So, now that the Stros are done with that, where does the club go from here?
As the Stros (34-47) reached the halfway point of the 2007 season, that’s the question confronting the owner Drayton McLane and General Manager Tim Purpura. The club went 8-12 during the fourth 1/8th segment of the season after going 9-12, 11-9 and 6-14 during the first three (prior periodic season reviews here). That geneally abysmal performance removed any fleeting doubt that the Stros could compete for the National League Central division title. The Stros finished the first half of the season 13.5 games behind the division-leading Brewers (47-33), good for only fifth place in a mediocre six team division.
How has this happened to a club that is only a season and a half removed from a World Series appearance? As noted here earlier this season, some folks who cover the club on a regular basis don’t even know the answer to that question. However, it’s clear that the 2007 Stros have taken a major step backward because of an overall decline in pitching. Through 81 games, the Stros’ pitching staff has given up 65 more runs than a merely average National League club would have given up in the same number of innings (runs saved against average or RSAA, explained here) and an astounding 139 more runs than the best National League pitching staff (the Padres). The aggregate RSAA of the Stros’ staff is currently dead last in the 16 team National League, a startling development for a pitching staff that has been among the best in MLB over the past three seasons. The pitching staff’s performance is by far the worst by a Stros staff since the 2000 season, when a similar meltdown during the club’s initial season in Minute Maid Park resulted in a -69 RSAA and a disastrous 72-90 record, the only losing record for the Stros in the past 15 seasons until this season.
Meanwhile, the Stros’ hitting has actually taken an upswing recently after meandering below National League-average for the first 3/8ths of the season. Improved hitting from slugger Lance Berkman (12 RCAA/.386 OBP/.434 SLG/.820 OPS), continued excellent production from Hunter Pence (16/.358/.562/.920), and solid contributions from Mark Loretta (10/.410/.441/.851), Carlos Lee (6/.346/.514/.860), Mike Lamb (8/.365/.475/.840) and Luke Scott (4/.335/.465/.800) resulted in the Stros generating, through 81 games of the season, 18 more runs than an average National League club would have created using the same number of outs (runs created against average or RCAA, defined here) through the halfway point of the season. That’s good for 6th place in the National League, the best performance for Stros hitters since the 2004 club’s late season surge allowed the Stros to finish 7th in RCAA among the 16 National League teams.
Unfortunately, the Stros’ improved hitting does not come close to compensating for the Stros’ overall atrocious pitching. By adding a club’s overall RCAA and RSAA numbers, the sum provides a good measure for evaluating a club’s overall performance relative to an average National League club, which would have a combined RCAA/RSAA score of precisely zero. The Stros’ RCAA/RSAA deficit of -47 this season is a clear indication that the Stros are currently a far below-average National League team.
The season statistics for the Stros to date are below, courtesy of Lee Sinins‘ sabermetric Complete Baseball Encyclopedia. The abbreviations for the hitting stats are defined here and the same for the pitching stats are here. The Stros active roster is here with links to each individual player’s statistics:

Getting back to the “how has this happened?” question, it’s helpful to look back at how the Stros’ organization has developed over the years to figure out the answer to that question and to chart what club management needs to do to right the ship.
Despite never having won a World Series, the Stros have been a reasonably successful franchise over their 45 year existence, particularly over the past 15 years. Given the club’s initial expansive environment in the Astrodome, Stros management chose a model that emphasized development of good pitching and defense, which has allowed the club to be more consistently competitive over the years than many other clubs, such as the Stros in-state rival, the Rangers. Although the Stros developed some good hitters such as Rusty Staub, Joe Morgan, Jimmy Wynn and Cesar Cedeno, the organization has always been known more for development of its pitching than hitting. For years, Major League scouts joked that, whenever they would scout the Stros’ minor league teams, they would always bring their radar guns along because the Stros always seemed to have a bunch of fireballing prospects coming up through the ranks.
With the commencement of the Biggio-Bagwell era in the early 1990’s, the Stros model changed somewhat as the club became more balanced between pitching and hitting. Beginning in 1992, the Stros put together a string of seasons from 1992-2004 in which the club overall was above National League-average in terms of creating runs, topped by the 1998 juggernaut that generated a remarkable 154 more runs over the course of the season than an average National League club. With the exception of the 1992, 1995, 1996 and aformentioned 2000 seasons, the Stros’ pitching also remained above-average during those years, resulting in the club’s three straight playoff appearances in the late 1990’s, two more in 2001 and 2004, and topped by the 1998 club’s 116 RSAA (how did the Stros not win it all that season?).
Beginning in 2000 with the move to the more hitter-friendly Minute Maid Park, the Stros’ overall hitting began to decline again. Part of that downturn was attributable to the inevitable erosion of Biggio and Bagwell’s productivity as they grew older, but it also resulted from Richard Hidalgo’s surprising failure to develop into a consistent above-average National League hitter and the organization’s failure to develop any above National League-average hitters in their minor league system after 2000 other than Berkman, Pence, and Morgan Ensberg.
Nevertheless, this decline in hitting was somewhat offset with increased productivity in the Stros’ pitching staffs. Interestingly, the Stros’ increased emphasis on pitching since the 2000 season paid big dividends, as the chart below reflects:

Thus, the only two seasons since 2000 that the Stros have played sub-.500 ball have been the 2000 season and this season, the two seasons in which the Stros fielded below-average pitching staffs. On the other hand, when the Stros had their best pitching performance since 2000 in 2005, the Stros went to their first World Series despite a well-below average hitting performance.
So, what was McLane and Purpura’s mistake this season? Contrary to conventional wisdom that one regularly hears on sports talk radio shows and reads in the Chronicle, none of the trades or non-tenders that they have made over the past two seasons has really hurt the club. Jason Jennings (2 RSAA/4.69 ERA) has pitched better than either Jason Hirsh (-4 RSAA/4.90 ERA or Taylor Buchholz (-1 RSAA/4.66 ERA), and Willy Taveras (-1/.335/.346/.681) is not as productive a hitter as either Lee, Pence or Scott, the Stros’ three top outfielders. The same goes for Purpura dealing away Ben Zobrist and Mitch Talbot for Aubrey Huff last season — neither of those players has shown anything to suggest that they will ever be even National League-average players. Similarly, given the expense relative to the injury risk, not re-signing Clemens and Pettitte was absolutely the right move for a club that has no business locking up $40 million in payroll in two old, fading pitchers.
Thus, it has not been bad trades or ill-advised non-tenders that has caused the current dismal state of affairs with the Stros. Rather, McLane and Purpura’s mistake this season was in moving away from the club’s “development of pitching first” philosophy and thinking that improving the club’s hitting could compensate for a decidedly lackluster pitching staff and allow the Stros to compete for the NL Central title.
Consequently, rather than trading away productive players (those are the only ones that other clubs want), the Stros need to renew dedication to their long-term model of developing above-average pitching talent and depth throughout the organization. If the Stros can become comfortable that Jennings is not damaged goods, then the club should make every effort to re-sign him before he hits the free agent market after the season. But the key to turning around the ballclub’s decline is in restocking the pitching staff and that is done primarily by developing pitchers in the minor league system. So long as the club’s downturn in pitching performance is a temporary blip on the radar screen — which has usually been the case with the Stros over their history — the resurgence of the club’s hitting this season bodes well for development of a balanced club that has the potential to be above National League-average hitting and pitching over the next several seasons. That should be good enough to return quickly to contention in the NL Central.
After finishing their four game series with the Rockies today, the Stros face the Phillies (41-40) and the Mets (46-33) in the next seven games at Minute Maid Park leading up to the All-Star break and then go on the road after the break for nine games in Chicago (39-40), Washington (32-48) and Pittsburgh (35-45) before returning home on July 23rd for three game sets against the Dodgers (45-35) and the Padres (45-33). Look for the next periodic update around July 28th or so, by which time the Stros hopefully will be evaluating a few of the club’s good pitching prospects on the Major League level.