Is there a problem with the Airbus 330?

Airbus When I travel to Europe, I normally fly on Air France, which is one of my favorite airlines. Professional, orderly, reasonably comfortable and clean. It’s amazing how few airlines combine those characteristics these days. 

Air France’s fleet includes a large number of Airbus 330 aircraft, which is the aircraft that crashed into the Atlantic Ocean last month on Air France’s Flight 447 from Rio de Janeiro to Paris. So, given my preference for Air France, I’ve been following the development of information on that crash with particular interest.

James Fallows, who is a long-time aviator, follows most aircraft crashes closely, and he has provided much-needed information and insight in his posts on Flight 447 here, here, here and here. Initial speculation on the cause of the crash revolved around multiple system failures occurring during an unusually violent storm.

But now, questions are beginning to emerge as to whether there is a fundamental problem with the design of the Airbus 330. This lengthy David Rose/Mail Online article surveys the evidence that suggests a problem. Here is a list of the recent troubled flights of the Airbus 330 model:

August 2008 – Air Caraibes Atlantique – Paris to Martinique: Plane flying through turbulence experiences failure of autopilot, ADIRU and computerized instruments. Pilots successfully fight to restore control.

September 2008 – Air Caraibes Atlantique – Paris to Martinique: Second Air Caraibes flight to Martinique has identical experience. Plane is same model, different aircraft.

October 7, 2008 – Qantas Flight 72 – Singapore to Perth: Makes emergency landing after twice plunging uncontrollably in flight following failure of ADIRU, autopilot and instruments. 64 injured, 14 seriously.

December 28, 2008 – Qantas Flight 71 – Perth to Singapore: Forced to return to base after failure of autopilot and ADIRU.  Different aircraft, same model as in previous incident.

May 21, 2009 – TAM Flight 8901 – Miami to Sao Paulo: Experiences failure of autopilot, ADIRU and instruments. Crew regain control after five minutes. No injuries. US investigation under way.

June 1, 2009 – Air France Flight 447 – Rio to Paris: Crashes during Atlantic storm, killing 228. Automatic radio messages indicate that in minutes before crash, crew lost autopilot, ADIRU and computerized instruments.

June 23, 2009 – Northwest Airlines – Hong Kong to Tokyo: Flight loses autopilot, ADIRU and instruments before landing safely.  US investigation under way.

Rose goes on to report:

Interviews with pilots, lawyers and crash investigators suggest there may be an underlying problem with A330s. It’s impossible to conclude what this is, but there are two prime suspects – either flaws in the software, or with the wiring found inside huge numbers of modern aircraft.

‘It looks to me like there’s only one reason why AF447 crashed and QF72 survived,’ says Charles-Henri Tardivat, a former crash investigator who’s now part of a team from the London law firm Stewarts Law, which represents the victims’ families. ‘On QF72, the same things started happening that preceded the Air France crash. They were able to recover control because they were flying in daylight and perfect weather. They could see what was happening, even without their instruments. But AF447 was caught in a violent storm at night. The A330 is a very well-built aircraft, but there obviously is a problem somewhere. With so many of them out there, we need to find it.’

"Somebody gave him the steal sign"

If you haven’t already seen it, then don’t miss Jon Stewart’s classic destruction of the fawning treatment that former Phillies and Mets outfielder Lenny Dykstra received from several financial media outlets over the past several years in regard to his supposedly magical investment strategies. Ryan Chittum summarizes the media outlets’ attraction in Dykstra’s case to glitz over substance. Another reminder that the "too good to be true" rule is an important one to embrace when evaluating investment alternatives.

Can he do it?

Watson A year after 53 year-old Greg Norman flirted with winning the Open Championship, 59 year-old Tom Watson, just two months shy of his 60th birthday, is leading the Open going into the final round Sunday at Turnberry in Ayrshire on the western coast of Scotland.

Leave it to Clear Thinkers favorite Dan Jenkins, who at 79 has provided the best commentary on the Open through his Twitter page, to put Watson’s remarkable feat in perspective:

"I was Watson’s age 20 years ago–still drinking a lot, practically buying Elaine’s. I thought I was immortal. What’s the big deal about 59?"

As with Norman, I don’t think Watson can do it, but I will be pulling for him along with millions around the world. Watson’s run as a dominant player on the PGA Tour ended in the 1980’s when he inexplicably lost the deft putting stroke that had been the common thread through his eight major championships (5 Opens, 2 Master’s and 1 U.S. Open). Watson has magically regained that stroke this week and, if it holds for one more day, he could pull off the most improbable victory in the history of golf.

One thing going for Watson — playing golf as a youth during the winter months in his native Kansas City helped him to become on one of the best bad weather golfers of the modern era. And it will probably be blustery in Turnberry on Sunday.

Update: Watson gave it a great go, but lost in a playoff to Stewart Cink. It is Cink’s first major championship. Dan Wexler does a good job summing up Watson’s accomplishment.

Big Fan

I suspect that the NFL would prefer that you watch something else going into this upcoming season, but Big Fan looks interesting.

The Money Pit

Money%20Pit.jpg Casey Mulligan’s clever post below reminded me of the classic Onion News segment that follows:

In 2008, we were told that each American taxpayer had to spend thousands on bank bailouts in order to avoid utter disaster. We were not supposed to object, because a few thousand is a cheap price to pay for disaster avoidance.

In early 2009, we were told that each American taxpayer had to spend thousands on fiscal stimulus in order to avoid utter disaster. We were not supposed to object, because a few thousand is a cheap price to pay for disaster avoidance.

Now we are told that each American taxpayer has to spend thousands (? amount to be unveiled later) on government health care in order to avoid utter disaster. We were not supposed to object, because a few thousand is a cheap price to pay for disaster avoidance.

We are lucky to have the White House to save us from so many disasters!


In The Know: Should The Government Stop Dumping Money Into A Giant Hole?

 

Checking in on MLB and the NL Central at the All-Star Break

All STar GAme The Major League Baseball All-Star break is this week, so it’s a good time to step back and review the key statistics to identify the most productive players and teams over the first half of the season.

Following on my latest periodic post on the Stros, regular readers of this blog know that RCAA ("runs created against average") and RSAA ("runs saved against average") statistics, developed by Lee Sinins for his Sabermetric Baseball Encyclopedia, provide a simple but revealing benchmark of how an MLB player or MLB team is performing during the long MLB season.

RCAA reflects how many more (or fewer) runs that player generate relative to a league-average player (an exactly league-average player’s RCAA is zero).

Similarly, RSAA measures how many more (or fewer) runs that a pitcher saves relative to a league-average pitcher (an exactly league-average pitcher RSAA is zero).

Thus, a club’s positive RCAA number reflects how many more runs a club’s hitters are generating relative to what a league-average club would generate using the same number of outs. Likewise, a club’s positive RSAA number reflects how many more runs the club’s pitching staff is saving relative to what a league-average pitching staff would prevent in the same number of innings. Negative RCAA and RSAA numbers are just the opposite. A negative RCAA reflects how many fewer runs a club’s hitters are generating relative to a league-average club and a negative RSAA indicates how many more runs a pitching staff is giving up in comparison to a league-average staff.

Accordingly, focusing on those two basic statistics, let’s review the top players and the top teams from the first half of the 2009 season:

Continue reading

A daunting jury verdict for deal lawyers

Collins Flying a bit under the radar this past weekend was the dreaded "we’re sure as hell not coming back on Monday" verdict that the jury returned on Friday afternoon in the Refco, Inc-related criminal case against Mayer Brown partner, Joseph P. Collins.

Collins was Refco’s outside corporate counsel for ten years or so before Refco disintegrated into bankruptcy in October, 2005. A New York city federal jury found Collins guilty on five of 14 criminal counts, including two counts of wire fraud, two counts of securities fraud and conspiracy, and a mistrial was declared on the other nine counts. Sentencing is scheduled for November 3rd. A previous post on the indictment is here and a copy of the original indictment against Collins is here and previous posts about the Refco case are here.

The jury verdict against Collins crosses the Rubicon in terms of the federal government’s willingness to prosecute an outside deal lawyer for merely advising a client in regard to structuring transactions that are not intrinsically illegal. As is typical of most business prosecutions over the past several years that criminalize questionable business judgment rather than clear white collar criminal acts such as embezzlement, the case against Collins was a jumble of conclusory allegations of fraud without any specific allegations of what Collins did that was criminal.

Heck, it was undisputed at trial that Collins barely worked on the transactions on which the prosecutors based their case against him. Essentially, the prosecution alleged that Collins assisted former Refco CEO and controlling shareholder Phillip Bennett in using Refco’s credit to reduce indebtedness to Refco of an affiliate controlled by Bennett. That’s not a crime, but the government asserted that Collins committed a crime by aiding Bennett in misleading Refco auditors and investors by not telling them about the use of Refco’s credit to reduce the affiliate’s debt to Refco.

It didn’t help Colling that a couple of other former Refco officers who copped pleas testified for the prosecution, although Bennett was not one of them. And the fact that a couple of partners from Weil Gotshal — which replaced Mayer Brown as Refco’s corporate counsel after Thomas H. Lee Partners bought a majority stake in the firm a few months before Refco’s public offering — also testified against Collins. I’d bet that testimony didn’t help relations between the two firms.

What’s curious about all of this is that numerous lawyers, accountants and investment bankers scrutinized and presumably profited from Refco over the past several years in connection with various investments in the firm, including its well-publicized public offering that valued the company at $4 billion five months before it disintegrated into bankruptcy. Not only did those professionals fail to uncover the alleged fraud, but none of them other than Collins was targeted as a criminal. See why these matters are better suited for civil cases in which responsibility for wrongdoing can be allocated among all the responsible parties?

Moreover, as this earlier post notes, if Collins knew about a massive fraud at Refco, then why on earth did he allow the company to be bought by Thomas H. Lee Partners and then go public where discovery of the fraud would likely lead to far more draconian consequences than if Refco had remained private?

Collins testified in his own defense and rightfully contended that it was never the job of Collins — or generally any outside corporate counsel, for that matter — to monitor the company’s transactions, which would be an impossible task for outside counsel. Collins went on to testify that was never informed of the hidden debt and that Refco’s top executives lied to him from the beginning.

At any rate, at the end of the trial, the prosecution contended that none of the specifics really meant much. Collins and Mayer Brown made millions off of Refco, which ultimately tanked. Thus, Collins must have done something wrong, right? Even this apparently divided jury agreed with that twisted logic.

Here’s hoping that the trial judge will set aside the verdict against Collins, but that’s probably wishful thinking in these anti-business times. The problem with this emerging governmental policy of prosecuting transactional lawyers is similar to the policy of criminalizing agency costs against corporate officers. There is a big difference between prosecuting agency costs and prosecuting clear-cut crimes, such as embezzlement. The difference relates primarily to the nature of the evidence involved, the relevance of contracts, and the subtleties of dividing responsibility between corporate actors.

Larry Ribstein has put it this way. Suppose somebody mugs you on the street. There is no question that is a crime. However, what if they ask you first if they can borrow your wallet, you loan it to them, and then they don’t give it back in time? What if they ask your employee who’s running the store for you whether they can borrow some money, the employee loans it to them and then they don’t pay it back? What if the "thief" is another employee who says the manager gave him the money as bonus compensation?

Who is liable in these situations turns on the contracts and the legal relationships among the various parties. Proof depends on who said what to whom. Can we rely on what the witnesses say about this? What if the prosecutor tells the guy who’s minding the store that he’ll not face a prosecution for conspiracy if he spills the beans on the employee?

In the meantime, the Collins verdict sends an ominous message to transactional lawyers everywhere. Rest assured that American business — and ultimately all of us — will endure the additional costs that deal lawyers will charge to endure the risk that the government will prosecute them for a crime that they do not know about.