As expected, the Conglomerate Enron online symposium last week generated over 15 interesting posts, including ones by the reliably insightful Larry Ribstein (see also here), Ellen Podgor, Don Langevoort, Lisa Fairfax, and Thomas Joo.

However, one of the final posts in the symposium particularly caught my attention. Moderator Gordon Smith passed it along from John Kroger, who served on the Task Force for a year or so in 2002-03, during which time he helped prosecute Arthur Andersen out of business and prepare the odious prosecution that placed four former Merrill Lynch executives in prison for arranging to have Merrill buy an asset from Enron that Enron may have improperly accounted for, although even that has never been proven.

Following his service on the Task Force, Kroger took a job as a law professor in Portland, from where he proceeded to publish a law review article, Enron, Fraud and Securities Reform: An Enron Prosecutor’s Perspective. Kroger’s resume reflects no apparent background in either structured finance or the private finance business sector, but that doesn’t stop him in the article from, among other things, characterizing Enron’s structured finance transactions as wholesale frauds and proposing that such risk-taking should be criminalized.

For a more balanced view from experts in the field of structured finance regarding the economic and financial benefits of such transactions and Enron’s use of them, see Christopher Culp and William Niskanen‘s Corporate Aftershock: The Policy Lessons from Enron and Other Major Corporate Corporations and Culp’s subsequent book, Risk Transfer: Derivatives in Theory and Practice.

With that backdrop, Kroger wrote the following post on the Conglomerate Enron symposium:

“Here’s a Quick Reality Check”

I am shocked at how skeptical most of these blog entries are. Of course, as a former prosecutor in the case, I am certainly biased. That said, here’s a quick reality check. In 2000, 96% of Enron’s reported net income and 105% of its reported funds flow came from accounting manipulation schemes, the vast majority of which clearly violated GAAP. At the same time, Enron managed to keep some $25 billion in company debt off its financial statements, hidden from investors. Lay told his employees to keep buying more Enron stock while he was secretly selling his own. Both men made millions spinning the socks off investors for a company that was, in the end, revealed as an empty shell. The jury heard months of testimony and concluded, quite reasonably, that the defendants knew precisely what was going on. In the United States, we don’t always treat poor criminals and rich criminals alike, but we should. When people commit fraud, they should go to prison.

Using Kroger’s post as a template, my reply is as follows:

I am shocked at how many of the blog entries presume that Lay and Skilling were involved in a massive fraud at Enron. Of course, as a defense attorney in various Enron-related civil actions, I am certainly biased.

That said, here’s a quick reality check.

In 2000, rather than allowing shareholders to suffer loss of value during a difficult post-stock market bubble period, Enron supplemented its net income and reported funds flow through innovative structured finance transactions that effectively hedged the risk of loss in many of its assets for the benefit of investors.

Moreover, when the Enron board induced Lay to return to the Enron CEO position after Skilling’s resignation in August 2001, he put his money where his mouth was — he used the entire board-approved $20 million bonus to invest in more Enron stock.

Indeed, Lay made that bold investment in Enron even though he had already lost an enormous amount of his personal net worth in the first seven months of 2001 due to the decline in Enron’s stock price, losses that he willingly incurred because he insisted that his personal portfolio remain disproportionately invested in Enron stock.

The jury heard months of testimony from primarily cooperating prosecution witnesses who had a substantial incentive to lie by implicating Lay and Skilling in crimes. After the prosecution effectively prevented witnesses with exculpatory testimony for Lay and Skilling from testifying, the jury concluded, quite reasonably, that Lay and Skilling were rich and the company they led went bust, so they must be guilty of some crime.

In the United States, we don’t always treat poor criminals and rich criminals alike, but we should. When business executives are accused of fraud, they should get a fair trial before they are sent to prison for life.