There are bad stock plays and there are horrible stock plays. And then there is Houston-based Landry’s Restaurants, Inc.

This story began back in July of 2007 when the company announced that it was delinquent in its regulatory filings with the SEC and that it was in need of refinancing over $400 million in debt in a rapidly deteriorating debt market. Shortly thereafter, the company sued some of its bondholders for declaring the company in technical default under their bonds, but the company quickly settled that litigation on not particularly good terms.

A few months later, Landry’s announced in January 2008 that its CEO and major shareholder (39%), Tilman Fertitta, had made an offer to take the company private by buying the other 61% of the company’s stock for $23.50 share, which worked to be a $1.3 billion deal, including debt.

Given the circumstances, that offer sounded pretty good, particularly given that the proposed purchase price was a 40% premium over the $16.67 share price at the time of the offer.

Unfortunately, a spate of shareholder lawsuits followed Fertitta’s bid. By early March, 2008, it was apparent that Fertitta’s bid was so speculative that he hadn’t even lined up financing for it.

So, in April of 2008, Fertitta lowered his offer to $21 per share because of "tighter credit markets", and Landry’s announced that it had accepted that price in June.

But by the fall of 2008, the financial crisis on Wall Street had roiled credit markets even further and Hurricane Ike caused considerable damage to several Landry’s properties.

So, in October of 2008, Fertitta lowered his offer to $13.50 per share.

Then, in mid January of 2009, Landry’s announced that it was terminating the proposed deal with Fertitta. The reason was a bit convoluted, but here is the gist of it.

Landry’s contended that the SEC was requiring the company to issue a proxy statement disclosing information about a confidential commitment letter from the lead lenders on the buyout deal. However, Landry’s was negotiating with those same lenders to refinance the bond indebtedness that the company promised to refinance in connection with October, 2007 litigation settlement with its bondholders noted above. Inasmuch as the lenders’ commitment for financing Fertitta’s buyout required that the terms of the commitment remain confidential, the company elected to terminate the buyout rather than risk that the lenders would declare a default for breach of confidentiality and back out of the financing commitment as well as the negotiations on refinancing the bond indebtedness.

Amidst all this, Landry’s stock was tanking, closing at under $5 per share.

Meanwhile, while the take-private bids languished and the company’s stock plummeted to historic lows, Fertitta continued to buy more Landry’s stock so that he now controls somewhere in the neighborhood of 55% of the company’s shares.

Yes, that’s right. Despite a series of unsuccessful take-private offers over a year and a half, Landry’s board failed to obtain a standstill agreement from Fertitta that would have prevented him from taking a majority equity position while Landry’s stock price was tanking.

So, given all of that, how could Fertitta and the Landry’s directors screw things up any worse?

How about proposing yet another deal in which Fertitta would buyout Landry’s other shareholders in return for giving them an equity stake in a publicly-owned spin-off (Saltgrass Steakhouse) in a brutally competitive niche of the restaurant market?

Prediction: This is not going to turn out well.