Behind the Closed Doors – the Fastow Sentence

As noted earlier here, the six-year prison sentence handed down earlier last month to former Enron CFO Andrew Fastow was surprising on several levels, not the least of which was that the Enron Task Force elicited testimony from Fastow during the Lay-Skilling trial that his minimum sentence would be ten years.

The purpose of that testimony was to make Fastow appear to be more credible to the Lay-Skilling jury — he was going to do at least ten years, so he supposedly didn’t have any incentive to lie in order to reduce his sentence.

Thus, it was somewhat surprising that, in the run-up to the Fastow sentencing hearing, Fastow’s attorneys requested a sentence of less than ten years and there was nary a peep from the Task Force objecting to the request.

Then, at the sentencing hearing, the Task Force prosecutors at least tacitly supported the less-than-ten-year sentence by not objecting to Fastow counsel’s requests for leniency to U.S. District Judge Ken Hoyt and even extolling Fastow’s “cooperation” with the Task Force in regard to the Lay-Skilling trial.

Indeed, one of the most surprising aspects of the Fastow sentencing hearing is that neither the Task Force prosecutors nor Fastow attorneys disclosed to Judge Hoyt during the sentencing hearing about Fastow’s contrary testimony during the Lay-Skilling trial.

Or did they? According to this Tom Fowler/Houston Chronicle article, Task Force prosecutors and Fastow’s attorneys met with Judge Hoyt in chambers during a transcribed meeting the afternoon before Fastow’s sentencing.

The transcript of that meeting has not been made public and none of the participants is talking about what was discussed. The Chronicle has filed a motion to unseal the transcript, and neither Fastow nor the Task Force is really opposing the Chronicle’s motion (Fastow has requested that matters regarding his personal medical condition be redacted from the transcript).

But what is really odd about all this is that Fowler reports that the Task Force, in a recent filing that is not yet publicly available, states that it wants to review the transcript of the closed-door meeting because “[t]he government is currently assessing whether to file a notice of appeal of the sentence imposed on Mr. Fastow, and it cannot make that determination without a copy of the transcript of the pre-sentencing hearing.”

Note to Task Force — it’s hard to appeal rulings successfully when you do not object to the ruling in the first place.

Previewing the Skilling appeal

skilling101106.jpgFormer Enron CEO Jeff Skilling filed a motion for bail pending appeal earlier in the week (download a copy here; Carrie Johnson’s WaPo article on the motion is here) and, in so doing, previews the major issues that he will emphasize in his upcoming appeal of his conviction on conspiracy, securities fraud and insider trading charges: the “deliberate ignorance” jury instruction; the Task Force’s application of the “deprivation of honest services” theory upon which most of the conviction is based; failure to transfer the venue of the trial and related jury bias issues; and the Task Force’s prosecutorial misconduct, particularly in effectively precluding witnesses with exculpatory testimony for Skilling from testifying during the trial by threatening those witnesses with prosecution if they were to do so. The motion is compelling, and its introduction sums up Skilling’s position well:

Jeff Skilling should remain on bail pending appeal. He presents no flight risk, nor is he a threat to society; his appeal is not being pursued to delay; and his appeal will raise substantial issues of law that, if resolved in his favor, will likely result in the reversal of his convictions. See 18 U.S.C. ß 3143(b) (elements defendant must establish to obtain bail pending appeal); United States v. Clark, 917 F.2d 177, 179 (5th Cir. 1990) (same). Only the last of these elements should be in dispute, and Skilling satisfies them. His appeal challenges all the counts of conviction and presents enough of a ìclose,î or ìsubstantial,î question to warrant bail pending its resolution. United States v. Valera-Elizondo, 761 F.2d 1020, 1024 (5th Cir. 1985).
One of the strongest arguments Skilling will have on appeal is that a ìdeliberate ignoranceî instruction should not have been given in this case. Whether to give such an instruction always presents a ìclose question.î United States v. Tunick, No. S3 98 CR 1238 (SAS), 2001 U.S. Dist Lexis 2911, at *8 n.5 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 22, 2001). The question was especially close here for at least four reasons:

ï Such instructions are disfavored, see United States v. Ojebode, 957 F.2d 1218, 1229 (5th Cir. 1992);
ï Skilling never asserted an ìostrichî defense, a usual prerequisite to issuing the instruction, see United States v. Lara-Velasquez, 919 F.2d 946, 951 (5th Cir. 1990);
ï Skilling never purposefully blinded himself to any allegedly criminal facts, another prerequisite, see United States v. Posada-Rios, 158 F.3d 832, 875 (5th Cir. 1998); and,
ï Finally, the Task Force all but conceded that the instruction should apply only to Lay, yet the Court refused to give an instruction informing the jury that the deliberate ignorance theory could apply only to one, and not to both, defendants, cf. 2001 Fifth Circuit Criminal Jury Instruction 1.37 (approving such clarification; citing United States v. Reissig, 186 F.3d 617 (5th Cir. 1999)).

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The Surprising Fastow Sentence

This Kristin Hays-Tom Fowler/Chronicle article picks up on an aspect of the six-year sentence assessed to former Enron CFO Andrew Fastow earlier this week that has largely been ignored in the media but noted earlier here.

The Enron Task Force elicited testimony from Fastow during the Lay-Skilling trial that represented to the jury that Fastow was a more credible witness because he had agreed to a minimum ten-year prison sentence and, thus, had no incentive to lie.

As we know now, Fastow had not really agreed to anything of the sort and, in fact, successfully petitioned U.S. District Judge Ken Hoyt for a lighter sentence. The article quotes several experts — including former Enron Task Force director Andrew Weissmann — who express surprise that the Task Force did not attempt to require Fastow to serve a minimum of ten years.

Although interesting, the article fails to address the most troubling aspect of the Fastow sentencing hearing — that is, the apparent failure of any of the attorneys involved to inform Judge Hoyt about how the Lay-Skilling jury was misled by Fastow’s testimony.

When Judge Hoyt finds out about that he was not informed about that, my sense is that he is not going to be pleased.

The public reaction to the Fastow sentence has been fascinating and reflects the dubious nature of the Justice Department’s regulation of business-through-criminalization policy.

Viewed in a vacuum, the Fastow sentence is reasonably fair. Fastow effectively embezzled millions from Enron and ruined the careers of several other Enron executives who he induced to participate in the embezzlement. Six years is a harsh sentence, so Fastow is certainly not getting off lightly.

However, the Fastow sentence was not handed down in a vacuum.

Not only did Fastow and the Task Force prosecutors mislead the jury in order to convict Lay and Skilling, they trampled justice by needlessly ruining the careers of the four Merrill Lynch executives in the Nigerian Barge case and they are currently doing the same thing to the three U.K. bankers in the NatWest Three case.

There is simply no way to reconcile Fastow’s sentence with the six-year sentence handed down to Jamie Olis — who did not steal anything and refused to tell lies about others — or the seven-year sentence of former Enron chief accountant Richard Causey, who also did not steal anything and who has not testified against anybody.

The death of Ken Lay from defending himself against a weak and unjust case, as well as the effective life sentence likely faced by Jeff Skilling, further underscore the confusing message conveyed by the Fastow sentence.

As Larry Ribstein has repeatedly observed, criminal cases involving business executives have become a sort of lottery, incrementally undermining the principles of justice and respect for the rule of law upon which the success of American society is largely based.

If we lose respect for those principles, then “do you really think you could stand upright in the winds [of abusive state power] that would blow then?

More on the Fastow Sentence

It’s a good thing that Andy Fastow’s counsel did not mention Fastow’s following testimony on March 8 in the Lay-Skilling trial during Fastow’s sentencing hearing today in front of U.S. District Judge Kenneth Hoyt:

Q. Does the government decide your sentence?

A. My Judge decides the sentence.

Q. And who is your Judge?

A. Judge Hoyt.

Q. Is that right here in Houston, in this courthouse?

A. Yes.

Q. Do you recall the maximum sentence that you could be sentenced to for these crimes?

A. For the crimes I’ve pled guilty to?

Q. Yes.

A. Yes. Ten years.

Q. And was there a minimum sentence that you pleaded guilty to?

A. My plea agreement states that I agree to a sentence of 10 years. [. . .]

Q. And in agreeing — in addition to agreeing to serving 10 years in prison, did you also have to forfeit moneys?

A. Yes.

The foregoing testimony was elicted on direct examination of Fastow by Enron Task Force prosecutor John Hueston for the purpose of representing to the Lay-Skilling jury that Fastow’s testimony was credible because he had agreed to a floor of ten years of prison time. On March 8th, Skilling counsel Daniel Petrocelli followed up by asking Fastow during cross-examination about the sentence that he had agreed to under his plea deal:

Q. Okay. And you said you have to go to jail for 10 years; right?

A. Well, my sentence is for 10 years. I could potentially have time off for good behavior. [. . .]

Q. Okay. And the reason why you just answered my question in the way you did is because you want to communicate to the jury that Mr. Skilling is a criminal along with you, correct?

A. No, Mr. Petrocelli. I’m just trying to answer the questions honestly. My outcome is already determined.

Q. Well, not —

A. I’ll be sentenced to ten years as far as I understand. It doesn’t matter — my sentence isn’t affected by whether Mr. Skilling is convicted or not.

Then, on re-direct examination by Hueston on March 13th, Fastow testified as follows:

Q. And as a result of your pledge to cooperate, did you agree to plead guilty to a 10-year minimum sentence of imprisonment?

A. A 10-year maximum imprisonment.

Q. And what is the minimum amount of time that that plea agreement calls for?

A. It calls for a 10-year sentence.

Q. So after January 14th, can your cooperation lower that 10 years?

A. My understanding is that I will be sentenced to 10 years. The Judge ultimately has a discretion; but in my plea agreement, I agreed to the 10-year sentence.

Later that same day, Hueston asked Fastow about the suggestion made during cross-examination that Fastow had forged the key Global Galactic agreement between Fastow and former Enron chief accountant, Richard Causey:

Q. And after all this time, you found and turned over the document to the FBI, you remembered, late May or June; is that right?

A. I believe that’s correct, yes.

Q. And you turned it over because you were cooperating?

A. Yes, sir.

Q. And this is months after, six months after, you enter your plea of guilty; is that right?

A. Approximately, yes, sir.

Q. And can this document lower your sentence now, under your understanding?

A. My understanding is, no.

Q. And if, as the defense was suggesting, you were just falsely creating this document, wouldn’t it have been better to do so before you entered a plea of guilty, when you were bargaining with the government?

A. Well, one could argue that. [. . .]

Q. Mr. Fastow, if as the defense suggests, you’re on some sort of mission to say or do anything to convict Jeff Skilling, might you have been tempted to just add a couple more initials to that Global Galactic document?

A. Sir, I have no incentive to add any initials. My incentive is to be truthful. If I’m not truthful, I could go to prison for life. By making a document more compelling, I can’t lower my sentence.

Q. By trying to do that, there’s only one thing you’re sentence would do; right?

A. I’m sorry?

Q. If you tried to alter a document or tell a lie, there’s only one direction that sentence can go?

A. That’s correct. That would be a lie. That means my sentence would go up, potentially, to a life sentence.

Want to make a bet that the Task Force prosecutors did not inform Judge Hoyt today during Fastow’s sentencing hearing that Fastow and the Task Force had previously represented to the Lay-Skilling jury that Fastow’s testimony was more credible because he had agreed to a minimum ten-year sentence?

Try to make sense of this

Fastow20.jpgJamie Olis3.jpgLet’s see if I get this straight.
On one hand, Andrew Fastow — who served up his wife as a sacrifical lamb for his embezzlement of millions from Enron that triggered one of the largest bankruptcy cases in U.S. history, who used the NatWest Three to hide his embezzlement of millions more and then turned on the U.K. bankers to save his skin, who very well may have forged Richard Causey’s initials on the Global Galatic “agreement,” whose bizarre testimony during the Lay-Skilling trial was largely discounted by jurors and who had a large hand in ruining the careers of four innocent Merrill Lynch executives in order to lessen his prison sentence — is sentenced to six years in prison.
On the other hand, Jamie Olis — who worked on a transaction to improve his company’s earnings, did as he was told by his superiors, did not profit from the transaction, defended his company and himself against allegations of wrongdoing with regard to the transaction and did not trigger any type of insolvency case by his company — is sentenced to six years in prison.
These results are not the product of a rational application of our criminal justice system. Ellen Podgor has additional thoughts, particularly how the Fastow sentence may bear on the anticipated life sentence that former Enron CEO Jeff Skilling faces.

An interesting letter to Judge Lake

Heartland logo.gifThe day before one of the relatively few real Enron criminals is scheduled to be sentenced, an interesting letter to U.S. District Judge Sim Lake became public in regard to the sentencing of former Enron CEO Jeff Skilling.
During and after the Lay-Skilling trial, Heartland Institute economists Paul Fisher and Jim Johnston authored several articles (previous posts here) that challenged the myth that Enron was merely a house of cards propped up through the fraud of its leaders (that myth has been a recurring theme on this blog, see here, here, here, here, here, and here, to cite just a few posts).
Now, in this letter to U.S. District Judge Sim Lake, Fisher and Johnston urge Judge Lake — in connection with the sentencing of Skilling — to take into consideration the huge beneficial impact that Enron had on various important markets. In so doing, Fisher and Johnston remind us once again of the vacuous nature of the real presumption in the Lay-Skilling trial — that is, that Skilling and Lay were rich and Enron collapsed, so they must be guilty of something in connection with Enron’s descent into bankruptcy:

From an economic perspective, the harm [that Skilling and Lay caused] is difficult to calculate. For sure, the collapse caused a huge notional loss to investors and employees in the form of pension and savings plans. However, Ken Lay and Jeff Skilling were not convicted of causing the collapse. They were convicted of lying about Enron’s financial condition (and one count of insider trading [against Skilling]). If the misrepresentation of Enron’s financial condition in 2001 as alleged in the indictment had not occurred, presumably the bad news would have been known earlier. That in turn would have caused the Enron share price to collapse sooner and even less time would have been available for investors and employees to liquidate their holdings.
The implication of this reality is that there was no additional harm done to the investors and employees from the alleged hiding of Enron’s profits and losses. While it may have changed the identity of the losers it did not increase the totality of the losses.
On balance, the benefits created by Ken Lay and Jeffrey Skilling in building Enron seem to us to far outweigh any incremental harm done to investors from the alleged fraud. The economists we know who have carefully studied the risk management practices and techniques developed by Enron agree that they were beneficial and will continue to be so. Not giving this reasonable weight will send a potentially harmful message. That is not to excuse any fraud, but rather to recognize the context of the decision.

Meanwhile, this Carrie Johnson-Brooke Masters/WaPo article explores the dubious reasoning behind prison sentences for businesspersons convicted of fraud that are harsher than those handed down for first-degree murder or treason.

The Fastow sentencing memorandum

Fastow18.jpgAs Jamie Olis awaits his resentencing for working on a transaction for which he did not profit, Andrew Fastow’s lawyers (one of whom is Olis’ attorney — small world, isn’t it?) filed a sentencing memorandum earlier this week that claims that Fastow has “stepped up to take responsibility,” has expressed “full remorse” for his role in Enron’s demise and “is a changed man.” WaPo’s Carrie Johnson reports on the memorandum here and a copy of the Fastow sentencing memo can be downloaded here.
Before you become convinced that Fastow has turned his back on his evil ways and become a paragon of virtue, take a moment to review the following:

How Fastow served up his wife as a sacrifical lamb for his effective embezzlement of funds from Enron;
How Fastow used the NatWest Three to hide his embezzlement of funds from Enron and then turned on the bankers to save his skin;
How Fastow may have forged Richard Causey’s initials on the Global Galatic “agreement”;
Fastow’s bizarre testimony in the Lay-Skilling trial; and
Fastow’s involvement in ruining the careers of four innocent Merrill Lynch executives in order to lessen his prison sentence.

Changed man? Heck, it looks to me as if Fastow has manipulated the Enron Task Force in the same manner as he manipulated many of his colleagues at Enron.

Wasting talent

Skilling22.jpgSo, a tortured Jeff Skilling is back in the news as a result of being cited for public intoxication while visiting Dallas a week or so ago.
While many await with anxious anticipation the imposition of the harsh prison sentence that Skilling will almost certainly receive, I continue to think about the great waste that results from the government’s criminalization policy toward risk-taking businesspersons and Skilling’s legacy of beneficial risk-taking.
This is not the product of a rational criminal justice system.

Wanted: Adult Supervision at the Enron Task Force

This one takes the cake.

After trampling justice and the rule of law for five years while damaging lives, families and careers of former Enron executives and a selected few who did nothing other than have the misfortune of engaging in transactions with Enron, the Enron Task Force outdid itself yesterday in responding to the Ken Lay Estate’s motion to vacate the jury verdict against the late Mr. Lay.

In its response, the Task Force requests U.S. District Judge Sim Lake to postpone ruling on the Lay Estate motion until the Task Force has had an opportunity to lobby Congress to change the law that mercifully provides for the dismissal of charges against individuals such as Lay who die during the criminal proceedings. The Chronicle’s Tom Fowler reports on the Task Force pleading here, Chronicle business columnist Loren Steffy comments here and the NY Times’ Alexei Barrionuevo reports here.

Given the Task Force’s lengthy track record of exhibiting dubious judgment, its over-the-top response to the Lay Estate motion is really not surprising.

However, it is a stark reminder that the use of the overwhelming power of government to criminalize business executives — now even in death — is seriously out of hand, as even some prominent former Justice Department officials are now acknowledging publicly.

As Sir Thomas More reminds us, we better address the difficult task of curtailing use of that power, lest it be used on us.

They Never Really Had a Chance

As I noted at the conclusion of the Lay-Skilling trial, my sense is that the trial was over before it began because the jurors — particularly its leaders — were predisposed to convict.

Now, according to this Brenda Sandburg/American Lawyer article, the jury consultants working the Lay-Skilling case thought the same thing. In fact, they gave little hope that any jury anywhere could be empaneled that would view the case without a strong predisposition to convict.

Remember that the next time you read and hear the prosecution in a criminal case undertaking a propaganda campaign to fan the flames of resentment and scapegoating in the jury pool.

As Sir Thomas More reminds us, do any of us really think that we could “stand upright in the winds that would blow” if that power were applied to us?