I’ve already shared my views many times on performance-enhancing drugs in Major League Baseball, so I didn’t want to comment on the Mitchell Commission Report until I had an opportunity to read it. Now that I have, here’s my bottom-line conclusion:

$20 million for that?

What is initially most striking about the Mitchell Report is its sloppiness (couldn’t they even fix the line spacing and pagination before publishing the damn thing?). The only hard evidence in the 400 plus page report is exhibit D, which contains copies of checks and money orders that players and trainers allegedly used to buy performance-enhancing drugs from Kirk Radomski.

Thus, in almost two years of “work,” the only hard evidence that the Mitchell Commission could generate is that which was given to them by federal prosecutors who investigated and prosecuted Radomski, and then leaned on him to talk with the commission. There is a discussion dealing with the BALCO and Signature pharmacy investigations, but the product of the rest of the commission’s work is statements attributed to anonymous and a relatively few named individuals who contend that they know about certain players who used performance-enhancing drugs.

Meanwhile, the report’s lack of perspective is stunning. One section is actually devoted to sportswriter comments on baseball and steroids! What is that doing in a supposedly serious report? There is no mention of the scientific uncertainty regarding the impact that steroids and other PEDs have on performance in baseball. Similarly, there is no statistical analysis to support the report’s suggestion that PED use was even a meaningful factor in the elevated hitting levels of the late 1990’s. As anyone who follows baseball knows, there were numerous variables besides performance-enhancing drugs that impacted the surge in hitting during the late 1990’s.

And that’s not all. The report fails to place its findings in the context of the fact that MLB had no enforceable policy or regulation banning steroids until September 2002, did not have a testing program until 2004 and did not ban human growth hormone until 2005. As a number of commentators have already noted, why on earth are Mark McGwire and other ballplayers being condemned for taking androstenedione (a supplement that produces testosterone) when it could be purchased over-the-counter and didn’t even violate MLB rules at the time?

But what is arguably most galling about the Mitchell Commission Report is its utter lack of historical perspective regarding the use of PEDs within the highly-competitive environment of professional baseball.

Performance-enhancing drugs have been a mainstay of professional baseball for at least the past two generations. Before the steroid era, the PED of choice in MLB was amphetamines, which — as with steroids over the past decade — were used liberally and with the tacit consent of the MLB clubs. Amidst the catcalls from some corners that players who used steroids should be denied entry into the Hall of Fame, it should be noted that no serious consideration has even been given to denying a place in the Hall to star players who used amphetamines during their careers.

As with steroids, amphetamine use was the direct result of the physically-draining nature of the MLB season and the pathologically competitive environment that the MLB owners promote and MLB fans love. The players who took steroids and other PED’s over the past decade were attempting to improve their bodies’ capacity to endure that punishing workload (regardless of whether their protocols were really effective), just as the players who used amphetamines in earlier eras were attempting to improve their attention span and reaction time.

Isn’t it ironic that the Mitchell Commission and much of the mainstream media vilifies professional ballplayers who used PEDs in an attempt to prevent their bodies from breaking down, while MLB management and the same mainstream media for decades have lauded “tough” injured players who “played with pain” through their ailments, even as MLB clubs pressured medication on the players, often at serious risk to the players’ health and careers?

The Mitchell Commission didn’t have access to most of the players because of the Players Union’s decision not to cooperate, but the commission did have complete access to employees of the MLB clubs and the Baseball Commissioner’s office. Despite that broad access, the report is almost completely silent on the role of MLB management in establishing the culture in which PEDs became an integral part of competing for and maintaining a precious MLB roster spot. Likewise, the report provides precious little information on how the Commissionerís Office and the MLB clubs addressed the growing problem of PEDs in MLB. The Mitchell Commission’s failure to include this readily available information in the report had to be intentional and reflects a concerted effort by the commission to keep the focus of the report on the players.

And Mitchell got $20 mil for his law firm’s work? Good work if you can get it, I guess. But not work of which he should be proud.

Update: J.C. Bradbury proposes a creative way to deter PED use in baseball.

Well, one thing’s clear — new Stros General Manager Ed Wade is not risk averse!
The six player deal that is bringing star shortstop Miguel Tejada to the Stros has already been thoroughly analyzed around the blogosphere, so there really is not much to add. From what I’ve seen, most folks think the Stros gave up too much for Tejada. I’m not sure about that, but I’m not sure that this trade helps the Stros all that much, either.
As regular readers of this blog know, the Stros’ decline over the past two seasons since their World Series team of 2005 has been for different reasons. The 2006 Stros fell short in the mediocre National League Central because their strong pitching finally could not overcome the club’s chronically anemic hitting. Then, after Stros management took steps to improve the club’s hitting for the 2007 season, the Stros pitching staff fell apart as the club’s subpar defense contributed to the staff’s struggles.

Continue reading →

Skip Sauer reminds us that Major League Baseball owners have very long memories. Phil Miller also chimes in.

Two topics on this blog are legal matters and baseball, so Barry Bonds has been a frequent subject of posts here over the past four years. Inasmuch as this post from over two years ago speculated that Bonds would be indicted, regular readers of this blog weren’t surprised when the shoe finally dropped on Bonds this past week.
The Bonds indictment was met with typical self-righteous vindication by much of the mainstream media, but the blogs have thankfully provided a much more measured analysis of the charges. For example:

Peter Henning provides this excellent analysis (see also here) of the indictment and the probable course of the prosecution. Also, JC Bradbury compiles some thoughts from other legal commentators about the Bonds case, and Keith Scherer provides this extensive analysis of the Bonds case;
Norm Pattis provides this interesting post that analyzes the probable prison sentence that Bonds is facing, which is far less than those typically reported in the mainstream media. Thankfully, Bonds does not appear to face a draconian trial penalty if he chooses to defend himself at trial;
Reason’s Hit & Run blog provides this balanced compendium of blog posts and articles from over the years that remind us that witch hunts are common when a controversial person such as Bonds is prosecuted for covering up an alleged crime when the investigation was actually into the alleged crime, not the cover up; and
Along those same lines, Scott Henson questions the prosecution’s motives and judgment in pursuing Bonds.

And as Bonds is being singled out while more popular ballplayers have had a pass on being investigated for alleged illegal use of steroids, I’m trying to figure out why the Apple Rule is not available to protect Bonds? Could it be for the same reason that it was not available to former heavyweight boxing champion Jack Johnson during an earlier era?

New Stros General Manager Ed Wade’s first major move was to end Brad Lidge’s career with the Stros. Wade traded Lidge and utilityman Eric Bruntlett to the Phillies for CF Michael Bourn (a Houston native and former University of Houston player), reliever Geoff Geary and AA 3B Michael Costanzo.
I’m a firm believer that you evaluate trades primarily on the front end. A Major League ballclub wants its general manager to take reasonable risks in an attempt to improve the club. Because of the nature of risk, a reasonable trade can turn out bad. The Jason Jennings trade is a good recent example. It was a decent trade on the front end, but injury risk undermined the Stros’ purpose for the trade. Sure, many local pundits condemned the trade after the Stros risk was realized, but that’s an unfair way to evaluate a trade. If a GM is going to be ridiculed after the fact for taking risks to help the club, then that’s going to deter the GM from taking those risks. That’s a poor policy for developing and maintaining a successful ballclub.
Thus, evaluating this trade on the front end, it looks like a pretty good deal for the Stros, despite having to give up Lidge. One of the favorite pastimes of Stros fans over the past couple of seasons has been to psychoanalyze Lidge, who has taken it all in good-natured stride. His story is a compelling one. During the 2004 season, Lidge burst on the scene in essentially his second season of Major Leage Baseball and was, at least for a part of that season, the best relief pitcher in MLB and one of the primary reasons why the Stros won 36 out of their final 46 regular season games to make the playoffs and eventually come within a game of the 2004 World Series. In 94.2 innings that season, Lidge had a microscopic 1.90 ERA and saved 26 more runs than an average National League pitcher would have saved in the same number of innings (RSAA, explained here).
Lidge was very good again during the 2005 season (2.29 ERA/14 RSAA in 70.2 innings), but the first cracks in his armor began to show late that season. With the Stros one out away from the 2005 World Series and Lidge dominating the Cardinals, Albert Pujols hammered a game-winning Game 5 NLCS shot that still has not come back down to Earth. Lidge’s confidence seemed to evaporate in the wake of Pujols’ massive tater.
By the end of the following season (2006), Lidge had performed worse over the course of the season than virtually any other regular member of the Stros’ pitching staff (5.28 ERA/-6 RSAA in 75 innings). It was not really difficult to understand why — Lidge lost the ability to throw his devastating slider for strikes consistently. As a result, hitters laid off Lidge’s slider and laid into his fastball, which Lidge does not locate particularly well. Moreover, Lidge has a long history of arm and specifically elbow problems owing to his violent mechanics — as a starter in the low minors, he appeared in just 19 games from 1999 to 2001. His struggles with his control over the past couple of seasons just might indicate that the future injury risk for Lidge is quite high.
Lidge did make a nice comeback in 2007 (6 RSAA/3.36 ERA in 67 IP) from his horrifying 2006 season, but he still struggled with his control frequently. Curiously, the Stros delayed his knee surgery to remove loose cartilage until after the season, so it’s clear now that they were showcasing him for a possible trade. Lidge is talented and an asset for any pitching staff, but his one dominant season (2004) does not mean that he will regain his stature as a dominant closer. My sense is that Chad Qualls may well end up being a better fit for that role.
Inasmuch as the Stros need to re-stock the young talent on their big league club and in their minor league system, trading veteran talent such as Lidge in his last year before free agency makes sense. Bourn is a potential leadoff man with on-base skills that Willy Taveras never mastered, and he runs and plays CF well. The downside risk on Bourn is that he will be an inexpensive OBP and defensive tool for a couple of years. Finally, picking up Bourn allows the Stros to move Hunter Pence to right field and dangle Luke Scott as trade bait for more pitching.
The prospect in the deal — Costanzo — is not a top notch prospect at third, but he projects as an average MLB 3B by his 270 AVG./.368 OBA/.490 SLG in his age-23 season in AA ball. Inasmuch as it is doubtful that Ty Wigginton is the long range answer for the Stros at 3B, it is conceivable that Constanzo could make Wigginton available as trade bait before the end of next season. That’s the kind of flexibility that the Stros have lacked over the past several seasons as their minor league system became depleted.
Geary can be a serviceable reliever for the Stros, but I’m not going to get too excited about him until I see how he adjusts to the short porch in Minute Maid Park’s left field. He pitched very well for the Phillies during their playoff stretch drive this past season, but ge is not a flamethrower. Right-handed offspeed pitchers (starting with the forgettable 2000 performance of Jose Lima) don’t generally do all that well at Minute Maid. especially pitchers such as Geary who do not generate an overabundance of ground balls.
Nevertheless, I like this trade. Bourn has the potential to be what Taveras probably will never be, Geary can contribute right away and Costanzo is a solid prospect. All in all, a good day’s work for the Stros new GM.
Update: Jeff Albert provides this optimistic analysis of the Lidge deal from the Phillies’ perspective.

Dr. Michael Lewis penned this NY Times op-ed last weekend in which he asserts that Major League Baseball’s present revenue-sharing formula does little to affect the quality of the various teams on average, even though small market teams do well now and then:

The Colorado Rockiesí appearance in the World Series last month may have looked like evidence of success for revenue-sharing. Like the Oakland Athletics, the Minnesota Twins, the Detroit Tigers and the San Diego Padres last year, a small-market team proved competitive enough to reach the playoffs. But revenue sharing, as it is now structured, actually makes lasting success less likely for all five of these teams. [. . .]
Since 1998, millions of dollars have been transferred from richer teams to poorer ones in an attempt to let all teams share in the economic advantages associated with playing in big markets ó a large fan base, lots of press coverage and lucrative local cable television contracts. Last year, more than $300 million was transferred.
Yet since revenue sharing began, at least one team from each of the big four markets ó New York, Los Angeles, Chicago and Boston ó has appeared in every World Series except 2006. In the 10 years before 1998, in contrast, only two Series included one of those big-market teams.
The problem is that the teams receiving payments have come to use them as a primary source of income ó rather than to build winning teams. . .

As John Palmer sums up:

Revenue sharing has little impact on the expected marginal revenue and marginal costs of ticket sales, and it especially has little impact on the expected marginal revenue product and marginal factor costs of hiring more talent for the team. As a result, many teams like, say, Tampa Bay, respond to what is essentially a lump-sum transfer by pocketing the extra cash. [. . .]
So revenue-sharing also reduces the marginal revenue of an expected win, and not just for the big-market teams that are taxed to support the programme; it also reduces the incentive for small market teams, the recipients of revenue-sharing, to win too.