On the heels of the U.S. Supreme Court’s hearing earlier this week in Conrad Black’s appeal of his criminal conviction on honest services wire-fraud charges under 18 U.S.C. § 1346 (“Section 1346), former Enron CEO Jeff Skilling filed his brief on the merits of his similar appeal with the Supreme Court yesterday.  Oral argument on Skilling’s appeal will take place on March1st of next year at 1 p.m.

A copy of the Skilling’s merits brief is below. The sections of that copy are bookmarked in Adobe Acrobat to facilitate ease of review, so download a copy to take advantage of those features.

This earlier post and Lyle Denniston’s ScotusBlog post on the Skilling merits brief provide thorough analysis of the issues involved in Skilling’s appeal, which differ a bit from Lord Black’s appeal. So, I won’t reiterate those points here.

However, the following are some highlights of the brief, which is well-written and forceful. Citations to the appellate record that are contained in the brief are deleted in the following excerpts.

The following excerpts get to the heart of the appeal:

Skilling not only was tried by jurors drawn from a community passionately committed to convicting him, but he was prosecuted under a vague statute that virtually ensured jurors would vindicate that objective. Section 1346 is an unconstitutionally vague statute. A federal criminal statute must define the conduct it proscribes so that ordinary persons have notice of what is prohibited, and prosecutors are constrained in what they can prosecute.

But everyone agrees that § 1346 on its face says nothing about the conduct it proscribes. To identify its meaning, one must consult almost two decades worth of Federal Reports, searching for cases describing or enforcing the judicially-created crime of honest-services fraud, before this Court rejected them all as exceeding the judicial function in McNally v. U.S., 483 U.S. 350 (1987). But those cases reflect only the same morass of conflict and confusion that, in part, led this Court to require that Congress define the crime clearly in the first place. Congress did not do so. And it is beyond the judicial function to identify, through common-law exegesis of pre-McNally precedents, the crime that Congress failed to define. [.  .  .]

The Government’s theory is not that Skilling received bribes or kickbacks, or that he directed money or property to an entity in which he had a personal interest, or indeed that he acted for any private gain that was distinct from his ordinary compensation incentives. The Government openly conceded at trial that Skilling stole no money from Enron, that the case against Skilling was not about “greed,” that Skilling sought to pursue Enron’s “best interests,” and that every act for which he was prosecuted was undertaken for the purpose of protecting Enron and promoting its share value.

The Government proceeded on the theory that Skilling nonetheless committed honest-services fraud simply because he took on too much risk for the long-term good of Enron, and improperly touted the company. It did not seek an instruction requiring jurors to find that Skilling acted pursuant to undisclosed personal financial interests in conflict with Enron’s. Instead the Government urged the jury to send Skilling to prison simply because he breached his “duty to do [his] job and do it appropriately.”

That theory of honest-services fraud has no grounding in pre-McNally caselaw, and is totally at odds with the Government’s current conception of the statute.The implications of that theory, moreover, extend far beyond what Congress reasonably could have intended when it enacted § 1346 to overrule McNally, a public-official kickback case. In the private sector, corporate officers are expected to take business risks and cheerlead for their enterprises. A rule that criminalizes every business decision that seems imprudent to prosecutors or lay jurors in hindsight — but does not involve the corrupt pursuit of private gain— would force officers to proceed at their peril in making everyday business judgments. Fortunately, the theory of honest-services fraud the Government advanced below is not the law, as the Government now recognizes.

In that regard, Skilling reminds the Court of the chillingly scant basis of the “crime” the Enron Task Force prosecutors told the jury that Skilling had committed:

In closing argument, the Government declared that Skilling and Lay committed honest-services fraud because they violated a duty to Enron’s “employees” — one prosecutors described as “a duty of good faith and honest services, a duty to be truthful, and a duty to do their job … and do it appropriately.” [.  .  .][ The Enron Task Force’s] consistent position in this case has been that the evidence needed only to show—and did only show—“a material violation of a fiduciary duty that defendants owed to Enron and its shareholders.”

In other words, making a bad decision or doing a poor job in running a business is a crime. Almost nothing else need be said in explaining why the Skilling appeal is of paramount importance to the protection of taking risk and creating wealth in the American business community.

On the issue of why Skilling should have never been tried in Houston, check out part of the brief’s summary of the community prejudice against Skilling that the leader of the mob promoted:

What follows is a sampling of the searing media attacks.

One column in the Houston Chronicle, entitled “Your Tar and Feathers Ready? Mine Are,” demanded a “witch hunt.” Houstonians maintained that Skilling and Lay had “stole[n] money from investors,” “ripped off their stockholders for billions,” and “destroyed a great corporation.”

Skilling and Lay were compared to Al Qaeda, Hitler, Satan, child molesters, rapists, embezzlers, and terrorists and encouraged to “go to jail” and “to hell.” Some suggested they should face “the old time Code of the West.” A local rap song (entitled “Drop the S Off Skilling”) threatened Skilling’s murder. Polling showed that Houstonians routinely labeled Skilling a “pig,” “snake,” “crook,” “thief,” “fraud,” “asshole,” “criminal,” “bastard,” “scoundrel,” “liar,” “weasel,” “economic terrorist,” “evil,” “deceitful,” “dishonest,” “greedy,” “devious,” “lecherous,” “despicable,” “equivalent [to] an axe murderer,” and a man who had “no conscience,” “stole from employees,” and “swindled a lot of people.”

Skilling’s picture was “used as a dartboard” and placed on “Wanted” posters next to Osama bin Laden. When Skilling was indicted, the Chronicle proclaimed: “Most Agree: Indictment Overdue.” The paper’s negative coverage extended to articles on sports, education, music, and more.

After detailing how potential jurors’ pre-trial questionnaire answers about the case mirrored the foregoing community prejudice, Skilling describes U.S. District Judge Sim Lake’s nominal questioning of the jurors that was hopelessly inadequate to overcome the presumption of community prejudice:

Skilling sought extensive, non-public, individualized voir dire to try to screen out all the potentially biased jurors—especially in light of the questionnaire responses exposing specific prejudices. But the court took the opposite tack, holding voir dire before throngs of reporters in a ceremonial courtroom, limiting it to just five hours, and twice chastising defense counsel for asking too many questions about potential prejudice because the court had prohibited “individual voir dire.” Just 46 people were questioned—eight more than the minimum necessary—and only for a few minutes each. Only seven were struck for cause, with one excused for hardship.

Skilling then explains what should have happened in the face of such clear bias:

[I]f the [District Court] had presumed prejudice among all potential jurors, it could not have refused to permit probing inquiry into each individual juror’s biases. To the contrary, the Government would have been forced to make detailed inquiries of each juror in order to prove each juror’s impartiality beyond a reasonable doubt, and of course the defense would have been entitled to pursue similar lines to smoke out concealed or latent prejudices.

None of that happened here. Instead the district court satisfied itself that Skilling failed to prove actual prejudice for little reason other than the court looked jurors “in the eye” and decided to credit their promises of fairness. If the presumption of prejudice can be rebutted on that kind of showing, the presumption has no meaning at all.

As I’ve noted many times previously, a humane and civil society would find a better way than what was done to Jeff Skilling. It is simply un-American to throw people in prison for their errors in business judgment while they are attempting to create jobs for communities and wealth for investors.

I remain hopeful that the U.S. Supreme Court will agree.

Jeff Skilling’s Merits Brief at SCOTUS