Stetson College of Law Professor Ellen S. Podgor, who authors the popular White Collar Crime Prof Blog, has written an important law review article on a key issue that is confronting defense attorneys and courts in this age of criminalizing merely unpopular business people and practices — the onerous trial penalty that a defendant faces for electing to exercise the right to force the government to prove guilt beyond a reasonable doubt:

This Article  .  .  . shows that innocence is no longer the key determinant in some aspects of the federal criminal justice system, even for those charged with white collar offenses. Rather, our existing legal system places the risk of going to trial, and in some cases even being charged with a crime, so high, that innocence and guilt no longer become the real considerations. This is especially true for upper level white collar offenders like CEO’s and corporate entities.

In these cases maneuvering the system to receive the least onerous consequences may ensure the best result for the accused party, regardless of innocence. Arthur Andersen LLP, Jamie Olis, and Jeffrey Skilling proceeded to trial after criminal charges were brought against them. In contrast, KPMG, Gene Foster, and Andrew Fastow secured plea agreements or deferred prosecution agreements with reduced sentences and finite results. As one might imagine, the latter group’s sentences or fines were significantly below those of the individuals and entities that proceeded to trial. The pronounced gap between those risking trial and those securing pleas is what raises concerns here. [.  .   .]

The reward of a “not guilty” verdict at trial comes at a high cost. There is the high cost of going to trial, a cost that far exceeds the typical street crime because of the long investigation and trial and in large part be-cause these cases are predominantly a product of documents. It can also be a short-lived verdict when the government decides to proceed against the individual with a second prosecution, even after a not guilty finding. [.  .  .]

This means that innocence or guilt does not frame the judicial process in white collar cases. The risk of trial becomes so great that in order to minimize the possible consequences innocence becomes an irrelevancy. Although the plea bargain to trial differential existed for many years in crimes outside the white collar crime context, the high sentences now being given to individuals and entities charged with white collar crimes place those crimes in comparable stead with street crimes. This gives pause to whether the next phase of wrongful convictions might move beyond street crimes into the white collar world.

My sense is that many prosecutors these days have come to the conclusion that merely obtaining an indictment in a business-related case means that they probably won’t have to bother with a trial — the trial penalty that the defendant faces will almost always prompt a plea bargain.

Thus, the indictment itself has become the punishment for risky business behavior that prosecutors simply do not like.

We live in scary times, indeed.

Clear Thinkers favorite Holman Jenkins has yet another excellent column this week entitled When Bad Luck is a Crime (or, stated another way, the new crime of violating the obligation to throw in the towel).

Among other points, Jenkins notes that the mainstream media to date has done a poor job of resisting hindsight bias in reporting on business failures:

When it comes to cheering CEOs, booing them or throwing them in jail, a consideration that ought to be nagging is whether we’re reacting to luck or design.

Ken Lay, to cite a notorious example, was prosecuted not for the sins that brought down Enron, but for failing to tell investors the company was predestined to fail even as he tried to save it. Exactly the same treatment is now being meted out to two ex-Bear Stearns hedge- fund managers on trial in New York this week. Then there’s Ken Lewis, the Bank of America chief, who hasn’t been indicted (yet) but is being roundly booed in the media because his acquisition of Merrill Lynch is deemed in retrospect to have been a mistake.

Now we might be tempted to say journalists are especially susceptible to the hindsight fallacy. But a truer statement is that we thrive on it, are its avenging angels, forever treating every bad outcome as proof of incompetence if not malfeasance, and every good outcome as the result of far-seeing excellence. [.  .  .]

.  .  .  Here, journalism, and perhaps only journalism, can unpack the final puzzle—albeit a journalism that properly understands the role of luck in determining the outcomes that so excite journalists and sometimes prosecutors in the first place.

Meanwhile, Stephen Bainbridge and Larry Ribstein — both of whom have been pre-eminent blogosphere leaders in educating the public about business law issues — provide insightful analysis of the legal and policy issues involved in the Galleon insider trading case that the Department of Justice initiated late last week.

As noted here before, criminalizing insider trading risks harming legal and socially beneficial trading. The line is thin indeed between illegal insider trading, on one hand, and an entirely legal and productive hedge fund operation on the other.

Sort of makes one wonder whether the criminalization of insider trading does more harm than good?