The futility of regulating failure

failure-300x300 David Warren makes a remarkably lucid point about the dubious notion that governmental action is the proper remedy to any wrong:

Politicians try to pass laws against it; to create rules and regulations so complex and cumbersome that (as we saw in the BP disaster) an easily-corrupted "judgement call" bureaucracy must grant exemptions from them, in order for anything to function at all. When disaster strikes, they add more rules and regulations.

But more profoundly, the rules and regulations — once they pass a point of irreducible complexity — create a mindset in which those who should be thinking about safety are instead focused on rules and regulations. To those who see danger, the glib answer comes, citing all the safety standards that have been diligently observed.

From what we already know, this appears to be exactly what happened aboard Deepwater Horizon, and will not be rectified by the U.S. government’s latest, very political decision, to use means both fair and foul to prosecute British Petroleum, and punish the rest of the oil industry for its mistakes.

Let me mention in passing that President Barack Obama was in no way responsible for the catastrophe, and that there is nothing he can do about it. He is being held to blame for "inaction," as wrongly as his predecessor was held to blame over Hurricane Katrina, by media and public unable to cope with the proposition that, "Stuff happens."

In a sense, Obama is hoist on his own petard. The man who blames Bush for everything now finds there are some things presidents cannot do. More deeply, the opposition party that persuades the public government can solve all their problems, discovers once in power there are problems their government cannot solve.

Alas, it will take more time than they have to learn the next lesson: that governments which try to solve the insoluble, more or less invariably, make each problem worse.

I like to dwell on the wisdom of our ancestors. It took us millennia to emerge from the primitive notion that a malignant agency must lie behind every unfortunate experience. Indeed, the Catholic Church spent centuries fighting folk pagan beliefs in things like evil fairies, and the whole notion the Devil can compel any person to act against his will — only to watch an explosion of witch-hunting and related popular hysterias at the time of the Reformation.

In so many ways, the trend of post-Christian society today is back to pagan superstitions: to the belief that malice lies behind every misfortune, and to the related idea that various, essentially pagan charms can be used to ward off that to which all flesh is heir. The belief that, for instance, laws can be passed, that change the entire order of nature, is among the most irrational of these.

Sheer human stupidity is the cause of any number of human catastrophes — including the stupidity of superstition itself. We need to re-embrace this concept; to hug the native incompetence within ourselves, and begin forgiving it in others.

Amen.

So, what have you done for me lately?

Rayner Noble What on earth is University of Houston Athletic Director Mack Rhoades thinking?

With UH already being an afterthought in the ongoing negotiations over the reorganization of big-time college athletics, Rhoades this past Friday fired the best coach that UH has had over the past 20 years, baseball coach Rayner Noble.

Not exactly the way to inspire confidence in the alumni base, Mr. Rhoades.

Only in his late-40’s, Noble is already an institution at the University of Houston, where he has spent most of the past 30 years.

Noble initially came to UH in 1980 as an exceptional player from Houston’s Spring Woods High School, where he was the ace of a pitching staff than included Roger Clemens. He became the first freshman in Southwest Conference history to start as a pitcher and in centerfield. In 1983, he won 12 games and posted a 1.32 ERA while becoming the first UH pitcher to be named a consensus All-American and the first UH player to win Southwest Conference Player of the Year honors.

Noble was drafted by the Astros in the 1983 Major League Baseball Draft and quickly moved up the Astros farm system. But after developing chronic tendonitis in his pitching elbow at the Triple-A level, Noble decided to go into coaching, initially as an assistant for long-time UH baseball coach Bragg Stockton and then helping Rice coach Wayne Graham in the early 1990’s lay the foundation of the ultra-successful Rice program. During an era in which UH administrators were not making very good decisions, UH unexpectedly made the good decision to hire Noble as head baseball coach in 1994.

UH has been richly rewarded for that decision. Over the past 16 seasons, Noble guided the UH baseball program to three NCAA Super Regional berths over a four year period from 1999-2003, eight NCAA Regional appearances, three Conference USA regular-season titles and three C-USA Tournament championships. In so doing, he chalked up a 551-420 record, including a record-breaking 48 wins in both the 2000 and 2002 seasons.

With the exception of Leroy Burrell’s elite UH track program, no other UH coach comes even close to Noble’s accomplishments during that period.

But what made Rayner Noble truly special at UH was that he loved and understood his alma mater. Playing in an inferior conference and without comparable financial resources, UH could rarely compete with programs such as Texas, Texas A&M, Baylor or local powerhouse Rice for elite players coming out of high school. Consequently, Noble specialized in recruiting players who he could develop into solid college players.

In so doing, he developed a large number of excellent players, such as pitchers Ryan Wagner and Brad Sullivan, who in 2003 were the first UH players selected in the first-round of the MLB Draft.

Moreover, given his experience as a professional player, Noble understood the vagaries of fashioning a successful college career into a spot on an MLB roster. Thus, Noble always emphasized to his players the importance of completing their college education. Noble’s players were true student-athletes – if a player didn’t attend class, he didn’t play for Rayner Noble. Several UH professors confided to me over the years that Noble was by for the easiest coach that they ever worked with in regard to an academic problem of a student-athlete. Not surprisingly, Noble was highly-respected and well-liked by most UH faculty members and administrators.

So, what was that performance, integrity, loyalty and wisdom worth when Noble’s teams suffered back-to-back losing seasons over the past two seasons?

Apparently, not much.

Make no mistake about it, the firing of Rayner Noble is a sad commentary on the state of intercollegiate athletics. Rather than looking at the big picture and the enormous contributions that Noble has made to student-athletes and the school, AD Rhoades and UH made a decision based narrowly on short-term results at a time when UH athletics desperately needs to be thinking for the long term.

Without the financial resources of the other major Texas universities, the University of Houston used to stand for unusual commitment to its coaches. Bill Yeoman, Guy V. Lewis, and the late Dave Williams were examples of the long-term excellence that UH used to achieve in intercollegiate athletics as a result of that commitment.

The firing of Rayner Noble reminds us that UH dispensed with that wise policy long ago.

As a result, the University of Houston has just lost much more than a baseball coach. The university lost a part of its soul.

UH will find another baseball coach.

But that lost part of UH’s soul will be much harder to replace.

More Kiri

Last week, it was West Side Story. This week, the incomparable Tiri Te Kanawa sings O mio babbino caro.

Obfuscation is government’s secret weapon

Paulsen Over the past couple of years, Bill King has done a great job (and see generally here) of explaining how Houstonís unfunded public pension obligation represents a horrific burden on the city governmentís financial condition.

Given that such obligations are clearly unsustainable, why does the city government continue to provide them?

Edward L. Glaeser provides the following particularly lucid explanation of the dynamic that leads to such profligacy:

On Friday, The New York Times ran a front-page article about pensions that took note of a 44-year-old retired police officer who receives an annual pension of $101,333 despite never having earned more than $74,000 a year in base pay. The article reported that in Yonkers alone ìmore than 100 retired police officers and firefighters are collecting pensions greater than their pay when they were workingî and that ìabout 3,700 retired public workers in New York are now getting pensions of more than $100,000 a year, exempt from state and local taxes.î

The emotional response of many people is to vilify the retirees, but thatís a mistake. The individual police officers and firefighters were following the rules. They have jobs that require them to risk their lives in service of their communities, and large pensions are one payoff for accepting those risks and accepting relatively lower wages up front. Iím sure many of them are no less impatient than the rest of us and would have preferred to get more money in their 20s and less in their 50s.

The fault lies in the political process that makes their negotiating partners ó state and local governments ó more impatient than their employees. State and local governments donít want to face the short-term consequences of paying higher wages, so they structure compensation in ways that defer the costs of each new deal for years.

Politics doesnít just favor delayed compensation; it also favors forms of compensation that are particularly hard for people to evaluate. Governments almost always love obfuscation. The appeal of Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac was that they could subsidize homeownership without appearing to cost the taxpayers anything. Of course, they ended costing us plenty, just like hard-to-evaluate pension promises.

The rest of Glaeserís post is here.

Sort of reminds one of this, this and this, eh?

Can psychiatry be a science?

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Louis Menandís New Yorker article earlier this year that reviewed a couple of new books on psychiatry in the context of the confusing state of psychiatric literature posed the compelling question that is the title of this post:

You go see a doctor. The doctor hears your story and prescribes an antidepressant. Do you take it?

However you go about making this decision, do not read the psychiatric literature. Everything in it, from the science (do the meds really work?) to the metaphysics (is depression really a disease?), will confuse you. There is little agreement about what causes depression and no consensus about what cures it. Virtually no scientist subscribes to the man-in-the-waiting-room theory, which is that depression is caused by a lack of serotonin, but many people report that they feel better when they take drugs that affect serotonin and other brain chemicals. [.  .  .]

.  .  . As a branch of medicine, depression seems to be a mess. Business, however, is extremely good. Between 1988, the year after Prozac was approved by the F.D.A., and 2000, adult use of antidepressants almost tripled. By 2005, one out of every ten Americans had a prescription for an antidepressant. IMS Health, a company that gathers data on health care, reports that in the United States in 2008 a hundred and sixty-four million prescriptions were written for antidepressants, and sales totalled $9.6 billion.

As a depressed person might ask, What does it all mean?

Following on that provocative article, Russ Roberts’ essential EconTalk series this week presents this fascinating interview of Menand on the state of psychiatric knowledge and the scientific basis for making conclusions about current therapeutic approaches of battling it.

Although hard and fast conclusions are few, Menand is asking the right questions about a subject that desperately needs better societal understanding. His article and interview are valuable contributions to improving that understanding.