The Landry’s bondholders fight back

Landry%27s%20logo%20080207.gifOne of the most irritating aspects for a plaintiff in an inflammatory lawsuit is that the other side eventually gets to tell its side of the story.
As noted earlier here, here and here, Houston-based Landry’s Restaurants, Inc recently made the questionable decision, during a period of tightening credit markets generally, to tee off on and sue the holders of a substantial amount of the company’s debt.
Even though Landry’s finally filed its long-delayed Forms 10-K and 10-Q on Friday, Round Two in the lawsuit has been taking place over the past couple of days in U.S. District Judge Sam Kent’s court and it does not appear to be going well for Landry’s. The Indenture Trustee of Landry’s bonds filed this emergency motion to vacate or modify the temporary restraining order that Landry’s obtained last week, pointing out the following:

Simply put, Landry’s has breached its contract, the proper notices have been given, and the time to cure the breach has passed. Landryís seeks to utilize the ex parte relief in paragraph (a) [of the TRO, which requires the Indenture Trustee to rescind the acceleration of the bonds] in an effort to rewrite the contract, thus prejudicing the rights of the Noteholders. Paragraph (a) serves no legitimate purpose, needlessly alters the status quo to the Trusteeís detriment, and should thus be vacated. [. . .]
On July 24, 2007, 126 days after the Trustee sent the Notice of Default to Landryís, and 129 days after Landryís was required to file its 10-K, the Trustee sent Landryís a Notice of Acceleration that informed Landryís that the default had ripened into an Event of Default and that ì[t]he Indenture Trustee, acting upon a direction of a majority of Note Holders given pursuant to Section 6.05 of the Indenture, hereby declares the unpaid principal of, premium, if any, and accrued and unpaid interest on, all the Notes outstanding to be due and payable immediately, all pursuant to Section 6.02 of the Indenture.î . . . In a Form 8-K filed the next day, Landry’s publicly admitted that the Acceleration Notice was effective. As Landryís put it: ì[t]he sum total of the Notes are $400 million, which are now due and payable.î . . . Again, this admission squarely contradicts the representations Landryís has made in its Complaint and ex parte TRO application in this case.

Meanwhile,a couple of the bondholders weigh in with this opposition to Landry’s motion to extend the TRO until the preliminary injunction hearing:

This is far from a technical breach of Landry’s obligations. The filing of Forms 10K and 10Q are not elective matters. They are requirements both of federal law and the plain terms of the Indenture. The information Landry’s was required to file — but did not file — is critical to the Bondholders’ ability to evaluate Landry’s credit-worthiness, and the likelihood that they will be repaid the $400 million they are owed. Landry’s failure to timely file this required financial information violates its duties of candor to the investing public, and violates its contract with the Trustee and the Bondholders. The Bondholders rights — and the status quo ante –should not be altered irrevocably by the TRO before the Bondholders have an opportunity to be heard. Paragraph (a) is not necessary to preserve the status quo, and Landry’s claimed rights can be fully protected and preserved without harming the Bondholders in this manner, and without placing them at risk of tens, if not hundreds, of millions of dollars of losses.

Finally, Landry’s announced on Friday that it had obtained refinancing of the debt, albeit on far less attractive terms than the existing bonds before their maturity was accelerated.
Round 3 is next Thursday.

Gretchen Morgenson’s recurring nightmare

morgensongretchen%20080807.jpgLarry Ribstein used to be NY Times business columnist Gretchen Morgenson’s worst nightmare, but the nightmares receded a bit when Professor Ribstein tired of exposing the vacuous nature of her weekly columns after a year or so. Nevertheless, Morgenson’s nightmare has not gone away completely:

[Kevin J.] Murphy and [Jan] Zaojnik attribute the rise in the relative value of managerial ability to a variety of factors. Most interestingly, these include the need for public relations skills in dealing with external constituencies and increased media coverage. Other factors include the need to be conversant with other disciplines — economics, management science, accounting, finance. The authors argue that firm-specific skills are becoming less important because data are no longer “buried in the bowels of the organization,” but are easily accessible by computers.
The authors conclude that the importance of general rather than firm-specific human capital means that:

CEOs can capture the whole marginal product created by their transferable ability, but the lack of alternative use for their firm-specific skills means that they can only extract a fraction of the rents created by this part of their human capital. Therefore, a shift in the relative importance of general managerial ability will lead to higher wages even if overall managerial marginal productivity declines.

. . .Most importantly, I love the irony here. Murphy and Zaojnik are saying that part of what is driving executive pay up is the skill in dealing with Gretchen Morgenson and her ilk ñ the very people who are complaining about that pay.

Read the entire post.

In praise of credit snobs

sub-prime-mortgages-080607.gifEarlier posts here and here noted Alex Tabarrok’s clever characterization of folks who criticized development of new lending vehicles for folks with low incomes or bad credit. Thus, this Economist article about a recent study on making loans to the poor caught my eye. Check out the conclusion of the study:

Contrary to the fears of the credit snobs, the readier access to credit did not tempt the new customers into a debt trap. Over 15-27 months, those reconsidered for a loan were more likely to have a formal credit score. And this score suffered no harm as a result of their easier borrowing.
Overall, the study suggests that profit-seeking lenders do not deserve the fate Dante reserved for them. Far from tempting the poor into unpayable debt, they help them keep their jobs, put food on the table, and build up a credit history. The authors show that poor people can make good use of borrowed money, even if they sometimes struggle to demonstrate this creditworthiness to lenders. If not hell, that is a kind of purgatory.

Read the entire article.

Latest on the Las Vegas Monofail

Las%20Vegas%20monorail%20080407.jpgWith the crunch worsening over the past several weeks in the credit markets, the bankruptcy reorganization forces are gearing up and eyeing potential debtors. Well, in this Heartland blog post, Thomas A. Rubin predicts one of the probable debtors that will need serious reorganization — the Las Vegas Monorail Company (prior posts here):

In short, the Las Vegas Monorail appears headed straight down the path to bankruptcy by approximately the year 2010 with nothing on the horizon that could prevent it ñ other than, perhaps, an ill-conceived government bailout or the absolute dumbest group of investors/suckers in recent financial history.
This result should come as a surprise to no one. Over the last several decades, I know of only one U.S. rail transit system, or quasi-transit system, that has come remotely close to covering its operating costs out of fares and other operating revenues (the Seattle Monorail), and none that have made any contribution what-so-ever to capital costs. However, the Las Vegas Monorail promoters assured everyone that operating revenues would not only cover operating costs, but would also cover all the debt service costs of the bonds sold to pay for the construction of the Monorail. [. . .]
One hopes that someone, somewhere, in a public sector decision-making capacity will tell the various casinos along the right of way that, if they want to see it continue to operate, well, it is all theirs.

Read the entire post, which lays out the public risks involved in even a privately-financed boondoggle of this nature. Meanwhile, this clever Political Calculations post comes up with an entertaining solution to achieving the same benefits of a light rail system at a far cheaper cost.

Landry’s goes nuclear

Landry%27s%20logo%20080207.gifAs noted earlier here and here, the crunch in the credit markets has Houston-based Landry’s Restaurants Inc scrambling to refinance about $400 million in bond debt this week.
Well, that scramble took an interesting turn on Wednesday of this week as Landry’s sued the bondholders. Based on that lawsuit, U.S. District Judge Sam Kent of Galveston approved a temporary restraining order against the representatives of the bondholders that ordered the Indenture Trustee of the bonds to withdraw the notice of acceleration of the maturity of the bonds and not to take any action based on that acceleration pending a preliminary injunction hearing on August 16. The following is the alleged basis for the TRO and proposed injunctive relief straight from Landry’s complaint:

This action arises from an attempt by opportunistic hedge funds to distort the plain language of Landry’s Indenture to manufacture grounds for a technical default that would allow them to reap an extraordinary and umnerited windfall from Landry’s good faith effort to provide its stockholders and noteholders with accurate financial information.
From the outset, [the bondholders] have embarked on a scheme designed solely to maximize their short-term financial gain at the expense of Landry’s, its stockholders, and the investing public. [The bondholders’] plan appears to be an effort to improperly accelerate the Senior Notes so that they and those working with them could ultimately sell their Senior Notes at a substantial profit in the open market, once they extort “renegotiated” interest payments and other concessions from the Company.
The Trustee’s defective notices of default and acceleration notwithstanding, Landry’s has made every required payment due under the Indenture. There has been no material breach of any of Landry’s obligations under the Indenture. Despite this fact, the Trustee, apparently at the urging of [the bondholders], served a notice claiming that Landry’s was in default because Landry’s allegedly failed to provide reports that are required for “information purposes only.”
The Indenture requires that Landry’s furnish to the Trustee-within the time periods specified by the Securities and Exchange Commission’s (the “SEC” or the “Commission”) rules and regulations-all quarterly and annual financial information required to be contained on Forms 10-Q, 10-K, and 8-K. The Indenture does not impose on Landry’s any independent requirement that it file those reports or abstain from seeking additional time to file its financial reports.
Landry’s properly delayed the filing of its Form 10-K by submitting a Form 12b-25 with the SEC on March 16,2007. Form 12b-25 bestows an automatic 15-day extension on filers who would not otherwise be capable of filing without unreasonable effort or expense. Accordingly, while a delayed SEC filing may have consequences for Landry’s under SEC rules, it would not comprise a default under the Indenture.
Despite the fact that Landry’s had neither missed a single payment nor committed any material breach of the Indenture, and despite the further fact that the 15-day extension period allowed by the filing of the Form 12b-25 had not expired, the Trustee, by letter agreement dated March 20, 2007, issued a Notice of Default. The Trustee’s basis for asserting a default was that Landry’s had failed to timely file its Form 10-K annual report for the fiscal year 2006 (the “10-K”). This Notice of Default was defective, however, because it was sent during the time period allowed by the Rule 12b-25 extension. Nevertheless, relying on its defective Notice of Default, the Trustee purported to accelerate the entire debt by notice dated July 24, 2007.
On information and belief, the Trustee has taken this unreasonable position at the behest of [certain bondholders], eager to void the bargain struck with Landry’s in the 2004 Indenture so as to take advantage of tightening credit market conditions.
To get to this result, Defendants have intentionally and materially breached the terms of the Indenture or, in the alternative, tortiously interfered with Landry’s business relations, disparaged the Company, and attempted to saddle the Company with new obligations in violation of the Trust Indenture Act of 1939.
As a result, Landry’s continues to suffer irreparable economic harm from Defendants’ continuing threats of future improper actions. Therefore, Landry’s respectfully seeks immediate and temporary injunctive relief to preserve the status quo while this litigation ensues. Among other things, the requested injunction would afford the Company a measure of relief from the uncertainty and controversy that presently exist with respect to the parties’ respective rights and obligations under the Indenture.

A copy of the TRO is here and a copy of the complaint (sans exhibits) is here.
Meanwhile, the filing of the case in the Galveston Division of the Southern District is raising more than a few eyebrows, particularly given that the lead lawyer for Landry’s in obtaining the TRO was plaintiffs’ lawyer Anthony Buzbee, who knows a thing or two about filing cases in favorable forums. Landry’s and most of its other lawyers involved in the case (the firms of Andrews & Kurth and Haynes & Boone) are Houston-based. Also, Landry’s general counsel, Steven Scheinthal, gave an interview to the Houston Chronicle earlier this week that resulted in this rather interesting article in which he was quoted as saying that “We do not believe the bondholders are nice people. We’re a Houston-based company, and the bondholders have no regard for anybody other than themselves. They strictly see this as an economic opportunity to take advantage of.” Nevertheless, the Chronicle’s business columnist, Loren Steffy, thinks that Landry’s lawsuit is a loser.
Round 2 is coming up shortly.

WSJ subscriber reaction to the Murdoch takeover

Wall%20Street%20Journal%20logo.jpgSo, all of 170 out of the Wall Street Journal’s 1.7 million subscribers terminated their subscription as a result of Rupert Murdoch’s successful bid to acquire the WSJ?
What the heck. Felix Salmon makes a good case that Murdoch should turn the WSJ into a free service:

The potential readership of the WSJ . . . is enormous. Right now, there is no one-stop-shop on the World Wide Web for comprehensive, global businesss and finance news and analysis. A free WSJ.com would overnight become the global authority on such matters. WSJ.com is never going to make much money selling subscriptions in India or Brazil or Russia or even Mexico ñ but if it became a regular read among the business classes in those countries, local ad reps could make a fortune for News Corp. (Technology nowadays makes it very easy to target ads to readers in specific countries.)
The reason I’m hopeful about Murdoch buying the WSJ is that Murdoch has a truly global outlook, while the WSJ has always seemed to be a bit on the parochial side. And no one with a global outlook thinks that trying to sell subscriptions to WSJ.com makes any sense. Free is clearly the way to go.

Give it up, Arnie

wholefoods073007.jpgWant a glimpse into the regulatory mindset of government?
This earlier post passed along Don Boudreaux’s response to the Wall Street Journal letter-to-th editor of Arnie Celnicker, a former attorney for the FTC and the Antitrust Division of the Justice Department, in which Celnicker defends the FTC’s opposition to the proposed Whole Foods-Wild Oats merger (previous posts here). In an attempt to have the last word, Celnicker has written another letter-to-the editor in which he contends, in part, as follows:

We agree that consumers want more organic products, and that there has been increased investment to meet that demand. The financial markets, however, have deprived Wild Oats of the capital to compete head-on with Whole Foods. Mr. Boudreaux’s assertion that this indicates Wild Oats’ assets are now poorly managed, and that they would be better managed by Whole Foods, is a non sequitur.
Avoiding head-on competition with Whole Foods indicates that Whole Foods already has such market power that the risks of head-on competition are great, for Wild Oats or any other firm. It does not mean Wild Oats is poorly managed; it does show the capital market’s respect for a firm, Whole Foods, with a dominant market position. Even if Wild Oats were poorly managed, it does not follow that an acquisition by Whole Foods would enhance consumer well-being. These two firms are the only two national premium natural and organic supermarkets. Surely there are others, besides Whole Foods, who can efficiently manage Wild Oats’ assets, without reducing competition.

Celnicker suggests that capital markets “have deprived” Wild Oats as if the company has some entitlement to capital, and that such deprivation justifies government intervention. But if there are others who can efficiently manage Wild Oats’ assets, then why did they not outbid Whole Foods for those assets?
The Wild Oats board has determined that the best value for the company’s shareholders can be derived by selling to Whole Foods. Celnicker contends that the government’s judgment regarding “consumer well-being” should trump the Wild Oats board’s judgment on behalf of Wild Oats’ shareholders. But will the government provide a safety net for the loss in value to Wild Oats’ shareholders if the Wild Oats board’s judgment is correct and those assets decline in value without the merger? If the government is not willing to step up and arrange alternative capital, then the value of that “consumer well-being” that Celnicker seeks to have the government protect is largely ephemeral in nature.

Tilman’s bad dream

fertitta%20at%20the%20nugget.jpgIt wasn’t a good end of the week for Landry’s Restaurants, Inc CEO Tilman Fertitta (previous posts here).
First, there was Landry’s public disclosures that the company was delinquent in its regulatory filings with the SEC and that it was in need of refinancing over $400 million in debt in a rapidly deteriorating debt market.
Those missteps led to Fertitta’s public announcement on Friday that the refinancing “was no big deal,” which led to the inevitable comparisons in some media circles of Landry’s and Enron, and Fertitta and Donald Trump (actually, that comparison has been made before). Not surprisingly, the company’s stock closed at a 52 week low on Friday ($25.43), falling almost 20% in the past week alone.
Fertitta is an easy target, but the situation is probably not as grim as it might seem at first glance. Landry’s has always been a highly-leveraged company. Heck, the latest news resulted in Moody’s downgrading the corporate family rating from B2 from B1, and S&P lowered its ratings on Landry’s corporate credit rating to CCC from B-plus. So, it’s not as if Landry’s stock was blue chip even before the latest developments.
Where things appear to have gone awry is that the company decided that building stores from within wouldn’t allow it to grow fast enough. Back a few years ago when Landry’s was a popular growth stock, the company’s casual dining seafood eateries were popular and growing quickly in generally first-rate locations. But in an attempt to accelerate that solid growth, Landry’s overpaid for the high-volume Rainforest Cafe chain a few years ago and then went on to make a relatively big investment in buying and revitalizing the Golden Nugget casino in downtown Las Vegas. It looked as if Landry’s had decided to pull back on its debt-loaded buying binge when it sold off its its Joe’s Crab Shack chain late last year in a $192 million deal, but the company came right back a short time later to make an unsolicited offer to buy the high-end steakhouse Smith & Wollensky before being topped by a rival bidder.
As the price of Landry’s stock slumped over the past several months, the company sensed value and initiated a program to buy back $87 million in stock. Nevertheless, the market did not respond all that positively to the buyback program, so the stock is still trading at a relatively small 14 times this year’s profit estimates, Thus, a case can be made that Landry’s is a good buy if it can extract itself from its current debt refinancing problems, but the downgrades reflect that the market is a bit skeptical regarding Fertitta’s assurance that arranging such refinancing “is no big deal.”
Nonetheless, this just might be the kick in the rear that Landry’s needs. Building well-located and good-looking restaurants while providing solid service is how Landry’s grew quickly. Paying substantially more for financing the debt necessary to buy overpriced stores may be just the way to persuade Landry’s board and management that building from within wasn’t such a bad strategy after all.

Is Landry’s in trouble?

Landry%27s%20logo.gifCerberus Capital Management’s decision earlier in the week to terminate its attempted sale of $12 billion in Chrysler debt underscored the quickly tightening U.S. credit markets (except on oil patch deals!), and the ripple effects are already being felt in Houston. Check out this Houston Business Journal article about Houston-based restaurant company Landry’s:

Landry’s Restaurants Inc. is looking for new financing to replace its current credit agreement and outstanding 7.5 percent senior unsecured notes.
The Houston-based casual dining chain operator said Wednesday that it would not be able to file its annual report for the year ended Dec. 31 because an internal review of stock option granting practices is not complete.
As a result, Landry’s (NYSE: LNY) said it has been notified by U.S. Bank National Association — the trustee of its $400 million unsecured notes — that the unpaid principal and any interest is now due.
Landry’s expects to be able to refinance the loan, but due to “the recent tightening of the credit markets,” it could be under less-favorable financing terms.
The company also said it is not in compliance with a $450 million credit agreement with Wachovia Bank, National Association and other lenders. Landry’s expects it can get a waiver of the covenant and does not expect Wachovia to accelerate the indebtedness of the agreement. The amount outstanding is about $97 million.

Late yesterday, Standard & Poor’s Ratings Services lowered its credit ratings of Landry’s and continued to place the company’s ratings on negative watch because of Landry’s failure to file its 10K regulatory filing with the SEC for fiscal 2006 and its 10Q for the first-quarter 2007.
H’mm.
Update: Tilman’s bad dream.

The Kelleher legacy

Kellerher.jpgMitch Schnurman asks outgoing Southwest Airlines chairman and former CEO Herb Kelleher how he wants to be remembered:

“That I consumed more Wild Turkey and cigarettes than anybody else in the industry,” he quipped to reporters last week, after announcing that this would be his last year as chairman of Southwest Airlines.

As Schnurman notes, Kelleher’s fun-loving response dramatically underplays the revolutionary impact that this remarkable leader had on air travel, which he made affordable for millions of new air travelers. Read Schnurman’s fine column on Kelleher, which includes this beaut of an anecdote on why Kelleher agreed to the Wright Amendment:

My favorite memory of Kelleher was in late 2005, when the debate over the Wright Amendment was intensifying and moving to Washington. In the Senate hearing room, he lived up to the moment, saying that he had agreed to the 1979 Wright law in the same way the Germans accepted the end of World War I.
“In other words,” he told the senators, “with a gun to my head.”