The Toy Cannon

WynnJ-8x10.jpgJohn Brattain over at the Hardball Times wrote this well researched article about one of the most underappreciated Stros players of all-time, Jimmy Wynn.
Wynn — who was nicknamed “the Toy Cannon” — toiled for the Stros during the club’s difficult early years when the club was not blessed with much talent. Moreover, his career hitting numbers do not compare well with statistics of today’s sluggers because Wynn played in a different, more pitching dominated era (1963-77). Nevertheless, as Brattain points out, Wynn was one of the best centerfielders of his era:

I?ve often been amazed that Wynn never got more love from the BBWAA or the VC in Hall of Fame consideration. No, I?m not advocating him, but when I watched this little dynamo, I was always very impressed how he played the game.
When you consider that he played the bulk of his career in what were at the time the toughest hitter?s parks in the game (the Astrodome and Dodger Stadium) his 291 home runs looks very impressive. Wynn was a plus defender (albeit a rag arm which caused right fielder Joe Ferguson to cut in front of Wynn to make a catch with a runner on third during the 1974 World Series) with a terrific batting eye. He has a number of legitimate knocks against him: short career (6653 AB), no hardware save three All Star Game rings, just 26 post-season AB, no big career milestones etc.
According to Lee Sinins? sabermetric encyclopedia, Wynn was the second best (albeit a distant second) CF in the NL from 1960 to 1980 (using the “Runs Created Against Position” (“RCAA”) metric). If there was ever an “Unappreciated Player Hall-of-Fame,” I?m guessing Wynn would go in on the first ballot.

Brattain’s article points to another reason why the RCAA is particularly valuable to evaluate hitting ability across different eras. RCAA measures the two most important things in winning baseball games ? that is, creating runs and avoiding making outs — by computing the number of outs that a particular player uses in creating runs for his team. RCAA then compares that number to the amount of runs that an average player in the league would create while using an equivalent number of outs. Inasmuch as the hypothetical average player’s RCAA is always zero, a player can have either a positive RCAA — which indicates he is an above average hitter (i.e., Barry Bonds) — or a negative RCAA, which means he is performing below average (i.e., Brad Ausmus).
Thus, RCAA measures a player’s hitting ability against that of an average player each season and, as a result, a player’s lifetime RCAA reflects how well that player hit in comparison to an average player during that player’s career. Accordingly, Wynn’s RCAA reflects how well he compared to an average hitter during his era, just as the current Stros’ hitters’ RCAA reflects how they measure against the average player in today’s era. Inasmuch as Wynn was consistently in the top ten in the National League RCAA during a good part of his career — which is basically the stature of current players Bags, Bidg and Berkman during their prime seasons — the Toy Cannon remains one of the best Stros players of all-time.

Stros trade Redding for catching prospect

Redding.jpgThe Stros traded (finally) disgruntled pitcher Tim Redding today to the San Diego Padres for 25 year old catching prospect Humberto Quintero, who may be the best catcher on the Stros’ squad when he hits town. Inasmuch as Quintero has a total of 95 lifetime at bats, that gives you an idea of the sorry state of the catching position on the Stros’ squad.
Baseball Prospectus projects Quintero as a .236 BA/.273 OBA/.335 SLG. hitter for this season, which compares favorably with either Brad Ausmus (.239/.303/.324) or Raul Chavez (.228/.270/.320). The following is a Baseball Prospectus blurb on Quintero:

At least the young backstop finally hit better [at AAA Portland last season] in addition to terrorizing baserunners. He profiles as a low-strikeout, low-walk hitter with modest pop, but the Pads are wishcasting for some .290 seasons with doubles power. With Ramon Hernandez’s contract up at year’s end, they may give Quintero his shot sooner than expected.

Translated: the Stros continue their attraction to “catch and throw” prospects at catcher, but at least this one is only 25 and may develop into something more than either Ausmus or Chavez. It’s Springtime — we can dream, can’t we?
More on the Stros later in the week as the final roster is finalized and the club returns from Spring Training for Opening Day next Tuesday.

The real reason why Barry might not play?

barrybonds.jpgBaseball fans are opening their newspapars this morning to this article reporting that star San Francisco Giants slugger Barry Bonds, the best baseball player of his generation, might not play this upcoming season because of a minor knee injury and the effect that media scrutiny of Bonds’ steroid use has had on his family. However, as Paul Harvey would say, “here’s the rest of the story.”
Turns out that Bonds’ former mistress — Kimberly Bell — is apparently singing like a canary to the same federal grand jury in San Francisco that has been investigating the alleged illegal distribution of steroids that resulted in the indictment of certain individuals affiliated with BALCO (previous posts here and here). This San Francisco Chronicle article reports that Ms. Bell has not only testified that Bonds admitted to her that he used steroids, but that he gave her $80,000 from autographing baseballs in increments of just under $10,000 to avoid currency transaction reporting requirements. Federal prosecutors do not look kindly upon such activities.
As noted in this earlier post, Bonds allegedly claimed in his grand jury testimony several months ago that that he did not understand that some of the supplements that his BALCO trainer was giving him were steroids. Inasmuch as Ms. Bell’s alleged testimony reflects that prosecutors may be preparing to charge Bonds with perjury, currency reporting violations, and possible tax evasion, Bonds’ lack of desire to play this season may have more to do with preparing a criminal defense than anything else.

Good news from Kissimmee

Berkman.jpgThe Stros have scheduled a news conference for this afternoon in which they will announce that the club and All-Star Lance Berkman have agreed to a six year, $85 million contract.
Berkman is one of the best hitters in Major League Baseball, and the contract avoids the possibility of the Stros losing their best homegrown player since Bidg as Berkman could have become a free agent after the 2005 season. To understand just how good a player Berkman is, consider how many many more runs that Berkman has created compared to the number of runs an average Major League player generates.
That statistic — called “runs created against average” or “RCAA” — is particularly valuable to evaluate hitting because it focuses on the two most important things in winning baseball games ? that is, creating runs and avoiding making outs. RCAA basically computes the number of outs that a particular player uses in creating runs for his team and then compares that number to the amount of runs that an average player in the league would create while using an equivalent number of outs. A player can have either a positive RCAA — which indicates he is an above average hitter (i.e., Barry Bonds) — or a negative RCAA, which means he is performing below average (i.e., Brad Ausmus).
Over the past 4 years, Berkman ranks 6th in all of Major League Baseball in runs created against average:
1 Barry Bonds 597
2 Todd Helton 284
3 Albert Pujols 281
4 Jim Thome 250
5 Manny Ramirez 240
6 Lance Berkman 236
7 Jason Giambi 225
8 Alex Rodriguez 218
9 Jim Edmonds 216
10 Gary Sheffield 210
Kudos to Drayton McLane and Tim Purpura in locking Berkman up. It’s a happy day in Stros land.

If you really want to appreciate the Stros, then read this

Why are some Major League Baseball teams are chronically bad?

The Stros have consistently been one of the better Major League Baseball teams during the Bidg-Bags era.

On the other hand, during the latter part of that era, the Tampa Bay Devil Rays have been one of the worst MLB teams. This St. Petersburg Times article reviews the futility that permeates the Devil Ray franchise:

Wednesday is the 10-year anniversary of the awarding of the Major League franchise to Tampa Bay, but there is little to celebrate. After seven seasons, the Devil Rays have been losers on the field, failures at the gate, and criticized by business publications, baseball experts and their own fans as prime examples of how an organization should not be run.

What went wrong?

Well, interestingly, the same things that doom many startup businesses. The club (business) was undercapitalized from the beginning. Management was inexperienced, which resulted in multiple bad personnel decisions.

To make matters worse, a poor business entity structure made it virtually impossible to replace the incompetent management. Finally, the fan (customer) base turned out to be a mirage and no one enjoys going to the Tampa ballpark (store). Beyond that, the club (business) is doing just fine:

Forbes magazine labeled the Rays the “most horrific” franchise of the modern era and the “worst-managed organization” in baseball. Sports Illustrated called them the “worst run franchise in the game.” The Sporting News pronounced them in need of “a new owner, a new general manager and a new ballpark in a new city.”
They have been the subject of contraction speculation, rumors of financial ruin and punchlines by late-night TV hosts.

Their best hitter, Aubrey Huff, has referred to them as “basically a joke.” One of their former general partners, Bill Griffin, says ownership is like “managing a war with too little resources.” And one of their current investors, Gary Markel, says he isn’t excited about the upcoming season because “we’re going to get killed.”

How’s that for spring training optimism?

Hat tip to Professor Sauer over at the Sports Economist for the link to the article and for making all Stros fans feel a bit better after a tough off-season.

A really bad season

I knew that Sammy Sosa had a bad season last year, at least by his standards. However, you know that it was a really bad season when it costs the owners of the club three cents a share.

What a way to start spring training

This week started well yesterday when the mailman delivered the always eagerly awaited copy of the Baseball Prospectus, which is flat out the best annual baseball book on the market.
So, in anticipation of reviewing this year’s edition, I cruised over to the Baseball Prospectus ($) website to check things out, only to find Joe Sheehan dropping some serious bad karma on the Stros. After identifying the Indians as the team most likely to take a big step forward this season, Mr. Sheehan votes the Stros most likely to take a big step in the other direction:

The flip side of the Indians’ story is that of the Astros. Their Cinderella run from seventh in the wild-card chase to the seventh game of the ALCS was one of ’04’s great stories. It also provided an object lesson in how the length of the baseball season makes fools of those of us who make broad statements based on how things look at any point in time.
On February 28, though, it’s hard to see how the Astros can repeat last year’s success. They are going to lose a ton of runs from even last year’s average attack–seventh in the NL in EqA. Carlos Beltran is gone. Jeff Kent is gone. Their best hitter, Lance Berkman, is going to miss at least a few weeks rehabbing a knee injury. Jeff Bagwell and Craig Biggio are a year older. Even in the best-case scenario, where Chris Burke and Jason Lane are allowed to win jobs and both hit to expectations, that just makes up for the losses of Beltran and Kent.

After pointing out the Stros’ inexplicable continued reliance on Brad Ausmus, and the problems that Bidg creates in blocking the progress of younger players, Mr. Sheehan turns to the Stros’ pitching staff:

The Astros aren’t going to make it up on the pitching side. Keeping Roger Clemens around just kept them running in place. They still have the same depth issues as they did a year ago, with a host of injury cases and suspects vying to fill out the rotation behind Clemens and Roy Oswalt and the bullpen in front of Brad Lidge. A healthy Andy Pettitte makes up some of that, but there’s still the question of whether two starters can be found from among Brandon Backe, Carlos Hernandez, Tim Redding, or even a longshot like Ezequiel Astacio.

Mr. Sheehan concludes with the following ominous warning:

Last year’s playoff run happened because the front end of the Astros’ roster included some very dominant players. They’re down two stars this year, and the likelihood that Clemens and Lidge can match ’04’s work is slim. They don’t have the depth to make up for that kind of slippage. Not only are the Astros unlikely to return to the postseason, I doubt they can stay in contention.

Well, that analysis did not make my day.
I will have more on the Stros later during spring training, but my short retort to the above analysis is that Mr. Sheehan overstates the Stros’ problems, just like he did last August in this earlier post. Thus, even the best sabermetricians are not infallible.
Although the Stros are clearly a team in transition from the Biggio-Bagwell era, I’m cautiously optimistic that the club can continue to contend even during this period. Yes, losing Beltran hurt, but as noted here, not as much for the long term prospects of the club as one might think. Moroever, my sense is that the loss of Kent will be nowhere near as big a problem as Mr. Sheehan makes it out to be, particularly if Chris Burke emerges as a solid major leaguer. In fact, if now seasoned veterans such as Ensberg and Everett can become just average National League hitters this season, then that improvement will likely more than make up for any difference in run production between Beltran and his replacement, Jason Lane. Finally, both of the Stros’ main National League Central rivals — the Cardinals and the Cubs — are notably weaker this season, so I don’t see either of those clubs, or the improved Reds, running away from the Stros in the division race.
Consequently, despite Mr. Sheehan’s reservations, don’t give up on the Stros just yet. This is a club that has been pretty darn good for a very long time, and I don’t see it as one that will slide into mediocrity without a good fight. Let’s at least wait to see how spring training unfolds.

Breakfast with Bill James

Rich Lederer over at the Baseball Analysts posts this first segment in a three part series of his recent interview with Bill James, who is the creator of Sabermetrics, the mathematical and statistical analysis of baseball records. Check out this fascinating interview, which includes such interesting observations as the following:

RL: In the 1979 Abstract, you noted that Rod Carew once swung at two pitches when he was being intentionally walked, trying to get the pitcher to throw him something he could reach. Do you think that is a strategy Barry Bonds could employ today?
BJ: I don’t know. I would argue about it this way. If it is genuinely advantageous for the defense to intentionally walk Barry Bonds, then logically it has to be defensible for Bonds to swing at one or two pitches to try to negate that advantage and try to tempt them into throwing him a pitch. On the other hand, if hitters never react by swinging at pitches to try to stop the opposing team from intentionally walking them, the implication is that the offense always agrees to accept it even though the defense thinks the walk is helpful, which seems somewhat illogical.

A couple of previous interviews with Mr. James can be reviewed here and here. Mr. James was hired last year by the Red Sox as a consultant and, although he would attribute the Red Sox subsequent World Series Championship as pure coincidence, I’m not so sure. Bill James is one smart cookie on matters relating to baseball.
Update: Here is the second segment of the interview.
And the third.

Thoughts on the regulation of minor league football and basketball

Several developments over the past month or so have prompted me to think about the National Collegiate Athletic Association‘s regulation of minor league football and basketball. Although it is an unincorporated association that includes many of the best universities in America, the NCAA has developed into a hulking and bloated bureaucracy that is the poster child for ineffective and misguided regulation.
One of the developments that triggered my thinking was the disclosure this past week that one of the best players on each of the University of Texas’ basketball, football and baseball teams had been declared academically ineligible for the spring semester. That’s not much of a return on the astounding $1.6 million a year that UT is currently spending on academic assistance for its athletes.
This UT academic problems come on the heels of the announcement last month that the NCAA — whose rules and regulations manual already resembles the Internal Revenue Code in terms of size and complexity — approved the first phase of a “landmark” academic reform package under which about 30 percent of Division I football teams (including UT’s) would lose scholarships if the reforms were to be implemented immediately. The demand for professors with expertise in developing basket-weaving curricula is going to increase at more than a few NCAA member institutions in response to this latest NCAA initiative.
Meanwhile, partly as a result of the NCAA’s strict regulation of compensation that can be paid to athletes in intercollegiate football and basketball (i.e., essentially scholarships), salaries for college coaches skyrocket at the same time as a black market for compensating college football and basketball players continues to run rampant, despite the NCAA and now the government‘s efforts to curtail it.
Finally, a college baseball game in Houston over the weekend between Rice and Texas A&M during the Minute Maid Classic Baseball Classic drew almost 20,000 fans. That’s right — a college baseball game, in February, drew almost 20,000 fans.
What are we to make of all of this?
Well, a bit of historical perspective helps. For all of its faults, Major League Baseball is the only one of the three major professional sports (football, basketball and baseball) that has capitalized and subsidized a thorough minor league development system. Oh, the NBA has its development league and the NFL has NFL Europe, but both of these ventures pale in comparison to the depth and success of baseball’s minor league system. As a result, it’s relatively rare for a baseball player to play in the Major Leagues without spending at least some time playing minor league baseball. In comparison, relatively few of the players in the NFL or the NBA ever play in NFL-Europe or the NBADL.
The reason for this is not that professional football and basketball players do not need to develop their skills in a minor league. Rather, the reason is that professional football and basketball simply rely on a ready-made minor league systems to develop most of their players — that is, intercollegiate football and basketball.
This odd arrangement arose partly as a result of how professional sports developed in America over the past century. On one hand, professional baseball was already well-established in the late 19th century when intercollegiate football and basketball started taking root. Thus, MLB developed its minor league system as a necessary means to develop its players decades before intercollegiate baseball became popular on college campuses. Intercollegiate baseball has only become a source of player development for professional baseball over the past couple of decades or so, and it is still rare for a college baseball player to go straight from playing college baseball to playing in the Major Leagues.
On the other hand, despite the popularity of the NFL and the NBA today, the success of of those professional sports is still relatively recent in comparison with MLB’s business success over the past century. Until the 1960’s in regard to football, and the 1980’s in regard to basketball, neither professional sport was particularly vibrant financially or as popular with the public as their intercollegiate counterparts. Thus, until relatively recently, neither the NFL nor the NBA has been in a financial position to capitalize a minor league system of player development similar to MLB’s minor league system.
However, now that the NFL and the NBA owners have the financial wherewithal to subsidize viable minor league systems, they have little economic incentive to do so. Inasmuch as the NCAA and its member institutions have transformed intercollegiate football and basketball into a free minor league system for the NFL and the NBA, the owners of professional football and basketball teams have gladly accepted the NCAA member institutions’ generosity.
The arrangement has been extraordinary successful for professional football and basketball owners, who have seen the value of their clubs skyrocket over the past two decades. A substantial part of that increase in value is attributable to avoiding the cost of developing a minor league system, as well as taking advantage of liberal public financing arrangements for the construction of new stadiums and areanas. That latter point is a subject for another day.
In comparison, the NCAA member institutions’ acceptance of minor league professional status has not been nearly as successful. Yes, the top tier of intercollegiate football and basketball programs have had been successful financially, but the athletic programs of most NCAA member institutions struggle financially.
Moreover, almost every NCAA member institution compromises academic integrity at least to some extent in order to attract the best players possible to play on the institution’s football and basketball teams. As a result, respected academics such as UT Chancellor Mark Yudof regularly have to endure troubling scandals (in Yudof’s case, as president of the University of Minnesota) that underscore the tension between the business of minor league professional sports and the academic integrity of NCAA member institutions. The NCAA member institutions’ reaction to these conflicts has generally been to increase regulation with usually unsatisfactory results.
So, what is the solution to this mess? Well, it’s doubtful that more regulation of college football and basketball is the answer. Rather, my sense is that the model for reform is right in the front of the noses of the NCAA member institutions — i.e., college baseball.
Due to MLB’s well-structured minor league system of player development, a baseball player emerging from high school has a choice: Do I accept a moderate compensation level to play professional ball in the minor leagues in the hope of developing to the point of being a highly-paid MLB player? Or do I hedge the risk of not developing sufficiently to play at the MLB level by accepting a subsidized college education while developing my skills playing intercollegiate baseball?
This simple choice is the key difference between intercollegiate football and basketball, on one hand, and intercollegiate baseball on the other. Except for the relatively few high school basketball players who are sufficiently developed to be able to play professional basketball in the NBA or Europe immediately after high school, high school football and basketball players’ only realistic choice for developing the skills to play at the highest professional level is college football or basketball.
Consequently, each year, the NCAA member institutions fall over themselves trying to accomodate a large pool of talented football and basketball players who have little or no interest in collegiate academics. Rather than placing the cost and risk of these players’ development on the professional football and basketball clubs, the NCAA member institutions continue to incur the huge cost of subsidizing development of these players while engaging in the charade that these professional players are really “student-athletes.”
In comparison, most top college baseball teams are generally comprised of two types of players — a few professional-caliber players combined with a greater number of well-motivated student-athletes. That is an attractive blend of players, and the tremendous increase in popularity of college baseball over the past decade reflects the entertaining competition that results from such a player mix. Heck, the college baseball system is structured so well that even a small academic institution can win the National Championship in college baseball.
Nevertheless, transforming the current minor league system in college football and basketball into the college baseball model is going to take fundamental reforms within the NCAA. Primarily, it’s going to require the courage and resilience of the presidents of the NCAA member institutions, who need to stand up and quit being played as patsies by the NFL and NBA owners who prefer to foist the risk of funding and administering minor league systems on to the NCAA member institutions.
Moreover, such a transformation of college football and basketball from entrenched minor league systems will be risky. The quality of play in college football and basketball will suffer a bit, even though the competition likely would not. In time, such a transformation would force both the NFL and the NBA to expand their minor league systems to develop the skills of the pool of physically-gifted athletes who prefer to develop their skills as minor league professionals rather than as college students. Competition from such true minor league football and basketball teams might result in a decrease in popularity of college football and basketball.
However, such a transformation would remove most of the galling incentives to compromise academic integrity and to engage in the black market for compensating players that are rife under the current system. Likewise, once viable professional minor leagues in football and basketball exist, football and basketball players will have the same choice coming out of high school that has generated the well-motivated mix of players that has made college baseball such an entertaining intercollegiate sport over the past decade.
Now that type of choice — rather than the choice of which basket-weaving course to take in order to remain eligible — is the kind of choice that NCAA member institutions should be encouraging.

A note on Roy Oswalt

A tip of the hat today goes to Stros owner Drayton McLane and GM Tim Purpura for signing ace pitcher Roy Oswalt to a two year $16.9 million contract. The contract will take Oswalt up to his final arbitration year of 2007, so the Stros will have to deal with the risk that he will become a free agent after that year unless they agree on a long term deal.
Although the Rocket is the highest paid Stros player, Oswalt is currently their best starting pitcher. After 3.01 ERA/33 Runs Saved Against Average (“RSAA,” explained here) and 2.97 ERA/21 RSAA seasons in 2002 and 2003, Oswalt had a 3.49 ERA/22 RSAA in 35 starts (36 games) last season, most of which was pitched with a painful abdominal injury. His career ERA is 3.11 compared to his league average of 4.26, and he has a career 105 RSAA in 120 games.
Just to give you an idea of the level of talent that the Stros have in Oswalt, consider the following, courtesy of Lee Sinins. Over the past 50 years in Major League Baseball, Oswalt ranks 7th in the NL in RSAA through the age of 26:
RSAA
1 Tom Seaver 174
2 Don Drysdale 173
3 Ferguson Jenkins 134
4 Pedro Martinez 129
5 Dwight Gooden 118
6 Jim Maloney 106
7 Roy Oswalt 105
8 Gary Nolan 97
9 Jose Rijo 91
10 Greg Maddux 84
Not bad company, Roy.