter what the premise.

Read the entire post.
Update: Professor DeVany compares Bonds and Hank Aaron’s home run-hitting prowess to that of an average MLB player here, and provides additional comments regarding Bonds here. Professor DeVany’s paper on home-run hitting is here (pdf).

Barry Bonds finally broke Hank Aaron’s all-time home run record last night, dooming all of us to several days of inane and simplistic arguments on talk radio shows as to whether Bonds’ record should include an asterisk because of his use of steroids during the latter stages of his career.
For a more balanced view regarding Bonds and his steroid use, take a look at previous posts here, here, here, here, here and here over the past several years. In the end, Bonds is a product of his environment.
Update: Kuff agrees with me, and sabermetrician JC Bradbury provides a reasoned view on Bonds. Lee Sinins provides this statistical analysis (pdf) of Bonds’ career. And here is the video on no. 756:

Is shooting from the hip a Houston Chronicle requirement for covering the Stros?
As noted in earlier posts here, here, here, here, here and here, the Chronicle’s Stros beat writer — Jose de Jesus Ortiz — incongruously struggles with analyzing baseball. But on the heels of watching Stros sore-armed starting pitcher Jason Jennings get torched for 11 runs in 2/3rd’s of an inning on Sunday, Ortiz displays his utter ignorance of the history of the club he covers on a daily basis:

Seeing Jason Jennings give up 11 runs while only securing two outs on Sunday afternoon, opposing scouts surely had to tell their bosses not to give up top prospects for the veteran righthander.
Because the Astros made the Jennings trade out of desperation after pushing Andy Pettitte out of town and then failing to acquire Jon Garland, the Jennings trade seemed to be the best the Astros could do at the time.
As it turns out, they could hardly have done worse, especially considering that a little digging in Colorado would have uncovered that Jennings hadn’t thrown bullpen sessions between starts in the second half of the season because of a tender right elbow.
As Tim Purpura heads into Tuesday’s non-waiver trade deadline, let’s look back and see where this trade fits among the worst in franchise history?
What are the worst three trades in franchise history?
Here are my list in order of the worst:
ï Getting rid of Joe Morgan.
ï Getting rid of Billy Wagner for three prospects who didn’t produce.
ï Getting rid of Willy Taveras, Jason Hirsh and Taylor Buchholz for Jennings.

Had Ortiz merely bothered to run a Google Blog Search before publishing the foregoing, he would have discovered that two of the three trades that he lists are not even in the top seven of all-time bad Stros trades.
Then, on one hand, Ortiz contends that the Stros traded Billy Wagner for “three prospects who didn’t produce,” which is not really correct, either. The Phillies sent an established Major League pitcher who was not very good — Brandon Duckworth — along with pitching prospects Taylor Buchholz and Ezequiel Astacio to the Stros for Wagner.
However, undaunted, Ortiz then in the following sentence lists Buchholz — one of the prospects “who didn’t produce” from the Wagner trade — as one of the reasons why the Jennings trade is supposedly the third worst in Stros history.
Is this really the best that the Chronicle can do in covering the Stros?

So, the Stros trade Dan Wheeler, the club’s best relief pitcher over the past two seasons who is having a bad season this year, for Tampa Bay utilityman Ty Wigginton, who is the right-hand equivalent of the Stros’ Mike Lamb. The Stros then prepare to release 3B Morgan Ensberg, who has been mired in a slump for over year, but who has far better career hitting statistics (55 RCAA/.367 OBA/.475 SLG/.843 OPS) than either Wigginton (-11/.326/.448/.774) or Lamb (-15/.339/.428/.768) and is a far better third baseman defensively than either of them. By the way, even during his prolonged slump, Ensberg’s hitting (-8 RCAA) has been substantially more productive for the Stros than the hitting of other Stros’ starters Craig Biggio (-31 RCAA), Adam Everett (-32 RCAA) and Brad Ausmus (-53 RCAA) over the same period of time.
Thus, absent a further trade of either Lamb or Mark Loretta for a potentially productive prospect or two, this deal is akin to rearranging the deck chairs on the Titanic. Why is a team whose main problem is bad pitching trading one of its better pitchers for a below-average National League hitter? Wheeler, Wigginton, Lamb and Ensberg’s career statistics are below the hyperlinked break. The abbreviations for the hitting stats are defined here and the same for the pitching stats are here.
Update: Baseball Prospectus’ Joe Sheehan agrees with my analysis ($) on the Wheeler for Wigginton deal and the give-up on Ensberg:

You got me. Rumors persist that Ensberg will be traded before his DFA period ends, but even if he is, the return wonít be much. So for Wheeler and Ensberg, the Astros get a 29-year-old infielder who runs a below-average OBP with good power and so-so defense. Mildly impressive at second base, Wigginton is just a guy at third base, and this is the first season since 2004 in which heís outhitting Ensberg. At that, the difference this year is just 17 points of EqA. This looks more like a tantrum by the Astros than a baseball decision, their frustration with Ensbergís injury woes and power outage getting the better of them.

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At the quarter pole of this season, I observed the following:

Stros management, for all their declarations of trying to field a playoff contender, is really biding its time this season as Biggio trudges toward his 3,000th hit. There is simply no way that this club will be much better than a .500 ballclub with its current starting pitching staff and Biggio, Everett, Ausmus and the pitcher burdening the hitting lineup on most nights. The Stros should be honest and concede that the club is attempting to compete as well as possible while supporting Biggio’s climb toward 3,000 hits and dispense with the ruse that this club, as presently configured, has any meaningful shot at the playoffs.

Well, as the Stros (44-57) have now completed 62.5% of the season (prior periodic reviews are here), Stros management has apparently embraced my suggestion. Rather than promoting the club’s competitiveness, Stros management has decided to make the remainder of the season the Craig Biggio Good-Bye Tour, beginning with Bidg’s well-orchestrated retirement announcement and game-winning, grand slam homer earlier in the week. Ah, the memories!
Unfortunately, when Biggio is retired and gone after this season, Stros management will have to figure out what to do next. As I have been pointing out for several years now, the ballclub has been in decline since 2001, although extraordinary pitching staff performances in 2004 and 2005 masked the decline during those two playoff seasons. But this season, the decline of the club has hit the club’s traditional strength — that is, pitching — and the result is that the Stros may finish this season with the worst record in the National League.
Interestingly, this club’s 44-57 record through 62.5% of the season is about the same as the club’s record last season during the middle 60% of the season (42-55). Only good performances during the first and final 20% segments of the 2006 season allowed that club to finish two games over .500 (82-80). Now, in the first five eighth segments of this season, the Stros’ record has been been consistently mediocre or worse — 9-12, 11-9, 6-14, 8-12, and 10-10 in the most recent 20 game segment. So, the accelerating downward trend that started during the middle of last season has continued this season.
Although some folks continue to be confused about what ails the Stros, a dramatic and pervasive downturn in pitching remains the big problem. The Stros’ staff — which has been among the best in the National League over the past three seasons — has given up 55 more runs than an average National League pitching staff would have allowed in the same number of innings (RSAA, explained here). That places the Stros staff 15th among the 16 National League teams with only the Cardinals’ staff being worse, and only three Stros pitchers — Roy Oswalt (5 RSAA/3.80 ERA), Chad Qualls (1 RSAA/3.83 ERA) and Brad Lidge (10 RSAA/1.94 ERA) — have saved more runs this season than an average National League pitcher would have saved in the same number of innings.
Meanwhile, the Stros’ hitters continue to be about National League-average (5 runs created against average, explained here), which is right in the middle (8th) of the 16 National League teams. Although National League-average in hitting is far better than the past two Stros squads achieved, it is not close to being good enough to make up for the Stros’ abysmal pitching. As a result, the Stros’ combined RCAA/RSAA score of -50 so far this season reflects that they continue to be a far below-average National League team.
The season statistics for the Stros to date are below, courtesy of Lee Sinins‘ sabermetric Complete Baseball Encyclopedia. The abbreviations for the hitting stats are defined here and the same for the pitching stats are here. The Stros active roster is here with links to each individual player’s statistics:

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