Category Archives: Business – General

A small Austin brokerage house schools the big banks

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Amherst_Logo Tongues were wagging in financial circles around the world last week regarding this Wall Street Journal article about Austin-based Amherst Holdings’ amazing play in which they sold credit default swaps on mortgage bonds to a number of Wall Street and London’s biggest banks. Amherst then turned around and bought the mortgages underlying the bonds upon which the CDS were written to prevent a default that would have triggered Amherst’s obligation to pay on the CDS.

Thus, in short, Amherst sold CDS on bonds and then bought the security for the bonds, thereby rendering the CDS worthless. Although the amount of profit is somewhat unclear, Amherst reportedly pocketed tens of millions of dollars on the deal.

The Financial Times’ economist Willem Buiter does an entertaining job of explaining Amherst’s transactional plan in the context of gambling and the difficulties involved in regulating such transactions. In so doing, he makes the following observation:

"The scheme is beautiful in its simplicity, absolutely outrageous, quite unethical, deeply deceptive and duplicitous, indeed quite immoral, but apparently legal."

Geez, maybe these Amherst sharpies could have saved AIG?

Kevin Howard and the Thin Line of Business Criminality

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In this earlier post regarding former Enron Broadband CFO Kevin Howard’s recent plea deal, I predicted that the factual basis for the plea deal would barely describe wrongdoing, much less criminality.

Turns out I was right. Paragraph 14 of the plea agreement at the bottom of page 6 sets forth the factual basis of the deal.

That paragraph describes that Enron had told the market that its Broadband unit had great potential, but that it expected to lose at least $60 million for the year. Inasmuch as Enron’s prediction was turning out to be correct, Howard helped arrange a joint venture transaction that monetized a portion of Broadband’s lucrative deal with Blockbuster. Nothing unusual about that.

So, what’s the problem, you ask?

Essentially, the factual basis provides that Howard did not disclose to Enron’s auditor (Arthur Andersen) that Enron’s joint venture partner was not expecting to be a long-term partner in the joint venture, even though the partner verified by signing the joint venture agreement that it was not relying on any such expectation in connection with entering into the venture.

Nevertheless, the factual statement suggest that if Andersen had known that the partner was really not expecting to be in the venture for the long haul despite the terms of the written agreement, then the auditor may not have allowed Enron to account for the deal in a way that reduced the Broadband unit’s losses to the $60 million level that the company had projected and ultimately reported.

That’s the basis for a crime?

Frankly, U.S. District Judge Vanessa Gilmore should have the same reaction to Howard’s proposed plea deal that U.S. District Judge Lynn Hughes had to the equally vacuous deal that Enron Task Force prosecutors crammed down the throat of former Enron mid-level executive Chris Calger back in 2005. At least the DOJ ultimately threw in the towel on the stinky Calger plea deal.

Based on the foregoing, any business executive who engages in a transaction for the purpose of helping his company achieve earning projections is at risk of being indicted and convicted of a crime, and sentenced to a long prison sentence.

And by a long prison sentence, I don’t mean the 4-12 months of home confinement to which Howard agreed in his deal.

Remember, the foregoing transaction is one for which Jeff Skilling is currently serving 24 years in prison.

A truly civil society would find a better way.

SCOTUS takes up the honest services issue

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ConradBlack Well now, that certainly did not take long, now did it?

Just a week after former Enron CEO Jeff Skilling appealed his criminal conviction and monstrous 24-year prison sentence to the U.S. Supreme Court on an allegedly erroneous application of the honest services wire-fraud statute (18 U.S.C. § 1346), the Supreme Court agreed to hear the appeal of former Hollinger International chairman Conrad Black on similar grounds. The briefs in support and opposition to Black’s petition for certiorari to the Supreme Court can be reviewed here.

Black’s conviction revolves around allegations that he diverted about $6 million from Hollinger International, which owned the Sun-Times and a number of other newspapers. He and two other former executives whose appeals will also be heard by the Supreme Court — former Hollinger CFO John Boultbee and corporate counsel Mark Kipnis — were convicted of three counts of mail fraud based on the theory that they improperly arranged the transfer of $5.5 million from a Hollinger subsidiary under sham non-compete agreements.

The high court’s decision to hear Black’s appeal on the honest services wire fraud issue leaves the Skilling petition somewhat in limbo. Although Skilling’s appeal arguably frames the issue better than Black’s, the Court could simply carry Skilling’s petition along with Black’s appeal and then remand Skilling’s case to the Fifth Circuit once it has adjudicated Black’s appeal.

But regardless whether the Supreme Court grants cert in Skilling’s appeal, the Court’s decision to hear Black’s appeal is very good news for Skilling.

By the way, as if on cue, Lord Black from his prison cell provides this entertaining evisceration of the forces that prevented him from selling for the benefit of shareholders the now bankrupt and worthless Chicago Sun-Times. Here’s a taste of Lord Black’s analysis of the situation:

[Former Bush I administration SEC chairman Richard] Breeden, whose career highlights include whitewashing George W. Bush on his lucrative insider trade in Harken Energy shares before the Gulf War in 1991, while he was Bush Sr.’s SEC chairman, and his immensely well-paid stints as special monitor or counsel of KPMG, WorldCom, and Fannie Mae, produced his special committee report in August 2005. (He has since, with no background at all, set up an offshore hedge fund and has promptly lost more than half his investors’ money.)

The report had cost over $100 million, accused us of a $500 million kleptocracy, and promised a future of unheard-of profitability for the company. On this, Breeden has delivered, as no profit has been heard of since he usurped the management. He also promised $1 billion of recoveries for the shareholders, and has instead wiped them out; $2 billion from the pockets and retirement and college funds of scores of thousands of people.

His report did fulfill his objective of generating criminal charges that, if substantially successful, could vacate or at least mitigate my $1 billion libel suits against him, the largest defamation claims in Canadian history.

Lord Black is a genuine piece of work.

Bad regulation vs. deregulation

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timothy_geithner Clear Thinkers favorite Niall Ferguson provides this timely reminder to those who believe that the financial turmoil of the past couple of years is the result of lax regulation of financial markets:

Human beings are as good at devising ex post facto explanations for big disasters as they are bad at anticipating those disasters. It is indeed impressive how rapidly the economists who failed to predict this crisis — or predicted the wrong crisis (a dollar crash) — have been able to produce such a satisfying story about its origins. Yes, it was all the fault of deregulation.

There are just three problems with this story. First, deregulation began quite a while ago (the Depository Institutions Deregulation and Monetary Control Act was passed in 1980). If deregulation is to blame for the recession that began in December 2007, presumably it should also get some of the credit for the intervening growth. Second, the much greater financial regulation of the 1970s failed to prevent the United States from suffering not only double-digit inflation in that decade but also a recession (between 1973 and 1975) every bit as severe and protracted as the one we’re in now. Third, the continental Europeans — who supposedly have much better-regulated financial sectors than the United States — have even worse problems in their banking sector than we do. The German government likes to wag its finger disapprovingly at the “Anglo Saxon” financial model, but last year average bank leverage was four times higher in Germany than in the United States. Schadenfreude will be in order when the German banking crisis strikes.

We need to remember that much financial innovation over the past 30 years was economically beneficial, and not just to the fat cats of Wall Street. New vehicles like hedge funds gave investors like pension funds and endowments vastly more to choose from than the time-honored choice among cash, bonds and stocks. Likewise, innovations like securitization lowered borrowing costs for most consumers. And the globalization of finance played a crucial role in raising growth rates in emerging markets, particularly in Asia, propelling hundreds of millions of people out of poverty.

The reality is that crises are more often caused by bad regulation than by deregulation. [.  .  .]

.  .  . Taxpayers, therefore, should beware. It is more than a little convenient for America’s political class to blame deregulation for this financial crisis and the resulting excesses of the free market. Not only does that neatly pass the buck, but it also creates a justification for . . . more regulation. The old Latin question is highly apposite here: Quis custodiet ipsos custodes? — Who regulates the regulators? Until that question is answered, calls for more regulation are symptoms of the very disease they purport to cure.

Stated another way, it’s not that rules are unnecessary for markets to perform efficiently. But what type of rules are better?

Rules that politicians enact and government bureaucrats enforce generally are far less efficient than rules that emerge as a result of the voluntary interactions of millions of individuals and companies. The successes and mistakes of those individuals and companies pursuing their own interests create rules that are the product of competition and personal responsibility. When those rules become sufficiently important in the fabric of a market economy, they become formalized as common law and precedent by courts. The distinction between inefficient government-imposed rules and the decentralized rules that facilitate productive market economies is an important one to understand as we wade through this current financial crisis.

The rules that the government is currently making up on the fly in connection with the Chrysler bankruptcy are a good example of rules that are destined to allocate resources inefficiently.

Thinking about the Chrysler deal

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chrysler_logo Unworkable credit situation, UAW ownership and Italian engineering. What could possibly go wrong?

The blogosphere has really stepped up in analyzing the government-pushed and government-subsidized asset sale by Chrysler out of its only recently-filed chapter 11 case (handy site on the chapter 11 case is here). The best technical bankruptcy analysis has been provided by Steve Jakubowski, while Larry Ribstein, Professor Bainbridge, Mark Roe and the Epicurean Dealmaker have weighed in ably on the policy considerations of the deal. But Todd Zywicki in this W$J op-ed does the best job of summing up the long-range risk of what the Obama Administration is doing here:

By stepping over the bright line between the rule of law and the arbitrary behavior of men, President Obama may have created a thousand new failing businesses. That is, businesses that might have received financing before but that now will not, since lenders face the potential of future government confiscation. In other words, Mr. Obama may have helped save the jobs of thousands of union workers whose dues, in part, engineered his election. But what about the untold number of job losses in the future caused by trampling the sanctity of contracts today?

Chrysler’s proposed asset sale is unusual, but not unprecedented. Still, the legality of what is going on here is certainly sketchy. And what is unprecedented about this case is the participation of the government in financing the deal and the new Chrysler. Theoretically, another bidder could emerge and top the new Chrysler’s bid for the assets. However, such a competing bid simply could not be financed under current market conditions absent a subsidy from another government.

So, what to make of all this? Here’s what I will be watching.

Will the government market in Chrysler debt? If so, how will the market price it?

Or will the government simply hold the Chrysler debt as the company attempts to re-invent itself, turning the debt into a type of quasi-equity?

And will a company owned predominantly by a union and the government be able to attract the type of creative management and engineering talent that will be necessary to create wealth for the owners?

Frankly, the government bailout is the easy part. Creating wealth is a whole lot tougher.

Is the case against Sir Allen getting more complicated?

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Sir Allen On first blush, the criminal case against Sir Allen Stanford, the mercurial chairman of Stanford Financial Group, would appear to be pretty straightforward.

On the other hand, why was the Securities and Exchange Commission apparently falling over itself for years to avoid closing down Stanford Capital, even in the face of credible, inside information provided to the agency regarding Stanford’s scam nature?

Could Sir Allen have been keeping the regulators at bay by playing several agencies of the federal government off against one another?:

A Panorama (BBC) investigation has suggested that Sir Allen was shielded from an earlier inquiry into his activities because he co-operated with a US Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) attempt to track money laundering by Latin American drug cartels. [. . .]

Panorama claimed some US officials were aware of Sir Allen’s cartel links as long ago as 1990. It reported that Sir Allen, paid a $3.1 million (£2.05 million) cheque to the DEA in 1999 after that sum was invested in his bank by another Mexican drug gang, the Juarez cartel of Amada Carillo Fuentes.

According to Panorama, whose investigation will air on Monday, Sir Allen was initially investigated by the SEC over suspicions he was running a Ponzi scheme in the summer of 2006, but the inquiry was over by the winter of that year.

The BBC claims the decision to close the investigation followed a request by another government agency.

Panorama says it is aware of "strong evidence" that Sir Allen was a "confidential agent" for the DEA as far back as 1999 and turned over details of money laundering by clients from Colombia, Mexico and Ecuador.

Rodney Gallagher, a British financial investigator, who knew Sir Allen in the 1980s said it was clear to him that the Texan had "a very close relationship with the DEA" and occasionally hired former agency staff to work for him.

The DEA declined to comment to the BBC on its allegations.  .   .  .

If Sir Allen bought time for a scam by playing nice with the DEA, the federal government’s dubious prohibition policy toward certain drugs will have added an entirely new layer of costs.

Cruising the Houston Ship Channel

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The oil and gas industry is synonymous with Houston, but many folks do not know that health care and the Port of Houston are huge economic drivers in the local economy, too. Check out this time lapse video by Lou Vest on a ship leaving the Port of Houston along the Houston Ship Channel. Here is a similar video that Vest did last year during the daytime. Enjoy.

Permanent Enron myopia

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Loren Steffy Inasmuch as what took place with regard to Enron earlier in the decade has now happened to much of Wall Street, the vacuity of the Houston Chronicle’s coverage of Enron-related matters has become clear.

Nevertheless, Chronicle business columnist Loren Steffy still cannot work himself out of his small Enron shell.

Most recently, Steffy wrote this column in which he compares Sir Allen Stanford of the beleaguered Stanford Financial Group to former Enron executives, Ken Lay and Jeff Skilling:

All this finger pointing should bring a strong sense of déjà vu to Houstonians, who watched Enron’s meteoric rise and fall, as well as the unsuccessful efforts of the late company chairman Ken Lay and CEO Jeff Skilling to plead ignorance of the company’s fraudulent accounting practices and blame any criminal behavior on the chief financial officer, Andy Fastow.  .  .  .

If Stanford is any indication, the “I’m not a crook, I’m an idiot” defense for CEOs remains alive and well. For those who buy the idea that people who construct and direct massive financial enterprises are really dunces who haven’t a clue how they function, we’ve got a truckload of Enron shares to sell.

Of course, the foregoing is a complete misrepresentation of Skilling and Lay’s defense. Rather than contending that he did not know what was going on at Enron, Skilling contended that he was a hand’s-on manager over virtually all facets of Enron’s far-flung business operations. Similarly, Lay contended that he became intimately involved in day-to-day management of the company after re-taking the Enron CEO role when Skilling resigned unexpectedly in August, 2001. Thus, Skilling and Lay’s position was that they were totally engaged in Enron’s massive business operations, that there was no wide-ranging fraud, and that Enron’s trust-based business model failed when skittish post-9/11 markets became spooked over conflict-of-interest allegations regarding Fastow’s role in generally legitimate special purpose entities.

That’s a bit different than Sir Allen’s defense that "he left all the financial stuff" to Stanford Capital’s CFO James Davis, don’t you think?

Steffy has done this before in regard to Enron-related matters, so another misrepresentation isn’t really surprising. But what is troubling is the Chronicle’s continued promotion of Steffy’s simplistic world view in which most troubled businesses are seen as merely a vehicle by which greedy and unethical executives exploit helpless investors. Indeed, Steffy’s fatuous viewpoint casts complex business events as merely struggles by honest investors against bad executives. Not only does this viewpoint ignore reality, it provides Steffy comfort by allowing himself to feel morally certain and superior to those he is belittling, while saving himself from the hard work of performing any serious analysis.

Morality plays are comfortable and easy to tell. The truth is more nuanced and harder to explain. In choosing to take the easy way out, the Chronicle and Steffy have forfeited the opportunity to provide a valuable service to investors and businesspeople by furthering understanding on such key subjects as the importance of hedging risk and the fragile nature of trust-based businesses.

That type of understanding sure would have come in handy for many investors in Wall Street firms over the past couple of years.

April 30, 2009 Update: Loren Steffy responds here and points out that the quote that I used above is from a Chronicle editorial that he did not write. For that error, I apologize.

However, Steffy’s related column here makes the same misrepresentation regarding Ken Lay’s defense and Steffy’s blog post continues to fail to respond to the misrepresentation.

Some things never change.

The Chronicle’s Enron myopia

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blindfolded_walkers Even when it is on the right side of an issue, the Chronicle reminds us of its failings.

As noted earlier here, it has become fashionable among the Old Media to support the recent decision of the Justice Department to request dismissal of the criminal case against former Alaska senator Ted Stevens because of the DOJ’s misconduct in handling the prosecution. The Chronicle chimed in last week with this self-righteous editorial.

Of course, for anyone paying attention, prosecutorial misconduct by the DOJ is not unusual. U.S. District Judge Lewis Kaplan sanctioned the DOJ by dismissing indictments against 13 former KPMG partners. Federal prosecutors in Miami are in hot water with a federal judge there over abusive tactics in a criminal drug case against a local doctor. There even appears to be a connection between the prosecutorial misconduct in the Steven case and the dubious case against former Vice-Presidential aide, Scooter Libby.

As the always-insightful Larry Ribstein points out, could it be that there are agency costs in managing corporate criminal prosecutions just as there are in managing corporations? Along the same lines, Doug Berman suggests that an insidious culture within the DOJ has produced the abuse of power.

But the most galling aspect of the Chronicle’s emergent awareness of abusive state power is that it has virtually ignored the egregious examples of prosecutorial misconduct in its own hometown, particularly in the case against Jeff Skilling that resulted in a barbaric and indefensible 24-year prison sentence.

As conflicted publications such as the Wall Street Journal promoted Enron myths and the demonization of Enron executives, the Chronicle could have provided a valuable public service by providing balanced reporting and analysis of what really caused Enron’s demise and how such a company can be better-structured to survive in even the most adverse market conditions. When clear evidence of prosecutorial misconduct emerged early in the Enron-related criminal cases, the Chronicle could have provided an even greater public service by taking a strong stand against such dangerous abuse of state power. It’s certainly not hard to find historical reminders of the injustice that results from such abuse.

So, what did the Chronicle do instead? It embraced the Enron Myth and led the mob in demonizing Enron executives. From the beginning of the Enron-related criminal cases, the Chronicle editorial staff simply elected to ignore mounting evidence of prosecutorial misconduct in favor of the easier approach of leading the angry mob. The Chronicle’s coverage of the Skilling prosecution was so inflammatory and biased that the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals made the highly unusual finding that the Chronicle created a presumption of community prejudice against Skilling (see pp. 41-45 of the Fifth Circuit decision).

Even now, despite the legacy of prosecutorial misconduct in the Enron-related criminal cases and the fact that what happened to Enron has now happened to many big Wall Street firms, the Chronicle stubbornly clings to the Enron Myth and refuses even to acknowledge that the evidence of prosecutorial abuse in the Enron-related cases is worse than what caused the dismissal of the Stevens case.

As with most Old Media newspapers these days, the Chronicle is struggling to survive. Winning that first Pulitzer Prize sure would sure provide a boost to the Chronicle’s flagging spirits.

Wouldn’t it be the ultimate irony if the decision to lead the angry mob against Enron distracted the Chronicle from a truly enthralling story of prosecutorial misconduct that could have won the newspaper that elusive Pulitzer?

Dylan on Politics

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bob_dylan_l From Bill Flanagan’s recent interview with Bob Dylan:

What’s your take on politics?

Politics is entertainment. It’s a sport. It’s for the well groomed and well heeled. The impeccably dressed. Party animals. Politicians are interchangeable.

Don’t you believe in the democratic process?

Yeah, but what’s that got to do with politics? Politics creates more problems than it solves. It can be counter-productive. The real power is in the hands of small groups of people and I don’t think they have titles.

H’mm.