George Will nails the GOP

georgewill.jpgIt’s never pretty for the Republicans when George Will lays the wood to them, this time over the Abramoff scandal:

The national pastime is no longer baseball, it is rent-seeking — bending public power for private advantage. There are two reasons why rent-seeking has become so lurid, but those reasons for today’s dystopian politics are reasons why most suggested cures seem utopian.
The first reason is big government — the regulatory state. This year Washington will disperse $2.6 trillion, which is a small portion of Washington’s economic consequences, considering the costs and benefits distributed by incessant fiddling with the tax code, and by government’s regulatory fidgets.
Second, House Republicans, after 40 years in the minority, have, since 1994, wallowed in the pleasures of power. They have practiced DeLayism, or “K Street conservatism.” This involves exuberantly serving rent-seekers, who hire K Street lobbyists as helpers. For House Republicans the aim of the game is to build political support. But Republicans shed their conservatism in the process of securing their seats in the service, they say, of conservatism.
. . . “K Street conservatism” compounds unseemliness with hypocrisy. Until the Bush administration, with its incontinent spending, unleashed an especially conscienceless Republican control of both political branches, conservatives pretended to believe in limited government. The last five years, during which the number of registered lobbyists more than doubled, have proved that, for some Republicans, conservative virtue was merely the absence of opportunity for vice.

Read the entire piece.

A benign regulation that distracts from mischief

SEC_SEC2.jpgInasmuch as I am critical of the SEC in this earlier post today, it’s only fair to compliment the agency for one of its regulatory initiatives that could have a beneficial impact.
This NY Times article reviews the SEC’s new proposed rules on disclosure of executive compensation, which — even though the new rules address a problem that probably would not break the top 20 in current corporate governance problems — could work to keep the SEC busy from pursuing more damaging regulatory actions. Larry Ribstein has the most insightful comments on the proposed new rules (here, here and here) and points out the possible mischief-saving nature of the SEC initiative:

By focusing on executive compensation disclosure, [SEC chairman] Cox manages to get a big pile of political capital from the pro-regulatory populists, while at the same time causing relatively little harm compared to many other things he could be doing. . . . .[D]isclosing executive compensation is probably . . . not going to be hugely costly. If it deters abuses, that’s not so bad. Meanwhile, maybe Cox can use the political capital he gains from this move to meaningfully shrink regulation.

What’s exactly so “ugly” about the Bags-Stros situation?

JeffBagwell6.jpgWhy do some media reporters make up disputes where none exist in connection with an already newsworthy story?
In his most recent column, Chronicle columnist Richard Justice updates the status of Stros firstbaseman and future Hall-of-Famer, Jeff Bagwell. As regular readers of this blog know, the Stros situation with Bags is a tad difficult at this point. Bags is at the end of his career and is a shadow of his former stature due to a chronically arthritic right shoulder that prevents him from throwing a ball effectively. The Stros backloaded Bags’ most recent contract so that he will receive approximately $24 million in this final season of the contract ($17 million in salary and $7 million to buy out an option for next season). That’s far in excess of Bags’ value as a player at this point, but what the heck — you win under some long-term contracts and you lose under others.
Inasmuch as Bags is probably no longer capable of being an every-day player, the Stros prefer to work out a settlement with Bags under which the club would declare Bags disabled under the club’s disability insurance policy, the club and the insurer would either litigate that claim or settle it, the club would pay Bags his $24 million and Bags would retire as the greatest player in club history. Bags, for his part, states publicly that he would prefer to play out this season, but he has to say that because saying that he cannot and retiring is the only way that he would not be entitled to recover the $24 million that the Stros still owe him under his contract. For their part, the Stros have never said or done anything that indicates that they would not pay the balance of Bags’ contract according to its terms.
While discussing all of this, Justice illogically criticizes the Stros’ desire to declare Bags disabled and make a claim on the club’s disability insurance policy, and then observes as follows:

Before this gets ugly ó and it could get ugly as each side presses its case ó the signing of veteran outfielder Preston Wilson indicates where the Astros believe this is headed.

So, what’s “ugly” about the situation? That the Stros prefer to settle up with the best player in club history rather than have him languish on the bench for a season as an over-priced pinch-hitter? What would be ugly would be for the Stros to use a disabled player in their everyday lineup simply because the club doesn’t want to eat his contract. Rather than being critical of the club, Justice should be complimenting the Stros for not doing just that.

The SEC protects Carl Icahn, too

icahn2.jpgIt’s a pretty sure sign that securities regulators do not have enough to do when they are busy trying to protect the likes of Carl Icahn.
As noted in this earlier post, Icahn was outmaneuvered in late 2004 by New York-based Perry Corporation in connection with Mylan Laboratories’ bid for the generic drug maker, King Pharmaceuticals. Icahn — who owned a bit less than 10% of Mylan — pursued his typical strategy of attempting to extract some ransom from Mylan’s takeover bid by opposing the company’s bid for King.
But Perry’s moves in connection with the proposed deal made Icahn look totally 1980’s in comparison. Perry owned a big chunk of King shares and would have made around $28 million if Mylan’s bid had been successful. However, in making its play, Perry set up an elaborate swap trade with Bear Stearns and Goldman Sachs so that the block of Mylan’s voting equity that Mylan controlled (which was just a tad larger than Icahn’s) had limited exposure to fluctuations in Mylan’s share price. Perry accomplished this by buying its stake in Mylan while having Bear Stearns and Goldman Sachs “short” the same number of shares.
Well, as the earlier post indicated, Perry’s moves outraged Icahn, who filed a lawsuit and started sounding as if he was the spokesman for CALPERS’ shareholder activist committee. Alas, Mylan’s bid for King collapsed, Icahn dropped his lawsuit and most folks thought that was the end of the entertaining match of wits between well-heeled investment types.
But not so fast. Perry disclosed to its investors this week that the SEC recently sent a Wells notice to Perry informing the hedge fund that the agency is considering a civil enforcement action over the fund’s Mylan-King hedging strategy. According to Perry’s disclosure, the SEC’s enforcement division is recommending that the agency accuse Perry of violating the antifraud provisions of securities laws, which require large investors to disclose pertinent financial information about their holdings. Perry is currently preparing a response to the Wells notice — called a “Wells submission” — in which the firm will challenge the basis of the SEC’s proposed action against the firm. That’s not surprising given that Perry’s hedging strategy in regard to Mylan-King deal was utterly transparent and reported in the business sections of virtually every major media outlet.
In the meantime, however, we can all rest more comfortably with the knowledge that the SEC is protecting Mr. Icahn. He has created a tremendous amount of shareholder wealth over his long career. It’s nice to see that the SEC is actively protecting him in his twilight years when he really needs it. ;^)

Picking darkhorses in a new market

trading floor.jpgMaybe if Enron hadn’t collapsed, it wouldn’t have taken this long for this new market to develop.
Tyler Cowen points us to the The Ticket Reserve, a web-based company that has created an options market for tickets to championship sporting events. An account holder can buy and sell options to purchase tickets at face value to popular sporting events such as NFL playoff games, BCS bowl games, and NCAA Basketball Tournament games.
Thus, you could currently purchase an option to buy two upper deck tickets to the Final Four to see the Texas Longhorns play for $169. If the Horns make it to the Final Four, then you would pay the face value of the tickets ($140), plus the $169 option price. Your risk is that the Horns do not make the Final Four, in which case your option becomes worthless and you would be out the $169 option price. While you wait for the Final Four, you can sell your option for whatever price the market will bear, presumably for more than $169 if the Horns play particularly well or for less if one or two of the Horns’ starters are injured before the NCAA tournament. Thus, if you’re a player in this market, the key would be to pick as many relatively low-valued darkhorse teams as possible early and then ride the speculation that the teams will do well in the NCAA tournament to big profits in the sale of your options during the run-up to the NCAA tournament.
Inasmuch as this type of market is cut out for the Sports Economist, Brad Humphreys also provides his insights.

The drift of the Lay-Skilling case

LaySkilling.gifAs noted earlier here, the clear drift over the past several weeks of the Enron Task Force’s case against former key Enron executives Ken Lay and Jeff Skilling has been toward the charges relating to alleged misleading disclosure of material facts relating to Enron’s business and away from the more technical charges pertaining to alleged fraud in Enron’s accounting and structured finance transactions.
Well, this Mary Flood/Chronicle article provides even more confirmation that the Task Force has chosen to make the Lay-Skilling trial a material non-disclosure case. As Ms. Flood notes, the Task Force last week quietly arranged for Mark Koenig, the former head of Enron’s investor relations section, to alter the statement that he made in connection with an August 2004 cooperation agreement with the Task Force under which Koenig pled guilty to a single count of aiding and abetting securities fraud. Koenig faces a possible 10 year sentence on the charge, but he clearly expects to receive a lesser sentence through his cooperation with the Task Force. A copy of Koenig’s explanation of his revised statement is here, a copy of his revised statement is here and a copy of the transcript of the hearing in which Koenig agreed to his plea deal can be downloaded here.
The gist of Koenig’s revised plea bargain statement is that he misrepresented in his initial statement what occurred during a July 12 2001 conference call between Enron executives and securities analysts. In his initial statement, Koenig confessed to telling analysts during that call that Enron Energy Services was reorganized “to get some more efficiency” when the true purpose of the reorganization was simply to conceal losses. You may recall that EES also figured prominently in former Enron chief accountant Richard Causey’s statement in connection with his plea deal.
In his revised statement, Koenig now contends that — based on a recent review of an audiotape of the July 12 2001 conference call — it was Skilling who made the “get some more efficiency” representation to analysts and not Koenig, after all. Koenig’s revised plea statement clearly is intended to head off the type of impeachment that occurred with regard to the testimony of key prosecution witness Ken Rice during last year’s Enron Broadband trial.
Nevertheless, Koenig’s revised statement raises almost as many questions as it answers, not the least of which is why Koenig — who was under treatment and medication for depression at the time of his plea deal — agreed to a relatively harsh plea deal and admitted to making the key false statement in the charge against him in the first place when, in fact, he didn’t make the statement? Similarly, how did Koenig’s lawyer miss such a key error in the original plea deal?
Meanwhile, Ms. Flood also reports that the Lay-Skilling defense team filed a pleading yesterday that could certainly liven up the examination of witnesses during the upcoming trial. The pleading requests that U.S. District Judge Sim Lake allow the defense to attempt to impeach the credibility of certain government witnesses during the trial by allowing the defense to cross-exam those witnesses regarding such matters as their use of pornography, unlawful drug use, solicitation of prostitutes and/or extramarital affairs. This Carrie Johnson/Washington Post article reports that the defense motion is pointed particularly toward former Enron CFO, Andrew Fastow:

One unnamed witness, described by a source familiar with the case as former finance chief Andrew S. Fastow, had “pornography habits, which were so extensive that when his computer files were seized they were submitted to the FBI for criminal investigation,” defense lawyers claimed in court filings.

Looks as if at least the defense wants to avoid what occurred during a large portion of the trial of the Enron Broadband case last year.

Top ten lies of entreprenuers

guykawasaki3.jpgAuthor, Apple Mac evangelist, and Silicon Valley venture capitalist Guy Kawasaki has an interesting blog in which he follows up this clever post on the “Top Ten Lies of Venture Capitalists” with this hilarious post on the “Top Ten Lies of Entreprenuers,” which include the following (see Kawasaki’s post for his explanation of each lie):

1. ìOur projections are conservative.î
2. ìGartner says our market will be $50 billion in 2010.î
3. ìBoeing is going to sign our purchase order next week.î
4. ìKey employees are set to join us as soon as we get funded.î
5. ìNo one is doing what we’re doing.î
6. ìNo one can do what we’re doing.î
7. ìHurry because several other venture capital firms are interested.î
8. ìOracle is too big/dumb/slow to be a threat.î
9. ìWe have a proven management team.î
10. ìPatents make our product defensible.î
Bonus lie: ìAll we have to do is get 1% of the market.î

My contribution: “If you can help us solve this initial cash flow issue, we’ll be just fine.”

Peter Lattman on the Calpine chapter 11 case

Calpine Steam Guy Logo2.JPGAfter only a week, Peter Lattman’s new WSJ Law Blog is proving well worth reading, as reflected by his posts here and here on the politics involved in the initial meetings to select the creditors’ committee and its counsel in the Calpine Corp. chapter 11 case, which include the following observations:

Youíd think that a get-together of people owed money by Calpine would be a solemn affair, but it felt more Kiwanis Club than Creditors Club. Thatís because most of the people in the room werenít creditors; they were the lawyers, bankers, and consultants who make their livings off the carcasses of bankrupt companies like Calpine.
And this is one tight-knit group. After . . . 10 minutes of bland introductory remarks, they adjourned the meeting for two hours to select a committee. At that point a party broke out. The various advisors lingered, glad-handing and networking their way through the room. We even ran into a few hedge fund managers working the crowd, trying to handicap their investments.

National Championship redux

vinceyoung3.jpgFollowing a weekend in which University of Texas alums continue to bask in the glow of their university’s first National Championship football team in a generation, I pass along the following items of interest:

The flat-out cleverest piece on the UT-USC National Championship game is this hilarious Bill Simmons/ESPN Page 2 column entitled “Welcome Back, Coach Fredo.” Don’t worry, Longhorn fans. Simmons is talking about USC coach Pete Carroll with that “Coach Fredo” tag. Hat tip to Kevin Whited for the link.

As expected, the star of UT’s National Championship team — QB Vince Young of Houston’s Madison High School —
announced on Sunday that he is ending his UT career and declaring himself eligible for the NFL Draft later this year. A collective sigh of relief could be heard from the eleven Big 12 coaches other than Longhorn coach Mack Brown.

Speaking of the NFL Draft, corporate legal expert Stephen Bainbridge provides a forum for discussing who the Texans should select as the first pick in the upcoming draft. One commenter posted the following football/corporate law question regarding the recent Texans-49’ers “Reggie Bush Bowl“:

Just a thought on the football game between the 49ers and the Texans. If the team was a corporation, would the Texans have a duty to lose the game in order to secure the number one pick? Winning the game is really not a benefit to the organization itself. Curious about your thoughts.

Another favored former Longhorn QB — Major Applewhite — may be the last offensive coordinator of the Rice University football program before the university downgrades its football program from NCAA Division I-A. New Rice head coach Todd Graham is employing young assistant coaches to help him attempt to revive the program — the average age of the assistants who he has hired to date is just under 33 years old.

The star-crossed football career of former Texas Tech running back Bam Morris — fresh off a prolonged stint in Leavenworth Federal Prison — took another interesting turn as the Orlando Predators of the Arena Football League hired Morris to play running back for the team. Morris was the top running back in college football during the 1993 season.

Finally, although football is a dangerous activity, it’s nothing compared to this one.

The Talented Mr. Kopper

The NY Times’ Landon Thomas, Jr. — whose interesting article on former Merrill Lynch executive Nigerian Barge defendant Daniel Bayly was highlighted in this previous post — scores again today with this fascinating article on Michael J. Kopper, the former Enron executive who orchestrated along with with former Enron CFO Andrew Fastow the effective embezzlement of millions from Enron through the company’s transactions with special purpose entities (“SPE’s”) that the two controlled.

Despite Kopper’s role in orchestrating the embezzlement and the resulting breach of market trust that ultimately led to Enron’s demise into bankruptcy, Mr. Thomas notes that Kopper’s plea bargain with the Enron Task Force is likely to result in a relatively light prison sentence, perhaps even probation.

One has to wonder how former Enron chief accountant Richard Causey — who didn’t receive a penny from the tens of millions that Fastow and Kopper embezzled from Enron — feels about that turn of events. Larry Ribstein comments along those same lines here.

Given the societal bias against all things related to Enron, it’s easy to overlook the key role that Kopper had in Enron’s collapse. A good case can be made that the true criminal acts at Enron were limited to Fastow, Kopper and a relatively small group of their underlings who also profited from the transactions between Enron and the SPE’s that Fastow and Kopper controlled.

The original concept of the SPE’s — before Fastow and Kopper hijacked them — was actually sound and creative.

With equity owned primarily by investment banks and other financial institutions, the SPE’s were initially intended to be private equity funds with completely separate management from Enron. The main attraction of the SPE’s for investors was the funds’ preferred right to invest in Enron assets, which benefited Enron by allowing the company to preserve liquidity and hedge risk.

Former Enron treasurer Jeff McMahon — who often clashed with Fastow over Fastow’s machinations with the SPE’s and ultimately lost his treasurer’s position because of those clashes — recruited a bright investment banker from Bankers Trust in London named Michael Jakubik in 1998 to run the SPE’s.

However, after Jakubik had moved to Houston to take the position of running the equity funds, Fastow engineered a last-minute coup in which he installed Kopper in the position with the SPE’s intended for Jakubik and directed McMahon to put Jakubik in another position with Enron.

That set the stage for Fastow and Kopper’s embezzlement from Enron using the SPE’s, the public disclosure of which triggered the the breach of trust that caused the markets to turn on Enron.

Mr. Thomas’ colleague at the Times, Kurt Eichenwald does a good job of describing the foregoing events on pp. 194-219 of his book on the Enron scandal, Conspiracy of Fools (Broadway 2005).