The Surprising Fastow Sentence

This Kristin Hays-Tom Fowler/Chronicle article picks up on an aspect of the six-year sentence assessed to former Enron CFO Andrew Fastow earlier this week that has largely been ignored in the media but noted earlier here.

The Enron Task Force elicited testimony from Fastow during the Lay-Skilling trial that represented to the jury that Fastow was a more credible witness because he had agreed to a minimum ten-year prison sentence and, thus, had no incentive to lie.

As we know now, Fastow had not really agreed to anything of the sort and, in fact, successfully petitioned U.S. District Judge Ken Hoyt for a lighter sentence. The article quotes several experts — including former Enron Task Force director Andrew Weissmann — who express surprise that the Task Force did not attempt to require Fastow to serve a minimum of ten years.

Although interesting, the article fails to address the most troubling aspect of the Fastow sentencing hearing — that is, the apparent failure of any of the attorneys involved to inform Judge Hoyt about how the Lay-Skilling jury was misled by Fastow’s testimony.

When Judge Hoyt finds out about that he was not informed about that, my sense is that he is not going to be pleased.

The public reaction to the Fastow sentence has been fascinating and reflects the dubious nature of the Justice Department’s regulation of business-through-criminalization policy.

Viewed in a vacuum, the Fastow sentence is reasonably fair. Fastow effectively embezzled millions from Enron and ruined the careers of several other Enron executives who he induced to participate in the embezzlement. Six years is a harsh sentence, so Fastow is certainly not getting off lightly.

However, the Fastow sentence was not handed down in a vacuum.

Not only did Fastow and the Task Force prosecutors mislead the jury in order to convict Lay and Skilling, they trampled justice by needlessly ruining the careers of the four Merrill Lynch executives in the Nigerian Barge case and they are currently doing the same thing to the three U.K. bankers in the NatWest Three case.

There is simply no way to reconcile Fastow’s sentence with the six-year sentence handed down to Jamie Olis — who did not steal anything and refused to tell lies about others — or the seven-year sentence of former Enron chief accountant Richard Causey, who also did not steal anything and who has not testified against anybody.

The death of Ken Lay from defending himself against a weak and unjust case, as well as the effective life sentence likely faced by Jeff Skilling, further underscore the confusing message conveyed by the Fastow sentence.

As Larry Ribstein has repeatedly observed, criminal cases involving business executives have become a sort of lottery, incrementally undermining the principles of justice and respect for the rule of law upon which the success of American society is largely based.

If we lose respect for those principles, then “do you really think you could stand upright in the winds [of abusive state power] that would blow then?

Mayor Bloomberg, save your money

bad_cop.jpgThis short WSJ ($) article left me shaking my head:

New York City Mayor Michael Bloomberg appointed consulting firm McKinsey & Co. yesterday to examine why more international companies are choosing to raise money outside of New York.
The two-month, $600,000 study comes as many of the largest initial stock offerings bypass a listing with NYSE Group Inc. and Nasdaq Stock Market Inc. for listings in London or in their home markets. Mr. Bloomberg and Sen. Charles Schumer (D., N.Y.) will review the results in an effort to improve New York’s position as a financial center.
Many big international IPOs no longer want to have their shares listed on a Western stock market, in part because they want local investors or because big international investment firms can often buy the stock even if its not listed in New York. Out of the top 25 global IPOs in each of the last two years, London snagged 11 listings, Hong Kong picked up six and New York received four, according to recent data.
Regulation costs, legal risks and increased white-collar-crime enforcement also get a lot of attention. The four-year-old U.S. Sarbanes-Oxley accounting-and-governance law has made it more expensive for companies, especially smaller ones, to list.
Investment-bank underwriting fees are also substantially lower in London — 3% to 4% of IPO receipts, compared with 6.5% to 7% in the U.S., according to a June report commissioned by the City of London.
Yesterday, at a private-equity conference in New York sponsored by Dow Jones & Co., Nasdaq Chief Executive Bob Greifeld said he couldn’t think of a reason for the difference in the IPO fees and predicted that there would be more pricing pressure on U.S. underwriting fees in coming years.

Mayor Bloomberg should save his city’s money. For the answer to the question posed, all the Mayor needs to do is talk to his state’s future governor and examine this mindset, which the future governor embraces. That mindset leads to abominations such as this and this, which business owners tend to notice after awhile. Indeed, the proponents of such dubious policies are widely-publicizing them to the international business community.
All of this has already contributed greatly to U.S. public companies and executive talent fleeing in droves to private equity. Why on earth would any international company choose to raise public money in such an environment?

More on the Fastow Sentence

It’s a good thing that Andy Fastow’s counsel did not mention Fastow’s following testimony on March 8 in the Lay-Skilling trial during Fastow’s sentencing hearing today in front of U.S. District Judge Kenneth Hoyt:

Q. Does the government decide your sentence?

A. My Judge decides the sentence.

Q. And who is your Judge?

A. Judge Hoyt.

Q. Is that right here in Houston, in this courthouse?

A. Yes.

Q. Do you recall the maximum sentence that you could be sentenced to for these crimes?

A. For the crimes I’ve pled guilty to?

Q. Yes.

A. Yes. Ten years.

Q. And was there a minimum sentence that you pleaded guilty to?

A. My plea agreement states that I agree to a sentence of 10 years. [. . .]

Q. And in agreeing — in addition to agreeing to serving 10 years in prison, did you also have to forfeit moneys?

A. Yes.

The foregoing testimony was elicted on direct examination of Fastow by Enron Task Force prosecutor John Hueston for the purpose of representing to the Lay-Skilling jury that Fastow’s testimony was credible because he had agreed to a floor of ten years of prison time. On March 8th, Skilling counsel Daniel Petrocelli followed up by asking Fastow during cross-examination about the sentence that he had agreed to under his plea deal:

Q. Okay. And you said you have to go to jail for 10 years; right?

A. Well, my sentence is for 10 years. I could potentially have time off for good behavior. [. . .]

Q. Okay. And the reason why you just answered my question in the way you did is because you want to communicate to the jury that Mr. Skilling is a criminal along with you, correct?

A. No, Mr. Petrocelli. I’m just trying to answer the questions honestly. My outcome is already determined.

Q. Well, not —

A. I’ll be sentenced to ten years as far as I understand. It doesn’t matter — my sentence isn’t affected by whether Mr. Skilling is convicted or not.

Then, on re-direct examination by Hueston on March 13th, Fastow testified as follows:

Q. And as a result of your pledge to cooperate, did you agree to plead guilty to a 10-year minimum sentence of imprisonment?

A. A 10-year maximum imprisonment.

Q. And what is the minimum amount of time that that plea agreement calls for?

A. It calls for a 10-year sentence.

Q. So after January 14th, can your cooperation lower that 10 years?

A. My understanding is that I will be sentenced to 10 years. The Judge ultimately has a discretion; but in my plea agreement, I agreed to the 10-year sentence.

Later that same day, Hueston asked Fastow about the suggestion made during cross-examination that Fastow had forged the key Global Galactic agreement between Fastow and former Enron chief accountant, Richard Causey:

Q. And after all this time, you found and turned over the document to the FBI, you remembered, late May or June; is that right?

A. I believe that’s correct, yes.

Q. And you turned it over because you were cooperating?

A. Yes, sir.

Q. And this is months after, six months after, you enter your plea of guilty; is that right?

A. Approximately, yes, sir.

Q. And can this document lower your sentence now, under your understanding?

A. My understanding is, no.

Q. And if, as the defense was suggesting, you were just falsely creating this document, wouldn’t it have been better to do so before you entered a plea of guilty, when you were bargaining with the government?

A. Well, one could argue that. [. . .]

Q. Mr. Fastow, if as the defense suggests, you’re on some sort of mission to say or do anything to convict Jeff Skilling, might you have been tempted to just add a couple more initials to that Global Galactic document?

A. Sir, I have no incentive to add any initials. My incentive is to be truthful. If I’m not truthful, I could go to prison for life. By making a document more compelling, I can’t lower my sentence.

Q. By trying to do that, there’s only one thing you’re sentence would do; right?

A. I’m sorry?

Q. If you tried to alter a document or tell a lie, there’s only one direction that sentence can go?

A. That’s correct. That would be a lie. That means my sentence would go up, potentially, to a life sentence.

Want to make a bet that the Task Force prosecutors did not inform Judge Hoyt today during Fastow’s sentencing hearing that Fastow and the Task Force had previously represented to the Lay-Skilling jury that Fastow’s testimony was more credible because he had agreed to a minimum ten-year sentence?

Try to make sense of this

Fastow20.jpgJamie Olis3.jpgLet’s see if I get this straight.
On one hand, Andrew Fastow — who served up his wife as a sacrifical lamb for his embezzlement of millions from Enron that triggered one of the largest bankruptcy cases in U.S. history, who used the NatWest Three to hide his embezzlement of millions more and then turned on the U.K. bankers to save his skin, who very well may have forged Richard Causey’s initials on the Global Galatic “agreement,” whose bizarre testimony during the Lay-Skilling trial was largely discounted by jurors and who had a large hand in ruining the careers of four innocent Merrill Lynch executives in order to lessen his prison sentence — is sentenced to six years in prison.
On the other hand, Jamie Olis — who worked on a transaction to improve his company’s earnings, did as he was told by his superiors, did not profit from the transaction, defended his company and himself against allegations of wrongdoing with regard to the transaction and did not trigger any type of insolvency case by his company — is sentenced to six years in prison.
These results are not the product of a rational application of our criminal justice system. Ellen Podgor has additional thoughts, particularly how the Fastow sentence may bear on the anticipated life sentence that former Enron CEO Jeff Skilling faces.

Jamie Olis Resentenced to Six Years

U.S. District Judge Sim Lake resentenced Jamie Olis to six years in prison this afternoon (Olis has already served about 2.5 years in prison) in the latest chapter of the three year saga that has become arguably the starkest example government’s dubious criminalization of business during the post-Enron era.

During the hearing, Judge Lake read portions of a lengthy opinion that he has written on the Olis resentencing. Although Judge Lake found that a sentencing guidelines sentence for Olis would be in a range of 151-188 months based on an estimated $79 million damage amount (the intended tax benefit to Dynegy from Project Alpha), he concluded that Olis deserved a non-guidelines sentence because of Olis’ exemplary character, the fact that Olis did not personally gain from Project Alpha, and that Dynegy did not fail as a going concern as a result of the transaction.

Judge Lake also concluded that the extensive publicity relating to Olis’ case and other recent white collar business cases has sufficiently informed the business world of the severity of fraudulent business conduct that principles of general deterrence do not require a guidelines sentence.

Although six years is a harsh sentence, my initial reaction to Judge Lake’s decision (before reading it) is that it would be very difficult to mount an effective appeal on Olis’ behalf to reduce the sentence.

On the other hand, the prosecution — exhibiting a lack of judgment that has become routine during this era of criminalizing business — announced at the end of the hearing that it intends to appeal Judge Lake’s opinion to the Fifth Circuit.

Frankly, I hope the government does appeal the sentence. That utter lack of prosecutorial discretion might be the only way to prompt the Fifth Circuit to take a whack at reducing Olis’ sentence further.

Update: Doug Berman, Ellen Podgor and Larry Ribstein, all of whom have blogged extensively on the Olis case, add their initial thoughts.

Professor Podgor’s point about the disparity between Olis’ sentence and the sentences of his co-defendants who copped pleas is particularly insightful.

Judge Lake notes in this opinion that this disparity in treatment between cooperating defendants and defendants who assert their innocence is a mechanism that Congress has adopted to facilitate cooperation in federal criminal investigations. But what looks good in theory has become ugly in practice.

Given the government’s overwhelming resource advantage and the willingness of prosecutors to appeal to jurors’ resentment to obtain convictions, asserting innocence in white collar criminal cases has become a risk that is too huge to take.

The Fastow sentencing memorandum

Fastow18.jpgAs Jamie Olis awaits his resentencing for working on a transaction for which he did not profit, Andrew Fastow’s lawyers (one of whom is Olis’ attorney — small world, isn’t it?) filed a sentencing memorandum earlier this week that claims that Fastow has “stepped up to take responsibility,” has expressed “full remorse” for his role in Enron’s demise and “is a changed man.” WaPo’s Carrie Johnson reports on the memorandum here and a copy of the Fastow sentencing memo can be downloaded here.
Before you become convinced that Fastow has turned his back on his evil ways and become a paragon of virtue, take a moment to review the following:

How Fastow served up his wife as a sacrifical lamb for his effective embezzlement of funds from Enron;
How Fastow used the NatWest Three to hide his embezzlement of funds from Enron and then turned on the bankers to save his skin;
How Fastow may have forged Richard Causey’s initials on the Global Galatic “agreement”;
Fastow’s bizarre testimony in the Lay-Skilling trial; and
Fastow’s involvement in ruining the careers of four innocent Merrill Lynch executives in order to lessen his prison sentence.

Changed man? Heck, it looks to me as if Fastow has manipulated the Enron Task Force in the same manner as he manipulated many of his colleagues at Enron.

The resentencing of Jamie Olis

Jamie Olis.jpgUS District Judge Sim Lake announced yesterday that Jamie Olis will be resentenced on Friday at 2 p.m., almost a year after the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals reversed Judge Lake’s previous 24+ year sentence.

As we await another chapter in what has emerged as one of the most egregious injustices of the government’s criminalization of business interests during the post-Enron era, the following are a sampling of my posts on the Olis saga since I began following the case two and a half years ago:

My first post on the sad case of Jamie Olis (March 24, 2004), a little over a month after the beginning of this blog;

The WSJ’s Holman Jenkins notices the sad case of Jamie Olis (March 31, 2004);

Larry Ribstein addresses the Olis case for the first time, marking the beginning of this fine scholar’s writings in the blawgosphere on the dubious nature of the government’s regulation-of-business-through-criminalization policy (April 7, 2004);

Olis is ordered to report to prison on May 20, 2004 (May 5, 2004);

The Wall Street Journal runs its first thorough article on the Olis case (May 20, 2004);

Novelist and former prosecutor Mark Costello decries the Olis sentence and the increasing criminalization of business interests in the New York Times (June 7, 2004);

The Los Angeles Times weighs in with a thorough article on the Olis case (July 12, 2004);

Sentencing scholar Douglas Berman takes up the Olis case, beginning his excellent blawgosphere analysis of the unjust nature of the sentence (July 16, 2004);

The sad case of Olis gets even sadder as he is transferred to a prison far away from his wife and young daughter (January 31, 2005);

The government’s misrepresentation of the market losses in the Enron Nigerian Barge trial mirrors the prosecution’s misrepresentation of the market loss involved in the Olis case (April 20, 2005);

Would Olis have fared better had he been tried and sentenced in Russia? (June 1, 2005);

While Theodore Siphol goes home, Bill Fuhs and Jamie Olis go to jail (June 24, 2005);

The Olis case is lost amidst the myopia of the NY Times (September 16, 2005);

Embezzling $43 million and copping a plea is better than embezzling nothing and asserting one’s innocence at trial (October 16, 2005);

Finally, some justice for Jamie Olis as the Fifth Circuit reverses his 24+ year sentence (November 1, 2005);

The Chronicle’s business columnist Loren Steffy — who generally supports the government’s regulation-of-business-through-criminalization policy — says that the government has gone too far in the Olis case (November 24, 2005);

The Justice Department’s initial reaction to the reversal of Olis’ sentence is that he should be resentenced to “only” 15 years (December 21, 2005);

The Justice Department drags its feet in regard to the Olis resentencing (January 18, 2006);

Short-selling and the genesis of the case against Olis (February 4, 2006);

Hope for Olis on the key market loss issue (February 27, 2006);

Martin Frankel’s sentence exposes the absurdity of Olis’ original sentence (March 24, 2006);

Prison time is slow time” (June 22, 2006);

More hope for sanity in the resentencing of Olis (August 1, 2006);

Professor Grundfest takes on the market loss issue in the Olis case (August 22, 2206);

The Justice Department continues misrepresenting the market losses in the Olis case (September 6, 2006) while The Economist weighs in on the market loss issue (September 19, 2006);

The prosecution asked Professor Grundfest what? (September 13, 2006); and

The Olis resentencing hearing concludes (September 14, 2006).

Update: As usual, Larry Ribstein has a most insightful observation about the Olis resentencing:

The government has built much of its scheme for putting business in jail on this unfortunate young father. For more than two years, prosecutors could use the Olis example to soften up defendants for pleas and cooperation, sort of like a murdering despot pointing to his display of his enemies’ spiked heads. A significant reduction in Olis’s sentence would not only be a welcome bit of justice for Jamie Olis, but an important symbolic turn in the government’s questionable campaign.

Update 2: Olis was resentenced to six years.

Update 3: Olis’ ordeal continues (December 10, 2006).

Update 4: Did the Bureau of Prisons forget about Olis (February 1, 2007)? And Olis finally receives a ticket to Bastrop (February 11, 2007).

Update 5: Troubling information is revealed regarding the DOJ’s interference with the Olis defense (May 28, 2007).

Update 6: The Olis connection to the KPMG criminal case (June 13, 2007).

Update 7: Information on what really happened during Olis’ criminal trial finally starts to come out (October 9, 2007).

Update 8: Did the prosecution violate its Brady obligation to turnover exculpatory evidence to the Olis defense (December 4, 2007)?

Update 9: Why is the United States imprisoning people such as Jamie Olis (April 27, 2008)?

Update 10: This is criminal justice (Aug 9, 2008)?

Update 11: People who live in glass houses . . . (Aug 26, 2008).

Update 12: But what about the case in which the threat worked? (December 5, 2008).

Update 13:Olis as a casualty of the criminalization-of-business lottery (January 13, 2009).

Update 14: Reflecting on astonishing abuses of power (August 10, 2009).

Update 15: Jamie Olis and the trial penalty (October 27, 2009).

Update 16: The incalculable cost of a misguided criminal prosecution (January 5, 2010).

You just knew this was coming

amaranth.jpgThe business news was awash with articles over the past couple of days about how Amaranth Advisors, LLP lost $5 billion or so by making wrong bets that natural gas prices would rise. Inasmuch as Monday morning quarterbacking is much easier than actually making money in placing such bets, it’s fairly clear what happened. As gas prices fell precipitously because of a storage glut, Amaranth increased bets that would pay off exponentially only if natural-gas prices rebounded in anticipation of a cold winter or as a result of a hurricane hammering natural-gas facilities. That hasn’t happened and so prices have continued to erode.
Meanwhile, Amaranth’s risk management systems apparently did not accurately measure how much downside risk the company faced and did not provide an effective mechanism for hedging that risk. Amaranth’s bets went bad because the company misjudged the spread, which is the movement of the difference between prices for different month contracts. The institutions and wealthy investors that invested with Amaranth knew about that risk, but they took it because of the potential for big gains if Amaranth bet right. Nothing too unusual about that.

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KPMG continues to play rough with its former partners

kpmg logo53.jpgIn this earlier post, I noted that KPMG’s resistance to paying its former employees’ defense costs in the KPMG tax shelter criminal case could end up being an element in prompting US District Judge Lewis Kaplan to dismiss the charges because of the government’s prosecutorial misconduct in coercing the firm into that position.
Now, it looks as if KPMG has gone one step further. According to this Lynnlee Browning/NY Times article, KPMG is now suing several of its former employees who are also defendants in the criminal case for damages resulting from their alleged embezzlement from the firm and breach of fiduciary duty to the firm in regard to their involvement with the tax shelters.
That lawsuit — along with the firm’s continued refusal to pay their employees’ defense costs in the criminal case — must be giving current KPMG partners a warm and fuzzy feeling, don’t you think? Also, a note to KPMG — such civil suits have a little process called “discovery,” which often leads to the publication of embarrassing information. As if the firm needs any more bad publicity from this seemingly endless debacle.
Meanwhile, this Wall Street Journal editorial ($) reports that two previously undisclosed IRS memos to KPMG from 2003 and 2004 confirm that the Service didn’t think there was anything wrong with the shelters. The defendants in the criminal case are understandably demanding all government documents relating to such memos, and the prosecution — as is typical in this era of criminalizing business — is resisting those demands. In short, the legality of the KPMG tax shelters was a subject of debate within the IRS, but the Justice Department brought the criminal case anyway before the IRS had even won a court ruling declaring the shelters to be illegal.
So much for due process, eh?

Awaiting the Jamie Olis Sentence

As we await U.S. District Judge Sim Lake’s decision on the re-sentencing of Jamie Olis later this week, this Economist article does an excellent job of summarizing the issues that are at play in determining the all-important market loss issue with regard to Olis re-sentencing.

I particularly enjoyed the last sentence of the article:

“If Judge Lake has been spending the summer getting up to date on economics, perhaps Mr Olis will be out of prison much sooner than he must once have feared.”