The Washington Post’s Robert J. Samuelson in this op-ed makes the following interesting observations regarding the way in which our government tends to deal with problems:
One truth is that government often operates by crisis. People do hard things only when forced by events. A superb example is the aging of baby boomers. As is well known, the over-65 population will double between now and 2030. With Social Security, Medicare and other retiree programs representing about two-fifths of the federal budget, this aging threatens huge spending increases, big tax increases, larger deficits, or — to minimize those problems — significant cuts in retiree benefits or other spending. Faced with these realities, what have successive presidents and Congresses done? Absolutely nothing. Here’s the connection with terrorism: Even when problems are widely understood, pragmatic politicians avoid unpopular measures. In this they usually reflect public opinion. Everyone knows baby boomers will strain future budgets, yet there’s no clamor for corrective policies. We lapse into willful ignorance, hoping — against evidence and logic — that what we suspect must happen somehow won’t. So it was with terrorism, though with more excuses. The facts there weren’t well known (the terrorists weren’t telling us their plans). Ordinary Americans and foreign policy “experts” alike didn’t grasp the threat or what might be done to oppose it. Only Sept. 11 awakened us.
Until recently this common-sense appraisal seemed to describe the prevailing views of the public, the media and most politicians. Clarke changed that. The resulting controversy rests on the unstated notion that if the Bush administration had only taken his advice more seriously, it might somehow have prevented Sept. 11. This is a fiction, but it’s a fiction that must be maintained, because if it isn’t, then Clarke’s criticisms — and their political overtones — lose much of their practical relevance. So we get Hollywood-on-the-Potomac. Politicians and the media engage in sanctioned make-believe. They splice together memos and meetings and, by silence and innuendo, suggest that Sept. 11 was preventable. Therefore, someone’s to blame.
And what does this dilemma in American government portend for the future? Mr. Samuelson is not optimistic:
Whoever wins in November must face the larger dilemma of American democracy. Government can adopt painful policies only with public support. But that materializes only if most Americans believe that the problem being addressed is real and worth the requested sacrifices — in money, inconvenience or lives. Sadly, what it often takes to convince the public is suffering the very problem we’re trying to prevent. The solution to the dilemma proposed sanctimoniously by scholars and pundits is “leadership.” Politicians (particularly presidents) should convince the public of the need to act before it’s too late.
Sounds simple, but it’s risky in practice, as Bush has shown. In Iraq, he offered just such leadership. Believing Saddam Hussein had weapons of mass destruction — but not knowing for certain — he presented the strongest case possible to the public or (to critics) deliberately overstated the case. Now, he’s suffering a backlash because the weapons haven’t materialized and the war’s aftermath has proved obstinately messy.
Political hazards explain why presidents are usually unwilling to get too far ahead of public opinion or even to lead it. We think we control our destiny when we’ve often consigned it to chance and crisis. Clarke testified that before Sept. 11, a basic problem in strengthening anti-terrorism programs was that “we were not able to point to — and I hate to say this — body bags. You know, unfortunately, this country . . . requires body bags sometimes to make really tough decisions.”
Hat tip to Asymmetrical Information for the link to Mr. Samuelson’s piece. Also, check out Ms. Galt’s piece on Hindsight Bias on that blog. Very insightful.
It seems to me that you are making a new America is a “Cat with Nine Lives Argument.”
About Bush you say “he presented the strongest case possible to the public or (to critics) deliberately overstated the case. Now, he’s suffering a backlash because the weapons haven’t materialized and the war’s aftermath has proved obstinately messy.”
Being a supporter of the broad concept of making Iraq into a democracy, by force, if necessary, my problems with Bush are completely with his planning and execution. Foremost, why March 2003 and not March 2004? Have you seen Biden talk about this. He and the other democracts who approved the resolution thought they had handed Bush the election, because (while they didn’t think Bush was smart enough to figure it out) they thought Rove would tell Bush you have to wait to 2004 to invade.
I, too, am a supporter of the Bush Administration’s handling of the war against the Islamic fascists. However, I differ with you and many others in criticizing the Administration’s planning and execution of the Iraq phase of the war. My criticism of the Administration is that the Iraq phase of the war was sold to the American public badly, with a focus on WMD’s when, in reality, that was only one of many factors that justified this phase of the war.
I have seen Senator Biden’s point about the timing of the operation and, frankly, find it to be rather typical political posturing. I mean, really, does Biden think that war timing decisions should be made primarily on what is best from a political timing standpoint? Stated another way, does anyone really rationally believe that the President’s decision to invade Iraq was primarily political in nature? Frankly, in my view, he would have been far better off politically by not taking on the messy task of cleaning up the cesspool of Saddam’s legacy.