The subprime mortgage criminal lottery

benton J. campbell Well, well, well. Look who is resurfacing in connection with the creation of the Justice Department’s latest criminal Task Force to investigate whether crimes were committed when the subprime-mortgage market collapsed (just what we need — another corporate crime lottery):

Federal prosecutors are stepping up their scrutiny of players in the subprime-mortgage crisis, with a focus on Wall Street firms and mortgage lenders.

Prosecutors in the Eastern District of New York in Brooklyn have formed a task force of federal, state and local agencies that will involve as many as 15 law-enforcement agents and investigators.

The U.S. attorney for the office, Benton J. Campbell, who supervises about 150 prosecutors, said the group will look into potential crimes ranging from mortgage fraud by brokers to securities fraud, insider trading and accounting fraud.

You may remember Campbell. He was the lead prosecutor on the Enron-related criminal trial known in these parts as the first Enron Broadband trial, which ended in an embarrassing loss for Enron Task Force after the prosecution was caught threatening defense witnesses (see also here) and propounding false testimony from one of its key witnesses during the trial. Sort of what you would expect from a trial in which the Task Force advocated an unwarranted expansion of a criminal law intended to punish kickbacks and bribes against business executives who did no such thing.

Interestingly, in the Wall Street investigation, Campbell thinks there actually may be a non-criminal explanation about the meltdown in the sub-prime market:

Mr. Campbell said the "jury is still out" on just how much criminal activity the office might find, particularly on Wall Street, which saw a sudden decline in the value of securities backed by pools of mortgages last year. "There are market forces in play in that area, and that doesn’t necessarily mean there is fraud," said Mr. Campbell, 41 years old.

H’mm. How many damaged lives and careers would have been salvaged had Campbell and his fellow Enron Task Force prosecutors been so open-minded?

Thinking about Bear Stearns

bear_stearns_building Michael Lewis — author of Moneyball and The Blind Side: Evolution of a Game (previous post here) provides this particularly lucid Bloomberg.com op-ed regarding the implications of the Bear Stearns affair to investors generally:

All of this raises an obvious question: If the market got the value of Bear Stearns so wrong, how can it possibly believe it knows even the approximate value of any Wall Street firm? And if it doesn’t, how can any responsible investor buy shares in a big Wall Street firm?

At what point does the purchase of such shares cease to be intelligent investing, and become the crudest sort of gambling? [.  .  .]

To both their investors and their bosses, Wall Street firms have become shockingly opaque. But the problem isn’t new. It dates back at least to the early 1980s when one firm, Salomon Brothers, suddenly began to make more money than all the other firms combined. (Go look at the numbers: They’re incredible.)

The profits came from financial innovation — mainly in mortgage securities and interest-rate arbitrage. But its CEO, John Gutfreund, had only a vague idea what the bright young things dreaming up clever new securities were doing. Some of it was very smart, some of it was not so smart, but all of it was beyond his capacity to understand.

Ever since then, when extremely smart people have found extremely complicated ways to make huge sums of money, the typical Wall Street boss has seldom bothered to fully understand the matter, to challenge and question and argue.

This isn’t because Wall Street CEOs are lazy, or stupid. It’s because they are trapped. The Wall Street CEO can’t interfere with the new new thing on Wall Street because the new new thing is the profit center, and the people who create it are mobile.

Anything he does to slow them down increases the risk that his most lucrative employees will quit and join another big firm, or start their own hedge fund. He isn’t a boss in the conventional sense. He’s a hostage of his cleverest employees.

As noted in this earlier post, nothing is wrong with having compassion for Bear Stearns employees who lost much of their net worth as a result of the firm’s demise. But the reality is that the ones who suffered large losses in their nest egg when Bear Stearns failed were imprudent in their investment strategy. They should have diversified their holdings or bought a put on their shares that would have allowed them to enjoy the rise in the company’s stock price while being protected by a floor in that share price if things did not go as planned. Even though most of those Bear Stearns investors carry insurance on their homes and cars, relatively few of them elected to hedge the risk of their more speculative Bear Stearns investment. Most likely, many of these investors simply did not understand how Bear Stearns created their wealth in the first place. Absent a better understanding of investment risk and how to hedge it, such investment losses will continue in the future, regardless of whatever ill-advised regulations are devised in an attempt to prevent them.

The Economist Gets It

The Economist produces the best mainstream media article that I’ve seen to date placing the prosecutorial misconduct of the Enron Task Force toward former Enron executives Jeff Skilling and Ken Lay in the context of the most recent demise of a trust-based business, Bear Stearns:

For many people, the mere fact of Enron’s collapse is evidence that Mr Skilling and his old mentor and boss, Ken Lay, who died between his conviction and sentencing, presided over a fraudulent house of cards.

Yet Mr Skilling has always argued that Enron’s collapse largely resulted from a loss of trust in the firm by its financial-market counterparties, who engaged in the equivalent of a bank run.

Certainly, the amounts of money involved in the specific frauds identified at Enron were small compared to the amount of shareholder value that was ultimately destroyed when it plunged into bankruptcy.

Yet recent events in the financial markets add some weight to Mr Skilling’s story—though nobody is (yet) alleging the sort of fraudulent behaviour on Wall Street that apparently took place at Enron.

The hastily arranged purchase of Bear Stearns by JP Morgan Chase is the result of exactly such a bank run on the bank, as Bear’s counterparties lost faith in it.

This has seen the destruction of most of its roughly $20-billion market capitalisation since January 2007. By comparison, $65 billion was wiped out at Enron, and $190 billion at Citigroup since May 2007, as the credit crunch turned into a crisis in capitalism.

The article goes on to compare the similarity of certain of Ken Lay’s public comments regarding Enron’s liquidity in the turbulent post 9/11 markets (for which he was eventually prosecuted) with those of Bear Stearns and Lehman Brothers executives during the current turmoil in the financial markets.

The source of the information upon which Lay based his positive statements is the same fellow (former Enron CFO Andrew Fastow) whose exculpatory statements regarding Skilling and Lay the Enron Task Force improperly withheld in connection with their criminal trial. And the revelations of this latest round of prosecutorial misconduct with regard to Fastow comes on top of the Task Force’s blatant misrepresentation (see also here) of Fastow’s plea deal to the Lay-Skilling jury during the trial.

As usual, Larry Ribstein places all of this in context:

I’m constructing a “narrative” for the prosecutorial misconduct case: Prosecutors desperate for a conviction, their careers turning on the outcome, have a key witness, Andy Fastow. The problem is, the guy has, in [Enron Task Force prosecutor John] Hueston’s words, a “heartstopping history of self-dealing.”

Obviously the government couldn’t afford any additional shadow on Fastow’s credibility. Yet in the government interviews it seems his story got more negative on the defendants over time.

Could be a big problem for Fastow on the witness stand, as the defense sought on cross to show he was changing his story to suit his jailers. Could the prosecutors afford to give these notes to the defense? Why not just turn over a summary?

By the time the truth came out (if it ever did) they could do a dance about how the differences were inconsequential.The government is saying the differences are inconsequential. So why, then, didn’t they produce the notes as repeatedly requested, rather than summarizing them?  I think those prosecutors have some explaining to do.

Update: Warren Meyer also notes the similarities between Bear Stearns’ demise and that of Enron.

That Pesky Trust-Based Business Model

Over the weekend, we learned that the Fed had bailed out New York-based investment bank Bear Stearns during this unsettled time in the financial markets.

Almost seven years ago, a much larger company that shared many characteristics with Bear Stearns — Houston-based Enron — did not even generate serious consideration for a Fed bailout before it went under in the turbulent post-9/11 financial markets.

In between those two events, one of the world’s wealthiest insurers and another company that is similar in many respects to Bear Stearns and Enron — American Insurance Group — barely escaped a similar fate by cutting a deal with the now-disgraced former Governor and Attorney General of New York to cut loose the executive primarily responsible for creating AIG’s vast wealth.

The fact of the matter is that Enron was — and Bear Stearns and AIG are — trust-based businesses that fundamentally depend on the trust of the markets to sustain their value.

Once that trust is lost, such companies lose value quickly and dramatically, a case in point being that JP Morgan Chase’s proposed $236 million purchase price for Bear Stearns comes just hours after Bear’s market cap was $3.5 billion this past Friday and $20 billion as of January, 2007.

Although unfortunate for the owners of such companies, such a dramatic loss of wealth does not necessarily mean that any criminal conduct caused or was even involved in the loss. Rather, such loss is simply one of the risks of investing in a company based on a trust-based business model.

The sooner we all recognize and understand this risk — and avoid the mainstream media’s promotion of myths about them — the quicker we can put a stop to injustices such as this while advancing the discussion of how best to hedge the risk of such potential losses.

The Spitzer Lesson

The mainstream media and the blogosphere have been buzzing over the past 24 hours regarding the fall from grace of New York’s governor and former Lord of Regulation, Eliot Spitzer.

As noted in this previous post, there is an under-appreciated human element in such dubious criminal problems as Spitzer fell into.

So, I have a great deal of compassion for the members of Spitzer’s family, although Spitzer’s many victims would certainly attest that he showed none for them. Larry Ribstein has related and typically insightful thoughts regarding why the revelers in Spitzer’s fate should be concerned about the way in which he was brought down.

But I hope that the most important lesson that Spitzer’s political career teaches us is not lost amidst the glare of a tawdry sex scandal.

As with Rudy Giuliani before him, Spitzer rose to political power through the misuse of the state’s overwhelming prosecutorial power to regulate business interests. In so doing, Spitzer manipulated an all-too-accommodating mainstream media, which never misses an opportunity to take down an easy target such as a wealthy businessperson. Spitzer is now learning that the same media dynamic applies to powerful politicians, as well.

However, as noted earlier here, where was the mainstream media’s scrutiny when Spitzer was destroying wealth, jobs and careers while threatening to go Arthur Andersen on American Insurance Group and other companies?

Where was the healthy skepticism of the unrestrained use of the state’s prosecutorial power to regulate business where business had no available regulatory procedure with which to contest Spitzer’s actions?

As Dealbreaker’s John Carney noted at the time of that earlier post:

Why didn’t [the mainstream media covering Spitzer’s investigation of Grasso] reveal the slimy tactics of the Spitzer squad?

We suspect part of the problem was the fear of being “cut off” of access. Reporters compete for scoops, and often those scoops depend on sources who will leak information to them. In the NYSE case, reporters assigned to the story were largely at the mercy of the investigators, who could cut-off uncooperative reporters, leaving them without copy to bring to their editors while their competitors filed stories with the newest dirt. They probably felt—not unrealistically—that their very jobs were on the line.

This reveals an unfortunate state of affairs. Playing bugle boy while government officials call the tunes from behind a veil of anonymity is not investigative journalism—it’s hardly journalism at all. It’s closer to propaganda. It would have been far better had the journalists turned their backs on the Spitzer squad, or even revealed these tactics to the public. Sure they may have lost some “good” stories but they could have painted a truer picture of what was going on. But that’s probably too much to hope for.

And, as noted here, the same prosecution manipulation of the mainstream media contributed to the utter lack of balance in the media’s reporting on the Enron criminal prosecutions.

Alas, change does not come easily to the mainstream media.

Late last week, this post reported on developments that could well expose an egregious abuse of prosecutorial power in connection with the prosecution for former Enron CEO, Jeff Skilling. Why has no mainstream media outlet intervened in that case and demanded that the information about potentially serious governmental misconduct be made public?

The Spitzer lesson is not easily embraced.

Update: Following on the theme of this post, the W$J’s Kimberly Strassel reviews the mainstream media’s complicity in portraying Spitzer as something that he is not, and Charlie Gasporino — who wrote the book about Spitzer that foreshadowed these issues — comments along the same lines here.

Criminalizing Capitalism

handcuffs%20121308.gifIf I didn’t know better, I’d say that Nicole Gelinas has been reading (H/T Professor Bainbridge) my blog over the past several years:

[I]n the end, Sarbanes-Oxley has just made it easier for ambitious government attorneys to criminalize bad business judgment and complex accounting in hindsight. Further, in their focus on strengthening legal enforcement, the feds have passed up opportunities to create commonsense protections for investors. Worse still, the government has instilled investors with false confidence by implying that they can rely on prosecutors, not prudence, to protect their market holdings. Now the housing and mortgage meltdownówhich could hurt the economy far more than Enron didóis reminding investors that no law or regulation can protect them from economic disruption. [. . .]
As the economy heads into a possible downturn, calls will grow for someone to pay for the pain of another burst bubbleóand for yet more onerous rules, regulations, and prosecutions of businesses to prevent future crises. But no government mandate or punishment, however harsh, will stop companies and markets from being imperfect collections of fallible human beings. At the end of a decade of financial surprises, that may be the most enduring lesson of all.

As I noted here almost three years ago and have reiterated many times, the truth about Enron is that no massive conspiracy existed, that Jeff Skilling and Ken Lay were not intending to mislead anyone and that the company was simply a highly-leveraged, trust-based business with a relatively low credit rating and a booming commodities trading operation. Although there is nothing inherently wrong with such a business model, it turned out it to be the wrong one to survive amidst the perilous post-tech bubble, post-9/11 market conditions. Thus, when the markets were spooked by revelations of the embezzlement of several millions by Enron’s CFO and his relative few minions, the company failed.
However, Gelinas is spot on in observing that Enron’s failure was not a market failure. That Jeff Skilling failed to predict that Enron would fail is not a crime. Unlike his main accusers Andy Fastow and Ben Glisan, Skilling didn’t embezzle a dime from Enron. Did he tirelessly advocate on behalf of this innovative company? Sure, but since when is it a crime for a CEO to be optimistic — even overly-optimistic — about his company?
The primary justification for the absurdly-long sentence handed to Skilling is the plight of the innocent employees and investors who lost their nest eggs when Enron went bankrupt. But the main reason that those nest eggs ever had value in the first place was because Skilling had transformed Enron into the world’s leading energy risk management company through the creative use of futures and options contracts to hedge price risk for natural gas producers and industrial consumers.
Although nothing is wrong with compassion for folks who lose money on an investment, rarely is it mentioned in the Enron morality play that many of those investors who lost their nest egg when Enron failed were imprudent in their investment strategy. They should have diversified their Enron holdings or bought a put on their Enron shares that would have allowed them to enjoy the rise in Enron’s stock price while being protected by a floor in that share price if things did not go as planned. Even though virtually all of those innocent Enron investors carry insurance on their homes and cars, one can only speculate why they didn’t attempt to hedge the risk of their investment in Enron stock. Most likely, many of the investors simply did not understand how Enron’s risk management services created their wealth in the first place.
Beyond the shattered lives, families and careers, the real tragedy of the post-Enron demonization of business is that it has distracted us from examining the tougher issues of what really causes the demise of a company such as Enron and understanding how such a company can be structured to survive in even the worst market conditions. It’s easy to throw a good and decent man such as Jeff Skilling in prison for most of the rest of his life, throw away the keys and simply attribute Enron’s failure to him. It’s a lot harder to try and understand what really happened.

The Power of Myths

A common topic on this blog has been the power of anti-business myths within American society.

Take Enron, for example. We all know how the myth played out. Enron, which was one of the largest publicly-owned companies in the U.S., was really just an elaborate financial house of cards that a massive conspiracy hid from innocent and unsuspecting investors and employees.

The Enron Myth is so widely accepted that otherwise intelligent people reject any notion of ambiguity or fair-minded analysis in addressing facts and issues that call the morality play into question. The primary dynamics by which the myth is perpetuated are scapegoating and resentment, which are common themes of almost every mainstream media report on Enron.

The mainstream media — always quick to embrace a simple morality play with innocent victims and dastardly villains — was not about to complicate the story by pointing out that the investors in Enron could have hedged their risk of loss by buying insurance quite similar to that which Enron developed in creating their wealth in the first place.

Instead of attempting to examine and tell the nuanced story about what really happened at Enron, much of the mainstream media simply became a part of the mob that ultimately contributed to death of Ken Lay and hailed the barbaric 24 year sentence of Jeff Skilling.

Ambitious prosecutors, given wide latitude to obtain convictions of key Enron executives regardless of the evidence, gladly took advantage of the firestorm of anti-Enron public opinion to lead the mob.

Consequently, as Wall Street continues to endure massive equity write-downs that dwarf the $1.1 billion non-recurring charge against earnings that triggered Enron’s demise after the 3rd quarter of 2001, I was somewhat surprised to read this common sense analysis from NY Times columnist, David Brooks:

There is roughly a 100 percent chance that weíre going to spend much of this year talking about the subprime mortgage crisis, the financial markets and the worsening economy. The only question is which narrative is going to prevail, the Greed Narrative or the Ecology Narrative.

The Greed Narrative goes something like this: The financial markets are dominated by absurdly overpaid zillionaires. They invent complex financial instruments, like globally securitized subprime mortgages that few really understand. They dump these things onto the unsuspecting, sending destabilizing waves of money sloshing around the globe. Economies melt down. Regular people lose jobs and savings. Meanwhile, the financial insiders still get their obscene bonuses, rain or shine.

The morality of the Greed Narrative is straightforward. A small number of predators destabilize the economy and reap big bonuses. The financial system is fundamentally broken. Government should step in and control the malefactors of great wealth.

The Ecology Narrative is different. It starts with the premise that investors and borrowers cooperate and compete in a complex ecosystem. Everyone seeks wealth while minimizing risk. As Jim Manzi, a software entrepreneur who specializes in applied artificial intelligence, has noted, the chief tension in this ecosystem is between innovation and uncertainty. We could live in a safer world, but weíd have to forswear creativity. [. . .]

The Ecology Narrative is not morally satisfying. I wouldn’t bet on its popularity as a backlash against Wall Street and finance sweeps across a recession-haunted country. But the Ecology Narrative has one thing going for it. It happens to be true.

Along those same lines, this Landon Thomas/NY times story reports on how two Wall Street executives who were intimately involved in $34 billion in write-downs remain reasonably hot properties on the Wall Street employment market. The Greed Narrative apparently hasn’t caught up with those two yet, either.

But not so fast. This NY Times article reports that New York attorney general Andrew Cuomo, who replaced Eliot Spitzer as the Lord of Regulation, is currently putting the squeeze on a company that analyzed the quality of home loans for investment banks to provide evidence to prosecutors that the banks had detailed information that they did not reveal to investors about subprime mortgage risk. So, maybe that Greed Narrative still has legs after all.

But for the final word, don’t miss this Larry Ribstein post in which he exposes NY Times columnist Gretchen Morgenson’s stubborn adherence to the Greed Narrative even when it is clear from the subject of the story (in this case, the troubles of retailer Sears) that the narrative doesn’t fit.

In short, Morgenson is not one to allow the facts to get in the way of spinning a Greed Narrative morality play.

Landing the tuna rather than the barracuda

warren_buffett.jpgAs noted here last month, Berkshire Hathaway chairman and mainstream media folk hero Warren Buffett is a key player and, as these NY Times and W$J articles report, perhaps even a key witness in the upcoming criminal trial of a former AIG executive and four former executives of Berkshire’s General Reinsurance Corp, including former General Re CEO, Ronald E. Ferguson.
Although Buffett knew about the finite risk transactions that are at the heart of the prosecution, he is exempt from prosecution under the Buffett Rule. Previous posts on this case are here, here, here, here and here.
What’s particularly interesting about all this is that the prosecution is attempting to prevent the defense from even mentioning Buffett, whose knowledge of the transactions (and the government’s election not even to include Buffett as an unindicted co-conspirator, much less a defendant) is at least some evidence of the defendants’ lack of criminal intent (Warren Buffett would not engage in any criminal conduct, now would he?). The prosecution is contending that any evidence relating to Buffett’s knowledge of the transactions is hearsay and, thus, inadmissible. But until the testimony regarding Buffett’s knowledge is propounded in court, who knows whether it is hearsay?
Of course, the prosecution is not shy about using hearsay testimony when it comes from someone who is not an avuncular media darling such as Buffett. The prosecution has fingered former AIG chairman Maurice “Hank” Greenberg as an unindicted co-conspirator in the trial, which — based on previous experience — means that the prosecution will use testimony about Greenberg’s statements that would otherwise be hearsay.
As usual, Larry Ribstein sums up the vagaries of the government’s policy of selectively criminalizing merely questionable business transactions:

One might think that the government would have been trying to ensnare Buffett, who would be a high-profile trophy. The problem is that trying a cultural icon like Buffett would raise public doubt about the legitimacy of the government’s corporate crime enterprise. So Buffett gets the benefit of a version of the Apple rule — . . . the Buffett rule. In this case, unlike Enron, it’s better for the government to land the tuna than the barracuda.
According to the WSJ, the prosecution is arguing that “[t]he defendants want to deflect the issue of their involvement, knowledge and the intent relating to … the fraudulent transaction at the heart of this case by creating a trial-within-a-trial about Warren Buffett.” Deflect? Yes, I guess, for the government, a defendant’s insistence on defending himself is a pesky nuisance.
The bottom line is that issues of defendants’ guilt, including critical evidence of whether they knew they were engaging in wrongdoing, may not be available because, ultimately, the government decides who testifies by deciding whom to prosecute. All part of the costs of the extensive criminalization of accounting and other conduct of corporate agents.