Stros lose to DBacks

The Stros dropped two games at home to the National League’s worst team as the Diamondbacks held on for a 6-4 win on Thursday afternoon at the Juice Box. The Stros go to Cincy 14Ω games behind NL Central-leading Cards and 5Ω games behind the Padres for the NL Wild Card playoff spot.
The crowd of nearly 40,000 booed the Stros lustily throughout the game, particularly starter Tim Redding, who again struggled with his control. Redding gave up six runs on nine hits in 5 2/3 innings, while walking two, both in the DBacks’ 3 run first inning. After his rough start, Redding recovered to retire 12 of the next 13, but started to unravel in the fifth. After giving up a double, Adam Everett made a key throwing error on an infield hit by Gonzo, and then Hillenbrand followed with a two run dinger. Those three unearned runs pushed the DBacks’ lead to 6-1.
All of that went over about like a turd in the punchbowl with the Juice Box crowd.
The Stros had nine hits — including two doubles and a yak by Bidg — but could never put together the big inning against the DBacks’ rookie starter to pull even. Bidg’s first double was the 544th double of his remarkable career, moving him past Tony Gwynn for 19th all-time in the majors. His double in the fifth allowed Bidg to pass Reggie Jackson for 70th on the career hits list. It was Bidg’s 2,586th.
Pete Munro pitches for the Stros against the Reds in the first game of their weekend series on Friday in Cincy. Although the Reds can flat out bash the ball, their pitching is even worse than the DBacks. So, this series ought to be another good opportunity for the Stros to pad their hitting statistics. That means that they will probably score five runs total in the three games. That’s the kind of season it’s been.

The prison of radical Islam

In this Opinion Journal.com piece, Danielle Crittenden reviews a new book — “Inside the Kingdom” — by Osama Bin Ladin’s former sister-in-law, Carmen bin Ladin.
Inasmuch as women of radical Islamic families risk severe punishment for speaking out, first person accounts of life in this culture are rare. As Ms. Crittendon notes, Ms. Bin Ladin is not a distant relative seeking to cash in on her the Bin Ladin family’s notoriety. Rather, her story is arguably the most vivid account yet to appear in the West of the oppressive lives of Saudi women:

Carmen’s life in Saudi Arabia began when her car pulled up to Yeslam’s mother’s compound outside Jeddah. In the mid-1970s, the town was still not much more than a donkey crossroads in the middle of the desert. If winds weren’t whipping up the sand in blinding funnels, the sun was scorching down with unbearable heat. Shrouded in her unfamiliar and suffocating black robes, Carmen entered what sounds like a luridly decorated marble tomb. From then on, she was no longer free.
Each day, Yeslam vanished to work. Carmen and her young daughter passed the hours in the company of his mother and sister. Rarely could she leave the house–rarely, even, did she see sunlight. Courtyards had to be cleared of male servants before she could poke her head outside; she was not even permitted to cross the street alone to visit a relative. When she did venture out, she had to wear a choking abaya and thick socks to hide her ankles. “It was like carrying a jail on your back,” she writes.
Nor was she much freer inside the house. She could not listen to music, pick up an uncensored book or newspaper, or watch anything on television but a dour man reading the Quran. Nor could she absorb herself in household tasks. These were left to foreign servants, including the care of children.
Carmen was horrified by the effects of this isolation and uselessness. “The Bin Laden women were like pets kept by their husbands;. . . .Occasionally they were patted on the head and given presents; sometimes they were taken out, mostly to each other’s houses;. . . .I never once saw one of my sisters-in-law pick up a book. These women never met with men other than their husbands, and never talked about larger issues even with the men they had married. They had nothing to say.”

Read the whole piece.

Revising “The Deal”

Rich Karlgaard is the publisher of Forbes magazine. In this Wall Street Journal ($) column, Mr. Karlgaard examines what has gone wrong at Microsoft and what Bill Gates is doing to try and fix it:

Today Microsoft is struggling to figure out what attracts and motivates the most talented employees within capitalism’s free-agent system. The company had no such problem figuring that out in the 1980s and ’90s. Microsoft CEO Steve Ballmer liked to call the old motivational carrot “The Deal.” That arrangement worked like this: Come and work for Microsoft. Make do with a so-so salary but partake lavishly of options. Sure, you might be forced to grind away on 80-hour weeks for six or seven years. But you’ll change the world and get rich — wildly rich.
Microsoft’s stock has been flat since 1999. The Deal is broken. Not only that, but most of today’s change-the-world projects in computing live outside of Microsoft. These include open-source software, search engines, Web services, Flash video, WiFi, iPods, etc. For reasons of pay and excitement, Microsoft is losing its grip on a new generation of IQ.

Then, Mr. Karlgaard notes that the fortunes of companies in the technology world can changes just as fast as the technologies that they sell:

Digital Equipment Corporation reached its peak market value in 1988 but four years later sold to Compaq for a tenth the price. IBM was a titan throughout the 1980s yet nearly went bankrupt in 1992, before Lou Gerstner stepped in. At both IBM and DEC, the stellar 1980s financial results were lagging indicators of future vitality. The leading indicator was the flow of talent. By the late 1980s, even as DEC and IBM were at the peak of their financial powers, they already had lost the war for young IQ. The bright and bold were flocking to the new personal computer industry.
It’s hard to believe, but Microsoft, in 2004, has become a company run by gray hairs. Mr. Gates and Mr. Ballmer will turn 50 in the next 20 months. Older yet, with snowy white hair, is Jim Allchin, who directs the future of the company’s crown jewel, the Windows operating system . . .

In this context, Mr. Karlgaard suggests that the true purpose of Microsoft’s recent stock buyback program and dividend announcement is actually to reinvigorate “the Deal:”

My guess is that outside investors were not Microsoft’s primary audience for last week’s announcement of a one-time $32 billion dividend payment, a $30 billion stock buyback, and a doubling of the annual dividend payment. No, this move was done to rally employee shareholders and future employee shareholders. Microsoft needs a way to attract and keep future Bill Gateses and Steve Ballmers. It needs to revive The Deal.
A year ago, Microsoft announced it had removed the heart of The Deal — stock options — in favor of restricted grants. An army of Microsoftologists parsed the move for deeper meaning. One analysis had it that Microsoft was merely acknowledging what Mr. Gates’s good friend Mr. Buffett had asserted — that the early 2000s would produce lousy returns in the stock market. If that turned out to be true, stock options would only disappoint employees, lead to bad morale at Microsoft and make it harder to recruit.
In retrospect, maybe Microsoft should have been more optimistic about the stock market. It might have joined Intel, Cisco and others in the battle to keep stock options. But Microsoft didn’t do that, and since there are no longer options for employees, only share reward — paying a higher dividend — is available as an incentive for high-IQ employees.
It’s not The Deal, but it’s a start.