The latest boondoggle?

Hilton_Americas-Houston_home_right.jpgAnne Linehan, Kevin Whited and Cory Crow note this week’s “are you kidding me?” moment from City Hall — two Nancy Sarnoff/Chronicle articles reporting on the trial balloon that Mayor White floated about building a second large convention hotel in downtown Houston next to the George R. Brown Convention Center and the existing 1,200 room, city-owned Hilton Americas Hotel.
Another large downtown convention center hotel is surprising to anyone who has been following the Harris County government’s fits and starts in regard to the proposed Astrodome hotel redevelopment project. However, Mayor White recently engineered the hiring of a new leader (Greg Ortale) for the local convention bureau and it looks as if the prospect of elevating Houston to the small tier of U.S. cities with adequate facilities to handle the largest conventions was part of the pitch in that hire.
Does building another big downtown hotel make sense? In and of itself, the answer is clearly no. Private equity interests have no interest in risking their money on such a project, just as they have no interest in doing the same in regard to the Astrodome hotel redevelopment. Thus, the deal only begins to make sense because of the prospect of public financing, which is how the City financed the first downtown convention center hotel.
Despite the lack of any meaningful analysis in the Sarnoff/Chronicle articles, the first hotel has been anything but an unqualified success. The Mayor suggests that the City spent $300 million on it (that seems way low to me) and that its presently worth “at least $350 million” (yeah, but who’s buying?). There are a bunch of less risky investments that the City could have made with that $300 million that would have generated more than the speculative $50 million equity that Mayor White thinks the City has in the Hilton Americas.
But the larger question is whether the City ought to be in the business of building convention center hotels in the first place? As Cory points out, the rationale for the investment is that, with the larger number of convention center hotel rooms, Houston could compete with the small number of cities (Las Vegas, Orlando and San Antonio) for the really big conventions that need the concentrated mass of hotel rooms that only those cities offer. Although transit is an issue in getting from the downtown convention area to Houston’s cultural areas and attractions, I can see how Houston would be a viable alternative to those other cities. For example, Houston’s restaurants, theater district and museum district are better and more diverse than any of the other three alternatives. And Vegas is not every large convention’s cup of tea.
But given the alternatives, is another large investment in a second convention center hotel really a prudent allocation of the City of Houston’s financial resources? Here is where I have my doubts. As I’ve noted many times in regard to Houston’s light rail boondoggle, allocating $300-$500 million on another downtown convention center hotel has real consequences, such as leaving inadequate resources to make improvements to Houston’s infrastructure (flood control and fixing of traffic hotspots, to name just two) that would dramatically decrease the risk of death and property damage. Stated simply, does it make sense for the City to be investing that kind of money in a downtown convention hotel when convention attendees won’t be able to get to it from Hobby Airport? The main drag to the Gulf Freeway and downtown from Hobby Airport — Broadway Street — is already virtually impassable during even moderate rainstorms.
Maybe taking a flyer on a second downtown convention center hotel would make more sense but for the billions blown on the light rail system. But the size of that boondoggle leaves a very small margin for error in regard to allocation of the City’s remaining resources. At this point, a large investment in a second convention center hotel appears to fall well outside that small margin.
By the way, speaking of the Astrodome hotel project, it appears now that even Harris County officials believe that the deal is dead. However, the proposed alternative is to turn it into a horse barn?:

Meanwhile, there could be three or four groups prepared to present plans to transform the Dome.
The Houston Livestock Show and Rodeo may be one contender, said Leroy Shafer, the rodeo’s chief operating officer. The rodeo and partners are looking into whether the Dome could serve as a replacement facility for aging Reliant Arena.
Astroturf and tiered stadium seats would give way to more than 1,000 horse stalls and an arena with a capacity of at least 6,000. The vast open area where former Astros stars Jimmy Wynn and Jeff Bagwell hit towering drives would be turned into a three-story exhibition and stalling space, Shafer said.

Re-evaluating boondoggles

Houston%20Dynamo%20stadium%20011508.gifLet me get this straight. Mayor White started out with a proposal several months ago to allow the local MLS soccer team to build a stadium at their own expense on downtown land that the City of Houston owned but was not using except for extra parking (previous posts here).
So, how did we get to the point where the City is now willing to pony up at least $20 million and exercise its eminent domain power to acquire land for the private owners of the team to build their stadium? Heck, we haven’t even started to talk about who’s going to pick up the tab for the cost of the necessary infrastructure improvements or how much “Central Planning Chief” Peter Brown’s “mixed used development” ideas are going to cost (for the folly of such ventures, see here). By the way, Mr. Brown, what are the names of the other cities that are lining up to provide financing for a soccer stadium that makes you so sure that the Dynamo will leave if Houston doesn’t provide it?
And to top it off, the proposed location of the proposed new stadium figures to increase the cost of an even larger boondoggle.
Granted, we’re talking about throwing away “only” $20-30 million on this deal at this point. That’s peanuts in comparison to what the City wastes annually on the light rail system. But the way this deal has developed leads one to question whether there is any adult supervision whatsoever down at City Hall? If it’s acceptable to throw $20-30 million at a minor league soccer team, then what’s next? $20-30 million for the Aeros?

A real train wreck

Metrorail%20car-Houston%20011508.jpgThis LA Times op-ed by transit experts Jim Moore and Tom Rubin examining the LA area’s MTA transit system over the past 20 years. They provide a daunting warning for those who rationalize the massive deficits of Houston’s light rail system by contending that the system will become cost-efficient in the long run:

. . . the MTA has spent more than $11 billion since 1986 to build its rail network, and the effect has been to reduce total transit ridership on the system by more than 3 billion boardings. That’s a bizarre result.

Shouldn’t investments in transit infrastructure encourage, not discourage, transit use? So, why is Houston continuing to barrel down a path that LA has already shown is a poor way to invest in mass transit?

It could happen here

Metrorail%20car-Houston%20121207.jpgThis earlier post noted that a not very flattering analysis of the economic debacle that is the San Jose, California light rail system might very well describe Houston’s light rail system in a few years if we don’t come to our senses. Following up on those thoughts, this Randal O’Toole post reviews a San Jose Mercury News newspaper article that reports on the state of the San Jose transit system on the 20-year anniversary of light rail there. It’s not a pretty picture:

Santa Clara County taxpayers pay as much or more for transit, yet their transit system carries fewer riders, than almost any system with light rail in the country. ìThe heavy tax commitment to transit,î the article notes, ìmeans fewer dollars for road upgrades.î Especially since a half-cent sales tax that voters approved of for roads was hijacked by the transit agency in 2000. [. . .]
ìThe light-rail system should be considered a 100-year investment,î says San Joseís director of transportation planning. That shows how shallow planners are: within another 20 years, that investment will be completely worn out and San Jose will have to decide whether to scrap it or spend another few billion replacing it.
. . . [the] Silicon Valley, with its jobs spread out more thinly than almost anywhere else in the country, was unsuited for large-bus transit service. So to go from buses to light rail, which requires even more job concentration to work, was a mistake. Having made that mistake, VTA now wants to build BART, which requires even more job concentration. . .
Light rail was the wrong solution for San Jose in 1987, it is the wrong solution today, and it still will be the wrong solution in 2027. We can only hope that San Joseís leaders and opinion makers, including the Mercury-News, come to their senses by then and decide to junk the whole thing.

Meanwhile, in Houston, as our local “leaders” continue planning to spend upwards of $4 billion on expansion of a light rail system that relatively few citizens of the area will use, alternative transit projects that make much more sense are relegated to discussion in the blogosphere.
The Houston area is a big place with a vibrant and resilient economy. But Metro’s light rail system is the one urban boondoggle going right now that has the potential to become a serious economic drag on the local economy in the not-to-distant future. It’s far past time that our local leadership noticed and started taking actions to hedge this risk.

The Chronicle continues to defy reality

astrodome%20112107.jpgAs noted in this earlier post on the improbable Astrodome hotel redevelopment project (previous posts here), the Chronicle continues to beat the drum in support of the deal without any meaningful financial or economic analysis. The intro to the editorial reveals the depth of the Chron editorial board’s analysis — “The public favors preserving the world’s first indoor stadium; all parties should cooperate to do that.”
Here are just a few of the questions that the Chronicle editorial board should be asking:

If the Astrodome were not in Reliant Park, would anyone in their right mind even be thinking of investing over a half billion dollars to build a 1,300 room resort hotel in the middle of Reliant Park?
If the answer to the prior question is “no,” then why should anyone in their right mind even be thinking of investing over a half billion dollars to build a 1,300 room resort hotel in the middle of Reliant Park simply because the decrepit hulk of the Dome is there?
In one of the tightest credit and equity markets in years, and with many economic forecasters predicting a U.S. recession over the next 12-18 months, who realistically is going to fund the half billion dollars that the promoters claim is necessary to convert the Dome into a resort hotel?
If the promoters have not been able to put together a viable plan for redevelopment of the Dome in over three years of trying, then why are we still talking about this?

Transit survey raises more questions than it answers

metroraillogo%20111907.gifIsn’t it interesting the different reactions that Anne Linehan, Charles Kuffner and Tory Gattis had to the 2007 Houston Area Survey regarding transit options? The Chronicle and other light rail enthusiasts immediately seized upon the survey as evidence that Houston-area residents want to dump more money into the light rail money pit.
But the problem with such surveys is that they generally ask people questions in a vacuum and do not address Peter Gordon’s three elegantly simple questions regarding economic choices:
1) At what cost?
2) Compared to what? and
3) How do you know?
For example, assume for a moment that the persons surveyed were informed of the fact that the average urban freeway lane costs about $10 million per mile and that the average light rail line costs about $50 million per mile while carrying only one-fifth as many people as the freeway lane. And these are only average figures — as Randal O’Toole recently pointed out, Seattle’s recently rejected light rail expansion was projected to cost $250 million per mile, a whopping 125 times more expensive at moving people than a freeway.
Moreover, let’s also assume that the persons surveyed are informed that the expenditure of a billion or so of public money on expanding a poorly-used light rail system has real consequences, such as leaving inadequate funds to make improvements to Houston’s infrastructure that would dramatically decrease the risk of death and property damage from flooding. Or whether the billion or so being flushed down the light rail drain would be better used to fix various area traffic “hotspots” where accidents or bottlenecks occur with high frequency.
No one knows for sure, but my bet is that the survey results would be dramatically different if the foregoing costs and alternatives were included as a part of the survey. It’s a shame that neither the City’s current leaders nor the mainstream media are asking the simple questions set forth above that would generate a meaningful cost-benefit analysis and ensuing well-informed debate regarding continued investment in expensive public works projects such as Metro’s light rail system.
Instead, we get this:

Metro executive vice president John Sedlak led off [a presentation to the Transportation Policy Council, a group of elected officials and agency staffers that sets priorities for transportation spending in the 13-county Gulf Coast planning region] with a slide show describing the [proposed Metro University light rail line] project and told the panel its approval was needed so Metro could get federal funding and start engineering work.
If there was a short delay, Holm asked, “What would be the consequence?”
Sedlak replied that the project is on “an aggressive schedule” and that a delay “would send a message to Washington that there are issues with our overall program.”
Holm asked why Washington would think there were issues and not just loose ends to tie up.
“They watch every activity that takes place very carefully,” Sedlak said. “The federal government is aware we are having this meeting today.”
Holm asked what the application deadline was. Sedlak said it was “in the month of December.”
“If the delay was just a few days, would it jeopardize the funding of the entire program?” Holm asked.
“I truly believe it could,” Sedlak replied.
Kemah Mayor Bill King had questions, too.
How many more passengers would the rail carry than the buses on Richmond do now?
Sedlak said he did not know, but Metro could get him the answer.
King asked how the line would impact traffic on Richmond.
Sedlak said there would be some negative effects, but the finished line should “take vehicles off the street.” Numerical estimates are in the line’s environmental impact document, he said.
Holm spoke again, her voice a little shaky.
“There are cities,” she said, “that have never been turned down for a funding request. It’s not because they agree on everything they want. It’s because they do their due diligence and they do their battles at home.
“We need to still build consensus in this community. We need to be able to walk hand-in-hand in supporting a project,” she said.

Update: As usual, Tory Gattis has additional insightful thoughts.

The nation’s worst-managed transit system

metrocar%20111607.jpgTom Rubin is an accountant who has audited many transit agencies and is an expert in transit system accounting. Randal O’Toole channels a Rubin presentation in describing the nation’s worst-managed transit system:

Participants in the Preserving the American Dream conference were encouraged to ride [the] light-rail line to one of the conference events. What they saw was not a pretty picture. Trains were infrequent (one of the supposed advantages of rail is that they run so frequently that riders donít need to consult schedules), the in-street tracks are dangerous (one conference goer slipped on a rail and fell into a curb), and the fellow patrons are not always people you want to be around (several conference goers were treated to the scene of someone becoming violently ill on board, leading one of our members to say, ìSo thatís what they mean by ëvibrant streetsíî).
Beyond these impressions, Rubin observes that [the light-rail system] has ìthe worst operating statistics of any American transit operator.î The reason for this, he says, is that [the area] ó being built mostly after World War II ó is one of the most spread-out urban areas in the country. Not only are people spread out, but jobs are spread out, with no job concentrations anywhere.
This makes large buses particularly unsuitable for transit because there is no place where large numbers of people want to go. So what was [the transit system’s] solution when its bus numbers were low relative to other transit agencies? Build light rail ó in other words, use an expensive technology that requires even more job concentrations.
Now it has one of the, if not the, poorest-patronized light-rail systems in America. So what is its solution? Build heavy rail, a technology that requires even more job concentrations.

What transit system are O’Toole and Rubin describing? Well, it sure sounds like it could be Houston’s, but it’s not. They are talking about San Jose, California’s system.
But how long do you think it will be until Houston’s light rail system is in similar shape?

Why is the Chronicle beating this dead horse?

ReliantStadium%20and%20the%20Astrodome%20111207.jpgThe Chronicle continues its apparent campaign to breath life into the second largest local urban boondoggle (second only to the Metro light rail system) — the proposed Astrodome hotel project (previous posts here). Rice professor and local political pundit Bob Stein comments about the apparent dilemma:

“For public officials, it’s like being in a maze,” Stein said. “You don’t know which turn you make is going to help you. You have the rodeo and the Texans ó the stakeholders ó and then you have the public.”

In reality, there is no dilemma at all. As USC economics professor Peter Gordon observes with regard to such issues, three simple questions need to be addressed: 1) At what cost? 2) Compared to what? and 3) How do you know? Despite the public’s fondness for the Dome, it is an obsolescent hulk that serves no useful purpose and costs a considerable amount each year just to mothball. The cost of the renovation is enormous and will almost certainly require some type of public contribution, particularly given the currently spooked credit and equity markets. Even if the deal could be financed without a large public contribution (I doubt it can), the county still has to face the prospect that the project will fail (many new hotels do) and that large operating subsidies will be necessary in the future. To make matters worse, there is inadequate demand for the city’s existing supply of hotel rooms, much less a supply that is increased by 1,300 rooms that the Astrodome hotel project would contribute. Finally, the current tenants of Reliant Park object to the hotel project.
So, in the face of all of the foregoing, why does the Chronicle continue to beat the drum for the project? Inquiring minds would like to know.

“A rusted-out battleship in a spruced up port”

astrodome%20103107.jpgAmazingly, the silly notion that it might be economically feasible to convert the Astrodome into a Gaylord Texan-type convention hotel has been making the local rounds for over three years now.
Maybe the combination of the Texans and the Rodeo coming out against the proposal will finally put the nonsense to rest. As the Chron article notes, even County Judge Ed Emmett is skeptical about the merits of the proposal:

County Judge Ed Emmett signaled in September that he isn’t convinced the project is viable. While attending the Texans’ home opener in September, he said the Astrodome struck him as an aging, rusted-out battleship that remains in a spruced-up port.

It occurs to me that the Astrodome hotel promoters decision to obtain a financing commitment for the project before getting the consent of the Reliant Park tenants to the project put a very large cart before the horse. Sort of like Oilers’ owner Bud Adams unveiling a model of a proposed new downtown football/basketball stadium back in the mid-1990’s without telling Rockets owner Les Alexander and Mayor Bob Lanier about it first. And we all know what happened after that imbroglio.
All of these machinations over what to do with the Dome would be relatively harmless except for the fact that the Dome continues to “eat” — that is, it costs Harris County a hefty sum (probably at least $3 million or so annually) just to mothball the Dome. Hopefully, the opposition of the main tenants at Reliant Park to the hotel redevelopment plan will finally lead to the Dome property being used for the best land use, which is probably parking. That’s not as sexy as a big hotel, but it provides something that is actually needed and will generate some revenue.
By the way, a good sign that a project is almost kaput is that its supporters become delusional. According to the Chron article, that’s already happening to certain promoters of the Astrodome hotel project:

Willie Loston, director of the Harris County Sports & Convention Corp., said the county attorney’s office is researching whether the county could approve the project over the objections of the Texans and the rodeo if the sports corporation determined the development would not hurt their operations.

Continuing to rationalize a boondoggle

Metrorail%20car-Houston102207.jpgThe big transit news in these parts last week was the announcement that the Metropolitan Transit Authority’s board Metro’s board approved the final route for the east-west University line and decided to deploy the much more expensive light rail rather than bus rapid transit in four other transit corridors. Kevin Whited, Lou Minatti and Tory Gattis were among the local bloggers commenting on this development.
What is perhaps most galling about all of this is the sheer lack of any perspective from the local mainstream media regarding the dubious nature of Metro’s urban economics. The Chronicle article on Metro’s announcement is typical of the vacuity of media coverage of Metro — the fact that light rail systems are notoriously uneconomic and underused relative to cost is not even mentioned. Meanwhile, Metro continues to insist upon investing billions of tax proceeds in an inflexible light rail system that will cost millions in additional annual tax proceeds to subsidize. To make matters worse, the money that Metro is throwing away on what will be a underutilized and expensive light rail system would go a long ways toward dramatically ameliorating the Houston area’s flood control problems and traffic hotspots, two public works projects that would provide far more benefit for far more Houston area residents than the light rail project. In short, wasting huge amounts of public funds on a boondoggle simply does not occur in a vacuum. Such waste will negatively impact more pressing public works projects in Houston for decades.
Transit expert Randall O’Toole recently published this Cato Insitute policy analysis, Debunking Portland (related blog posts here and here), on the failures of Portlandís light rail system, which was built in a far more densely-populated area than Houston and is often touted by light rail advocates as an example of one of the rare successful systems. As O’Toole points out, the Portland system has not been a success. 9.8% of Portland-area commuters took transit to work before the region built its light rail system, while today, just just 7.6% of the area commuters use the system. The fact that Portlandís light rail system led to billions of dollars in economic development is largely a ruse — such development received billions of dollars in subsidies and, before the city started offering those subsidies, not a single transit-oriented development was built along the Portland light rail line. Finally, light rail cost overruns forced Portland to raise bus fares and reduce bus service.
As O’Toole observes, thatís considered a success?