Agents Prosecuting Agents

ribsteinInasmuch as I’ve been in an extremely busy period in my practice recently, I haven’t had time to blog much. But I came across something yesterday that I wanted to pass along.

Larry Ribstein — the University of Illinois law professor who has done more than anyone in the blogosphere to decry the enormous financial and human cost of the federal government’s criminalization of business lottery over the past decade – has posted on SSRN a new paper that he has been working on for some time – Agents Prosecuting Agents:

Significant questions have been raised concerning the efficiency of criminalizing agency costs and the problems of excessive prosecution of crimes committed by corporate agents. This paper provides a new perspective on these questions by analyzing them from the perspective of agency cost theory. It shows that there are close analogies between the agency costs associated with prosecutors in corporate crime cases and those of the agents being prosecuted. The important difference between the two contexts is that prosecutors are not subject to many of the standard mechanisms for dealing with corporate agency costs. An implication of this analysis is that society must decide if prosecuting corporate agents is worth incurring the agency costs of prosecutors. [.  .  .]

This paper contributes to this debate by approaching the subject from the perspective of agency theory and analogizing abuses of power by prosecutors to those of corporate agents. It shows that prosecutors’ conduct involves many of the same agency cost problems as the corporate conduct they are prosecuting. At the same time, the sort of market and institutional mechanisms that can constrain corporate agents may not be effective for prosecutorial agents. Moreover, the particular challenges of corporate criminal prosecutions exacerbate prosecutorial agency costs in this context.

This agency analysis illuminates whether and to what extent corporate agency costs should be criminalized. It shows that if the criminal justice system is to be used to punish corporate agents for harm they cause in the course of their employment, then society must be prepared to tolerate increased costs associated with delegating discretion to its own agents, those who prosecute these crimes. Prosecutorial agency costs, in turn, must be taken into account in designing and weighing the costs and benefits of criminal liability of corporate agents. [.  .  .]

The agency costs associated with prosecution of corporate crime are at least as consequential as those related to the crimes being prosecuted. This matters for at least two reasons. First, combining analyses of the two types of agency costs sheds light on how to appropriately constrain excessive or misguided corporate prosecutions. Second, prosecutorial agency costs bear on the extent to which the conduct of corporate agents should be criminalized at all given the weak constraints on prosecutorial conduct in enforcing the criminal law. The criminal laws may provide significant deterrence of corporate agents’ misconduct that other mechanisms cannot fully supply. However, we should not assume that it is socially valuable to use the criminal laws to ensure totally loyal corporate agents unless we are ready to demand similar perfection from our prosecutors.

We in Houston know all about the implications of the problem that Professor Ribstein addresses.

Our broken tax system

File this excellent Cato Institute video on our governments’ absurdly complicated tax system in the “why do we do this to ourselves” category of out-of-control governmental policies that include such intrusions as security theater and overcriminalization:

Old narratives die hard

PD*27270710A Russian criminal court sentenced former OAO Yukos chairman and CEO Mikhail Khodorkovsky to another seven years in prison last week. As if on cue, the mainstream U.S. media reported on the event as a reflection of the capricious and arbitrary nature of the Russian legal system.

We really are better than those corrupt Russians, aren’t we?

Meanwhile, the mainstream media continues to neglect — and often promotessimilar mistreatment and persecution of business executives in the U.S. I mean, really. Would R. Allen Stanford fare much worse in a Russian prison than he has in U.S. jails?

And to that the unnecessary and shameful criminalization of large segments of American society in other respects and you start wondering whether those writing for the mainstream media have any idea of what is going on in their own backyards?

Yeah, Russian criminal justice system is corrupt. The U.S. system is far superior.

Old narratives die hard.

A Couple of Houston Dealmaking “F’s”

f-gradeSteven M. Davidoff, the NY Times Dealbook’s Deal Professor on the world of mergers and acquisitions, includes Landry’s Restaurants, Inc’s Tilman Fertitta – for many of the reasons chronicled over the past several years here –  in the group of businessmen getting an “F” for dealmaking in 2010:

Others deserving an F are Tilman Fertitta, chief executive of Landry’s, for his second buyout effort of the restaurant company. Mr. Fertitta initially obtained the agreement of Landry’s board to $14.50 a share to take Landry’s private. He was then effectively forced by the hedge fund Pershing Square and the Delaware courts to raise his initial lowball bid to $24.50 a share.

Meanwhile, Dynegy, Inc’s management team also gets an “F” in the category of shareholder communications:

COMMUNICATIONS In this perennially competitive category for bad grades, the F this year goes to Dynegy. The energy company threatened its shareholders with possible bankruptcy if a sale to the Blackstone Group was not completed at $4.50 a share. The threat made the company appear heavy-handed with its shareholders and was ill conceived, because only a month after the Blackstone sale was canceled, the company agreed to sell itself to Carl C. Icahn for $5.50 a share. This latest sale is also being challenged by one of Dynegy’s largest shareholders.

Can’t really argue with either evaluation.

Deepwater Horizon and the Gulf

Deepwater HorizonDon’t miss a couple of interesting articles from this past weekend regarding the Deepwater Horizon blowout in the Gulf of Mexico this past April.

First, this thorough NY Times article (and accompanying slideshow) focuses on the destruction of the Horizon rig, which was a distinct from the blowout itself:

It has been eight months since the Macondo well erupted below the Deepwater Horizon, creating one of the worst environmental catastrophes in United States history. With government inquiries under way and billions of dollars in environmental fines at stake, most of the attention has focused on what caused the blowout. Investigators have dissected BP’s well design and Halliburton’s cementing work, uncovering problem after problem.

But this was a disaster with two distinct parts – first a blowout, then the destruction of the Horizon. The second part, which killed 11 people and injured dozens, has escaped intense scrutiny, as if it were an inevitable casualty of the blowout.

It was not.

Nearly 400 feet long, the Horizon had formidable and redundant defenses against even the worst blowout. It was equipped to divert surging oil and gas safely away from the rig. It had devices to quickly seal off a well blowout or to break free from it. It had systems to prevent gas from exploding and sophisticated alarms that would quickly warn the crew at the slightest trace of gas. The crew itself routinely practiced responding to alarms, fires and blowouts, and it was blessed with experienced leaders who clearly cared about safety.

On paper, experts and investigators agree, the Deepwater Horizon should have weathered this blowout.

This is the story of how and why it didn’t.

Meanwhile, this Robert Nelson/Weekly Standard article points out that it now is becoming apparent that the Gulf of Mexico suffered remarkably little damage from the oil spill that resulted from the blowout:

Oddly enough, however, the ecosystem of the Gulf itself turns out to have suffered remarkably little damage from the continuous gushing of oil into the water from April 20 till July 15, when the leaking well was capped. One group of scientists rated the health of the Gulf’s ecology at 71 on a scale of 100 before the spill and 65 in October. By mid-August, the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA) was having trouble finding spilled oil. This squared with the finding of researchers from the Lawrence Berkeley National Laboratory in California that the half-life of much of the leaking oil was about three days. At that rate, more than 90 percent would have disappeared in 12 days.

NOAA explained one reason for this in a report in August: “It is well known that bacteria that break down the dispersed and weathered surface oil are abundant in the Gulf of Mexico in large part because of the warm water, the favorable nutrient and oxygen levels, and the fact that oil regularly enters the Gulf of Mexico through natural seeps.” In other words, the organisms that normally live off the Gulf’s large natural seepage of oil into the water multiplied extremely rapidly and went on a feeding frenzy. Another 25 percent of the spilled oil-the lightest and most toxic part-simply evaporated at the surface or dissolved quickly.

Damage to wildlife, too, was relatively sparse. As of November 2, the U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service reported that 2,263 oil-soiled bird remains had been collected in the Gulf, far fewer than the 225,000 birds killed by the Exxon Valdez spill in Alaska in 1989. Despite fears for turtles, only 18 dead oil-soiled turtles had been found. No other reptile deaths were recorded.

While more than 1,000 sea otters alone had died in the Alaska spill, only 4 oil-soiled mammals (including dolphins) had been found dead in the Gulf region. These are very small numbers relative to the base populations. Similarly, government agencies were unable to find any evidence of dead fish. Fish can simply swim away from trouble. Nor was evidence found of contamination of live fish. In one government test, 2,768 chemical analyses uncovered no signs of contamination.

In the latest irony, marine biologists this fall have actually been seeing surprising increases in some fish populations. It seems that the closure of large areas of the Gulf to fishing amounted to an unplanned experiment in fisheries management. According to Sean Powers, a University of South Alabama marine biologist, “It’s just been amazing how many more sharks we are seeing this year. I didn’t believe it at first.” He attributed the change to the “incredible reduction in fishing pressure,” and added, “What’s interesting to me [is that] we are seeing it across the whole range, from the shrimp and small croaker all the way up to the large sharks.”

Protecting the Children

Mcdonalds11No, really. this is not from The Onion:

The Center for Science in the Public Interest has filed a lawsuit against McDonald’s Corp., claiming that the company’s meals with toys unfairly entice children into eating food that can do them harm.

The Washington advocacy group warned McDonald’s in June that it would sue if the company did not stop providing toys with children’s meals that have high amounts of sugar, calories, fat and salt. The suit, filed in San Francisco Superior Court, seeks class-action status.[.  .  .]

The lead plaintiff in the suit is Monica Parham, a mother of two from Sacramento who said the company "uses toys as bait to induce her kids to clamor to go to McDonald’s," the organization said.

Ms. Parham has to sue McDonald’s rather than simply telling her children “no”? Walter Olson chronicles here.

Malkiel on investing

Burton Malkiel’s WSJ op-ed yesterday on the importance of investing in China’s growth reminded me of this lengthy and engaging lecture that he gave earlier this year. It may take several sessions to get through the entire talk, but it’s definitely worth the effort.

Judge Kozinski on the criminalization of business lottery

Business crime croppedLarry Ribstein — the law professor who has done more than anyone in the blogosphere to decry the enormous financial and human cost of the federal government’s criminalization of business lottery over the past decade – highlights  in this blog post Ninth Circuit Judge Alex Kozinski’s lucid concurrence in the Ninth Circuit’s reversal of the business fraud conviction of former Network Associates CFO, Prabhat Goyal:

This case has consumed an inordinate amount of taxpayer resources, and has no doubt devastated the defendant’s personal and professional life. The defendant’s former employer also paid a price, footing a multimillion dollar bill for the defense. And, in the end, the government couldn’t prove that the defendant engaged in any criminal conduct. This is just one of a string of recent cases in which courts have found that federal prosecutors overreached by trying to stretch criminal law beyond its proper bounds. See Arthur Andersen LLP v.United States, 544 U.S. 696, 705-08 (2005); United States v. Reyes, 577 F.3d 1069, 1078 (9th Cir. 2009); United States v. Brown, 459 F.3d 509, 523-25 (5th Cir. 2006); cf. United States v. Moore, 612 F.3d 698, 703 (D.C. Cir. 2010) (Kavanaugh, J., concurring) (breadth of 18 U.S.C. ¬ß 1001 creates risk of prosecutorial abuse).

This is not the way criminal law is supposed to work. Civil law often covers conduct that falls in a gray area of arguable legality. But criminal law should clearly separate conduct that is criminal from conduct that is legal. This is not only because of the dire consequences of a conviction-including disenfranchisement, incarceration and even deportation-but also because criminal law represents the community’s sense of the type of behavior that merits the moral condemnation of society. See United States v. Bass, 404 U.S. 336, 348 (1971) (“[C]riminal punishment usually represents the moral condemnation of the community . . . .”); see also Wade v. United States, 426 F.2d 64, 69 (9th Cir. 1970) (“[T]he declaration that a person is criminally responsible for his actions is a moral judgment of the community . . . .”). When prosecutors have to stretch the law or the evidence to secure a conviction, as they did here, it can hardly be said that such moral judgment is warranted.

Mr. Goyal had the benefit of exceptionally fine advocacy on appeal, so he is spared the punishment for a crime he didn’t commit. But not everyone is so lucky. The government shouldn’t have brought charges unless it had clear evidence of wrongdoing, and the trial judge should have dismissed the case when the prosecution rested and it was clear the evidence could not support a conviction. Although we now vindicate Mr. Goyal, much damage has been done. One can only hope that he and his family will recover from the ordeal. And, perhaps, that the government will be more cautious in the future.

As Professor Ribstein has been saying for years, the problem with this policy is that the government is prosecuting agency costs, such as KPMG pushing the edge of the envelope on tax shelters or Andersen not using very good sense in carrying out its document retention policy.

There is a big difference between prosecuting agency costs and prosecuting clear-cut crimes, such as embezzlement. The difference relates primarily to the nature of the evidence involved, the relevance of contracts, and the subtleties of dividing responsibility between corporate actors.

Professor Ribstein has put it this way. Suppose somebody mugs you on the street. There is no question that is a crime.

However, what if the mugger asks you first if he can borrow your wallet, you loan it to him, and then he doesn’t give it back in time? What if the mugger asks your employee who’s running the store for you whether he can borrow some money, the employee allows it and then the mugger doesn’t pay it back? What if the "thief" is another employee who says the manager gave him the money as bonus compensation?

Who is liable in these situations turns on the contracts among the various parties. Proof depends on who said what to whom. Can we rely on what the witnesses say about this? What if the prosecutor tells the employee who’s minding the store that he’ll not face prosecution for conspiracy if he spills the beans on the other employee who says that the manager gave him bonus compensation?

Society needs to have appropriate punishment and accounting for clear-cut crimes. But in cases such as Enron or Lehman Brothers, the civil lawsuits — unlike the criminal prosecution – included all the people involved, including the directors who approved wrongful corporate conduct and accountants and lawyers who may have facilitated it. That is a much more rational and effective way in which to deal with agency costs than attempting to make them appear to be clear-cut crimes, which they simply are not.

Finally, criminal prosecutions over merely questionable business judgment obscure the true nature of risk and fuel the myth that investment loss results primarily from criminal misconduct. Taking business risk is what leads to valuable innovation and wealth creation. Throwing creative and productive business executives such as Michael Milken and Jeff Skilling in prison does nothing to educate investors about the true nature of risk and the importance of diversification.

The supposed payoff to criminal prosecutions of agency costs is deterrence. But some businesspeople will keep on pulling these shenanigans regardless of the prosecutions, while the legitimate risk-takers who create jobs and wealth for the community sorts will be the ones who are deterred.

I’m not suggesting that the Bernie Madoffs of the world should be encouraged. But the cases against businesspeople such as Milken, Skilling, Hank Greenberg, Jamie Olis, the NatWest Three and the Merrill Lynch bankers are fundamentally different than Madoff’s scam, and I am not comfortable that politically ambitious prosecutors can tell the difference. As Professor Ribstein notes in another article, “prosecutors turn up the fire [in mounting dubious business prosecutions] and then sell extinguishers.

Richard Epstein on Obama

Reason‘s Nick Gillespie recently interviewed Richard A. Epstein (previous posts here), who explains how misdirected governmental programs under both Republican and Democratic administrations are having a devastating impact on economic growth and prosperity.

The entire interview is well worth watching. However, the initial portion of it (excerpted below) is particularly interesting because Epstein passes along his personal observations about Barack Obama gained from his experiences with Obama while both served on the University of Chicago Law School faculty.

While certainly not as bad as this, Epstein’s portrayal of Obama is but not particularly reassuring, either.