Former class action securities plaintiffs’ lawyer William Lerach finally cut a non-cooperation plea deal (Nathan Koppel’s WSJ Law Blog post is here) to resolve the longstanding criminal investigation into alleged undisclosed payments that Lerach and his firm made to class representatives and co-counsel in cases that they handled.
In certain defense and business circles, there is a fair amount of schadenfreude over Lerach’s demise — he had no reservation about alleging criminal conduct against business executives, such as he did when he claimed that Enron was shredding documents during the early stages of that company’s bankruptcy case (that claim turned out to be wrong).
However, before we get too sanguine about Lerach’s plea deal, let’s not forget the circumstances under which it has been obtained. The 61-year old Lerach was facing a horrifying trial penalty if he chose to fight the charges, and he almost certainly will lose his law license as a result of pleading guilty to a felony. And as Larry Ribstein has repeatedly pointed out, it doesn’t say much for our criminal justice system that the government is paying witnesses to testify against Lerach for the crime of paying his class representative clients. As Larry points out in his most recent post on the matter, the non-cooperation nature of the plea deal does not necessarily mean that the government isn’t providing Lerach some form of hidden incentive for his plea.
Update: Ted Frank argues that Lerach’s plea deal is, all things considered, not so bad for him, after all. On the other hand, Peter Henning is not so sure.
Daily Archives: September 19, 2007
An enduring myth of regulation
The New York Times is shocked to discover that big, established businesses often attempt to manipulate governmental regulation to their advantage over entrepreneurial startups. This hidden cost of regulation is one that I noted awhile back in regard to the proposed XM-Sirius merger. Many well-meaning folks — usually those without much experience in business matters — believe that regulation is good for the consumer because most established businesses generally abhor such regulation. However, established businesses typically use a part of their superior resources to manipulate regulation to their advantage and against the threat of beneficial competition from new companies. A big, well-established business can absorb the high cost of regulation and pass it along to the consumer. A thinly-leveraged start-up generally does not have that luxury.
Warren Meyer, who actually confronts this phenomenom as he runs his small business, makes the same point here and provides the following insightful quote on the subject from the late Milton Friedman:
The justification offered is always the same: to protect the consumer. However, the reason is demonstrated by observing who lobbies at the state legislature for the imposition or strengthening of licensure. The lobbyists are invariably representatives of the occupation in question rather than of the customers. True enough, plumbers presumably know better than anyone else what their customers need to be protected against. However, it is hard to regard altruistic concern for their customers as the primary motive behind their determined efforts to get legal power to decide who may be a plumber.
Thom Lambert also chimes in.
A dose of Americana
Will Veber over at Road Tips reports on his trip (with pictures) to one of the last bastions of pure Americana — the Iowa State Fair.