And you thought that Southlake Carroll football was competitive?

southlake Carroll dragon2.jpgSouthlake Carroll High School is a suburban Metroplex high school that, over the past decade or so, turned into a proverbial Texas high school football powerhouse. This past season, the Dragons won their second straight Texas 5A-Div. II championship and were named the mythical no. 1 high school football team in the country by USA Today.
However, according to this Ft. Worth Star Telegraph article, as tough as competition is in the Southlake football program, it’s nothing compared to the competition in the cheerleading program:

SOUTHLAKE — The Carroll school district has been consumed for weeks about how to handle the selection of cheerleaders for Carroll Senior High School’s varsity squad.
Investigations have been conducted, grievances filed and several meetings held between administrators and parents. Tonight, the school board will convene behind closed doors to consider a request by parents of 12 cheerleaders to cut more than half the squad members, who the parents say don’t deserve to be on the team. . .

Read the entire sordid tale, which does not mention the possible solution of forming a parent-cheerleader team at Southlake to mollify the demands of several of the mothers involved.

Can SBC, er, I mean, AT&T swallow BellSouth?

Last year, San Antonio-based SBC Communications swallowed the much smaller AT&T Corp., but then started using the venerable AT&T brand for the merged company. This year, SBC/AT&T is attempting to eat BellSouth Corp. in an estimated $67 billion deal, which is a much larger acquisition than the SBC-AT&T merger of last year.
The proposed merger continues a trend in the telecommunications industry over the past several years that really is a reaction to what happened in the industry after the court-ordered 1984 breakup of the old AT&T or “Ma Bell.” That break-up led to a restructuring of the entire industry and then the landmark 1996 Telecommunications Act enhanced head-to-head competition between phone companies for customers.
Since that time, long-distance phone rates have decreased substantially as consumers have many more options for such service. Meanwhile, cable companies are increasingly offering phone service as part of their consumer packages, declining prices on wireless calling plans have induced some consumers to forego traditional landlines entirely, and broadband connections are generating an entirely new new industry that allows calls to travel over the Internet.
Thus, in the wake of that competition, AT&T CEO Edward Whiteacre justified the new merger because AT&T needs “a bigger footprint. The world is changing. There is more competition.” Maybe so, but as with Hewlett-Packard’s acquisition of Compaq and Comcast’s failed bid for Disney, is the acquisition price for BellSouth so high that — as Professor Ribstein has observed — it takes a near-delusional synergy theory for AT&T management to justify it?

Oral argument today in the Nigerian Barge appeal

Bayly8.jpgfuhs8.jpgOral argument takes place today at the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals in New Orleans in the appeals of Dan Bayly, Robert Furst, James Brown and William Fuhs, the former Merrill Lynch executives who were convicted of wire fraud and conspiracy charges in November 2004 in the trial of the Enron-related case known as the Nigerian Barge case.
The plight of the Merrill Four in the Nigerian Barge case is a case study in the dubious nature of the government’s criminalization of business in the post-Enron era (for a thorough discussion of that subject, begin here). In the barge case, the Task Force took a finance transaction between Enron and Merrill Lynch and criminalized it through a brazen web of distortion, suppression of key testimony, inadmissible hearsay, opposition to the defense’s jury instruction on the key issue in the case and prosecutorial misconduct. In short, the Task Force effectively prosecuted the Merrill Four for doing their jobs in connection with the firm’s purchase of a dividend stream for which Enron, not Merrill, may have improperly accounted, although even that issue was never proven at trial.
James brown2.jpgfurst2.jpgThen, to make matters worse, the Task Force at trial played on the jury’s hindsight bias and presented to the panel a fictional screenplay of the underlying transaction while effectively effectively preventing the Merrill Four from presenting exculpatory testimony and evidence that contradicted the Task Force’s fictional account. The Task Force is deploying precisely the same deplorable tactics in the ongoing trial of former key Enron executives Ken Lay and Jeff Skilling.
Interestingly, part of the key testimony that the Task Force has elicited to date during the Lay-Skilling trial contradicts an important part of the testimony that it presented in convicting the Merrill Four during the Nigerian Barge trial. In Lay-Skilling, the Task Force had former Enron investor relations chief Mark Koenig testify that he learned on January 14, 2000 — just days before Enron was scheduled to publish its fourth-quarter 1999 financial statement — that earnings were likely to be 30 cents a share, a penny below the 31 cents a share that had been forecast on Wall Street. Koenig then testified that he alerted Enron’s CFO, Richard Causey, that the company would miss its forecast and that, on January 17 — the day before the earnings report was scheduled to be publicly released — he saw a draft memo saying that the company would earn 31 cents a share. On Jan. 19, the day after the earnings release, Koenig testified that he discussed the sudden change with Lay, who seemed surprised and allegedly observed to Koenig that “he went to bed and we were at 30 cents and, when he woke up, we were at 31 cents.”
In contrast, during the barge trial, the Task Force elicited extensive testimony and contended during closing argument that Enron’s motivation to arrange the barge transaction with Merrill Lynch in December 1999 was to help Enron hit its earnings target of 31 cents per share, not the 30 cent-per-share target that Koenig in his Lay-Skilling testimony suggested was the company’s true target until just days before the January 18 earnings release. Thus, the Task Force’s evidence in the barge trial that Enron’s earnings target in December 1999 was 31 cents per share directly contradicts Koenig’s testimony in Lay-Skilling that the company increased its earnings target by a penny-per-share just days before the January 18, 2000 earnings release.
So it goes in the wacky world of criminalizing corporate agency costs.
Meanwhile, Alexei Barrionuevo and Kurt Eichenwald of the NY Times provide this article today in which they summarize the testimony to date in the Lay-Skilling trial and observe that this week’s star witness — demonized former Enron CFO Andy Fastow — may end up being just another witness in the trial.