Catching up with Bill James

Bill James 042208 The beginning of the Major League Baseball season is a good time to check in with Clear Thinkers favorite, Bill James, the father of sabermetric analysis of baseball. Steve Dubner over at the Freakonomics blog recently provided James with this question-and-answer forum and, as usual, James’ observations on baseball are insightful and entertaining. For example:

Q: Using various statistics over a player’s lifetime, and comparing them to “league norms,” is it possible to determine which players may have used steroids?

A: Absolutely not, no. The problem is that many different causes can have the same effects. If a player used steroids, this could cause his home run total to explode at an advanced age — but so could weight training, Lasix surgery, better bats, playing in a different park, a great hitting coach, or a good divorce. It is almost always impossible to infer specific causes from general effects.

Q: Can you tell us about a time when you thought numbers were misleading and why?

A: I would say generally that baseball statistics are always trying to mislead you, and that it is a constant battle not to be misled by them. If you want something specific — pitchers’ won-lost records. And if you want a specific pitcher, Storm Davis, 1989.

For the record, Davis posted a 19-7 record with the Oakland A’s in 1989 while posting a pedestrian 4.36 ERA and giving up 8 more runs that season than a National League-average pitcher would have given up pitching in the same number of innings. Needless to say, a National League-average pitcher in 1989 did not have a 19-7 record. Here’s another of James’ interesting observations:

Q: Generally, who should have a larger role in evaluating college and minor league players: scouts or stat guys?

A: Ninety-five percent scouts, five percent stats. The thing is that — with the exception of a very few players like Ryan Braun — college players are so far away from the major leagues that even the best of them will have to improve tremendously in order to survive as major league players — thus, the knowledge of who will improve is vastly more important than the knowledge of who is good. Stats can tell you who is good, but they’re almost 100 percent useless when it comes to who will improve.

Read the entire post.

Batter up! Stros 2008 Season Preview

Minute Maid Park, Houston Astros 033008 The Stros are on the road for the first week of the 2008 Major League Baseball season, but that’s not a bad thing considering that the optimism usually associated with Opening Day during the Biggio-Bagwell era of the Stros is largely absent around Houston baseball circles these days (previous Opening Day posts since 2004 are here).

As noted in the concluding post on the Stros’ disastrous 2007 campaign, the Stros have been a team in decline for a long time even though generally superior pitching during the 2002-2006 seasons masked that downturn. Unfortunately, after cleaning house toward the end of the 2007 season, not much of what owner Drayton McLane did over the off-season indicates that he understands what the club needs to do to turnaround the downward spiral of the past two seasons. Inasmuch as McLane apparently remains under the delusion that the Stros can contend for a National League playoff spot, the club continues in a syndrome where it tends to take two steps back even after making an occasional good move. For example:

The Good: The Stros finally acquired Orioles star Miguel Tejada for Luke Scott, an injured Troy Patton and a couple of other minor leaguers.

The Bad: The Stros largely blew the benefit of deal by releasing their excellent defensive shortstop, Adam Everett, and placing Tejada at SS rather than 3B where he would be a better fit defensively and offensively. As a result, rather than having a very good defense with Tejada at 3B and Everett at SS, and an improved offense with Tejada’s bat, the Stros will field a terrible left-side of the infield defense and only a marginally-better offense than last season’s National League-average unit.

The Bad: By getting rid of Everett, the Stros appear locked in with 3B Ty Wigginton, who is not likely to be as good either offensively or defensively as former Stros 3B, Morgan Ensberg. Moreover, the Stros reacquired the Ausmusian Geoff Blum, who — along with Jimy Williams — probably cost the Stros a spot in the 2003 National League playoffs.

The Good: The Stros traded basket-case closer Brad Lidge for promising CF Michael Bourn, who will improve the Stros outfield defense, and signed 2B Kaz Matsui, who is a much better defensive 2B at this stage of his career than Craig Biggio was last season.

The Bad: The Stros traded 2B Chris Burke, who was never given a fair chance at his natural position, and paid an absurd $16.5 million over three years for Matsui, who has never played more than 114 games in any one of his four MLB seasons. To underscore this point, Matsui is beginning this season on the disabled list. Matsui’s career hitting stats are .325 OBA/.387 SLG/.712 OPS compared to Burke’s .304/.357/.662. Burke would have cost the Stros a fraction of the salary that they have committed to Matsui over the next three seasons and probably would have produced about the same once he was given an opportunity to settle into the 2B position. Go figure.

The Bad: The Stros traded solid MLB players Lidge, Chad Qualls and Luke Scott without receiving in return any above-average prospects to re-stock their farm system, which is rated by experts to be among the worst in MLB.

The Good: The Stros finally gave up on Woody Williams, who was a dubious acquisition from the start. Without both Williams and Jason Jennings, this season’s pitching staff should be better than last season’s, which gave up 79 more runs than a National League-average pitching staff would have given up in an equivalent number of innings (RSAA).

The Bad: After one of the best starting pitchers in MLB, Roy Oswalt, the following is the Stros’ rotation to begin the 2008 season:

  • Wandy Rodriguez: Rodriguez went from being one of the worst starting pitchers in MLB in 2005-06 to being merely a below-average starter (-7 RCAA/4.58 ERA/182? IP) in 2007. It’s conceivable that he could continue to improve and be a reasonable 4th or 5th starter. Of course, it’s just as likely that he could regress to what he was in 2005-06. That’s the hit-or-miss nature of pitching at the non-elite levels of MLB.
  • Brandon Backe: A fiery personality and a couple of good playoff performances three years ago misleads some addled observers to believe that Backe is a legitimate number two starter. However, he has made just 13 starts over the past two seasons while recovering from Tommy John surgery. In those 13 starts, he struck out 30 and walked 29. Backe’s career -15 RSAA is not the stuff of a frontline National League starting pitcher.
  • Shawn Chacon: Chacon was an inconsistent starter for six seasons before washing out with the Yankees and Pirates in 2006 (-24 RSAA — ouch!). He revived his career last season with the Pirates as a setup man, so what do the Stros do? Insert him back into the starting rotation. This is unlikely to turn out well.
  • Chris Sampson: Given Sampson’s story (revived his career as a pitcher after washing out as a minor league shortstop and coaching for several years at a Dallas community college), everyone
    is pulling for him. But his story is better than his stats. He is a control specialist who doesn’t strike many batters out playing with a left-side infield defense that will struggle to field ground balls. Sampson was going downhill at the time of his injury last season (6.86 ERA over his last seven starts), so don’t expect miracles this season.

The bottom line on all of this is that the Stros’ addition of Tejada’s bat probably will not be what the club’s promoters are cranking it up to be in the pre-season (Baseball Prospectus’ PECOTA prediction model projects Tejada’s 2008 statistics at a rather pedestrian .340 OBA/.428 SLG/.768 OPS with 14 dingers). The subtraction of Biggio, Everett and Brad Ausmus from the everyday starting lineup will probably result in a marginally better hitting club over the National League-average 2007 unit, but the defense and the pitching will likely remain decidedly below-National League average. Accordingly, it is unlikely that the Stros will improve much, if at all, on their 73 wins from last season. I’m putting the over/under on Stros wins this season at 75 and, absent career seasons from about half-a-dozen players, competing for a playoff spot is a pipe dream.

Over the past couple of seasons, I have reviewed the Stros during the season after each 10th (2006) and each 8th of the season (2007). Consistent with my lighter blogging schedule this season, I’m going to post my “Stros 2008 Season Review, Part __” this season after each 5th of the season, which works out to be after each 32 game segment of the season (I will do 33 game segments for the first and last segments). So look for my first season review this season after the first week in May, give or take a few days in the event of postponed games. Given the vacuum of baseball analysis at the Chronicle, check out Lisa Gray’s insightful Stros blog and Alyson Footer’s articles at Astros.com for daily reports on the Stros throughout the season.

Baseball Prospectus 2008 is here

Baseball Prospectus 2008 TK Baseball Prospectus 2008 is now shipping, so it’s time to order your copy in plenty of time for the beginning of the MLB season. In terms of improving your understanding of baseball, it’s the best $14 you can spend.

Given the direction of the Stros over the past two seasons, I was prepared for the BP experts to trash the local club’s chances for this season. But it’s really not all that bad. BP even kind of likes new Stros General Manager Ed Wade’s "win-now strategy," which they characterize as "so crazy that it just might work" in the chronically mediocre National League Central Division.

But even though BP doesn’t trash the Stros too badly, the same can’t be said BP’s treatment of Stros owner, Drayton McLane. Most of BP’s overview of the Stros is critical of McLane, such as the following on McLane’s revolving door policy with regard to General Managers and Managers:

This front-office turnover has contributed to a fundamental disconnect between the aspiration to contend and what appears to be the preferred means of doing so. Rather than focus on how to contend through improving the personnel in the lineup, the Astros have instead operated for years on the assumption that certain players were building blocks because they liked them, not because of what they actually contributed on the field. When the players in question are Biggio and Jeff Bagwell in their primes, that’s fine; when they are Ausmus, Everett, or a completely cooked Biggio, the term "building block" is robbed of its meaning.

Given this mentality, it was really no surprise that the Astros turned 2007 into a supersized Viking funeral for legitimate franchise great Biggio, complete with a team-level self-immolation, and with little but the ashes left to show for it at the end.  .   .

I really can’t recommend Baseball Prospectus 2008 too highly. For serious students of baseball, it’s 600 pages of pure reading pleasure.

Thoughts on Rusty and Pettitte

rusty hardin 022308This earlier post was one of the first to express reservations regarding Rusty Hardin’s handling of Roger Clemens’ defense to the allegations contained in the Mitchell Commission Report (previous posts here) and aftermath, but my reservations are nothing compared to those of Minneapolis attorney Ron Rosenbaum:

No one can really explain the strategy followed here," says Ron Rosenbaum, a local attorney and former talk-radio host on KSTP-AM, a station that still features him all too occasionally. "It strikes me as insane." [.  .  .]

"There’s a difference of opinion in this town, but from the very beginning I thought this was a textbook case of how to not handle a legal situation like this," Rosenbaum says of his fellow lawyer, adding with incredulity that Hardin would allow Clemens to submit himself to a lie detector test, which the pitcher has said he would take. "At the end of the day, all you can do is recommend advice as an attorney. You can’t tell your client directly what to do."

Rosenbaum is even harder on Clemens, who he characterizes as an ego-driven "buffoon."

pettitte 022308I know Hardin, who is a first-rate trial attorney. Thus, unlike Rosenbaum, I’m certain that Hardin has fully advised Clemens in writing of the considerable risks of the strategy that Clemens has undertaken in attempting to defend himself against alleged PED use. Nevertheless, the disastrous Clemens defense strategy to date reminds me of the best advice I used to pass along to young attorneys who I trained: "One of the most difficult, yet important, responsibilities of a good lawyer is to tell a potentially lucrative client ‘No’."

Meanwhile, Clemens’ former teammate and friend, Andy Pettitte, was widely praised across most of the mainstream media (the Chronicle’s Jerome Solomon was a notable exception) for his "honesty" in admitting during a press-conference earlier in the week to use of human growth hormone at several times in the past. Now, I’m not much of one for simplistic morality plays being applied to complex issues such as steroids or other PED use in professional sports and society. Moreover, I certainly don’t approve of the way ballplayers such as Pettitte and Clemens have been filleted publicly while Major League Baseball owners have largely received a pass on their culpability for promoting an almost pathologically competitive MLB culture that promotes use of PED’s and other drugs. Nevertheless, as this C.J. Mahaney post points out, Pettitte’s supposed adherence to his avowed Christian faith during his "confession" leaves much to be desired. Sometimes those simple morality plays aren’t quite as applicable as they first appear.

BP’s PECOTA projection for the 2008 Stros

Astros-Logo%20021807.jpgThe sabermetricians over at Baseball Prospectus have developed a statistical system for projecting baseball player performance called PECOTA, which is short for “Player Empirical Comparison and Optimization Test Algorithm.” PECOTA player performance based on comparison with thousands of historical player-seasons and analyzes similarities with past player-seasons based not only on rate statistics, but also height, weight, age, and many other factors. It is a remarkably accurate predictor of player performance.
BP annually prepares PECOTA projections on each Major League and minor league ballplayer, so it is a simple process to aggregate those individual numbers and project how each MLB team will do. BP’s projection for each MLB Division in the 2008 season is here ($), although you will have to subscribe to BP to review the entire PECOTA projections.
Not surprisingly, BP projects the Stros to finish 74-88 (or one game better than last season), good for fourth in the NL Central behind the Cubs, Brewers and Reds. PECOTA projects the Stros’ hitting to continue to be league-average with no meaningful improvement in the abysmal pitching that the club endured last season.
Well, at least we’ll have the Craig Biggio number retirement ceremony to look forward to. ;^)
By the way, Baseball Prospectus 2008, BP’s annual book that is the best source of knowledge about baseball, is scheduled to be published in the next week or so. If you enjoy following baseball, then I highly recommend it.

The aftermath of the Clemens hearing

clemens%20at%20congress.jpgMany folks have been asking me about my thoughts on the Roger Clemens saga, but I am so disappointed with the abysmal level of discourse regarding the Mitchell Commission Report and the issues involved with the use of steroids and other PED’s in society that I find it hard to drum up much enthusiasm for addressing it. Compare the discussion of the issues from this earlier post with this live blog analysis of the questions and answers from Clemens hearing and you will see what I mean. Sort of makes you want to whipsaw the committee in the same manner as this Colman McCarthy/Washington Post op-ed, doesn’t it? Art DeVany expresses similar sentiments.
Although I expressed reservations early on about the unconventional way in which Clemens’ legal team has been defending the matter, I don’t think the hearing measurably increased Clemens’ risk of being charged criminally. In fact, in an odd way, the hearing may have actually mitigated that risk somewhat.
McNamee came across as such a manipulator that my sense is that it’s doubtful that prosecutors would base a criminal case against Clemens primarily on McNamee’s testimony. Thus, unless investigators come up with a conduit of the PED’s who is willing to testify that the PED’s were delivered to Clemens and McNamee, Clemens may avoid criminal charges. He is certainly not out of the woods yet, but the Congressional hearing probably hurt him more in the court of public opinion than it did with regard to a potential criminal case (Update: Peter Henning agrees with me).
Nevertheless, I’m not yet ready to bet on that prediction. At least without long odds in my favor.

The worst in Major League Baseball?

Houston_Astros2 - Copy.jpgSabermetrics Godfather Bill James coined the “Law of Competitive Balance” to explain the trend that teams that win in professional sports tend to slack off in the following year because team management doesn’t work as hard, resists taking risks to make the team better, and generally thinks defensively.

For example, Stros management reacted to the club’s playoff appearances in 2004-05 by rationalizing that “if we won with Ausmus and Everett in those seasons, then surely we can do it again next season.”

As a result, the Stros made minor changes to their roster over the past two seasons through free agency and continued a decade-long trend of failing to develop MLB-level players through their farm system.

The Stros’ decline over the last two seasons of the Biggio-Bagwell era (from 89-73 in 2005 to 73-89 in 2007) is powerful evidence of the validity of the Law of Competitive Balance.

Well, the chickens are really coming home to roost now as Baseball Prospectus has now deemed the Stros’ farm system to be the worst in Major League Baseball ($):

The worst farm system in baseball has no top-tier talent, but plenty of older prospects.

[On the top players in the Stros system under the age of 25]: The fact that Pence is the only other player [other than minor leaguers] to qualify for this list, and that he does so by a mere few days, speaks volumes about just how sad the state of affairs is in Houston.

The team’s recent drafts have been downright laughable, and its once-fruitful Venezuelan pipeline has dried up, as other organizations had passed the Astros in Latin America in terms of committing resources.

This is the worst organization in baseball, made even more dreadful by some early moves in the Ed Wade administration that merely upgrade the big-league squad from dreadful to bad.

The future is very grim in Space City.

Here is how BP rates the Stros prospects:

Five-Star Prospects: None
Four-Star Prospects: 1. J.R. Towles, C
Three-Star Prospects: 2. Felipe Paulino, RHP; 3. Bud Norris, RHP
Two-Star Prospects: 4. Brad James, RHP; 5. Josh Flores, OF; 6. Chad Reineke, RHP; 7. Mitch Einertson, OF; 8. Eli Iorg, OF; 9. Jordan Parraz, OF; 10. Sergio Perez, RHP; 11. Collin DeLome, OF

What’s particularly odd about all this is that the Stros built a consistent winner in the late 1990’s and early part of this decade through their farm system, by developing the Venezuelan pipeline of young players, and picking up productive college players.

But the Stros have drafted poorly this decade, which required the club to invest heavily in free agents to remain competitive. Not only is that approach expensive financially, it has had the additional impact of negatively affecting the Stros’ drafts of young talent.

In three of the last five drafts, the Stros have lost their first-round pick as free-agent compensation. Inasmuch as the Stros have generally not offered arbitration to their own free agents, the Stros only once during that period have received bonus choices of their own.

Meanwhile, the Stros have been unwilling to pay much over MLB’s “slot” recommendations for draft picks. Accordingly, the combination of few bonus choices, lack of first-round picks and financial conservatism culminated in a particularly awful 2007 draft.

As a result of the Carlos Lee and Woody Williams free agent signings, the Stros didn’t have a pick in the first two rounds of the 2007 draft.

Then, by electing not to offer arbitration to three of their own Type A free agents (Aubrey Huff, Andy Pettitte and Russ Springer), the Stros lost the opportunity to collect three first-round picks and three supplemental first-rounders as compensation.

The Stros thought they could sign their first two choices — third baseman Derek Dietrich (3rd round) and righthander Brett Eibner of The Woodands (4th round) — but the prospects ended up asking for more than “slot” money and wound up opting for college ball.

Consequently, the Stros spent just a tad under $1.6 million on the 2007 draft, which was $3.6 million below the average of the other 29 MLB teams.

Meanwhile, the Stros Venezuelan pipeline largely dried up after former general manager Tim Purpura fired Andres Reiner, the former director of the Stros’ Venezuelan scouting and development, who was instrumental in the Stros signing of Venequelan stars Bobby Abreu, Carlos Guillen, Richard Hidalgo and Johan Santana.

New Stros General Manager Ed Wade has reorganized the club’s scouting department and brought in former Brewers scout Bobby Heck to run it, but it’s far too early at this point to assess whether those moves will stem the downturn in the Stros’ farm system.

Frankly, absent a concerted effort to collect draft picks and do a better job of drafting players who are likely to opt for pro ball, I have my doubts that the Stros have done enough to turn around the decline in their farm system.

Given how bad it is currently, that’s a frightening thought for the future of the ballclub.

Have I got a deal for you

newsom_i8wx.jpgBowie Bonds hit baseball. Or is this a case of a player having an IPO on himself? (H/T Alex Tabarrok)!
You have to give markets credit — they have created a way for prospects to buy a form of insurance on their careers.
And, as usual, Larry Ribstein asks the essential legal question.

The improving conversation about PED’s in baseball

As I noted earlier in this blog, the Mitchell Commission Report is a sloppy hatchet job. However, the report has had the beneficial impact of prompting more reasoned voices to emerge regarding the use of steroids and other performance enhancing drugs in professional baseball to offset the mainstream’s media’s typical demonization of the players. Here are a few examples:

Eric Walker’s new website Steroids and Baseball is worth a look. Walker provides an interesting analysis of power hitting performance over the modern eras using a time series of power factor statistics. Based on putting the time series together at critical points where there is a change in the baseball or an interruption in personnel from a war, Walker shows that you get a series that does not show any meaningful increase in power hitting as measured by the power factor. Indeed, the power factor in the so-called steroid era is no higher than in other eras after subtracting the cumulative effects of changes in the baseball in preceding eras from the time series. In addition, Walker surveys research on the benefits and costs of steroids on athletic performance and health, and again concludes that the results are not all that clear.

Meanwhile, Radley Balko links to an article by sportswriter Dan Le Batard noting a point that I’ve frequently made in my prior posts on PED use in baseball — the motivation behind the use was to improve the capacity of the user’s body to hold up under the physically brutal and pathologically competitive nature of MLB. Balko concludes with the following wise advice:

At some point, athletes, rules makers, fans, and ethicists are going to have to drop the hysterics, and begin a serious conversation about all of this. Shaming, prison, and witch hunts aren’t going to make these issues go away.

Following up on Balko’s thoughts, this Shawn Macomber/American Spectator article reports on a recent panel discussion over PED use in which Balko participated. Another participant in that panel discussion was Norman Fost, professor of pediatric medicine and director of the Program in Bioethics at the University of Wisconsin, who is the subject of this Chicago Tribune profile. Fost believes that steroids should be available, under a doctor’s supervision, to any pro or amateur adult athlete who wants them:

In all the health and morality questions about steroids, Fost said:

“It’s as though the drug hysteria serves as a distraction from more serious issues. You’d be hard-pressed to find a single death associated with steroid use, yet the TV cameras keep showing [Red Sox manager] Terry Francona drooling disgusting spit from something [chewing tobacco] that has a very high cancer rate associated with it.

“You have 400,000 deaths a year due to tobacco and tens of thousands of alcohol-related deaths, a substance heavily promoted by Major League Baseball, yet the president and Congress and the press have virtually nothing to say about tobacco and alcohol in athletics, but lots to say about steroids. A football player spending more than three years in the NFL has an 80 to 90 percent chance, according to one study, of some permanent disability, but the NFL produces films focusing on the most vicious hits. The dangers to health in sports today come not from enhancement but the sport itself.”

Similarly, Malcolm Gladwell builds on his earlier posts on the issue of PED’s in baseball with two more posts (here and here) in which he notes the following:

It is perfectly legal for an athlete to undergo “performance enhancing” eye surgery, that moves him from, say, the 50th to the 95th percentile in sight. It is not legal for that same athlete to take “performance enhancing” hormones that move his testosterone from the 50th to the 95th percentile–even thought the additional advantage of the eye surgery may be greater than the additional advantage conferred by the exogenous testosterone. Now, there may be a perfectly valid distinction between those two interventions. But what is it? Shouldn’t it be spelled out before we drum Roger Clemens and Barry Bonds out of the Hall of Fame?

Similarly, it is perfectly legal for an athlete to get painkillers after an injury, so he can continue playing (and, I would point out, risk further injury.) It is not legal for that athlete to take Human Growth Hormone, in order to speed his recovery from that same injury. Again, why? What is the distinction? Why is it okay to play hurt but not okay to try and not play hurt? There may be a perfectly valid reason here as well. But don’t we need to spell out what it is?

I realize that the people running major league baseball and the NFL are not philosophers. But the intellectual sloppiness with which this current crusade has been conducted is appalling.

Indeed, last week’s Congressional hearing over the Mitchell Report included an exchange toward the end that highlighted MLB’s long tradition of indulging use of another type of PED — amphetamines.

Moving on to the legal front, this Maury Brown blog post notes that Rusty Hardin — whose strategy of defending Roger Clemens has been a head-scratcher from the beginning — probably ought to quit giving interviews:

T.J. Quinn: Well, when someone sat and looked at just the numbers for Rogerís career, what conclusions do you think they drew?

Rusty Hardin: Oh, I think, I think they drew incredibly stupid inclusions, uh, conclusions, if they concluded that somehow you can look at his performance and it fits in. For instance, everybody talks about his, uh, doing it in order to extend his career. Think about it, T.J. The guy is supposed to have taken steroids in ë98. In ë97 he won the Cy Young. ë98 he won the Cy Young.

T.J. Quinn: Brain McNamee’s, you know, his story was that Roger had already been taking steroids when he approached him in 1998, which would suggest?

Rusty Hardin: I didn’t remember that. You may, if you’re right about that, I didn’t know that.

T.J. Quinn: Thatís what he said. That was in the Mitchell report and I think his lawyers addressed that as well, that Brian McNamee said, ìI never suggested that Roger take them. He was taking them.So that wouldn’t that explain?

Rusty Hardin: [OVERLAPPING] I never read that. Are you real sure of that?

T.J. Quinn: Quite.

And while many commentators are suggesting that Clemens’ alleged PED use is unprovable beyond a reasonable doubt because it boils down to a swearing match between Clemens and his chief accuser, that is not a prudent bet to make. My experience is that lawsuits and investigations have a funny way of discovering people who have knowledge about swearing matches.

Finally, does anyone else get the impression that Houstonian Chuck Knoblauch may need the same type of mental block that he had while throwing a baseball from second to first base in regard to his upcoming Congressional testimony?

The most influential person in sports that no one has heard of

MLBAM.gifThe 30 Major League Baseball clubs invested $80 million in a fledgling media company. That initial investment has been repaid and the media company generated $450 million in revenues this past year, producing a $3 million dividend for each MLB club. Several investment banks recently estimated that the value of the clubs’ original $80 million investment is now worth $2.5 billion.
Who managed this windfall for MLB? The most influential person in the sports business that no one has ever heard of — Bob Bowman, the President and Chief Executive Officer of MLB Advanced Media (MLBAM). Maury Brown interviews Brown.