How high will the bidding for EGL go?

EGL%20logo%20052107.pngJust when it looked as if an outside bidder had outbid Jim Crane’s management led-private equity group for control of Houston-based EGL, Inc., Crane’s group upped its bid to $46.25 a share (prior posts here) this past Friday. Then, yesterday, the Crane group’s main competitor for EGL — an affiliate of Apollo Management, LP — sweetened its bid to $47.50 per share. EGL’s board, which is being toasted daily by EGL shareholders, notified Crane’s group that it is available until Wednesday to discuss a revision to that group’s $46.25 per share offer.
For those of you keeping score, that newest bid price represents just under a 60% premium over the EGL share price from when Crane’s group announced its his original bid for the company earlier this year.
This all must be very confusing to Ben Stein.

Passport hell

passports.jpgQuestion: What do you get when changes are made in the processing of a governmental service that, even in the best of times, doesn’t really function all that smoothly?
Answer: According to this Lisa Falkenberg/Chronicle column, a real mess:

The scene at the George Thomas “Mickey” Leland Federal Building in downtown Houston resembled a soup kitchen. Outside, tired-looking people crowded benches and sprawled on grass. Inside, State Department guards kept teeming hordes at bay in the lobby so they wouldn’t add to the lines, snaking through hallways outside the fourth floor passport office.
“We started out in a line to get in a line to get to the elevator so that we could get in a line to get a number to wait in another line,” Prothro told me.
Applicants, from El Paso to Oklahoma City, waited like cattle in holding areas, clutching suitcases, gripping manila envelopes of itineraries, some frantically calling congressmen for help. Even those with appointments were shooed by guards to the rear of the line.
The nationwide passport backlog ó prompted by a federal law that took effect in January requiring U.S. citizens to obtain passports before flying to places such as Canada, Mexico and the Caribbean ó was exacerbated this week in Houston by two days of computer system failures, said Eric Botts, assistant regional director.
The crowd grew so large, it presented a fire hazard.
“I can certainly understand people are frustrated,” Botts said.
Botts said his staff has worked overtime, doing “everything humanly possible” for the past two years to meet surging passport demand. Each day, the office may get 500 e-mailed or faxed congressional inquiries about cases, and 800 from the national passport information center. He said his office has a backlog of 90,000 passports.
By midday, passport purgatory quickly deteriorated into passport hell. Around 3 p.m., a worker delivered grim news to an outside line:
“If you’re here trying to get a passport today, that’s not going to happen,” he said. “I don’t know why they sent all of you here. As you can see, they sent thousands of people here. There’s no way an agency this small can handle all this work.”
Inside the stuffy office, more than 250 people, including screaming toddlers, waited in line or in plastic chairs, staring at Fox News, sharing gripes in every language and glaring anxiously at passport agents behind thick glass windows. Many went several hours without eating or drinking, for fear of losing their spots in line. [. . .]
Occasional applause erupted when someone emerged with a passport. These lucky few adopted a distinctive swagger and a wide grin as they coveted their hard-earned treasure.

Rationalizing the latest boondoggle

Houston%20Dynamo%20stadium.gifHoustonians are currently enduring the rationalizations of a couple of boondoggles, a big one and a relatively small one. The Chronicle is always a good source for these rationalizations, such as this romantic interlude from Chron soccer writer Glenn Davis regarding the proposed downtown soccer stadium:

[A] downtown stadium will be an unparalleled vehicle for promoting soccer. Stadiums out in the hinterlands in MLS are still trying to prove them-selves as a magnet for fans.
Fans migrating to stadiums located in the inner city can become a part of a ritual.
When I was growing up in New Jersey, my father used to take me to sporting events at Madison Square Garden in the heart of New York. The ritual began as we left the house.
Take the train from the suburbs to Hoboken, N.J., then jump on the Path train (subway) under the Hudson River. As we exited the Path and scrambled up the steps to the street, a whole new world opened up.
The streets of Manhattan were alive with vendors, scalpers hawking tickets, and fans of the New York Rangers or Knicks. The air crackled with competition and excitement.
For a kid from the suburbs, this was like going into a new world. To this day, these impressions are indelible in my mind. Whether going to Madison Square Garden or to Giants Stadium to watch PelÈ and the New York Cosmos, I always felt that sense of anticipation.
[Dynamo CEO Oliver] Luck has told me his ritual with his father was taking public transportation to go to Cleveland Indians games.
Stadiums in the U.S. have in many cases become soulless, with their flight to the suburbs and attempts to woo fans more for the buildings and their amenities than why they were built in the first place.
Stadiums should be a meeting place for like individuals from all ethnic and cultural backgrounds who come together with the common bond of a sport.

I almost broke into a solo of Kumbaya over that one. At least Chronicle sportswriter John Lopez is more realistic, if not more persuasive, of the real basis for public financing of another downtown stadium:

The predominantly white fan base that follows the Astros got theirs. The largely white and black fan base of the Rockets got theirs, too.
What about Dynamo fans? What about the fan base that has been estimated at roughly 45 percent Hispanic, 45 percent white and 10 percent Asian? [. . .]
On paper, yes. It has to make sense. But in the eyes of many, it’s also about getting the same things the Astros, Rockets and Texans fans got. Acknowledgment.

Or, as Kevin Whited muses: “So, we need a new soccer stadium downtown so that Houston can be more like Manhattan, and so that fans of what is a minor-league sport in the United States won’t cry racism?”
Meanwhile, Dennis Coates, a professor of the University of Maryland Baltimore County, provides the following persuasive analysis of the lack of any economic merit to a similar initiative to build a downtown arena in Baltimore:

Studies like that done by KPMG about a new arena for Baltimore have been thoroughly discredited by independent observers. They are much like the predictions of psychics. While a psychic’s predictions of the future are rarely assessed for their accuracy, the predictions of stadium benefits have been thoroughly scrutinized by a wide array of independent researchers. There is almost no support for any of the predictions made by the stadium and arena benefit psychics when those predictions are compared to data on what actually happened. The bottom line is the feasibility studies are more a PR process than a fact finding one. I urge you to not buy into the PR as if it is objective science.

Thus, the local debate regarding another downtown stadium is off to an inauspicious start. If proponents of the stadium deal admit in campaigning for the deal that the economic benefits of the deal are questionable, but that the intangible benefits to the community override the financial risk of the deal, then most reasoned opponents of such deals would at least be satisfied with the debate of the issues. They might not be persuaded to support the deal on that basis, but at least they would have the comfort that the public’s assessment of the deal would be based upon an honest presentation of the issues. As it stands now, the presentation of the economic issues in most stadium campaigns is muddled by highly questionable assertions of direct economic benefits derived from such deals. Here’s hoping that the Chronicle will at least promote truth in advertising in regard to the debate over the downtown soccer stadium deal.

Set up for failure

tressel%20leading%20team.jpgA question for you. Who would establish a popular entertainment business along with a hundred or so partners and then doom it to fail for most of the partners?
Answer: The presidents of the university-members of the National Collegiate Athletic Association.
This Frank Fitzpatrick/Philadelphia Daily News article sums up the dire financial picture for most of the NCAA members:

Better than 90 percent of Division I athletic programs spend more than they earn, by an average of $7.1 million annually, according to figures released yesterday by NCAA researchers.
The statistics, for 2004-05, were included in a report urging the NCAA to standardize its procedures for collecting financial data, which was presented during a meeting of the Knight Commission, a college sports watchdog agency.
Only 22 of the 313 Division I athletic departments were self-supporting, the study noted. The rest required bailouts, either direct subsidies from their institutions or student fees, to balance their books. [. . .]
The report did not identify the 22 self-sustaining schools, though commission members indicated they were all among the college football superpowers. . .

This Brent Schrotenboer/San Diego Union-Tribune article analyzes the financial challenges faced by one of the have-nots in the world of minor league professional sports, San Diego State University:

While the current fiscal year doesn’t close until June 30, the athletic department again will receive about $2.8 million in ìone-timeî or ìauxiliaryî funding from other university sources to balance its budget of about $27 million.
The infusion is necessary despite a $160 annual student fee increase implemented in 2004 by SDSU President Stephen Weber, overriding a student referendum. That has added $4.8 million to $7 million to the athletic department coffers annually. An additional $5 million in athletics revenue comes from the state general fund. [. . .]
Most athletic departments at NCAA Division I-A schools are not profitable. But for more than a decade, SDSU has needed help at a higher rate than the national average for public schools.
. . . In the two most recent fiscal years, 42.7 percent of athletics revenue has come from student fees, the general fund and other university funding, according to audited financial statements. [. . .]
Before the season, SDSU projected football ticket revenue of $3 million but ended up with only $1.9 million, forcing tightening in other athletic department expenses this year. The year before, SDSU projected $2.5 million in football revenue and brought in $2.3 million. Meanwhile, the team hasn’t finished better than 6-6 since 1998.
This year, the SDSU athletic department has a projected budget shortfall of $100,000 to $250,000 ñ even after about $2.8 million in ìone-time fundingî was arranged from a university contract with a broadband communications company. . .

The SDSU athletic program finances are the same as most other major college programs, including the University of Houston and Rice University’s programs. As noted here over a couple of years ago and in more recent posts here and here, the present structure of big-time college football and basketball is corrupt, but certainly an entertaining form of corruption. The issue is whether the leaders of NCAA member institutions have the courage to restructure college athletics in a manner that reduces the incentives for corruption while retaining many of the salutory benefits of the enterprise. Inasmuch as history indicates that such reforms will not occur under the NCAA, could a rival concern — one that treats big-time college football and basketball as the minor league professional sports enterprises that they are — be a lucrative play for an entrepreneurial entertainment or media concern?

The Jenkens & Gilchrist post-mortem

jenkens051807.gifThe Wall Street Journal’s Nathan Koppel has authored an excellent review (W$J article here) of the demise of Dallas-based Jenkens & Gilchrist (prior blog posts here), which shut down earlier this year after mass defections and an expensive settlement with the federal government. Koppel’s piece follows this earlier Dallas Morning News article that does a good job of chronicling the demise of the firm.
Given that the former leaders of the firm candidly admitted that the firm took big risks in the tax shelter business in order to generate increased profits, Larry Ribstein makes a typically insightful observation about how strict regulation of law firm structure may have contributed to the firm’s questionable risk-taking:

It is at least worth exploring whether freeing law firms from these constraints would produce more responsible firms. Jenkens is another reminder that it is folly to assume that such an innovation would besmirch some Platonic ideal of non-profit-oriented professionalism that law firms currently adhere to.

Anadarko’s interesting investor

anadarko.jpgWell, well, well. Look who has bought a big stake in The Woodlands-based Anadarko Petroleum Corporation:

Icahn Management LP, one of investor Carl Icahn’s investment vehicles, has purchased about 3.1 million shares in Anadarko Petroleum Corp., according to a Reuters report Tuesday.
The purchase amounts to a 0.7 percent stake in Anadarko, which has 463.9 million shares outstanding.
Reuters said regulatory filings stated that his ownership in The Woodlands-based Anadarko (NYSE: APC) was worth about $133.5 million as of March 31.

The always-entertaining Icahn lost out last year to Anadarko in the bidding over Kerr-McGee.

Ben Stein’s bad day

ben_stein2.jpgNY Times business columnist Ben Stein has penned some real stinkers, but this past Sunday’s column may just be his worst yet.
First, Brad DeLong explains Stein’s basic misunderstanding of fundamental principles of unemployment and economic growth, and then observes of Stein’s confusion:

It’s a misconception like… like… like this: “Dear Dr. Gridlock: I took my foot off the accelerator three second ago. Why is the car still going 60? Why doesn’t the car instantaneously stop when I take my foot off the accelerator?”
So if only Ben Stein would stop calling himself an economist, it would brighten my day, so I pray for it.
Note that I no longer prayer for competent editors at the New York Times who would exercise even a little quality control. Of that I have despaired.

Then, Felix Salmon proceeds to eviscerate the remainder of Stein’s column, including Stein’s populist call for a WalMart in Midtown of New York City:

A Wal-Mart in Midtown? Maybe we could tear down Rockefeller Center and build one there. Or repurpose the Central Park Zoo as a big-box retailer; the Sheep Meadow could be the parking lot. Obviously we’d need to give Wal-Mart the space rent-free, or for maybe no more than a buck or two a foot, because that’s how the company can offer us its everyday low prices. But doing so would surely be worthwhile: “every New Yorker needs food and paper towels.” I only wonder how we’ve all managed to cope until now.

Finally, in regard to another topic that Stein has addressed in his column, the bidding competition for Houston-based freight logistics company EGL, Inc that was noted here last week continued over the past weekend:

The bidding war continues for EGL Inc.
Over the weekend, both EGL Chief Executive Officer James Crane and CEVA Group PLC, an affiliate of New York-based Apollo Management LP, upped the ante on their offers for the company. [. . .]
On May 11, Crane amended his offer to $45 per share in cash.
On May 12, CEVA countered with $46 per share in cash, and on May 13, EGL’s special committee determined that the revised proposal from the CEVA group was a superior proposal as defined in the merger agreement.
The committee has given Crane’s group until May 16 to make another offer.

EGL’s stock was trading at $29.76 a share when EGL chairman and CEO Jim Crane made his original management led, private equity-backed offer to take the company private. Sounds like a good deal for EGL shareholders, eh? Not according to Ben, who said the following about such buyouts in his Times column earlier this year:

[M]anagement buyouts are great for management. But by every standard I can see, they are yet another sad sign of how our corporate trustees have lost their moral compass. The time for them to stop is long overdue. If the stockholders have hired you and pay your wage to manage their assets, your job is to do that for themónot to buy them out at fire-sale prices and turn around and make billions that rightfully belong to them. The management buyout is a sad and infuriating avatar of a decadent age.

To which I commented at the time:

My anecdotal experience is that a good sign to hold on to one’s pocket book firmly is when someone tells you that it is better to have fewer bidders competing to purchase something. Indeed, my sense is that a management-led, private equity-financed play for a public company is usually just as likely to spur competing offers for the company as it is an attempt to lowball the public company’s shareholders. When the folks who know the most about a company’s business show that kind of confidence in the value of the company, that sends a strong signal to the market that more value can be made. Such confidence tends to be contagious.

Has there ever been a Times columnist as far out of their league as Stein?
Update: Don’t miss Larry Ribstein’s post regarding the Times editors’ decision to hire Stein, which includes this wry observation:

Is this why the Times needs a governance structure that insulates its managers from markets?

Trouble at Whole Foods

wholefoods.jpgFormer Austin resident Joe Weisenthal over at DealBreaker sums up this Street.com analysis of the continuing financial performance troubles of Austin-based Whole Foods:

Being from Austin, it’s a little painful to see cracks in a homegrown success story like Whole Food success story (Dell has been painful enough). Then again, every company has to get its comeuppance, which is what the company is now in the process of receiving. Sure, it continues to open new stores, and apparently the one on Houston even has a sushi conveyor belt, although we haven’t been able to verify that first hand. But everyone sells sushi now, and everyone sells organic foods. Basically, a Whole Foods store isn’t unique like it used to be, and the company is feeling the pain. Plus, the high-end grocery space is getting more crowded. In the east, there’s Wegmans, which ostensibly makes Whole Foods look like an Albertsons. And then supposedly there’s a chain called Eataly, coming from Italy, which will make Whole Foods look like your little Korean grocer down the street. So it’s finally getting tested, something its investors aren’t used to.

Whole Foods shares dropped more than 10 percent Thursday, closing at a 2 1/2-year low of $41.15. That Texas grocery store competition remains absolutely brutal.

What was Ben Stein saying again?

EGL%20logo%20050907.pngHave you checked out what’s been going on this week in regard to EGL, Inc chairman and CEO Jim Crane’s proposed private equity buyout of EGL?:

Jim Crane, chief executive of EGL Inc., has a decision to make. The company’s special committee of board directors said Monday that it has determined that the latest bid for the company by an affiliate of Apollo Management LP is superior to Crane’s bid.
The New York private equity firm, through an affiliated European company, CEVA Group Plc, submitted a new bid at $43 on May 3. That is $5 a share higher than an offer accepted by the board from Crane and his partners, Centerbridge Partners LP and The Woodbridge Co. Ltd.
In March, Crane — the transportation and logistics company’s largest single shareholder — was forced to sweeten his cash offer from $36 to $38 in light of pressure from Apollo, which claimed that Crane was trying to steer the board away from its first offer.
Crane has until May 11 to respond to the special committee’s decision with a revised proposal. If no further bid is tendered, the board would then consider whether or not to terminate the existing merger agreement with Crane and accept the Apollo bid.
EGL would have to pay a $30 million termination fee to kill the current deal with Crane and his partners.
Apollo’s latest offer for EGL (NASDAQ: EAGL) puts a $1.75 billion value on the company, or about 8 percent higher than the May 2 closing price of $40.

Let’s see now. By my calculation, when Crane’s group made its original buyout proposal early this year, EGL stock was trading at $29.78. Now, four months later, Apollo is offering $43 a share, despite the fact that EGL’s financial performance was less than stellar during the 4th quarter of 2006.
And Ben Stein says that management led-private equity buyouts are bad for public company shareholders?

The court of investor opinion

soxdummy.jpgAlex Pollock has an interesting idea to help decide the debate over the true effects of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act on the U.S. securities markets:

[I]f Sarbanes-Oxley 404 were voluntary, would investors differentiate among American companies and pay a premium for the securities of those companies which implemented it, compared to those which chose not to? . . .
In this context, we can say there are two competing theories:
A. Sarbanes-Oxley is bad for investors because the costs are excessive relative to the benefits, and
B. Sarbanes-Oxley is good for investors because it protects them and makes them willing to pay more for securities.
Theory B is usually used as an argument for keeping Sarbanes-Oxley Section 404 mandatory, but it is actually a great argument for making it voluntary.
Under a voluntary regime, if Theory B is right and investors love how they are protected by Sarbanes-Oxley 404, they will bid up the prices of the securities issued by companies who implement it. We will then observe within the U.S. market a premium analogous to the ìcross listingî premium, and everyone will end up following suit.
But if, as many of us believe more likely, investors think their money is better spent on research and development or marketing than on excessive accounting routines, paperwork, and bureaucracy, the companies will respond accordingly. [. . .]
Investor choice would demonstrate whether Theory A or Theory B is correct. Alternately stated, letís send Sarbanes-Oxley to the court of investors.