This typically insightful David Warren piece puts the recent Israeli assassination of Sheikh Ahmed Yassin into perspective within the Byzantine political landscape of the Middle East. Here are a few excerpts, beginning with the moral question:

On the moral question, whether it was right for the Israeli prime minister, Ariel Sharon, to order the assassination of Sheikh Ahmed Yassin, there is no difference from the question whether it would be right to assassinate Osama bin Laden. Bin Laden co-founded Al Qaeda, Yassin founded Hamas. These are organizations which exist for the express purpose of killing people; Qaeda being committed to killing “Crusaders and Zionists” plus bystanders; Hamas more specifically Jews plus bystanders. The question is not whether one should do it, but how.
The Israelis calculate Sheikh Yassin cost them 377 dead and 2,076 maimed — including only a handful in military uniform. He was known to personally order the hits, and he ordered hundreds of them, both through Hamas and affiliates; culminating in last week’s attack on the Israeli port of Ashdod, in which terrorists very nearly succeeded in blowing up large stores of toxic industrial chemicals. That was also the first successful “vengeance operation” (I use Al Jazeera’s terminology) mounted from inside Gaza, since the Israelis succeeded in fencing the territory — a “heritage moment” in Hamas propaganda. Yassin is the reciprocal Israeli heritage moment.

And then the pragmatic issue:

The Israelis are calculating that the advantages of disrupting the management of Hamas, which actually delivers the terrorism, outweigh the disadvantage of providing them with a recruitment tool. Most seasoned observers of the Middle East would guess they got it right. It is certainly the calculation the Bush administration has made, in going after Qaeda’s senior management; and it appears to be working — preventing more terrorist hits than it inspires.

And finally the political analysis:

Strange to say (and I can hear the guffaws of my numerous if inattentive leftwing readers) the assassination was a typically moderate act. Note [Ariel Sharon] killed Sheikh Yassin, and not Yasser Arafat, though the latter is also up to his ears in innocent Israeli blood, and the IDF know where to find him.
The unbelievable truth is that Mr. Sharon is trying to advance the “peace process”, by giving Arafat’s Palestinian Administration a leg up on Hamas, before their inevitable civil war. For despite all its butchery, even Arafat ‘s Fatah is the slightly more accommodating party. The only thing that keeps Fatah and Hamas together is their common target of Israel; with Israel removed, they become two scorpions in a bottle. There are big risks in weighing in so decisively, but even bigger ones if Hamas succeeds in its ambition of ruling Gaza after the Israeli departure.

We all recall the attack on the World Trade Center of September 11, 2001, but few of us remember that today is the anniversary of this earlier attack on the WTC.

Victor Davis Hanson is one of the most insightful current commentators on America’s war against Islamic extremists, and his articles are often referred to in this blog. This LA Times piece is about this interesting man. Thanks to Occam’s Toothbrush for the link.

As the civil war worsens in Haiti, Daniel Drezner and Tyler Cowan point to Haiti Pundit, a blog about news and views on Haitian politics and culture. With American armed forces entering Haiti today, this is a good source of current information on the Haitian situation.

“Rumsfeld’s War” is a new book by Rowan Scarborough, defense reporter for The Washington Times. Today’s Times contains the first excerpt of a series from the book.
Mr. Rumsfeld’s efforts to transform the Pentagon have an interesting background that stretches back several decades. Author Robert Coram compellingly presents this interesting story in his book, “Boyd: The Fighter Pilot Who Changed the Art of War.” Suffice it to say that appearances are deceiving with regard to the Pentagon, the special interests that attempt to control it, and the elected officials that attempt to lead it. This is not a story that the mainstream media has covered well, so Mr. Coram’s book and a few others that deal with this interesting story are essential to a sound understanding of the key issues confronting the United States Armed Forces in the context of modern warfare.

Victor Davis Hanson, a registered Democrat and among the most insightful current commentators on America’s role in the Middle East, predicts in this NRO Online piece that the Democratic party’s approach to the current Presidential campaign is doomed to failure. The entire piece is well worth reading, but here is a tidbit:

No one wishes to occupy a country. But after the instability in Iraq and a cost nearing 400 combat deaths the Democrats are now not merely questioning the tactics of achieving democracy in Iraq, but the entire notion of occupation itself. But once they go down that road they will discover history is not on their side and will be hard put to offer better alternatives to the present course.
For the record, not occupying Germany in 1918 led to the myth that the Prussians were never beaten, but stabbed in the back while occupying foreign territory ? a terrible mistake not repeated with postwar Japan and Germany. It might have been neater and quicker to leave Afghanistan after the Soviets were expelled in the 1980s and to depart Haiti in a flash, but the wages of those exit strategies were the Taliban and September 11 as well as the current mess in the Caribbean. The first Bush administration left the present jumble in Iraq to the second, which to its everlasting credit is determined not to leave it to others. Had Mr. Clinton bombed and then just left the Balkans, rather than the present costly and bothersome peace we would have had the sectarian and tribal sort of ruin that surely will get worse if we run now from Iraq.
Since the Democrats viciously and clumsily have attacked one of the most courageous (and humane) policies of any administration in the last 30 years, the American people will soon come to ask what they in fact will propose instead (“put up or shut up”). Most of us are cognizant that bombing from 40,000 feet gives an “exit strategy,” but, without soldiers on the ground, postpones the problem of tyrannical resurgence ? and thus will inevitably leave either another war for another generation or something far worse still on the horizon like September 11.
There were a number of legitimate areas of debate for the fall campaign ? deficits, unfunded security measures at home, moral scrutiny over postwar contracts, more help for Afghanistan, greater control of domestic entitlements, unworkable immigration proposals, and the like. But instead of statesmanship from the opposition, we got slander about Mr. Bush’s National Guard service, misrepresentations about intelligence failures that had hampered both previous administrations and the present congress, preference for an unsupportable European position over our own, and stupidity about what to do in Iraq.
The Democrats may have seen some short-term gains from all the attention given to their bluster, but theirs still remain untenable issues. And so nemesis will bite them like they will not believe in the autumn ? and, of course, just when it matters most.

One of my favorite magazines is Atlantic Monthly. In the February edition, North Korea dictator Kim Jong II‘s former cook pens an article ($) about the decade he spent cooking for the, might we say, idiosyncratic Mr. Kim. The entire article is well worth reading, but here is a sampling:

Kim Jong Il is an avid equestrian, and has even appeared in a TV movie atop a snow-white horse. (All horses belonging to the Kim family are white.) I often accompanied him on long rides. . .
One day in 1992, as I was riding behind Kim Jong Il at a right-turning path, I noticed that his horse was standing by itself. Kim had fallen off the horse. It had apparently slipped on a bed of pebbles laid over some asphalt being repaired. Kim Jong Il had hit his head and shoulder quite hard and had fallen unconscious. A doctor was called immediately.
I’m not sure when he regained consciousness, but the next day we all returned to Pyongyang by his private train. From that day, every evening at 10:00 P.M. for the next month, five or six of his administrative staff members and I would be injected with the same painkiller that Kim Jong Il was taking. He was afraid he would become addicted to it, and didn’t want to be the only one.

Jonathon Rauch senior writer for the National Journal states in this solid piece that the War in Iraq was a mistake, but the right kind of mistake to make. Mr. Rauch concludes as follows:

If reasonable people thought Saddam possessed forbidden weapons, that was because Saddam sought to give the impression that he possessed them. He may have believed he possessed them. (His fearful and corrupt scientists, Kay hypothesized, may have been running a sham weapons program.) For four years after the 1991 Persian Gulf War, Iraq successfully hid its chemical weapons program. When a defector blew the whistle, weapons inspectors were stunned at the extent of Saddam’s deception. The Iraqis responded not by coming clean but by redoubling their efforts to obstruct and intimidate — for example, interfering with inspectors’ helicopter flights and, at one point, firing a grenade into their headquarters. No one could have failed to conclude that Saddam was hiding the truth.
The truth he hid, however, was not his weapons but his weakness. Or perhaps his minions were hiding his weakness from him. In either case, his power and prestige depended upon his fearsome reputation at home and his defiant posture abroad. He was contained but could not afford to let anyone know it, for fear of being invaded or overthrown. So he waved what looked like a gun and got shot.
Many people now demand to know why American intelligence was so badly fooled. The subject certainly merits investigating. Questions should be asked. Chins should be stroked. But even without an investigation, we know the most important reason we were fooled: Saddam Hussein did everything in his power to fool us, and by the time he stopped trying to fool us — if he stopped trying — it was too late for anyone ever to believe him.
The war was based on lies. Not Bush’s or the CIA’s; Saddam Hussein’s.

The increasing political unrest in Haiti was noted earlier here. Today, the Christian Science Monitor provides a good overview of the current conflict. Meanwhile, the U.S. State Department warned Americans against travel to Haiti.

WaPo and the NY Times report on a recently discovered memo requesting more Al Qaeda support for Iraqi insurgent groups. The shadowy ties between Saddam’s Iraq, Al Qaeda, and various other Islamic extremist groups is explored in great detail in Laurie Mylroie’s book, “The War Against America.”