This earlier post noted the institutionalized fanaticism that is involved in the recruitment of big-time college football players. But that fanaticism is really nothing compared to the obsession that many professional football fans will indulge over the next several weeks as National Football League teams prepares for its annual draft of minor league, er . . I mean, “college” players in mid-April.
Inasmuch as many folks in Houston believe that the poor performance of the Houston Texans during their five seasons of existence is attributable to the poor draft picks of Texans’ management (I’m not convinced that’s entirely correct, but oh well), we are bombarded in these football-crazed parts over the next several weeks with media coverage of who the Texans and other NFL teams should choose in the draft. I’ve always had this vague notion that all this attention given to who NFL teams should choose might actually push the teams toward making poor choices, but I’ve never really been able to put my finger on any support for that notion.
Well, American Enterprise Institute scholar Kevin Hassett just might have the answer. According to an ongoing study that Yale University economist Cade Massey and University of Chicago economist Richard Thaler are conducting, Hassett reports that the Texans likely would have been much better off trading their high draft picks from past drafts for mutiple lower draft picks that the team could have used to buy more good players:

To recap, Massey and Thaler studied the draft and found that teams make systematic errors. They tend to place too high a value on the top players and too low a value on draft picks a little farther down.
The problem is, the very top players in the draft receive very high salaries. Even if they compete brilliantly, it’s hard for them to outperform their earnings. But by definition, since all teams have to operate within the same salary cap, winners have to have teams that are filled with players who outperform their paychecks.
Last year’s top overall pick, Mario Williams of the Houston Texans, is a nice example. He received a salary package worth $54 million over six years — and proceeded to play like a fairly mediocre defensive end. He was the sixth-leading tackler on his team, and recorded only 4 1/2 sacks.
While those numbers suggest Williams will be a serviceable NFL competitor, he was compensated as one of the best defensive players in the league. And since the total salary bill for the team is capped by the league, the money spent on Williams is money that can’t be spent on players at other positions. That undermines their ability to compete.
On the other hand, players a little farther down in the draft can be enormous bargains. Take Houston’s second-round pick DeMeco Ryans. He led the NFL in tackles, but only received a contract of $5 million over four years. Good teams fill their roster with such deals and avoid committing huge resources to the big-money players like Williams.

In other words, the Texans need more DeMeco Ryans and fewer David Carrs and Mario Williams, although it’s a bit early to write off the Williams pick as a bust on the level of the Carr pick. Hassett’s point is also supported by the success of the New England Patriots, who have used a model of emphasizing quality depth over star players in building one of the most successful NFL teams over the past decade. During most of that time, the Patriots were picking at the bottom of the draft board while, over the past five years, the Texans have been picking at or near the top.