Category Archives: Legal – Criminalizing Business

The Enronization of Lehman Brothers

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The big news in the business world at the end of last week and over the weekend was the publication of the examiner’s report in the Lehman Brothers bankruptcy case.

The mainstream media jumped all over the report as a precursor to criminal indictments of former Lehman executives because of allegations in the report (that’s all they are at this point) that Lehman used repo 105 transactions at the end of several quarters to make its balance sheet look more attractive than it really was.

Fancy that, executives trying to stem a run on a trust-based business!

Despite the gathering MSM lynch mob, the truth is that the examiner’s report is shaky grounds, at best, for criminal indictments against former Lehman executives.

As folks who are experienced in bankruptcy realize — but those who aren’t don’t — an examiner’s report is hardly an objective analysis of a debtor’s affairs. Bankruptcy examiners are highly incentivized to recommend as many legal actions against the debtor’s insiders and counter-parties as possible.

The fruits of those legal actions inure to the benefit of the bankruptcy debtor’s creditors, which is really the only constituency in most bankruptcy cases that really can effectively challenge an examiner’s compensation. As a result, feather nesting is not an unusual tactic of bankruptcy examiners.

Moreover, examiner’s reports in bankruptcy cases are far from dispositive. I haven’t read the Lehman examiner’s report yet, but I’m skeptical of the MSM’s initial rave reviews. The Enron examiner’s report met with similar early favorable reaction, but it turned out to be chock full of plain factual errors and dubious conclusions based on those errors.

For example, the MSM’s reporting of the examiner’s conclusions regarding the timing of the repo 105 transactions doesn’t make sense to me.

As I understand those transactions, they improved Lehman’s balance sheet by increasing its liquidity position at the end of several quarters through converting non-liquid assets to cash. When Lehman repurchased the assets after the date of the financial statement, the balance sheet didn’t change much except for showing less liquidity because the repurchased asset – which went back on the balance sheet after the repurchase – was probably worth more than the liquidity used to repurchase it (I seriously doubt that the sharpies who were dealing with Lehman as it was going down in flames were consenting to using Lehman’s trash assets in the repo deals).

At any rate, Peter Henning and Larry Ribstein have both done a good job of analyzing the main problem facing the Lehman insiders from a criminal standpoint. It is different and potentially more troublesome than the honest services wire fraud theory that was the basis of most Enron-related prosecutions. That is, the Lehman executives are subject to the provisions in the Sarbanes-Oxley legislation enacted after Enron’s bankruptcy that impose criminal liability on executives who falsely certify the (i) accuracy of the financial statements and (ii) absence of deficiencies in internal controls regarding the preparation of the financial statements.

By the way, although Henning’s analysis is quite good, his analogy of the repo 105 transactions to the Nigerian Barge transaction in the Enron-related criminal prosecutions is a stretch.

The Nigerian Barge transaction was a relatively small deal in which Enron — about an $80 billion market cap company at the time — sold its interest in the Nigerian barges to Merrill Lynch to make a $12 million profit at the end of the particular quarter.

On the other hand, the examiner alleges that Lehman was using repo 105 transactions to raise $35 – $50 billion of liquidity at the end of several quarters. Big difference.

Also, flying beneath the radar (as usual) is current Treasury Secretary Timothy Geithner and former Treasury Secretary Hank Paulson’s role in all of this.

As closely as Geithner (as head of the New York Federal Reserve) and Paulson (as Treasury Secretary) were monitoring Lehman during much of this time, it strains credulity that Geithner and Paulson didn’t have at least some idea of what Lehman was doing to make its balance sheet as attractive as possible. Both Geithner and Paulson were intimately involved in attempting to broker a Bear Stearns-type bailout of Lehman.

So, if Geithner and Paulson knew what was going on, then how on earth is the federal government going to single out Richard Fuld and other former Lehman executives for criminal conduct?

Which brings us to the real lesson of all this — that is, the inherently fragile nature of a trust-based business and the misguided nature of the notion that more governmental regulation will somehow protect investors from the next bust of such a business.

Larry Ribstein has been insightfully pointing out for years that more regulation of those businesses will not prevent the next meltdown, just as the more stringent regulations added under Sarbanes-Oxley after Enron’s collapse did not prevent Lehman Brothers from failing.

More responsive forms of business ownership certainly are a hedge to the inherent risk of investment in a trust-based business. But also helpful would be better investor understanding of the wisdom of hedging that risk and the importance of short sellers in providing information on troubled companies to the marketplace.

And as for criminal prosecutions? Unless there is evidence beyond a reasonable doubt of a crime, far better to allow the civil justice system allocate responsibility for Lehman’s failure among the multitude of potentially responsible parties. Professor Ribstein nails this point in the final paragraph of his post:

The lesson here is that pursuing high-profile criminal prosecutions in Lehman after the problems with such prosecutions in these situations proved so manifest in Enron would prove that after a decade of hugely costly trials and a massive new law that was supposed to change everything, we still haven’t learned a thing about the unsuitability of criminal liability for these kinds of cases.

Finally, Lawrence Kudlow and John Carney have an excellent seven-minute discussion below of the failure of governmental regulation in regard to Lehman:

Exposing the myth of American exceptionalism

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conrad_black Conrad Blackís prison routine allows him time to think and write, which is a good thing in view of the enormous waste that results from his dubious imprisonment.

This week Lord Black takes aim at the myth of American exceptionalism promoted in this recent Richard Lowry and Ramesh Ponnurus essay (Walter McDougall has examined the origins of this myth in detail in the first two books of his fine three-part series on American history). In challenging the myth, Lord Black takes dead aim at a common topic on this blog ñ the overcriminalization of American life:

The wages of this [Cold War] victory have included the stale-dating of the authorsí claim that America ìis freer, more individualistic, more democratic, and more open and dynamic than any other nation on earth.î It is more dynamic because of its size, the torpor of Europe and Japan, and the shambles of Russia.

But Americans do not do themselves a favor by not recognizing the terrible erosion of their countryís education, justice, and political systems, the shortcomings of U.S. health care, the collapse of its financial industry, the flight of most of its manufacturing, and the steep and generally unlamented decline of its prestige.

.   .    .   Rampaging and often lawless prosecutors win 95 percent of their cases (compared to 55 percent in Canada), by softening the pursuit of some in exchange for inculpatory perjury against others, in the plea-bargain system. The U.S. has six to fourteen times as many imprisoned people as other advanced prosperous democracies, and they languish in a corrupt carceral system that retains as many people as possible for as long as possible. There are an astounding 47 million Americans with a ìrecord,î and the country glories with unseemly glee in the joys of the death penalty. Due process and the other guarantees of individual rights of the Fifth, Sixth, and Eighth Amendments (such as the grand jury as any sort of assurance against capricious prosecution) scarcely exist in practice.

Most of the Congress is an infestation of paid-for legislators from rotten boroughs, representing the interests that finance their elections and exchanging earmarks with their colleagues like casbah hucksters.  .   .   .

Lord Black can sure still turn a phrase — ìcasbah hucksters.î Ha!

Gearing Up for the Skilling SCOTUS Argument

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Oral argument on Jeff Skilling’s appeal of his criminal conviction to the United States Supreme Court is next Monday afternoon, so the Skilling legal team warmed up for the occasion by filing the brief below in response to the Department of Justice’s brief on the merits.

If you want to read the entire brief, then I recommend downloading it so that you will be have the version bookmarked in Adobe Acrobat that facilitates review.

The DOJ’s case against Skilling has shrunk considerably, which is highlighted by the following Skilling reply brief passage on the DOJ’s tepid defense of Skilling’s conviction for honest services wire fraud under 18 U.S.C. 1346:

The Government’s application of its proposed self-dealing category to Skilling’s case demonstrates the continued manipulability of the statute under the Government’s approach. In Black and Weyhrauch, the Government expressed the view that 1346 prohibits only bribes/kickbacks and self dealing, and that the latter category is implicated only when conflicting financial interests are “undisclosed.” [references omitted].

That statement suggested that the Government would concede that Skilling did not commit honest-services fraud, because Skilling’s only alleged personal financial interests arose from Enron’s linking of his compensation to Enron’s stock value, an interest that was fully disclosed.

But the Government nevertheless argues that Skilling committed honest-services fraud. To bring Skilling’s case within the statute’s compass, the Government creates a third category of honest services fraud, one that involves disclosed personal financial interests.

The Government’s cursory explanation of Skilling’s honest-services liability (GB50) is hardly clear, but it appears to contend that while Skilling’s “personal financial interests” were disclosed and generally aligned with Enron’s interests, he put those interests in conflict when he took actions pursuant to his own disclosed compensation interest that were allegedly contrary to Enron’s. Accordingly, in this new category, what the defendant apparently fails to disclose is his scheme to put his own compensation interests ahead of his employer’s distinct interests.

Not only is that standard itself vague on its own terms, but the Government’s repeated acknowledgement that Skilling’s case has no precedent in pre-McNally case law (GB17, 49) confirms that this special crime is its own new category, created for the first time in the Government’s brief in this Court.

It is time for prosecutors to stop making up crimes under this statute. If 1346 is not invalidated altogether, it should be limited to the single category of conduct universally recognized in the case law and hence largely immune from manipulation quid pro quo bribes and kickbacks.

Stated simply, the Enron Task Force prosecuted Skilling for business judgments that he made that turned out badly for Enron viewed through the clarity of hindsight bias. But Skilling didn’t steal a dime from Enron and never took a kickback or a bribe. Those latter acts are crimes. Taking business risks that turn out badly is not.

At a time in which the U.S. economy desperately needs risk-takers to generate jobs and create wealth, here’s hoping that the Supreme Court understands the difference.

Jeff Skilling’s Reply Brief to the DOJ’s Brief in his Supreme Court Appeal

Tales of Two Lives

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Tim Geithner Wednesdayís Congressional testimony of Treasury Secretary Timothy Geithner and the Department of Justiceís incredible shrinking case against former Enron CEO Jeff Skilling got me to thinking.

Geithner has made his share of dubious decisions over the past several years. I think he was wrong not to allow the markets to allocate the risk that many financial institutions took, particularly in regard to American Insurance Group. As a result of these decisions, I donít think he should be the Secretary of the Treasury.

But I do not think it is fair to question that Geithner honestly believed that the actions he took were necessary to save the U.S. and world financial systems from chaos. You, like me, may not believe he was right about that, but there is little question that he honestly believed that he was mitigating the risk of a financial tsunami.

Turning to Skilling, the DOJís case against Skilling now boils down to several alleged misrepresentations that Skilling approved regarding a couple of financially-troubled divisions of Enron. But the overwhelming evidence at trial was that Skilling truly believed that the statements he approved regarding those divisions were accurate.

For example, one of those divisions ñ Enron Broadband ñ was attempting to develop and deliver the video-on-demand service that is now a popular and profitable product of digital television and such gadgets as Apple’s iPod. These systems are a creative accommodation to copyrighted music and video programming that has generated enormous wealth for artists and shareholders of companies in the business.

Skilling testified at trial about his optimism regarding Broadband:

ìAnd one last thing — I’ll make the last one argument for Broadband because people criticize me about Broadband, and I will take the criticism. We — certainly, we made a mistake. But it wasn’t big. I mean, it was a billion dollars. We invested a billion dollars in the Broadband business. If it had worked, it could have been worth $30 billion. It didn’t work. We lost a billion dollars, but if you can make those kinds of bets, that’s the kind of the risk you [should be taking] as a corporation. And if you do a lot of [deals with a] downside of a billion and upside of 30 [billion], you’re doing a good job for your shareholders in the long run, in my opinion. This one didn’t work.î

Given the current value of video-on-demand technology, Skilling’s valuation of Enron’s Broadband business opportunity was probably low. But regardless of the wisdom of Enronís timing in investing in that technology, there is little question that Skilling honestly believed that Enron Broadband could generate enormous wealth for Enronís shareholders.

Geithner will probably leave the Treasury soon and return to a Wall Street firm to make his fortune. Skilling lost his fortune and remains in a Colorado prison, where he is enduring a 24-year prison sentence.

I submit that no rational basis exists for the radically different futures of these two men.

The DOJ’s Merits Brief in the Skilling Appeal

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Skilling6 On the heels of last monthís filing with the U.S. Supreme Court of Jeff Skillingís brief on the merits of his appeal to the U.S. Supreme Court, the Department of Justice filed its brief on the merits of Skillingís appeal earlier this week.

A copy of the brief is below, but I recommend downloading it so that you will have the version bookmarked in Adobe Acrobat that facilitates review of the brief.

The DOJís brief is surprising in a couple of key respects.

First, the DOJís case against Skilling has shrunk dramatically. The DOJ now bases its entire case on Skillingís involvement in alleged misrepresentations that were made to the market regarding two Enron divisions, Enron Broadband Services and Enron Energy Services. Nothing in regard to the dubious Nigerian Barge transaction. No mention of the theory that Enronís earnings were lagging in 1999 and thatís why the reason why Skilling supposedly had former CFO Andrew Fastow engineer the allegedly corrupt LJM special purpose entity. Heck, there is not even a mention of the supposedly key Global Galactic Agreement. I mean really ñ is the DOJ even talking about the same case that it tried?

Stated simply, has the DOJís entire case against Skilling now been reduced to his optimistic statements about those two divisions?

The other surprising aspect of the brief is the DOJís apparent surrender on the lack of private gain issue in regard to Skillingís conviction on honest services wire fraud. Check out this reasoning from p. 50 of the brief:

Petitioner had, and acted upon, his personal financial interests, which conflicted with those of the shareholders to whom he owed a fiduciary duty. The company and its shareholders attempted to align their long-term interests with petitionerís by linking his compensation to stock price. But the obvious premise of that arrangement was that petitioner would act to maximize shareholder wealth. Petitioner subverted that premise, and placed his interests in conflict with that of the shareholders,when, for his own financial benefit, he engaged in an undisclosed scheme to artificially inflate the stockís price by deceiving the shareholders and others about the companyís true financial condition. That conduct constituted fraud. The only question here is whether the public nature of petitionerís compensation scheme prevents his conduct from constituting honest services fraud. It does not. Although petitionerís basic compensation scheme was public, his scheme to artificially inflate the companyís stock price by misrepresenting its financial condition, in order to derive additional personal benefits at the expense of shareholders, was not. Petitionerís deception deprived shareholders of the information they needed to make informed decisions and thereby defrauded them of his honest services.

So, what about the shareholders who sold stock at the allegedly inflated price resulting from Skillingís supposed deceptions? Did Skilling defraud them, too? If so, I can think of quite a few investors who wouldnít mind being defrauded like that.

And what about Skilling himself, who continued to acquire large amounts of Enron stock right up to the time he resigned from the company several months before its collapse. Did Skillingís alleged ìdeception deprive [Skilling] of the information [he] needed to make informed decisions and thereby defrauded [himself] of his honest services.î

Iíll bet that reasoning will raise a few questions during oral argument, which is currently scheduled for the afternoon of March 1st.

DOJ Merits Brief in Skilling Appeal

We sure have progressed, haven’t we?

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fire_3 Larry Ribstein points us to the abstract of a new Peter Leeson paper, Ordeals:

For 400 years the most sophisticated persons in Europe decided difficult criminal cases by asking the defendant to thrust his arm into a cauldron of boiling water and fish out a ring. If his arm was unharmed, he was exonerated. If not, he was convicted. Alternatively, a priest dunked the defendant in a pool. Sinking proved his innocence; floating proved his guilt. People called these trials ordeals.

No one alive today believes ordeals were a good way to decide defendants’ guilt. But maybe they should. This paper investigates the law and economics of ordeals. I argue that ordeals accurately assigned accused criminals’ guilt and innocence. They did this by leveraging a medieval superstition called iudicium Dei. According to this superstition, God condemned the guilty and exonerated the innocent through clergy conducted physical tests.

It sure is comforting to know that we sophisticated modern folk no longer believe that such ordeals are a good way to decide the guilt of a defendant.

On the other hand .   .   .

The growing threat of prosecutorial power

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white-collar-crime A frequent topic on this blog is the overcriminalization of American life, particularly in regard to taking business risks that create jobs for communities and wealth for citizens.

One of the most lucid writers on this disturbing trend is William Anderson (prior posts here), an economics professor at Frostburg State in Maryland. In this recent Regulation magazine article for the Cato Institute, Professor Anderson provides an excellent overview of how the federal government has gradually imposed police state-type laws on us that allow prosecutors to target citizens for a criminal case and then rationalize a crime from any number of vague criminal statutes:

The numbers tell a harsh story. In 1980, there were about 1,500 federal prosecutors and approximately 20,000 federal prisoners. Today, there are more than 7,500 U.S. attorneys and more than 200,000 federal prisoners, according to an October 2009 count. About 52 percent of federal prisoners are drug offenders, reflecting the emphasis of the ìWar on Drugs,î and while there is no specific ìwhite collarî crime category, one estimates, using Federal Bureau of Prisons statistics, that about 5 to 10 percent of the federal prison population consists of people convicted of white collar crimes.

The federal criminal code is growing. In the early days of the republic, there were three federal crimes: piracy, treason, and counterfeiting. Today, there are more than 4,000 federal criminal laws and more than 10,000 regulations that prosecutors easily can fold into the criminal statutes.  .   .  .

In surveying this sad state of affairs, Anderson notes one of the perverse incentives driving these dubious prosecutions:

The resulting near-free reign that prosecutors have in federal court is an open invitation to abuse of the law and the legal system. To make matters worse, federal prosecutors enjoy almost total legal immunity and are unlikely to face any sanctions no matter how dishonest or abusive their behavior might be; the rules that apply to everyone else do not apply to U.S. attorneys. [.  .  .]

The only thing that stands between almost any American and doing a stretch in federal prison is the choice of whom prosecutors will target. This is a serious problem that shows no signs of disappearing.

The fact that one such prosecutor in Massachusetts was even seriously considered by many in that state for a position in the U.S. Senate reflects that citizens still have not grasped the extent of this awful trend in American society.

It makes one wonder what itís going to take for Americans to stand up and put a stop to this?

So, you want to be a big-firm deal lawyer?

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Collins_3 Continuing to fly well beneath the radar screen — probably because lawyers don’t want to talk about it except in hushed tones — is the seven-year prison sentence that former Mayer Brown partner Joseph P. Collins was handed late last week.

As this earlier post explains in detail, Collins was the former outside deal lawyer for Refco, Inc., which unraveled back in 2005 under the weight of public disclosure of a series of insider transactions that were apparently designed to hide millions in liabilities from customers and investors.

As the earlier post notes and as the Memorandum of Law in support of a new trial for Collins explains, whether Collins even knew about the allegedly fraudulent nature of the transactions is highly questionable and whether he hid those transactions from anyone is even more dubious. But that hardly matters in this era of “let’s hammer the white-collar defendant.”

Meanwhile, Collins’ family will be deprived of the presence of their father for seven years.

What is it going to take for this madness to stop? A truly civilized society would find a better way.

Memorandum of Law in Support of New Trial for former Refco, Inc outside counsel, Joseph P. Collins

One Step Forward, a Big Step Back

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Well, the Department of Justice finally did the right thing and dismissed the remaining criminal charges against former Merrill Lynch banker, Dan Bayly, in connection with the shameful Enron-related Nigerian Barge prosecution.

Even in the heavily-littered landscape of failed Enron-related prosecutions, the Nigerian Barge prosecution stood out for its sheer brazen nature. As noted in this post from over five years ago (!), the Nigerian Barge prosecution was baseless from the start and, as later developments revealed, trumped-up to boot.

After prosecuting Arthur Andersen out of business in the intensely anti-business post-Enron climate of Houston in 2004, the Enron Task Force threatened to do the same to Merrill Lynch unless the firm served up some sacrificial lambs, which it did by offering Mr. Bayly, Robert Furst, James Brown and William Fuhs.

Through a deferred prosecution agreement with Merrill, the Task Force then proceeded to hamstring the Merrill defendants’ defense by limiting access to other Merrill Lynch executives who were involved in the barge transaction. To make matters worse, the Task Force then intimidated other potentially exculpatory witnesses by threatening to indict them if they cooperated with the Merrill defendants’ defense.

Thus, after bludgeoning a couple of plea deals from former key witnesses Ben Glisan and Michael Kopper, the Task Force proceeded to put on a paper-thin case against the defendants, which was good enough to obtain convictions.

Of course, most of the convictions were vacated on appeal (and in Fuhs’ case, thrown out completely), but not before each of the Merrill defendants had served over a year in prison and their families had incurred the incalculable human cost of these misguided prosecutions.

Incredibly, over the past couple of years, the Department of Justice (the Enron Task Force has, mercifully, been disbanded) actually has been threatening to pursue a re-trial of the Merrill defendants. Accordingly, the dismissal of the remaining charges against Mr. Bayly was good news. A similar dismissal of charges against his remaining co-defendants — Messrs. Furst and Brown — would certainly follow, right?

Apparently not, at least for the time being. Inexplicably, the DOJ announced yesterday that it is continuing to pursue charges against Mr. Furst.

So, Mr. Furst unloaded on the DOJ yesterday with the filing of this motion to dismiss on the grounds of pervasive and egregious prosecutorial misconduct. You can review the motion here, but if you go ahead and download it, then you can review a version of the motion that is bookmarked in Adobe Acrobat to facilitate ease of review. Inasmuch as the 45 page motion includes about 350 pages of exhibits, bookmarks are helpful.

The summary of the motion gets right to the shocking point:

The American criminal justice system is built upon the principle that the government’s interest is not that it shall win a case, but that justice shall be done. Berger v. United States, 295 U.S. 78, 88 (1935).

The Enron Task Force (the “ETF”) team of prosecutors and investigators formed in 2002 to address the public demand for individual accountability in the aftermath of Enron’s collapse investigated, indicted, and prosecuted Defendant Robert Furst and his co-defendants with the goal to win at all costs.

And the ETF “won.” Mr. Furst spent almost a year in prison before his conviction was overturned on appeal.But to secure victory, the ETF engaged in a campaign of misconduct which violated Mr. Furst”s constitutional rights to due process and a fair trial.

This misconduct was necessary because the case the ETF indicted and hoped to prosecute, which would involve a sordid tale of a well-organized conspiracy to defraud Enron and its shareholders, was not supported by the facts.

The ETF could not prove that Enron or its shareholders lost any money in the barge transaction, because they did not. The form and mechanics of the transaction were thoroughly vetted through hundreds of hours of negotiation by dozens of highly-competent attorneys. Witnesses interviewed by the ETF undercut its theory of the case.

In short, the barge transaction had all the markings of a legitimate business transaction, because it was.

But legitimate business transactions do not generate convictions, and the ETF needed convictions. So, in order to ensure victory, the ETF withheld volumes of exculpatory, case-dispositive evidence which nullified its theory of criminal liability; manipulated and misstated exculpatory testimony in pretrial disclosures to make it appear inculpatory; silenced witnesses by indiscriminately designating nearly all material witnesses as unindicted co-conspirators; and sponsored inculpatory testimony that it knew was false.

The ETF’s conduct did not end with the return of the verdict.

After trial, but before sentencing, the ETF received additional case-dispositive, exculpatory evidence from one of the key witnesses in the case. This evidence further nullified the ETF’s theory of criminal liability, and exculpated Mr. Furst.

Rather than disclosing this evidence to the Court, the ETF instead withheld the evidence and brazenly asked this Court to enhance Mr. Furst’s sentence for conduct which was negated by this and other evidence in the ETF’s possession.

This misconduct eliminates all faith in the integrity of the jury’s verdict and warrants dismissal of the Indictment.  .   .   .

The mess that is the Nigerian Barge prosecution is a quintessential example of what happens when government is given the leeway to bastardize charges to criminalize a merely questionable business transaction and then appeal to juror resentment against wealthy businesspeople to procure politically popular convictions.

The damage to the defendants, their careers and their families that this abuse of power has caused is bad enough.

But the carnage to justice and respect for the rule of law is even more ominous. Does anyone really think that they could stand upright in the winds of such abusive governmental power if that gale turned toward them?

The remaining charges against Messrs. Furst and Brown should be dismissed. Not only for their protection, but for ours, too.

Understanding Adoption

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One of the most discouraging aspects of the societal tide of resentment and scapegoating that has permeated the corporate criminal prosecutions since the demise of Enron has been the utter lack of perspective regarding the horrendous human cost of those prosecutions.

Even the horrendous financial cost of those prosecutions seems easier to confront.

A stark example of the human cost is what happened to Ken Lay’s family, who endured the decline of a loving father and grandfather as he defended himself against dubious charges that in a less-heated climate would likely never have been pursued.

Equally barbaric is the reprehensible 24-year prison sentence assessed to former Enron CEO Jeff Skilling, whose family has been deprived of their father for over three years now and is threatened to be without him for most of the rest of his life.

But the family that arguably paid the steepest cost from the wave of unjust corporate prosecutions was the family of Jamie Olis, the former mid-level Dynegy executive who was thrown to the prosecutorial wolves by his employer and then sentenced to a ludicrously excessive 24 plus-year prison term for his involvement in a structured finance transaction for which he profited not one dime.

The Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals ultimately threw out that sentence, which resulted in a still-too-harsh six-year re-sentencing. Olis was finally paroled last year and reunited with his wife and young daughter, who literally grew up visiting her father in prison.

But even in the face of such inhumanity, the human spirit perseveres.

Throughout the Olis family’s ordeal, Jamie’s father — Bill Olis — stood out as a rock of stability and common sense.

Whether it was attending the myriad of hearings in Jamie’s case in Houston, or escorting Jamie’s wife and daughter the hundreds of miles to visit Jamie in far-off prisons, or lending moral support to other families who were enduring similar injustices, Bill Olis projected a sense of calm perspective that was contagious to all who came in contact with him.

He had much to be bitter about in regard to what the federal government did to his son and family, but Bill Olis never gave in to bitterness. He was a quintessential Christian gentleman and nothing that the government did to his family could change that.

Throughout his son’s darkest times, Bill remained confident that he and his family would ultimately be reunited with Jamie. Yeah, the government is powerful, but no earthly force was going to destroy Bill Olis’ family.

As a result, Ellen Podgor of the White Collar Crime Prof Blog re-named her “Collar for the Best Parent Award” to the “Bill Olis Best Parent Award” because — in the category of a parent supporting an imprisoned child — “no one comes close to Bill Olis.”

What was not well known through all of this was that Bill Olis was slowly fading away physically during his son’s imprisonment. Bill had an oxygen unit with him almost constantly as he tended to his family’s needs throughout their ordeal.

No big deal for Bill. Mere failing health was not going to stop Bill Olis from being present when his son was released from prison last year. He was there embracing Jamie with the rest of the family, oxygen tank and all.

With the work of reuniting his son with his family done, Bill Olis died over this past weekend. I understand from a family friend that Jamie was able to spend most of Bill’s final two weeks with him, which I know Bill enjoyed immensely. He adored his son.

The Olis family story is a remarkable one and frankly far more interesting than the government’s dishonest case against Jamie.

Years ago, Bill Olis married a single Korean mother and adopted her young son. He provided his wife and son a stable and loving home, and the family flourished. His son excelled in school, obtained advanced degrees in both business and law, and embarked upon a successful career in corporate finance.

And when the government targeted the son as a sacrificial lamb for the anti-business mob, Bill Olis spent his last days in this world supporting his son every step of the way and making sure that he returned to his wife and daughter.

Then he passed away.

A Christian minister friend once observed to me that a good way to embrace what is good about the Christian spirit is through understanding the nature of adoption.

Bill Olis was living proof of the truth of that observation.