A tip of the hat today goes to Stros owner Drayton McLane and GM Tim Purpura for signing ace pitcher Roy Oswalt to a two year $16.9 million contract. The contract will take Oswalt up to his final arbitration year of 2007, so the Stros will have to deal with the risk that he will become a free agent after that year unless they agree on a long term deal.
Although the Rocket is the highest paid Stros player, Oswalt is currently their best starting pitcher. After 3.01 ERA/33 Runs Saved Against Average (“RSAA,” explained here) and 2.97 ERA/21 RSAA seasons in 2002 and 2003, Oswalt had a 3.49 ERA/22 RSAA in 35 starts (36 games) last season, most of which was pitched with a painful abdominal injury. His career ERA is 3.11 compared to his league average of 4.26, and he has a career 105 RSAA in 120 games.
Just to give you an idea of the level of talent that the Stros have in Oswalt, consider the following, courtesy of Lee Sinins. Over the past 50 years in Major League Baseball, Oswalt ranks 7th in the NL in RSAA through the age of 26:
RSAA
1 Tom Seaver 174
2 Don Drysdale 173
3 Ferguson Jenkins 134
4 Pedro Martinez 129
5 Dwight Gooden 118
6 Jim Maloney 106
7 Roy Oswalt 105
8 Gary Nolan 97
9 Jose Rijo 91
10 Greg Maddux 84
Not bad company, Roy.
Daily Archives: February 11, 2005
Pizza Armageddon
This could happen to you. Hat tip to Newmark’s Door for the link.
Courting Failure
This may seem a bit odd coming on the heels of the previous post, but UCLA law professor Lynn LoPucki‘s long-awaited new book — Courting Failure : How Competition for Big Cases Is Corrupting the Bankruptcy Courts (UM Press 2005) — is finally available.
As noted in this earlier post, Professor LoPucki has been studying for many years the issue that he characterizes as the “race to the bottom” — i.e., bankruptcy courts in certain jurisdictions bending federal bankruptcy law to market themselves to debtors’ lawyers who often are instrumental in choosing the venue of big business reorganization cases.
The cost attributable to this “race to the bottom” is considerable because the two main bankruptcy venues — Delaware and the New York City — commonly approve professional fees in big reorganization cases that are at the highest level of the profession. In comparison, the high hourly rates being charged and routinely approved in the Enron reorganization case in New York would likely not have been approved if the case had been filed in Houston where Enron is based and which is a far more convenient venue for the vast majority of Enron creditors. In addition, Professor LoPucki argues in his new book that the “race to the bottom” has also caused a decline in the quality of bankruptcy reorganizations and a parallel rise in chapter 22’s (i.e., repeat reorganizations).
By the way, the bankruptcy reform legislation referred to in the previous post fails to address this “race to the bottom” issue. So it goes.
Bankruptcy reform legislation appears to be coming
The long legislative fight over bankruptcy reform legislation appears to be coming to a close, as this Washington Post article reports.
If you want to understand why this is poorly-conceived legislation that is a perfect example of Republican legislators indulging the narrow self-interest of certain business interests, then read this.
Although not perfect, America’s Bankruptcy Code and system is the best in the world, which is one of the reasons that it is often emulated. Making that system more expensive and difficult for individuals is contrary to the public policy of the fresh start and the promotion of risk taking that are the foundation of our insolvency laws.
Carly Fiorina’s Seven Deadly Sins
The best summary I have seen to date of why Carly Fiorina failed at Hewlett Packard is contained in this Rich Karlgaard op-ed today in the Wall Street Journal ($). Karlgaard, who is publisher of Forbes and author of Life 2.0 (Crown Business, 2004), notes Ms. Fiorina’s seven basic failures in managing HP:
1. Acting like a rock star. . . In the U.S., only entrepreneurs get to act as rock stars. Hired guns do not. . . We love our entrepreneur rock stars so much we let their sins slide. Carly was excoriated for a boneheaded move — giving Compaq shareholders 37% of HP’s profitable printer division in a swap for Compaq’s flagging PC business. Founder-CEOs are allowed to get away with far worse. . . Jobs’s first bold act after reassuming Apple’s reins in 1996 was to buy NeXT Software at an inflated $400 million and kill the company. Because he owned NeXT, Apple’s purchase made him rich. Yet Apple shareholders forgave Jobs because, well, he’s a rock star. And he has made good on that faith.
2. Failing to see the cheap revolution. . . . Dell is on the right side of the cheap revolution divide. It sells powerful servers for under $5,000 and keeps overhead low in Round Rock, Texas, where the average three-bedroom house sells for $200,000. HP sells servers for tens of thousands and keeps high overhead in Palo Alto, Calif., where the average three-bedroom sells for $1,500,000.
3. Failing to see the consumer revolution. A huge shift has occurred in the last five years. The coolest tech products now go straight into the consumer market. . . Carly has ineffectively maneuvered HP into this consumer field.
4. Obsession with size over flexibility. . . we need to go deeper and challenge the very premise of these mergers: that large scale is a requirement of success in the global economy. By merging with Compaq, Carly clearly believed this. But maybe the opposite is true — that speed and flexibility now trump scale.
5. Letting talent go. . . Aside from chasing away shareholder capital, she chased away talent, from Michael Capellas on down. For high-IQ tech companies, talent loss may be the greater sin. The most dynamic — Microsoft and Oracle during the ’80s and ’90s, and Google now — have always been obsessed with recruiting and keeping talent.
6. Not tolerating strength in others. . . the good [CEO’s] tolerate strength in others; the bad ones don’t. Gates has Steve Ballmer. Michael Dell has Kevin Rollins. Larry Ellison has Jeff Henley. Carly had no one like that.
7. Lack of focus. We conclude with Peter Drucker’s other great insight: Effective CEOs pick two tasks and devote their energies there. When those tasks are done, they don’t go to #3. They make a new list. One overlooked trick to maintaining focus, Drucker told me, is to cut travel. “Make your reports come to see you. Use technology, it’s cheaper than traveling. I don’t know anybody who can work while traveling. Do you?” Carly, globe-hopping in her Gulfstream, worked 100-hour weeks. But she was focused on too many tasks. Which is no focus at all.
Read the entire op-ed, and then think about how HP’s corporate governance promotes inflexible and ill-conceived management decisions such as those made by Ms. Fiorina. Professor Bainbridge also has some interesting observations on the big picture meaning of the HP Board’s action in terminating Ms. Fiorina’s employment.
On an anecdotal note, I am friends with several former Compaq executives who now work for HP in Houston. In discussing HP’s problems several months ago with one of my friends who is an HP sales exective, I asked him to sum up why he thought that HP was having so many problems integrating its various units into a cohesive whole. My friend’s reply was quick and authoritative:
“Because we are such a pain in the ass to deal with.”
By the way, my friend noted that he had passed that exact thought along personally to Ms. Fiorina on several occasions.
Kremlin tightens grip on oil and gas reserves
In a trend that has been developing over the past year in connection with the Russian government’s handling of Russian oil giant OAO Yukos, the Russian government announced Thursday that foreign-owned oil and gas companies will not allowed to bid at auctions this year for permits to develop several big Russian oilfields unless the companies have at least a 51% Russian-owned affiliate participate in the auctions. The new restrictions will further undermine Western investor confidence toward investing capital in the Russian oil and gas industry, which is already undergoing a sharp decline in growth.
Double-digit increases in prodution over the past several years has made Russian production one of the primary sources of additional supply that has offset rising demand from China and developing countries. However, production has now fallen for four straight months and it is widely expected that there will be an abrupt slowing in growth later this year.
The Kremlin’s additional restrictions on foreign investors also rebuffs the Bush Administration’s efforts to increase cooperation between Western oil and gas companies and the Russia government in the energy sector. The Administration held a summit conference earlier this month in which such business matters were discussed, but it appears that the Administration’s lobbying has gone over like a lead balloon with the Putin regime.
Meanwhile, in updating the Yukos case, U.S. Bankruptcy Judge Letitia Clark will hear arguments next Wednesday in Houston on a motion to dismiss the Yukos chapter 11 case that is currently pending in Houston.
Indicted Duke trader cops plea bargain
Brian Lavielle, one of three former Duke Energy Corp. natural gas traders who were indicted last April for booking phony trades to increase bonus compensation, pleaded guilty in Houston Thursday to falsifying books and agreed to cooperate in the federal prosecution of his other two co-defendants.
Lavielle, who is 34, faces a maximum sentence of twenty years and a fine of $5 million, although the cooperation deal and the recent Supreme Court rejection of mandatory federal sentencing guidelines probably mean that his sentence will be far less than the maximum. Sentencing is scheduled for December 9.
As noted in the previous post on the indictment, Lavielle and fellow Duke traders Timothy Kramer and Todd Reid were indicted for racketeering, conspiracy, wire and mail fraud, money laundering and falsifying corporate books in connection with booking phony electricity and natural-gas trades to boost trading volumes and inflate profits in a trading book that was the basis of their annual bonuses. The indictment alleges that the three rigged 400 phony trades that produced a $50 million profit in the trade book used for bonus calculations between March 2001 and May 2002. The schemes are alleged to have inflated bonuses for the three by a total of at least $7 million.
This is one of the first criminal cases of which I am aware in which senior-level executives have been accused of devising schemes to generate profits in a trading book by using “mark-to-market” accounting in calculating bonuses, on one hand, and to enter losses in an “accrual book” that had no bearing on bonuses, on the other. Duke and many other energy trades commonly used mark-to-market accounting to record profit and loss for energy contracts that might not settle for many years. However, mark to market accounting method has come under intense scrutiny since the demise of Enron Corp. in late 2001 because of the latitude that the method allows in recording profitable results in trading operations.