The Regulatory Mindset

regulation booksRichard Epstein is typically lucid in taking on the increasingly foreboding regulatory culture that creates barriers for entrepreneurial creation of jobs and wealth:

What is to be done about the compliance culture–a culture born in response to excessive regulation–that now threatens to compromise the technological advances that have long spurred innovation in the United States?

This sad chronicle of relative decline takes place in three separate stages.

The first involves the new mindset that too often finds harmful externalities and bargaining breakdowns in virtually all human endeavors.

The second involves the bulky remedial structures that government puts in place to respond to these newly identified perils.

The third stage involves the subtle alterations in the selection of the compliance culture: the rise government officials and key private officers and executives whose skills matter ever more in these more severe regulatory environments.

This three-fold progression is not specific to this or that industry, but applies across the board.  .  .  . [. . .]

No one should be so reckless as to claim that these forces operate in all cases in all ways. We still have our wonderful success stories. Yet by the same token, no one should be so naïve as to think that these forces have no role to play in the loss of innovation and competitiveness in this country, a loss felt in both absolute and comparative senses. This loss has become an ever-larger feature of the modern United States.

Stated another way, it’s not that rules are unnecessary for markets to perform efficiently. But what type of rules are better?

Rules that politicians enact and governmental officials enforce generally are far less efficient than rules that emerge as a result of the voluntary interactions of millions of individuals and companies. The successes and mistakes of those individuals and companies pursuing their own interests create rules that are the product of competition and personal responsibility. When those rules become sufficiently important in the fabric of a market economy, they become formalized as common law and precedent by courts.

The distinction between inefficient government-imposed rules and the decentralized rules that facilitate productive market economies is an important one to understand as we wade through the carnage of this current era of increasing governmental regulation.

What’s the Difference?

The NY Times Joe Nocera notes that Countrywide Financial’s Angelo Mozilo is the latest winner of the criminalization of business lottery.

Meanwhile, Charles Gasparino explains why those who made faulty business decisions that led to a major U.S. banking crisis really shouldn’t be prosecuted for crimes.

Yet, the reality is that there is no discernible difference between what Mozilo did at Countrywide or what Dick Fuld did at Lehman Brothers with what Jeff Skilling did at Enron.

Yet, Skilling continues to serve a 24-year prison sentence and endure the immense collateral damage of his fate.

On the other hand, Mozilo and Fuld deal with civil litigation and move on with life.

Neither Mozilo nor Fuld should be prosecuted for trying to save their companies. Any responsibility that they have for the demise of their companies can be allocated in the civil justice system among all the responsible parties.

But that Jeff Skilling remains in prison – particularly given the despicable way in which he was put there – remains a serious blot on the American criminal justice system.

A truly civil society would find a better way.

Trying to right the NatWest Three wrong

Natwest Three - Copy.jpgIn the universe of unjust Enron-related criminal prosecutions, the NatWest Three case was particularly pernicious.
Three bankers from the United Kindom, who did nothing other than to have the misfortune of entering into a deal with the CFO of one of the largest public corporations in the U.S., were indicted by a federal grand jury in Houston, uprooted from their jobs and homes in the U.K., extradited to the U.S. under a post-9/11 law that was enacted to facilitate the extradition of terrorists, and forced to endure a four-year ordeal before they were able to return home to their families in the U.K. Two of the NatWest Three — David Bermingham and Gary Mulgrew — describe the barbaric treatment that they experienced in this series of interviews on the Ungagged.Net website.
Now safely back in the U.K., Bermingham is trying to do something constructive with his horrifying experience — that is, change the absurd U.K. statute that allowed the U.S. to extradite Bermingham and his colleagues without even the protection of an evidentiary hearing in the U.K. to determine whether there was evidence of a true crime.
Below is Bermingham’s testimony before the Joint Committee of Human Rights in the U.K. Not only does he provide a lucid and compelling argument for modification of the extradition statute, he also touches on several of the troubling aspects of the U.S. criminal justice system that have been often discussed here, such as draconian plea bargains, prosecutorial misconduct, witness intimidation, and the trial penalty, just to touch on a few.
After watching this video, ask yourself this question — just how have we gotten to the point where we are wasting our governmental resources on prosecuting people such as Bermingham?

Challenging that entertaining form of corruption

OBannonAll the talk in the sports world these days seems to revolve around the impending lock-out of NFL players by the NFL owners.

However, this Antonio Irzarry/Sports in the Courts Blog post reports on Ed O’Bannon’s class action lawsuit against the NCAA, which might just end up being more interesting and change-provoking than anything that occurs in the current NFL labor negotiations:

As noted many times over the years, big-time college sports under the rubric of NCAA regulation is shamefully corrupt. Granted, it’s an entertaining form of corruption, but corrupt nonetheless.

There is simply no reason why gifted young football and basketball players should be prevented from earning compensation for the entertainment and wealth that they create in the same manner that young golfers and tennis players do. 

It is far past time for the NCAA member institutions to abandon the NCAA’s obsolescent regulatory system and adopt one that recognizes and rewards the risks that the players take — and the contributions that they make – in providing entertainment and creating wealth.

Let’s face it – paying indirect compensation to professional athletes in the form of academic scholarships and flashy resort facilities just doesn’t cut it anymore.

Let the market sort out the institutions that are willing to take the risk of investing in what amount to upper minor-league football and basketball teams. The top 30-50 programs will probably do so, but most institutions outside of that group will not. Why risk losing even more money than most programs are under the present system?

Who knows? Perhaps the institutions that elect not to sponsor professional teams will decide to engage in true inter-collegiate competition between real student-athletes.

And with no need for the embarrassing hyprocrisy that the NCAA represents.

The NFL Bubble

NFL LOGO -2_2Earlier posts here and here noted the real possibility that the problems that the Harris County Sports Authority is currently experiencing in paying the debt incurred in the construction of various stadiums in Houston may be a sign of a bubble in the professional sports business that is about to burst.

S. M. Olivia of the Ludwig von Mises Institute picks up on that theme in analyzing the very real possibility that National Football League owners may elect to lock-out NFL players because of stalled negotiations over a new collective bargaining agreement:

The NFL encapsulates, perhaps better than any other single business entity, the popular conceptions — and misconceptions — about capitalism and the nature of markets. The league is the epitome of statist “crony” capitalism. Its franchise operators demand huge government subsidies for stadiums while jealously guarding its prerogatives as a “private” business. Governments (and their media enablers) largely go along with this because they’ve been led to believe the NFL’s popularity is so immense that no respectable city can go without a franchise.

Professional football is the ethanol of the entertainment industry. Since 1990, nearly every NFL franchise has either opened a new stadium, made substantial renovations to existing stadiums, or is currently in the process of obtaining a new stadium. Over this 20-year period the league’s franchises obtained over $7 billion in taxpayer subsidies raging from direct taxes to publicly backed bonds. Ten stadiums are 100% government-financed, while another 19 are at least 75% government-financed. Every single franchise receives some amount of government subsidies. [ .  .  .]

[The ongoing NFL-NFLPA dispute is]  .   .   . simple really: The owners overspent on unnecessary stadiums, and now they want the players to work more for less pay to help pay down the debt. That’s your entire labor dispute in one sentence. The league expects — nay, demand — the NFLPA to act like a local government in a stadium dispute and simply give the franchise operators what they want for little or nothing in return. Maintaining the “owners'” social standing is of paramount importance. [ .  .  .]

The NFL produces three things: stadium debt, intellectual property, and bureaucracy. None of these things should be confused with “free market” values. The league is a prime example of what happens when you mix politically influential egos with easy credit and a media environment that largely promotes economic ignorance. You have the perfect boom business.

But all booms eventually end. NFL acolytes — and they are presently the majority — will insist, as Homer Simpson once did, that “everything lasts forever.” One media writer I correspond with insisted to me recently the NFL will be even more popular in 20 years then it is today. Go back to 1991 and think about all of the businesses you could have said that about, incorrectly, at that time.

That’s not to say professional football will cease to exist, nor even that the present labor situation will yield some disaster beyond imagination. What I am saying is that all the positive, pie-in-the-sky press in the world can’t alter economic reality. The NFL isn’t just a house of cards. It’s a house of cards built atop a pile of toxic waste. The only thing keeping the house from sinking is a support structure composed of television contracts.

But the networks face their own economic challenges, and unless you can guarantee that Fox, ESPN, CBS, et al., will be stronger then they are now in 2031, then you can’t say with any confidence the NFL will survive and thrive indefinitely. The league is built on consumption, and when you adopt that model, eventually you’ll eat yourself out of your $1.3 billion house and home.

My sense is that the NFL owners will endure a public relations debacle if they force a work stoppage, particularly if they allow it to last a long time.

For one thing, the entertainment market is far different and more diverse now than it was during prior NFL work stoppages. Thus, the market for entertainment has many alternatives to the NFL.

Moreover, the market appreciates the grave injury risk that the players endure far better than it did during prior NFL work stoppages. The public is unlikely to side with wealthy owners who are attempting to force players to take more economic risk in the face of that injury risk.

Funny thing about those financial bubbles – they are far easier to see in hindsight.

The Persistant Financial Losses of U.S. Airlines

Could this have anything to do with security theater? Check out the synopsis from Severin Borenstein’s new working paper:

U.S. airlines have lost nearly $60 billion (2009 dollars) in domestic markets since deregulation, most of it in the last decade.

More than 30 years after domestic airline markets were deregulated, the dismal financial record is a puzzle that challenges the economics of deregulation. I examine some of the most common explanations among industry participants, analysts, and researchers — including high taxes and fuel costs, weak demand, and competition from lower-cost airlines. Descriptive statistics suggest that high taxes have been at most a minor factor and fuel costs shocks played a role only in the last few years.

Major drivers seem to be the severe demand downturn after 9/11 — demand remained much weaker in 2009 than it was in 2000 — and the large cost differential between legacy airlines and the low-cost carriers, which has persisted even as their price differentials have greatly declined.

A low-cost concierge medicine model

conciergeThe innovation of concierge medical practice has been a frequent topic here, so this recent NY Times article on the development of a low-cost concierge medical practice model caught my eye:

With 31 physicians in San Francisco and New York, [One Medical Group] offers most of the same services provided by personalized “concierge” medical practices, but at a much lower price: $150 to $200 a year.

One Medical Group doctors see at most 16 patients a day; the nationwide average for primary-care physicians is 25. They welcome e-mail communication with patients, for no extra charge. Same-day appointments are routine. And unlike most concierge practices, One Medical accepts a variety of insurance plans, including Medicare. [.  .  .]

.  .  . One Medical is the first to try to carry out such a model on a large scale. It now has several thousand patients and a growth rate of 50 percent a year, fueled largely by word of mouth. Dr. Lee said he planned to open a third office in Manhattan next month and expand to a third large city next year.

It will be interesting to see if this model still works on a larger scale, particularly if less healthy patients use a highly disproportionate amount of doctor time and resources.

However, as this latest disclosure regarding Obamacare reinforces, truly beneficial health care finance reform is more likely to come through innovations such as One Medical Group, not through government-managed overhauls.

The problem that no big city mayor wants to confront

gpensionThe turmoil in the municipal bond markets over the past week got me thinking.

Bill King has done a great job (and see generally here) of explaining how Houston’s unfunded public pension obligation represents an untenable burden on the city government’s financial condition. The problem is not just Houston’s, either.

So, it was refreshing to come across this Maria D. Fitzpatrick/Stanford Institute of Economic Policy Research paper (H/T Craig Newmark) that indicates that now may be the best time for Houston and other over-stretched local governments to attempt to do something about this mess:

ÔªøÔªøÔªøÔªøThe results show that the majority of Illinois public school teachers are willing to pay just 17 cents for a dollar increase in the present value of expected retirement benefits. The findings therefore suggest substantial inefficiency in compensation as the public cost of deferred compensation exceeds its value to employees.  .   .   . [. . .]

In this context, the main finding of this paper, that the majority of IPS employees value their pension benefits at about 17 cents on the dollar, has two important implications. First, it suggests a possible Pareto-improving and politically feasible solution to the current inability of states to pay their promised pension benefits to public employees. Governments could offer to buy back pension benefits from teachers and other public sector employees. If the results here generalize, governments may be able to buy back promised employee pension benefits, or at least some of these promised benefits, for as little as twenty cents on the dollar. Doing so would draw down the pension obligations of governments both significantly and immediately, rather than waiting for a reduction in benefits to take effect years in the future.

Meanwhile, in this WSJ op-ed, Roger W. Ferguson, Jr. passes along an innovative approach that Orange County, California – the site of one of the largest municipal bankruptcies in U.S. history back in the mid-1990’s – is taking to deal with its unfunded pension obligations:

The plan is a hybrid model: It combines contributions by the county and its employees with both a traditional defined-benefit pension and individual accounts, which the worker can take with him from job to job.

Here’s how it works: New hires can choose either the old defined-benefit plan or the new hybrid plan when they sign up for benefits. The plan maintains a strong traditional pension, but it reduces the requisite contribution for both the county and its employees. It also redirects a portion of that money into the defined-contribution part of the plan where the money can grow over time.

Unlike a typical 401(k), the defined contribution part of the hybrid plan emphasizes retirement income as the primary goal. It incorporates affordable deferred annuity options during employees’ working years that can deliver income in retirement that compares favorably with what workers can expect from the traditional pension plan alone. The hybrid plan also increases workers’ take-home pay because workers’ contributions are lower than they are in the old defined-benefit plan.

This new program helps workers to think about how much monthly income they will need in retirement–as opposed to how big a nest egg they’re building. [. . .]

Sometimes real change begins with compromise. A new approach on pensions won’t close the gap between current pension promises and the public’s ability to afford them. But it points the way forward and acknowledges the reality that we have to start somewhere to address our nation’s public pension woes.

Are you listening, Mayor Parker?

How to Build a Toaster

Thomas Thwaites with a practical lesson on the importance of facilitating trade.