Ungagged.net: The Other Side of the Enron Story

A common topic on this blog has been the power of anti-business myths within American society.

Take Enron, for example. The anti-business myth contended that that Enron — at one time one of the largest publicly-owned companies in the U.S. — was really just an elaborate financial house of cards that a massive conspiracy hid from innocent and unsuspecting investors and employees.

The Enron Myth is so widely accepted that otherwise intelligent people reject any notion of ambiguity or fair-minded analysis in addressing facts and issues that call the morality play into question. The primary dynamics by which the myth is perpetuated are scapegoating and resentment, which are common themes of almost every mainstream media report on Enron.

The mainstream media — always quick to embrace a simple morality play with innocent victims and dastardly villains — was not about to complicate the story by pointing out that the investors in Enron could have hedged their risk of loss by buying insurance quite similar to that which Enron developed in creating their wealth in the first place.

Instead of attempting to examine and tell the nuanced story about what really happened at Enron, much of the mainstream media simply became a part of the mob that ultimately contributed to the death of Ken Lay and hailed the barbaric 24 year sentence of Jeff Skilling. Ambitious prosecutors, given wide latitude to obtain convictions of key Enron executives regardless of the evidence, gladly took advantage of the firestorm of anti-Enron public opinion to lead the mob.

As noted in many subsequent posts here over the years, it is far more likely that the truth about Enron is that no massive conspiracy existed, that Skilling and Lay were not intending to mislead anyone and that the company was simply a highly-leveraged, trust-based business with a relatively low credit rating and a booming trading operation.

Although there is nothing inherently wrong with such a business model, it turned out it to be the wrong one to survive amidst choppy post-bubble, post-9/11 market conditions when the markets were spooked by revelations of the embezzlement of millions of dollars by Enron CFO Andy Fastow and a relative few of his minions.

The carnage of the Enron Myth is now piled high — the destruction of Arthur Andersen, the death of Lay, the outrageous prosecutorial misconduct involved in the case against Lay and Skilling, the senseless prosecution and imprisonment of the four Merrill Lynch executives in the Nigerian Barge case, Richard Causey, Chris Calger, Kevin Howard, Joe Hirko and the other Enron Broadband defendants — the list goes on and on.

In the wake of such destruction of careers and lives, the public is even less willing to confront the vacuity of the myth and the destructive dynamics by which it is perpetrated. indeed, even though what happened to Enron has now happened to Bear Stearns, Freddie and Fannie, Merrill Lynch, Lehman Brothers, AIG and any number of other trust-based businesses over the past two years, much of the public and the mainstream media still cling to the Enron Myth.

Attempting to challenge this enduring myth is a wonderful new resource — Ungagged.net: The Other Side of the Enron Story.

Created, funded and filmed by Beth Stier — who was the subject of prosecutorial misconduct as a non-party witness in the trial of the Enron Broadband case — Ungagged.net is a “webumentary.” That is, a website comprised of short modules of documentary-style content, organized into two main categories: “What It Was Like to Be on The Other Side of the Enron Story,” and “Behind the Scenes of The Other Side of the Enron Story.”

Ungagged.net currently features over a dozen relatives of defendants, attorneys, former Enron executives and employees telling their stories about what they experienced personally in dealing with the overwhelming governmental power and societal forces at work in the Enron saga. Moreover, six experts in economics, political science, finance, UK law and civil liberties — including Clear Thinkers favorites William Anderson and Harvey Silverglate — provide their views on the ominous implications that the government’s handling of the Enron case have on us all.

Ms. Stier continues to add new information to the site, the latest of which are dozens of snippets from fascinating interviews of David Bermingham and Gary Mulgrew, two of the NatWest Three bankers from England who were caught up in an international firestorm in connection with the Enron Task Force’s effort to turn Fastow and his right-hand man, Michael Kopper, into witnesses for the Task Force against Skilling and Lay. This series of interview modules paints an absolutely fascinating tale of three regular fellows from the U.K. having their lives, families and careers turned utterly upside down by governmental forces that viewed them as mere pawns in a much larger game.

Apart from the its egregious human toll and the serious abuse of state power that its promoters ignore, the Enron Myth’s devastating impact is that it obscures the true nature of investment risk and fuels the notion that investment loss results primarily from someone else’s misconduct. As Larry Ribstein has been asking for years, do we really want to be sending a message to investors that risk is bad when it often leads to valuable innovation and wealth creation?

For example, self-settled derivative prepay transactions are not particularly intuitive (no product actually changes hands) and are not well-understood outside the trading business. Nevertheless, such transactions provide the valuable benefit of hedging risk for companies, who pass along that benefit to consumers in the form of lower prices for their products and services.

Do we really want to allow prosecutors and regulators to paint such beneficial transactions as frauds and then manipulate the public’s ignorance to demonize innovative risk-takers who are attempting to create wealth? How does throwing creative and productive business executives such as Michael Milken and Jeff Skilling in prison do anything to educate investors about the true nature of risk and the importance of diversification and hedging?

Ungagged.net is currently a lonely voice in the wilderness advocating against such governmental overreach. Here’s hoping that voice grows louder as those of us who are concerned by the pernicious growth of abusive governmental power listen to the stories and observations contained in this valuable resource.

The trailer for the webumentary is below.

Will Tiger catch Jack?

tiger_woodsCharles Murray reasons (H/T Steve Sailer) that it is becoming statistically less probable that Tiger Woods will catch or exceed Jack Nicklaus’ record of 18 major golf championships:

The combination of qualities that enabled Nicklaus to win 18 majors and has enabled Woods to win 14 is freakish.  .   .   .

The role of those psychological strengths is why so much of the commentary about Woods’s play since he returned is beside the point. The commentators focus on whether his component skills are returning to their pre-scandal levels. He can return to precisely the same place on the bell curves of the component skills that he occupied before the meltdown in his personal life, but the package will not be the same. Tiger Woods has experienced a sort of concussion to that Chinese puzzle of psychological strengths, and there must be some residual damage that won’t ever go away.

The long-term effects can be quite small. When we are talking about the extremes of human accomplishment, there is no wiggle room. The package changed at all is no longer at the one-in-many-millions extreme that is required. Woods will still be a sensational golfer, winning a lot of tournaments and probably a few more majors. But to predict that Woods can win five majors between now and the end of his career – something that only 17 other golfers have done in their entire careers – assumes that nothing in the last year has significantly degraded the freakish combination required for extreme accomplishment. I find that assumption untenable.

Murray may be right. As I noted after his last major championship in mid-2008, Woods’ poorly-designed and excessive exercise regimen has damaged his body needlessly. Moreover, his swing has problems and his remarkable putting skills have eroded since his comeback, although that may simply be attributable to concentration problems stemming from the scandal and his pending divorce.

Add to those problems the fact that a half-dozen young, world-class players have emerged over the past two years to challenge for major championships and that only Ben Hogan (8) and Nicklaus (6) have won a large number of majors after the age of 35 (Woods will turn 35 later this year). 

Thus, what once looked like a sure thing isn’t such a lock anymore. My sense is that Woods still can beat Nicklaus’ record, but not unless he makes big changes in his training. And as noted earlier here, does Woods really have any true friends who can help him get pointed in the right direction?

Why is Timothy Geithner still Treasury Secretary?

Tim Geithner_3Iíve been asking that question for almost a year now (see also here).

Craig Pirrong is asking the same question after Geithnerís comments about American business to a group of reporters at breakfast this past week.

Meanwhile, Larry Ribstein reviews the politics of supposedly ìobjectiveî governmental regulation.

Frankly, given abysmal leadership provided by both the Bush and Obama Administrations, itís a testament to the resilience of American business that the economy hasnít tanked worse than it has.

Mr. Robinson’s Neighborhood

From a time when Eddie Murphy was very clever.

Cassano wins the lottery

lotteryLarry Ribstein notes that AIG scapegoat Joseph Cassano appears to have won in his turn enduring the criminalization-of-business lottery.

Meanwhile, Conrad Black was released from prison this week pending a re-trial of the charges against him, but he is ruined financially by his turn at the lottery.

And Jeff Skilling remains in prison and James Brown awaits another trial in his seven-year ordeal.

So, does the decision not to prosecute Cassano indicate a government move away from the lottery policy of regulating business?

Iíll believe it when I see it.

Five myths about the death penalty

Peculiar Institution2David Garland of New York University has a new book coming out later this year on a common topic on this blog, Peculiar Institution: America’s Death Penalty in an Age of Abolition (Belknap 2010). He previews the book in this WaPo op-ed in which he addresses the following five myths of the death penalty:

1. The United States is a death-penalty nation.

2. The United States is out of step with Europe and the rest of the Western world.

3. This country has the death penalty because the public supports it.

4. The death penalty works.

5. The death penalty doesn’t work.

Check out the entire article.

And you thought the TSA was bad?

intelligence agenciesThe silliness of the federal governmentís security theater policy has long been a common topic on this blog. But if you thought that the governmentís security theater jobs program is bad, check out this first installment of the Dana Priest-William Arkin/Washington Post series on the explosion in the hiring of government contractors and employees doing top-secret work for the governmentís intelligence agencies and programs:

After nine years of unprecedented spending and growth, the result is that the system put in place to keep the United States safe is so massive that its effectiveness is impossible to determine.  .   .   . Analysts who make sense of documents and conversations obtained by foreign and domestic spying share their judgment by publishing 50,000 intelligence reports each year ñ a volume so large that many are routinely ignored.  .  .  . Every day, collection systems at the National Security Agency intercept and store 1.7 billion e-mails, phone calls and other types of communications. The NSA sorts a fraction of those into 70 separate databases. The same problem bedevils every other intelligence agency, none of which have enough analysts and translators for all this work.

The first Post installment goes to detail the utter failure of the matrix of government intelligence resources to generate the quantity or quality of intelligence that would justify the billions of dollars being spent on them, while telling the all-too-familiar tale of Congress failing to require any meaningful accountability from the intelligence agencies.

All of which prompts one to wonder. We already know what happens when Wall Street crashes.

But with the explosive growth in the intelligence and security theater bureaucracies, as well as the growth in government that is just beginning in regard to Obamacare and the 2,000-plus page Dodd-Frank financial regulation reform legislation — and not to overlook the bloated bureaucracy that already exists to enforce the federal governmentís absurdly-complex tax laws ñ what happens when out-of-control government growth crashes?

The SEC’s strike suit against Goldman

GoldmanSachs-SEC-071510As noted in April when the Securities and Exchange Commission brought its lawsuit against Goldman Sachs, the case was destined to settle with Goldman paying a hefty settlement, which the SEC announced last week. But Larry Ribstein expands on that thought in this timely post on what the proposed settlement means to the folly of the current reform movement regarding governmental regulation of financial firms:

The SEC is heralding the $550 million settlement in its suit against Goldman as ìthe largest penalty ever assessed against a financial services firm in the history of the SEC,î and ìa stark lesson to Wall Street firms that no product is too complex, and no investor too sophisticated, to avoid a heavy price if a firm violates the fundamental principles of honest treatment and fair dealing.î Surely the agency had a strong incentive to try to use the Goldman settlement to obscure the memory of Madoff, Stanford and the Bank of America settlement. Meanwhile,todayís NYT concludes its Goldman story with a quote suggesting Goldman got off lightly.

The truth is far more disturbing: the SEC got a big payday in what would have been seen as a strike suit had it been a private securities class action lawyer. [.  .  .]

What clues on all this can be gleaned from a settlement that involves a huge amount of money but only an admission of a ìmistakeî?

The bottom line is that this suit has proved to be no more than a common ìstrikeî suit, no better than the sort of private securities class actions that triggered Congressional reform 15 years ago. Instead of attorneysí fees, the SECís objective appears to have been purely political. In the end it extracted a ransom payment from Goldman so the firm could reclaim its reputation and get back to business.

The court must now review the settlement. It should take a cue from the dissenting Commissioners and reject it because of the puzzling and troubling inconsistency between the amount of the settlement and Goldmanís meaningless admissions. The SEC should have to prove exactly what Goldman did wrong. This will force Goldman to either litigate or make a meaningful settlement. Goldman is hardly an object of pity at this point. In any event, the issues here go far beyond Goldman to, among other things, the proper role and function of the SEC.

It is sad that the SEC not only cannot be trusted to find fraud, but that it can no longer be trusted to litigate and settle cases involving the supposed frauds that it finds. But this is where we find ourselves in the days following ìfinancial reform.î

Expecting the SEC to regulate a firm as sophisticated as Goldman Sachs effectively is about as rational as investing oneís entire nest egg with Bernie Madoff or Allen Stanford.

Restrepo

I caught this remarkable documentary on Friday night at the Angelika. Anyone interested in the issues addressed in this earlier post will not want to miss it.