The Stros’ legacy of bad trades

Jason%20Jennings%20072007.jpgThis earlier post explored the possibility that Stros management got snookered in the trade for pitcher Jason Jennings because of possible undisclosed arm problems. After serving a stint on the disabled list with elbow inflammation earlier this season, Jennings has come back to pitch sport a 4.76 ERA in 70 innings, which means that Jennings has given up 5 more runs than an average National League pitcher would have given up in the same number of innings (RSAA, explained here). To top off this uninspiring season-long performance, Jennings gave up 7 earned runs in 5 innings in his last outing against the hapless Nationals (40-55). That prompted the following observation from Baseball Prospectus ($) injury expert, Will Carroll:

“He’s done,” the source told me after watching Jason Jennings pitch [against the Nationals]. A very knowledgeable man that I trust on pitching, he thinks that Jennings’ shoulder is “catching,” reducing his velocity and changing his mechanics enough to reduce movement. He also doesn’t believe that Jennings made any improvement after a DL stint, implying that there’s more going on inside the arm. Jennings’ results back up this assertion, and point to perhaps another period on the DL in the near future. With Jennings’ impending free agency, it will be curious how the Astros handle this. Will they acknowledge their trade for Jennings didn’t work, or will they try to get whatever they can from him in a season that’s lost?

Thus, the trade for Jennings — which was a reasonable risk at the time — is not turning out well. At least the Stros can take solace in the fact that they didn’t give up much in the trade — all three of the players that the Stros gave up (pitchers Jason Hirsh and Taylor Buchholz, and centerfielder Willy Taveras) have been below-average so far during their Major League careers and none of them is above-average this season.
Nevertheless, many Stros fans — apparently confused by the club’s poor play this sesaon — think the Jennings deal was a horrible trade. Earlier this week, I even heard a host of one of the ubiquitous sports talk shows on Houston’s radio landscape — a barren wasteland of insightful thought with the exception of Charlie Pallilo and a couple of others — predict that “the Jennings trade will go down as one of the worst trades in Stros history.”
Come on. The radio host apparently did not take the time to review the Stros’ extraordinary legacy of bad trades:

1971: The Stros traded secondbaseman Joe Morgan in the prime of his career, pitcher Jack Billingham, shortstop Denis Menke, and outfielders Cesar Geronimo and Ed Armbrister to Cincinnati for firstbaseman Lee May, secondbaseman Tommy Helms and utility infielder Jimmy Stewart. Morgan cemented his Hall of Fame career with the Reds, while Billingham and Geronimo were also solid contributors in the Reds’ World Series teams of the 1970’s. For many years, this trade set the standard by which bad trades in Major League Baseball were compared.
1969: The Stros traded slugging outfielder Rusty Staub in the prime of his career to Montreal for Jesus Alou and Donn Clendenon. When Clendenon refused to report, Houston agreed to take pitchers Jack Billingham and Skip Guinn instead. The Stros did not have another hitter the caliber of Staub for over 20 years until Jeff Bagwell joined the club in 1991. Clendenon went on to help the Mets win the 1969 World Series.
1992: The Stros traded 24-year old pitcher Curt Schilling to Philadelphia for pitcher Jason Grimsley. Schilling went on to become one of the best starting pitchers of the following 15 year era and saved his teams 345 more runs over that period than an average National League pitcher would have saved during that time pitching the same number of innings.
1991: The Stros traded 24-year old centerfielder Kenny Lofton and infielder Dave Rohde to Cleveland for catcher Eddie Taubensee and pitcher Willie Blair. Over the past 16 seasons, Lofton has generated 234 more runs than an average National League player would have created over that span using the same number of outs as Lofton. Just to rub it in, the now 40-year old Lofton had his best series of the season several weeks ago against the Stros while playing with the Rangers.
1994: The Stros traded thirdbaseman Ken Caminiti, centerfielder Steve Finley, shortstop Andujar Cedeno, firstbaseman Roberto Petagine and pitchers Brian Williams and Sean Fesh to San Diego for outfielder Derek Bell, pitcher Doug Brocail, shortstop Ricky Gutierrez, pitcher Pedro Martinez (no, not that Pedro Martinez) outfielder Phil Plantier and infiedler Craig Shipley. Caminiti proceeded to become one of the best sluggers in the National League over the next four seasons with the Padres, while Finley has been a well above-average centerfielder for the past 13 seasons. On the other hand, Bell in 1999 had one of the worst seasons by an outfielder in Stros history by generating 32 fewer runs than an average National League player would have created using the same number of outs as Bell used.
1968: The Stros traded starting pitcher Mike Cuellar to Baltimore for Curt Blefary and John Mason. Cuellar went on to have a career season for the Orioles in 1969 (41 RSAA) and was a dominant starter for the O’s for the following five seasons. Blefary played one average season for the Stros before they traded him to the Yankees.
1971: The Stros traded 23 year old slugging firstbaseman John Mayberry and Dave Grangaard to Kansas City for pitchers Lance Clemons and Jim York. Over the next four seasons, Mayberry had the most productive stretch of his career as he generated 175 more runs during those seasons than an average National League player would have created using the same number of outs as Mayberry.

1998: The Stros traded SS Carlos Guillen and pitchers Freddy Garcia and John Halama to the Mariners for Randy Johnson. Johnson gave the Stros what they wanted — an ERA of 1.28 in 11 stretch-drive starts and a 1.93 ERA in two NLDS starts. But the Stros lost in the NLDS and Johnson signed with the Dbacks the next season. Guillen went on to become a three-time All-Star, Garcia, who won 117 games over the following nine seasons and Halama was a National League-league pitcher over the next eight seasons. This marked the beginning of the decline in the Stros’ farm system that now ranks as one of the worst in MLB.

If Hirsh, Buchholz or Taveras turns into a star player, then maybe the Jennings deal will be included among these truly horrid Stros trades. But until then, the Jennings trade will remain simply a reasonable risk that did not work out.

Dissecting the Stros’ woes

Biggio%20breaking%20bat.jpgThe Stros (40-54) won last night for the first time in five games since the All-Star Break, which has put the club in contention for the worst record in Major League Baseball this season. That performance prompted Baseball Prospectus to provide this “what’s busted” capsule summary ($) of the Stros’ woes:

What’s Busted? Organizational decision-making. Whether it’s putting Craig Biggio’s goal ahead of the ballclub’s fortunes, or Phil Garner’s fickle relationship with Lidge, or unquestioning Brad Ausmus cultism, or spending big money on Woody Williams and being surprised by the result, it’s fair to say that the Astros have consistently made the wrong choices when they have to freedom to make them, and only have happy results from thoseólike Hunter Penceówho force choices upon them.

Add to those bad decisions a string of bad drafts from 1998-2002 and the Stros have a real mess on their hands. In those five drafts, the Stros generated only a handful of productive players — Brad Lidge and Morgan Ensberg (1998); Jason Lane and Chris Sampson (1999); Chad Qualls and Eric Bruntlett (2000); Chris Burke and Matt Albers (2001); and nothing so far out of the 2002 draft, which is shaping up to be one of the worst drafts in Stros franchise history. The foregoing is not much of a return on investment in the Stros’ minor league development program.
Despite the clarity of the foregoing mistakes, Chronicle sports columnist Richard Justice continues to manage to to get it wrong in analyzing the Stros:

Tim Purpura’s biggest blunder was swapping Andy Pettitte and Roger Clemens for Woody Williams and Jason Jennings. It really begins with Pettitte. The Astros had such a dislike of his agent, Randy Hendricks, that they allowed it to influence their evaluation of the player. Bad mistake. Childish, too.
We’ll never know if they could have signed Pettitte. I suspect his heart was set on returning to New York. Close friends in the home clubhouse tell me he agonized over the decision and would have returned if the Astros had tried a little harder. Instead, they treated him like he was an optional part.
Neither he nor Roger Clemens have been great this season, but they’ve been far better than Woody Williams and Jason Jennings, who are a combined 5-16 with 14 quality starts and a 4.94 ERA. Pettitte and Clemens are 7-10 with 15 quality starts and a 4.25 ERA. To adjust the ERAs by league, Pettitte and Clemens are .18 of a run under their league average while Williams and Jennings are .65 of a run above.

Purpura’s biggest blunder? In point of fact, trading Pettitte and Clemens for Williams and Jennings hasn’t had much of an effect on the Stros’ season at all, while not signing them has had a huge positive impact on the Stros’ payroll. Had Pettitte and Clemens been pitching for the Stros this season, they would have saved the club about 27 more runs than Williams and Jennings to this point in the season. That translates to about 4-5 more wins, which would make the Stros record at best 45-49 and still far behind in the NL Central. Meanwhile, if the Stros had signed Pettitte and Clemens, then the club’s payroll would be bleeding by an additional $25 million or so over and above the aggregate $10.5 million or so that they are paying Williams and Jennings. Had that occurred, Justice would probably be criticizing the Stros for wasting a substantial chunck of the club’s payroll on a couple of high-injury risk veterans on the downside of their respective careers.
The bottom line on this season is that the Stros pitching staff has underperformed so badly that having both Pettitte and Clemens would not have improved that overall performance enough to matter. Stros General Manager Tim Purpura has made some mistakes, such as signing Williams in the first place. But electing to pass on overpaying Pettitte and Clemens was not among them.

It’s the season for youth baseball conflicts

mr_met.jpgHolland & Knight’s Tampa office has started an interesting area of specialization:

The signs at the New Tampa Little League field are clear: Please practice good sportsmanship at all times.
League officials say one parent has missed the message, and they’ve asked him to leave the park more than once.
But that parent also happens to be a lawyer for one of the largest law firms in Florida. Now he’s alleging that the New Tampa Little League defamed his character in front of parents, friends and clients, and he has hinted strongly at legal action.
Fred Grady, 47, a construction lawyer for Holland & Knight in Tampa, sent league president Monica Wooden a letter on Holland & Knight stationery. The letter, dated June 11, says the league officers’ actions and accusations damaged him. Pursuant to state law, the letter gives Wooden 30 days to send him a copy of the league’s insurance policies and coverage.
That letter capped off a series of e-mail exchanges between Grady and Wooden in which Grady repeatedly asked for a letter of apology from Linda Harrell, a league director who ordered him off the field on April 28. Grady wanted the letter sent to all parents, players and coaches on his son’s team, and he wanted it in time for the end-of-the-season party so he could read it aloud, Wooden said.
“I’m all about principle,” Wooden said. “But I’m not going to patronize some guy who needs something for his self-gratification.”
When Grady didn’t get the letter, he sent Wooden the e-mails.
“If NTLL decides or has decided the Director acted outside of her scope of authority then so be it but that issue will NOT be determined by me, but rather by a judge or jury if this matter proceeds,” said one e-mail bearing Grady’s name.
Another read: “If the NTLL is not prepared to resolve the matter along these lines then I will have no other choice but to take legal action against NTLL and Ms. Harrell individually.”
Grady requested the name of the league’s lawyer: “I assume NTLL does not have LOCAL counsel? Perhaps NTLL should consider retaining a local attorney.”

Read the entire piece. But that rhubarb is nothing compared to this bit of youth baseball sociopathy:

A judge refused to reduce the sentence of a former youth baseball coach convicted of offering a player money to bean a 9-year-old autistic teammate.
Mark Downs Jr., 29, had argued in his appeal that his former attorney wasn’t effective. But Fayette County Judge Ralph Warman ruled Monday that Downs’ arguments were without merit. He let stand Downs’ one- to six-year prison sentence imposed last year.
Downs was convicted of corruption of minors and simple assault for offering $25 to an 8-year-old boy to hit his mildly autistic teammate with a ball while warming up before a June 2005 playoff game. The younger boy testified at trial that, on Downs’ instructions, he purposely threw a ball that hit his teammate in the groin, then threw another that hit him in the ear.
Prosecutors said Downs didn’t want the autistic boy in the game because he didn’t play as well as his teammates. League rules require each player to play at least three innings.

Wow.

Now, that’s a home office

BattingCages1.jpgThe concept of the home office has been elevated to an entirely new level.

Stros 2007 Season Review, Part Four

Bidg%20acknowledging%20ovation.jpgSo, now that the Stros are done with that, where does the club go from here?
As the Stros (34-47) reached the halfway point of the 2007 season, that’s the question confronting the owner Drayton McLane and General Manager Tim Purpura. The club went 8-12 during the fourth 1/8th segment of the season after going 9-12, 11-9 and 6-14 during the first three (prior periodic season reviews here). That geneally abysmal performance removed any fleeting doubt that the Stros could compete for the National League Central division title. The Stros finished the first half of the season 13.5 games behind the division-leading Brewers (47-33), good for only fifth place in a mediocre six team division.
How has this happened to a club that is only a season and a half removed from a World Series appearance? As noted here earlier this season, some folks who cover the club on a regular basis don’t even know the answer to that question. However, it’s clear that the 2007 Stros have taken a major step backward because of an overall decline in pitching. Through 81 games, the Stros’ pitching staff has given up 65 more runs than a merely average National League club would have given up in the same number of innings (runs saved against average or RSAA, explained here) and an astounding 139 more runs than the best National League pitching staff (the Padres). The aggregate RSAA of the Stros’ staff is currently dead last in the 16 team National League, a startling development for a pitching staff that has been among the best in MLB over the past three seasons. The pitching staff’s performance is by far the worst by a Stros staff since the 2000 season, when a similar meltdown during the club’s initial season in Minute Maid Park resulted in a -69 RSAA and a disastrous 72-90 record, the only losing record for the Stros in the past 15 seasons until this season.
Meanwhile, the Stros’ hitting has actually taken an upswing recently after meandering below National League-average for the first 3/8ths of the season. Improved hitting from slugger Lance Berkman (12 RCAA/.386 OBP/.434 SLG/.820 OPS), continued excellent production from Hunter Pence (16/.358/.562/.920), and solid contributions from Mark Loretta (10/.410/.441/.851), Carlos Lee (6/.346/.514/.860), Mike Lamb (8/.365/.475/.840) and Luke Scott (4/.335/.465/.800) resulted in the Stros generating, through 81 games of the season, 18 more runs than an average National League club would have created using the same number of outs (runs created against average or RCAA, defined here) through the halfway point of the season. That’s good for 6th place in the National League, the best performance for Stros hitters since the 2004 club’s late season surge allowed the Stros to finish 7th in RCAA among the 16 National League teams.
Unfortunately, the Stros’ improved hitting does not come close to compensating for the Stros’ overall atrocious pitching. By adding a club’s overall RCAA and RSAA numbers, the sum provides a good measure for evaluating a club’s overall performance relative to an average National League club, which would have a combined RCAA/RSAA score of precisely zero. The Stros’ RCAA/RSAA deficit of -47 this season is a clear indication that the Stros are currently a far below-average National League team.
The season statistics for the Stros to date are below, courtesy of Lee Sinins‘ sabermetric Complete Baseball Encyclopedia. The abbreviations for the hitting stats are defined here and the same for the pitching stats are here. The Stros active roster is here with links to each individual player’s statistics:

Continue reading

Biggio reaches 3,000 hit plateau

biggionew062907.jpgGood for Bidg that he collects his 3,000th hit on a night where he goes 5 for 6 and helped set up Carlos Lee’s walk-off bottom of the 11th grand slam to pull out an 8-5 win over the Rockies. That’s the Craig Biggio that Houstonians who have admired his magnificent 20 year career want to remember.
There are many tributes today around the web and in the Chronicle today, but John Lopez’s and the Plunk Biggio tributes are the best that I’ve read. Here are
a few of my blog posts on Bidg over the years:
A good man’s worthy cause (August 25, 2004);
Bidg sets the MLB hit by pitch record (June 29, 2005);
One of the downsides of the pursuit of 3,000 (August 26, 2005);
The remarkable Mr. Biggio (October 4, 2005); and
Where Bidg stands among the Stros’ best hitters of all-time (February 26, 2007).
Bidg’s career statistics through last night’s game are below, the best reflection of his certain Hall of Fame career.

Continue reading

Reaching a milestone the wrong way

biggiomissing062707.jpgI’ve noted in several previous posts (here and here) how Stros management has hurt the club and thumbed its nose at the integrity of baseball by indulging Craig Biggio’s quest for 3,000 hits, but Baseball Prospectus’ Joe Sheehan really lays the wood to Biggio and Stros management in this BP column ($):

Last night, the Astros started Chris Burke at second base, batting him sixth and using Mark Loretta as their leadoff man in their 6-1 loss to the Brewers. . . . [Stros manager] Phil Garner hasnít had a sudden change of heart about the best alignment of his available talent; no, heís sitting Craig Biggio in two of these three games to prevent Biggio from notching his 3,000th career hit on the road.
Set aside for the moment the issue of whether the Astros are better with Burke at second base and Loretta batting leadoff, which is certainly the case. That was also the case on Opening Day, but Garner has pencilled Biggioís name into the lineup 62 times, including 59 times in the leadoff spot. He decided at the beginning of the season that Biggio was his starting second baseman, and no amount of out-making was going to change that. Biggio’s .279 OBP wasnít the reason he was on the bench last night.
Consider the context as well. The Astros, in no small part because of that .279 OBP from their leadoff hitter, were 32-43 heading into last night’s game, 11 games behind the Brewers. I don’t think the Astros are serious contenders any more than the next guy does, but if they were going to make a push, it would certainly help to go into Miller Park and win three games. Doing so would seem to require playing your starters. Garner elected to not do so last night. Consider that the Astros were dead and buried in both 2004 and 2005 before making runs to the NLCS and World Series, respectively. If any team can take itself seriously from 11 games out with nearly 90 to play, itís these Astros.
Pull that all together for a second. Astros manager Phil Garner went into a do-or-die series with a division leader and benched his starting second baseman not for any reason related to merit, but so that an individual achievement can be celebrated in a certain manner. He put a statistic, a person and a show ahead of the teamís goals. He and the Astros have been doing this all year of course just by playing Biggio, but the naked manipulation of playing time in what should be a key series is galling.

Continue reading

Catching up with Bill James

Bill%20James%20062507.jpgClear Thinkers favorite and the original sabermetrician Bill James is the subject of this Dan Ackman/Opinion Journal piece, which provides the usual dose of Jamesian good sense regarding objective analysis of baseball. James, whose original Baseball Abstract in 1977 revolutionized the way in which statistics are used to evaluate baseball players, never worked for a Major League Baseball team until 2002, when the Red Sox hired him as consultant. Among the most interesting observations that James makes in the article is the following:

Mr. James, a rationalist in a church of red-blooded true believers, takes the long view: “In any given season there is an immense amount of luck in who wins the division, even if it’s a lopsided race,” he says. “People are made very uncomfortable by the notion that our lives are random, but there are huge random parts in everything that happens. It’s uncomfortable because it’s our job to drive the randomness out and make the system work.”

Read the entire piece.

What’s the excuse?

woody%20wiliams.jpgDespite the fact that Craig Biggio (-9 RCAA/.271 OBA/.382 SLG/.653 OPS) has been one of the least productive hitters (-28 RCAA) among regular National League players over the past season and a half, I at least understand the Stros’ decision in continuing to play him regularly as he plods toward his landmark 3,000th hit.
But what’s the Stros’ excuse for continuing to trot Woody Williams (-18 RSAA/5.75/17 HR’s in 92.1 innings) out to the mound every fifth game?
For the season, Williams is now the third least productive starter of the 90 or so regular starters in the entire National League. Unlike Biggio, he is not a franchise icon. Rather, Williams is a 40 year-old speculative off-season pickup who has not worked out. There is simply no reasonable explanation for not giving some of the Stros minor league talent a shot while having Williams play out his string in a less damaging role, probably as a long reliever.
By the way, after ridiculing the Rockets’ Les Alexander’s quite reasonable decision to change management, the Chronicle’s Richard Justice now thinks maybe Stros’ owner Drayton McLane should fire Stros General Manager Tim Purpura, despite the fact that Purpura has been an integral part of the Stros management team that has overseen the most successful decade in the club’s history.
As noted in the earlier post, I don’t understand why Chronicle management thinks Justice has any business analyzing sports. However, at least he is doing that rather than making management decisions for any of the local sports teams.

Want a season ticket? Take out a mortgage

Yankee%20stadium%20new.jpgConde Nast’s Megan Barnett reports on how the lion’s share of the new Yankee Stadium is apparently going to be financed. The idea is that the seats in the new Yankees Stadium will be sold in advance to investors who will own them in perpetuity. Morgan Stanley and its partner, a start-up entity called Stadium Capital Financing Group, are hoping that their structure becomes the accepted way of privately-financing sports stadiums. They have even applied for a patent regarding the concept, which seems like a stretch. Here’s how it would work:

Fans would buy seats for a designated period of time and finance them much like a mortgage. Pricing mechanisms can vary, but the most appealing option for buyers might be a 30-year loan with an annual payment equal to the current price of a season ticket. In exchange, the seat becomes real property, equivalent to, say, a condominium. The team (or university or other owner) receives the principal amount of the loan up front, to put toward construction costs.
This arrangement is different from seat licensing, which gives the holder the right to buy a season ticket for a specific seat. . . . Under [the] system, people own seats, not shares of a team.
Say, for instance, the current price of a season baseball ticket is $3,240. A 30-year loan at 6 percent interest with an annual payment of $3,240 results in a principal amount of $45,000. Even if the price of the seat doubles in the next 20 years, the seat owner still pays $3,240. Investors will have the option of making annual payments over 30 years, paying the entire amount up front, or something in between. Owners can also sell their seats at any time for market value, but rest assuredóthe team will get a cut of any profits.

At least one expert on financing stadiums, though, does not believe the financing technique will be all that earth shattering:

Roger Noll, a Stanford University economics professor who has written extensively about stadium financing, says that such an approach might make a dent in required public funding but will never replace it. Noll points out that most teams can’t afford to sacrifice future revenues in order to pay for their ball fields. “At the end of the day, stadiums are not good investments,” he says. “This isn’t going to be a revolution.”

H’mm, think this might work to defray the cost of this proposed boondoggle?