The integration of the University of Texas football program

whittier.2.184.jpgWhen the University of Texas plays USC for the BCS National Football Championship in the Rose Bowl on January 4, 2006, the Longhorn football team will be attempting to win its first undisputed national football title since 1969, which happened to be the last all-white college football team to win the national football championship.
This NY Times article tells the story about the integration of the Texas football program, including the not well-known story of how former Major League Baseball player and manager Don Baylor almost became the first black football player at the University of Texas in the mid-1960’s, how former President Lyndon Johnson used to help recruit football players for UT, and the interesting story of Julius Whittier, the first black student-athlete to play football at the University of Texas.

My kind of Econoblog

baseball_free agents.gifThe Wall Street Journal is running another chapter in its free Econoblog series, and the current installment pits the original Sports Economist Skip Sauer against SabernomicsJohn-Charles Bradbury discussing the free agent market in Major League Baseball this winter. Among the many interesting observations from these two sharp experts on the economics of baseball is the following from Professor Sauer on the super-heated free agent market for relief pitchers:

[T]his is the year of the reliever in the free-agent market. And if their contracts are anywhere near full value, that is one heck of an interesting observation. Why, you ask? Because it debunks an age-old claim that is inconsistent with economic analysis. The claim dates back to the origin of free agency, via arbitrator Peter Seitz’s decision in the McNally-Messersmith case (like the arbitrator in the recent Terrell Owens case, Seitz was abruptly fired, in his case by the owners). After Seitz’s decision, the owners and players both feared for the worst should full-blown free agency emerge in baseball’s marketplace. They proceeded to negotiate a collective-bargaining agreement which protected owners’ interests (by giving young players limited bargaining power), along with the interests of journeymen, allegedly, by limiting the supply of free agents.

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Robert Durst’s rather odd holiday season

durst-shock111103.jpgYou just never know who you are going to bump into during the holiday season at Houston’s famed Galleria shopping mall.
Robert Durst — the wealthy heir who was acquitted of murder after killing his neighbor, chopping up the body and throwing it into Galveston Bay — bumped into Galveston state district judge Susan Criss earlier this month at the Galleria. Judge Criss presided over Durst’s controversial trial, and ultimately had to be removed from the case by an appellate court after she refused to set a reasonable bond for Durst’s release under a plea bargain. Durst is currently back in Harris County jail awaiting a hearing on an alleged parole violation. The following is how Judge Criss characterized for the Chronicle her Galleria encounter with Durst:

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The Wall Street Journal’s Enron conflict of interest

The Wall Street Journal’s ($) John Emshwiller reports that former Enron chief accountant Richard Causey is currently negotiating with Task Force prosecutors regarding a possible plea bargain under which he would testify against his former bosses, Ken Lay and Jeff Skilling, in the upcoming Enron legacy criminal trial scheduled to begin in Houston federal court on January 17, 2006. A subsequent WaPo article on Causey’s plea bargain negotiations is here and the Chronicle story is here.

The gist of Emswiller’s piece is that the Task Force is focusing on statements that Causey made to investigators early in the Enron criminal investigation to the effect that Enron had adequate internal controls in place to limit the risk of Andrew Fastow using his position as both Enron’s CFO and as the control person in various special purpose entities doing business with Enron to harm the company.

The prosecution contends that Causey’s statements to investigators — as well as Lay and Skilling’s similar public statements regarding the controls — were false and that the executives knew that the controls on Fastow’s dual positions were inadequate.

The three executives contend that Enron’s internal controls were both extensive and reasonable, but that no control can absolutely prevent someone such as Fastow from using his position to perpetrate a fraud on the company if he is intent on doing so.

Frankly, neither Causey’s plea bargain negotiations nor Emshwiller’s story are particularly surprising. Given that Causey is facing the equivalent of a life sentence if he chooses to defend himself without access to his full net worth in a case in which much of media (including Mr. Emshwiller — see his Enron book, 24 Days: How Two Wall Street Journal Reporters Uncovered the Lies that Destroyed Faith in Corporate America) has already concluded that he is guilty, it is understandable that Causey would at least explore all options that would hedge that substantial risk of loss.

Likewise, the Enron Task Force has frequently used the media throughout its dubious handling of the criminal investigation of Enron to pressure former Enron executives into questionable plea bargains.

By the way, Emshwiller has already published questionable conclusions about Enron that are clearly adverse to the three former executives. Moreover, through his book, he has a financial interest in seeing that even his most dubious conclusions are confirmed during the upcoming trial.

Why on earth is a media publication of the Wall Street Journal’s caliber having someone with such an obvious conflict of interest covering the Lay-Skilling-Causey trial?