Monthly Archives: November 2009

The headline says it all

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health care reform The fundamental problem with the American health care finance system is that reliance on tax-deductible, employer-based health insurance and government subsidized insurance (such as Medicaid, Medicare) created a culture since WWII in which consumers of health care at the point of delivery expect to pay none (or only a small fraction) of the cost of that health care.

That culture has led to highly inefficient consumption of health care services and product. Some folks consume too much because they have no financial incentive to be prudent about their purchases, while many others who really need services and products go without.

So, reforming the system should start with changing the culture, right?

So much for that:

US wealthy should pay for health care overhaul, poll finds

Data could boost House plan to tax top-tier earners

WASHINGTON – Americans don’t want to shoulder the cost of President Obama’s health care overhaul themselves. They think the rich should pay for it.

That’s the finding from a new Associated Press poll, and it could be a boost for House Democrats, whose plan approved this month proposed taxing upper-income people to fund their sweeping remake of the medical system.  .  .  .

Thus, rather than true reform, Congress simply debates transferring payments from one group to another. Reminds me of the observation that the late Milton Friedman used to make about spending money:

There are four ways in which you can spend money. You can spend your own money on yourself. When you do that, why then you really watch out what you’re doing, and you try to get the most for your money.

Then you can spend your own money on somebody else. For example, I buy a birthday present for someone. Well, then I’m not so careful about the content of the present, but I’m very careful about the cost.

Then, I can spend somebody else’s money on myself. And if I spend somebody else’s money on myself, then I’m sure going to have a good lunch!

Finally, I can spend somebody else’s money on somebody else. And if I spend somebody else’s money on somebody else, I’m not concerned about how much it is, and I’m not concerned about what I get.

And that’s government.   .   .

Thinking about financial regulation

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wallstreet

Peter Wallison and Steve Randy Waldman have each written a thought-provoking and important analysis of the effect of regulation on the recent financial crisis.

First Wallison:

What caused the financial crisis?

The widely accepted narrative, prominent in the media and pressed by the Obama administration, is that the crisis was caused by deregulation–the "repeal" of the Glass-Steagall Act and the failure to regulate both derivatives and mortgage brokers–which allowed excessive financial innovation, risk taking, and greed among financial players from mortgage brokers to Wall Street bankers.

With this diagnosis, the proposed remedy is more regulation and government control of the financial system, from the over-the-counter derivative markets to mortgage brokers and the compensation of CEOs.

The alternative explanation is that the crisis was caused by the government’s own housing policies, which fostered the creation of 25 million subprime and other low-quality mortgages–almost 50 percent of all mortgages in the United States–that are now defaulting at unprecedented rates.

In this narrative, the fact that two-thirds of all these weak mortgages are now held by government agencies, or were produced by government requirements, shows that the demand for these mortgages–and the financial crisis itself–originated in Washington.

The problem for the administration’s narrative is that its principal examples do not stand up to analysis: the repeal of a portion of the Glass-Steagall Act did not eliminate the restrictions on banks’ securities activities (they were left unchanged), the mortgage brokers were responding to demand created by the government, and, there is no evidence that the failure to regulate credit default swaps (CDS) had any effect in causing or enhancing the financial crisis.

Without a persuasive explanation for the cause of the financial crisis, the administration’s regulatory proposals rest on a mythic foundation.

And Waldman:

An enduring truth about financial regulation is this: Given the discretion to do so, financial regulators will always do the wrong thing.

Remember — it’s the incentives, folks.

Fertitta gets squeezed this time

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Looks as if Tilman Fertitta is about to endure a bit of his own medicine.

As this post from a couple of months ago explains in detail, Landry’s Restaurants, Inc. shareholders have had a wild — and mostly bad — ride over the past several years as Fertitta (who is the company’s founder, CEO and chairman) tried to figure out a way to finance taking the company private.

Because Landry’s board failed to obtain a standstill agreement from Fertitta while he put shareholders through a series of failed buyout offers, Fertitta increased his ownership stake in Landry’s from approximately 39% to 55% as the company’s stock fell as low as $5 per share. As you might expect, Fertitta and the Landry’s board are defendants in a shareholder lawsuit in connection with that oversight.

Finally, after shareholders and the markets widely panned Fertitta’s Saltgrass Steakhouse spinoff proposal in September, the Landry’s board tentatively approved an offer from Fertitta to buy the balance of Landry’s shares for $14.75 per share. Compared to the spinoff proposal, Fertitta’s cash offer looked relatively good.

There is just one small problem with Fertitta’s proposal this time — under Delaware corporate law, Fertitta had to agree that his proposal is subject to a requirement that a majority of the Landry’s shares that Fertitta does not control have to approve the deal.

Enter William Ackman and his Pershing Square Capital Management hedge fund.

In an Schedule 13D filed with the SEC this past Friday, Pershing and its partner William McGuire (the Borders Group chairman) announced that they had purchased just under 10% of Landry’s outstanding shares and that they hold derivatives contracts that could hike the share to almost 14% of the oustanding shares.

And while they were at it, Pershing and McGuire announced that they opposed Fertitta’s $14.75 per share buyout offer.

So, Fertitta would appear to have only two choices. Either pull his proposal off the table — and risk a wholesale shareholder revolt of his actions that have depressed the company’s stock price over the past several years– or raise his offer to satisfy Pershing.

And even if he decides to meet Pershing’s asking price, where is Fertitta going to find the financing for his proposal? It’s not as if the financing markets have been particularly bullish on the company over the past couple of years.

Hold on tight, Landry’s shareholders. Your wild ride is not over yet.

The NY Times Steve Davidoff has more.

2009 Weekly local football review

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Jordan Shipley (AP Photo/Tony Gutierrez; previous weekly reviews for this season are here)

Central Florida 37 Houston Cougars 32

As I’ve noted many times, Houston (10-2/4-2) games over the past several seasons are just different. The game against Central Florida (6-4/4-2) was a case in point.

The 24th-ranked Coogs jumped out to a 17-3 lead with 7 minutes to go in the first half, but Central Florida — which had held out its starting QB and RB in last week’s game against Texas — controlled the ball for essentially the entire 2nd quarter and narrowed the score to 17-10 by the end of the half. Inasmuch as one of the Cougar TD’s was on a kick-off return, the Coogs’ offense really didn’t play much in the 2nd quarter.

Thus, by the 3rd quarter, the Houston offense had lost its rhythm. UCF’s defensive front — which is pretty stout — began dominating the line of scrimmage and Houston’s undermanned defense began to wear down.

Before you know it, the Coogs were reeling and UCF had outscored Houston 28-3 during the 3rd quarter and the first half of the 4th quarter. As usual, QB Case Keenum brought the Coogs back with two late scores, but the magic of a miracle finish was used last week at Tulsa.

With the loss and despite their fine season to date, the Cougars find themselves trailing SMU (6-4/5-1) in the C-USA West Division race. The Ponies play a decent Marshall (5-5/3-3) team next Saturday in West Virginia and then close at home against truly horrid Tulane (3-7/1-5). If SMU wins both those games, then the Ponies will win the C-USA West Division and play in the conference championship game against the C-USA East champ, either East Carolina (5-4/4-1) or Southern Miss (6-4/4-2). Despite having the best overall record in the league by far, the Cougars will be shut out of the conference championship game.

The Cougars close the season with home games against Memphis (2-8/1-5) and Rice (1-9/1-5). Interestingly, assuming Houston wins both those games and does not play in the C-USA Championship game, the Coogs will probably secure a more attractive bowl invitation than if they would receive if they won the C-USA Championship game (the Liberty Bowl in Memphis).

Rice 28 Tulane 20

The Owls (1-9/1-5) finally broke through against woeful Tulane (3-7/1-5) for their first victory as WR Toren Dixon did his best Jarett Dillard imitation (7 rec/158 yds/3 TD’s), including a spectacular 29 yard TD reception in the final minute that secured the win.

Rice has now played two straight good games after their off-week, and they have another chance for a win this Saturday against up-and-down UTEP (3-7/2-4). The Owls close their season on the Saturday after Thanksgiving against cross-town rival Houston.

Oklahoma 65 Texas Aggies 10

As with the Kansas State game a month ago, the Aggies (5-5/2-4) rolled over and played dead against an underachieving Oklahoma (6-4/4-2) team that was itching to hammer someone. Even considering the Aggies’ talent limitations, how can that not be a huge concern for those who are hoping for a rebound of the Aggie program?

The Aggies finish the season with home games against Baylor (4-6/1-5) and Texas (10-0/6-0). After A&M’s recent wins over Texas Tech and Iowa State, the Baylor game looked like a reasonably sure win as the Aggies marched toward bowl eligibility. But after two straight disheartening losses, the Bears are no longer looking like such a sure thing.

A loss to Baylor would almost make certain that the Ags would not become bowl eligible, which would be another major disappointment in the Mike Sherman era.

So it goes these days in Aggieland.

Texas 47 Baylor 14

The Horns (10-0/6-0) continued to cruise toward a probable berth in the BCS Championship game with an easy win over the chronically undermanned Bears (4-6/1-5). The Horns were up 40-0 at the half and let up on the gas pedal for the rest of the game.

Texas finishes the regular season against Kansas (5-5/1-5) and A&M before taking on either Kansas State (6-5/4-3) or Nebraska (7-3/4-2) in the Big 12 Championship game. It will be shocking If UT wins any of those games by less than two TD’s.

The Texans (5-4) were off this past week as they prepare for two straight interesting home games against the resurgent Titans (3-6) and the suddenly vulnerable-looking Colts (9-0).

Refusing to throw in the towel is not a crime

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Cioffi and Tannin Thank goodness.

Despite the government’s sordid expansion of crimes against business people over the past decade, at least it’s not a crime to decline to throw in the towel on a business venture simply because there are signs that it might fail. As John Carney eloquently points out, that’s in all of our best interests.

Sort of makes one wonder what would have happened if Jeff Skilling had been tried in even a reasonably fair environment?

And the government’s response of putting Messrs. Cioffi and Tannin through hell over the past year?:

"Of course, we are disappointed by the outcome in this case, but the jurors have spoken, and we accept their verdict," said Benton Campbell, the U.S. Attorney for the Eastern District of New York, in a written statement.

Of course, the off-the-record response was a tad less diplomatic toward the jury. But at least Campbell should know about failed prosecutions. Is a result such as this the reason why he insists on continuing to bring them?

Update: Frostburg State Economics Professor William Anderson, who has written extensively on the adverse economic impact of the government’s criminalization of business policy, followed the trial closely and provides this insightful postscript, which includes the following insightful observation about the obstacles that defendants face even in the face of a weak prosecution:

If anything, the slanderous and dishonest post-acquittal remarks by prosecutors drive home just how contemptuous federal prosecutors are of everyone else. The jury did not acquit because they were too stupid and vapid to understand the clarity of the prosecutionís case; they acquitted because they did understand that the governmentís simple, clear presentation was not true, or, at very best, did not do a good job of meeting the “reasonable doubt” standards.
I was not surprised at the acquittal, given what I knew was presented in court and given what my sources had been telling me. My only fear was a federal jury being, well, a federal jury that throws sops to those poor, underpaid prosecutors who claim they only are trying to do justice.
In the end, however, the jury did its job, and judge did his job, the defendants were innocent, and the prosecution continued to lie. Oh, and the media will continue to be the media. Like the Bourbons, they “learn nothing and they forget nothing.”

Too Big Even to Consider Failing

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As with many folks in the financial and legal world, I’m finishing up Andrew Ross Sorkin’s entertaining new best-seller, Too Big to Fail: The Inside Story of How Wall Street and Washington Fought to Save the Financial System—and Themselves (Viking 2009). Clear Thinkers favorite Arnold Kling has the best analysis of the book that I’ve read to date:

Reading the book leads me to ponder the differences between Chauffered America–Hollywood, investment bankers, and high government officials–and Strip Mall America–people who launch businesses like restaurants, hair salons, and other small enterprises. [.  .  .]

The obvious sociological point is that the top finance people live in a bubble, with secret entrances, isolated offices, chauffered automobiles, and private jets. Even the top government officials inhabit this world. Sorkin describes Geithner arriving at the airport in DC and losing it over not being met by a driver. Forced to take a taxi, Geithner turns to his colleague and says that he has no cash. Perhaps this would have been a moment to teach the head of the New York Fed how to use an ATM. [.  .  .]

I do not see how reading this book can help but reinforce a Simon Johnson/James Kwak view of Washington captured by Wall Street. Paulson seems to have no use for anyone who is not a Goldman Sachs alumnus. Geithner seems to have no use for anyone who is not a CEO of a large financial institution. Both of them view the collapse of major Wall Street firms as Armageddon.

The “regulatory overhaul” promised by the Obama Administration is still the same-old, same-old. Chauffered America will be restored to its exalted status, with a few new rules and regulations thrown in.

Instead, somebody should be asking the deeper question about Chauffered America. If Chauffered America were to disappear, would the rest of us miss it? Or could Strip Mall America get along just fine without the big-time bankers and their friends in government?

One comes away from the book with the conclusion that the primary purpose of the government and corporate leaders involved in resolving the crisis was to maintain the elitist culture of Wall Street with regard to financial matters, while at all times making sure that the government protected the maximum number of the folks making the bad bets from ever having to endure the true extent of the risk that they took in placing those bets. That’s why things like this happened.

As I noted after the demise of Lehman Brothers last fall, resolving the crisis was not rocket science. Sorkin’s book establishes that the leaders who were calling the shots were never going to let on that such was the case.