The Lord of Regulation’s abuse of power

SpitzerC.jpgIn this Wall Street Journal ($) op-ed, Chief Executive magazine editor William J. Holstein addresses a common theme of this blog — namely, the dubious motives and methods behind New York AG (“Attorney General” or “Aspiring Governor,” take your pick) Eliot’s Spitzer’s multiple investigations into alleged business corruption. Here is a sampling of posts over the past year regarding Mr. Spitzer’s abuse of power.
Addressing Mr. Spitzer’s heavy-handed treatment of former AIG chairman and CEO Maurice Greenberg and his son, Jeff, the former Marsh & McClennan CEO, Mr. Holstein notes the following:

Mr. Spitzer has charged in and discovered a pattern of practices he doesn’t like. He is applying a new set of values to reinsurance practices that had been in place for years . . .
Reflecting their dismay at the high-handed conduct of King George, the Founding Fathers created a judicial system with a stringent set of procedural safeguards to protect against overzealous or arbitrary prosecution. Yet in the atmosphere that Mr. Spitzer has helped create, the presumption is that CEOs are guilty — if Eliot Spitzer says they’re guilty.

Then Mr. Holstein turns to the specific “charges” that Mr. Spitzer has made publicly to prompt AIG to can Mr. Greenberg:

In dispute in the AIG case are highly complex transactions that may have reduced the company’s shareholder equity of $82.9 billion by as much as 2%. It’s not yet known if the total losses will reach that level, nor if they were material to AIG as a whole. After Mr. Greenberg’s departure, the board ran up the white flag to Attorney General Spitzer and declared the transactions “improper.”
Were they? One proper way to resolve this would be to create a policy framework with clear rules, which does not currently exist. Another way would have been for the Securities and Exchange Commission to negotiate an earnings restatement with AIG.
But Mr. Spitzer reportedly threatened a criminal indictment, which in effect would have put AIG out of business. Then he went on television to pronounce that the AIG transactions were “wrong” and “illegal,” . . . It’s not yet clear what the charges are. Nor has Mr. Spitzer heard Mr. Greenberg’s side of the story.
So the New York attorney general both charges and convicts in the court of public opinion.

Then, Mr. Holstein bores in on the hypocritical nature of Mr. Spitzer’s self-righteous campaign against business executives:

Mr. Spitzer’s political ambitions are increasingly clear. He wants to use his record to become governor of New York. Mr. Spitzer’s campaign office even paid Google to link a search for “AIG” to a Web site promoting his campaign before it was quickly taken down. In the same television show where he discussed the AIG case, Mr. Spitzer said he was “very close” to presidential hopeful Hillary Clinton and didn’t rule out a run for the vice presidency or presidency.
Mr. Spitzer has thus created a reasonable doubt about whether he is using the legal process for political gain. An attorney general running for higher office is different than a senator running because it creates a risk that the legal system becomes politicized and is no longer seen as adhering to principles of fair play and due process. . .
Ironically, the cornerstone of Mr. Spitzer’s actions has been an attack on conflicts of interest and cozy relationships that had long been tolerated. He is attempting to create a new ethical standard. Yet he has turned a blind eye to his own ethical problem.

The existence of business fraud at companies such as Enron, WorldCom, Tyco and maybe even AIG does not necessarily mean that there is more misconduct in big business than in any other relatively large organization, such as big government. Nevertheless, Mr. Spitzer and other prosecutors are publicizing these instances of business fraud to generalize arbitrarily against those who are easy and popular targets — i.e., wealthy and apparently greedy businessmen.
That tactic plays well with the mainstream media, which enjoys portraying the morality play of Mr. Spitzer as the defender of noble egalitarianism fighting against the forces of corrupt capitalism. In the wake of such seemingly simple stories, many complex structured finance transactions — which most prosecutors and journalists do not understand and do not perform the homework necessary to understand — are unfairly and incorrectly portrayed as complex business frauds despite the fact that such transactions are beneficial to shareholders of the company and have been reviewed and approved by multiple professionals who are experts in such transactions. Moreover, with the inviting prospect of greater political rewards resulting from the favorable publicity, prosecutors such as Mr. Spitzer have dispensed with any notion of prosecutorial discretion in regard to investigating business executives over such transactions.
And for those who would respond — “So what’s the big deal? What’s the problem with eroding the rule of law a bit to nail a few greedy business executives?” — I would remind them of Sir Thomas More’s advice to young lawyer Will Roper in the great movie, A Man for All Seasons. After Roper opines that it is acceptable to abuse the rule of law in order to achieve the laudable goal of prosecuting the Devil, Sir Thomas responds:

“Oh? And when the last law was down, and the Devil turned ’round on you, where would you hide, Roper, the laws all being flat? This country is planted thick with laws, from coast to coast, Man’s laws, not God’s! And if you cut them down — and you’re just the man to do it, Roper! — do you really think you could stand upright in the winds that would blow then?”
“Yes, I’d give the Devil the benefit of law, for my own safety’s sake!”

Folks, even greedy business executives are entitled to the protection of due process in the face of the overwhelming power of government. Not only for their protection, but for ours.

The Enron Broadband Trial

enron broadband2.jpgAlmost three and a half years after Enron collapsed into bankruptcy, the first criminal trial involving exclusively former Enron executives will crank up in front of U.S. District Judge Vanessa Gilmore in Houston federal court on Monday. Here is the Mary Flood’s article from last week and from the Sunday edition of the Chronicle on the case, which is know in Enron legal circles as the “Enron Broadband case.”
Despite widespread public acceptance that the name “Enron” means “business corruption,” the Enron Task Force has not actually done much in court to prove that proposition. Of the 23 people on which the Task Force has obtained indictments so far in connection with the Enron scandal, six have pled guilty and five — but only one former Enron executive — have been convicted in the Nigerian Barge case. Moreover, in that trial, one of the two former Enron defendants (former Enron accountant, Sheila Kahanek) was acquitted. Accordingly, 11 of the 23 people who have been indicted in Enron-related cases still await trial.
The trial of the Enron Broadband case will take care of five of those remaining 11 defendants. Those five former Enron employees of the Enron Broadband Services (“EBS”) subsidiary face charges of making false and misleading public statements about the financial viability of EBS. Adding intrigue is that those charges are closely related to charges against Enron’s big three defendants — former chairman and CEO Ken Lay, former CEO and COO Jeff Skilling and former chief accountant, Richard Causey — that are pending and will go to trial in January, 2006. Thus, the outcome of the Broadband trial will likely set the stage for that big Enron trial and possibly for future Enron-related prosecutions.
EBS was a part of the Enron’s emergence from a large but unexciting gas pipeline company to a high-techn global trading market-maker. In acquiring EBS, Enron planned to build a high-speed network that could not only deliver telecommunications services, but also create a trading market for the network, much as the company had created big trading markets in natural gas and electricity. Thus, EBS helped give Enron the glow of a trendy Internet stock when investor interest was creating the bubble in such stocks during the late 1990s.
The latest indictment in the Broadband case alleges that the five former EBS executives from April 1999 through May 14, 2001 engaged in a scheme and made false and misleading statements that were designed to deceive investors and others about EBS’ technological capabilities, value, revenues and business performance. Essentially, the indictment contends that the EBS defendants had Enron issue false and misleading press releases to equity analysts and other investors, used fraudulent structured finance transactions to generate bogus revenue so EBS would appear to reach publicly announced financial targets, and failed to disclose materially adverse information about EBS’ poor business performance.
However, perhaps most troubling for three of the defendants — Joseph Hirko, Scott Yeager and Rex Shelby — is the government’s insider trading charges. Those three former EBS executives made a boatload of money on sales of Enron stock during the period in which the government contends that they made false and misleading statements regarding EBS. According to the indictment, Mr. Hirko sold stock valued at about $70 million, Mr. Yeager about $55 million and Shelby about $35 million, which are numbers that will perk up any jury. Messrs. Hirko, Yeager, and Shelby — along with former EBS executives Kevin Howard and Michael Krautz — face conspiracy to commit wire and securities fraud charges, while the indictment’s insider trading and money laundering charges are focused solely on Messrs. Hirko, Yeager and Shelby.
Other potential problems for the defendants are the plea bargains that two former EBS executives have struck with the Task Force prosecutors. Ken Rice, a former high-level Enron executive who was once EBS’ CEO, and Kevin Hannon, EBS’ former chief operating officer, were originally indicted in the Broadband case, but both entered into plea deals with the prosecution in which they agreed to testify during the upcoming trial. Under cooperation agreements with the government, Messrs. Rice and Hannon admit to some of the indictment’s allegations, including that Enron and EBS made false statements about the products, services and business performance of EBS. Mr. Rice pled guilty to one count of securities fraud and faces up to 10 years in prison and a $1 million fine, while Mr. Hannon pled guilty to one conspiracy to commit securities and wire fraud count and faces up to five years in prison and a $250,000 fine.
The prosecution’s theory of the case revolves around the allegation that Messrs. Hirko, Yeager and Shelby orchestrated false press releases in April 1999 when touting the Enron Intelligent Network, which was a software driven telecommunications network. Although other EBS employees allegedly told the three defendants that “the Enron network was not intelligent,” the prosecution contends that the three continued issuing misleading press releases and marketing materials promoting EBS. In particular, the indictment refers to early drafts of a PowerPoint presentation that disclose that EBS’ network control software was under development. According to the prosecution, later versions of that PowerPoint presentation that were actually used in analyst meetings in December 1999 and January 2000 did not include that key disclosure. After one supposedly misleading presentation that was “received favorably by analysts and investors,” the prosecution contends that Enron’s stock price spiked from $54 on the day of the presentation to more than $72 the following day.
Meanwhile, the charges against Messrs. Howard and Krautz relate to a April 2000 structured finance transaction known as Project Braveheart that was designed to allow EBS to monetize a 20-year agreement with Blockbuster Inc. EBS’ agreement with Blockbuster provided that Blockbuster would obtain digital rights to films that EBS would encode and stream over its network to customers’ homes. The government contends that Messrs. Howard and Krautz understood the accounting rules relating to such a structured finance transaction, but that they intentionally violated those rules and withheld key information from Enron’s auditors so that the Braveheart transaction could be booked and allow Enron to post about $110 million in revenue in 2000-01.
The trial will feature at least two prominent members of Houston’s fine criminal defense bar. Jack Zimmermann — one of many proteges’ of legendary Houston criminal defense lawyer, Richard “Racehorse” Haynes — will represent Mr. Howard, while Lee Hamel, an experienced defender of white collar criminal cases in the Houston area, will defend Mr. Yeager.
Jury selection begins on Monday when 100 prospective jurors will report to Judge Gilmore’s courtroom for voir dire. Judge Gilmore told lawyers at a pretrial hearing earlier in the month that she will bring in another group of about 90 potential jurors on Tuesday if the lawyers do not pick a jury from the first group. Each side says they will need about four weeks for trial, so I’m guessing that the case will go to the jury sometime in early to mid-June.

Sentencing run amok

enron.jpgThe Chronicle’s Mary Flood reports today on recent developments in the Enron-related Nigerian Barge case, in which four former Merrill Lynch executives and one former Enron executive are awaiting sentencing after being convicted last year of wire fraud and conspiracy charges in regard to a relatively small transaction in which Enron allegedly disguised a loan from Merrill as a sale of an interest in some barges off the coast of Nigeria. Two of the defendants are scheduled to be sentenced by U.S. District Judge Ewing Werlein this coming Thursday and the other three will be sentenced on May 12.
Ms. Flood and the Chronicle have gotten involved in the case by filing a motion to unseal pleadings after the Task Force and the defendants attempted to keep the Task Force’s recommendations relating to their sentences under seal (i.e., not available for public scrutiny). But one of the Merrill defendants — James Brown — earlier this week filed his objection to the Task Force’s sentencing recommendation in regard to him, and that pleading contains shocking information regarding the length of sentences that the Task Force is proposing. The Task Force Court is proposing sentences ranging from seven years for William Fuhs, the former low-level Merrill executive who had little control over the transaction, to an effective life sentence in prison for Dan Boyle, the former Enron executive who was in charge of closing the deal.
The basis of the Task Force’s draconian sentencing recommendations is the alleged loss to Enron resulting from the Nigerian Barge transaction. However, as noted in earlier posts here and in regard to the U.S. Chamber of Commerce amicus curie brief noted here, the Task Force’s position on the damages to Enron investors resulting from the relatively small barge deal is highly dubious and simply is not a credible basis for tossing business executives with no prior criminal record into prison for long periods of time.
Thus, even after the injustice of the sad case of Jamie Olis, the Justice Department continues its unfortunate policy of seeking maximum sentences against easy targets, such as relatively wealthy business executives. Given the utter lack of any perspective within the Justice Department regarding such matters, it’s going to take strong-willed judges to step in and impose sentences that relate fairly to the nature of the offenses. Let’s hope that Judge Werlein does just that on Thursday.

Dynegy settles class action claims

dynegy.gifFormer Enron suitor Dynegy Inc. has agreed to pay $468 million to settle a class action suit that accused the Houston-based company and several of its former officers and directors of conspiring to cook the company’s books to mislead investors. The Chronicle story on the settlement is here.
For more than a decade in the Houston business community, Dynegy was known as “Enron-lite” — a smaller energy company that tracked Enron’s success in various business ventures, but primarily in natural gas trading. The class action claims arose during the period after Dynegy’s failed merger with Enron during that latter company’s meltdown at the end of 2001. Inasmuch as Enron was a market-maker in energy trading, that entire industry suffered a major shakeout immediately after Enron’s demise, and Dynegy was one of the trading companies that had to scramble to avoid its own demise in the aftermath of Enron’s bankruptcy.
Dynegy said it will pay the settlement using available cash, insurance, company stock, and bank lines. Dynegy reported about $1.2 billion in cash and unused bank credit availability as of Dec. 31, 2004. Dynegy will use insurance to cover $150 million of the settlement, $250 million from its cash reserves, and the remaining $68 million will be in the form of Dynegy’s common stock issuance. Dynegy expects to book a first-quarter charge of $155 million from the settlement and associated legal expenses, and its stock finished Friday’s regular session down 3.8% at $3.56.
The class action claims revolved around a financial project dubbed “Project Alpha,” a system of gas trades that Dynegy allegedly used to mollify a discrepancy between lagging operating cash flow and rising net income. As a part of that deal, class plaintiffs alleged that Dynegy disguised a $300 million loan as cash to inflate its financial statements. Representatives of Arthur Andersen, Dynegy’s former auditor, testified that Dynegy representatives had not disclosed key parts of the deal to Andersen and that its accounting treatment of the deal would have been different had all information been disclosed. That testimony led to a well-known conviction in a related criminal case that is known on this blog as the sad case of Jamie Olis.
The settlement also covers negligence allegations pending against former Dynegy CEO Chuck Watson, former president Steve Bergstrom, and former CFO Rob Doty. Their portions of the settlement will be paid out of the company’s Directors and Officers’ liability insurance policy.

For goodness sakes, get on with it

SpitzerGov2.jpgDon’t miss this Wall Street Journal ($) editorial today, which addresses the same issue that many of these earlier posts address in regard to the Lord of Regulation‘s ongoing public flogging of American International Group, Inc. and its former chairman and CEO, Maurice “Hank” Greenberg:

[Y]ou don’t have to belong to the ACLU to wonder about the lack of due process here. Mr. Spitzer uncovers questionable accounting about an insurance transaction and demands that the board fire the CEO. He then uses that firing to justify a public accusation of “fraud” that he hasn’t yet proven to anybody, much less to a jury of Mr. Greenberg’s peers.
To which our reaction is, then why not get on with it and indict the man? If Mr. Greenberg’s behavior is so heinous that it warrants a denunciation as “fraud” on national TV, what is Mr. Spitzer waiting for?

As an aside, this post addressed the Lord’s unusual public statement from last week in which he stated that his public flogging of AIG would probably not result in a criminal prosecution of the company, although the same could not be said about Mr. Greenberg. AIG and Berkshire Hathaway board members and shareholders heaved a joint sigh of relief and gave thanks to the Lord for his public statement.
Well, it turns out that the Lord may have had more than market stabilization as a motive for that public statement. The Lord is already running for Governor of New York, and it turns out that some of the Lord’s largest campaign contributors are partners in the law firm that is defending AIG in the Lord’s investigation of the company. Inasmuch as that firm has apparently been advising AIG to roll over for the Lord during the investigation, do you think the AIG board knew of the connections between the company’s law firm and the Lord before acting on that advice?

Justice Department’s brief in Arthur Andersen appeal

Arthur Anderson.gifHere is the Justice Department’s brief in Arthur Andersen’s appeal to the U.S. Supreme Court of its criminal conviction of witness tampering in connection with its destruction of Enron Corp.-related documents during the latter stages of that company’s collapse in late 2001.
The Justice Department frames its argument of the key issue in the appeal in the following manner:

The lower courts correctly defined the term ?corruptly? in Section 1512(b) as ?having an improper purpose? ?to subvert, undermine, or impede the fact-finding ability of an official proceeding.? The lower courts? definition is consistent with the purpose-based definition long given to the identical term in the general obstruction-of-justice statute, 18 U.S.C. 1503, on which Section 1512 was based; in other obstruction-of-justice statutes; and in other federal criminal statutes more generally. That definition does not render the term ?corruptly? superfluous. Nor does it criminalize conduct that is not inherently wrongful, because it has long been understood that it is improper to destroy documents when litigation is anticipated for the purpose of frustrating the truthseeking process.
Petitioner?s novel alternative definitions of the term ?corruptly? ? which would require either ?proof of improper means of persuasion or inducement to unlawful acts,? or ?proof of consciousness of wrongdoing? ? should be rejected. The former definition cannot be reconciled with the text of the statute; would give the term ?corruptly? a different meaning in Section 1512(b) than in other obstruction-of-justice statutes; and would criminalize little, if any, conduct that is not already criminalized by other provisions. The latter definition contravenes the established principle that ignorance of the law is no defense, and no exception to that principle is warranted here.

The Justice Department’s brief is 77 pages, which makes it even more incredible to me that appellate attorneys are not using the bookmark tool in Adobe Acrobat to facilitate ease of review of lengthy appellate briefs.

The Lord of Regulation chats with the Oracle of Omaha

Buffett image2.jpgLet’s review the landscape of regulating business for a moment.
Various former executives of disgraced and insolvent Enron Corp. are under indictment for using structured finance transactions that independent lawyers and accountants approved to mislead investors regarding Enron’s true financial condition. Although such transactions came to light almost four years ago, no such Enron executive has yet to be tried on such charges. In the meantime, Enron has been effectively liquidated.
Several years ago, General Reinsurance Corp., a unit of Berkshire Hathaway, and American International Group, Inc. entered into at least one large structured finance transaction with each other. As with Enron’s structured finance transactions, numerous executives, lawyers, accountants and perhaps even consultants for both companies reviewed and approved the deal. Here are the previous posts on the saga involving AIG and Berkshire.
New York Attorney General Eliot Spitzer, the new Lord of Regulation, believes that the companies did not account for the transaction properly and, as a result, that the transaction made AIG and Berkshire’s financial performance appear better to each company’s investors than it really was. Despite not having heard his side of the story, the Lord has already concluded that former AIG chairman and CEO Maurice “Hank” Greenberg — a rather hard-knuckled executive — committed a crime in regard to the transaction.
Greenberg image2.jpgYesterday, as this NY Times article reports, the Lord had a nice chat with the avuncular Oracle of Omaha, the chairman of Berkhsire, in which he questioned the Oracle over his knowledge of the transaction. The Oracle replied that he knew about the deal generally, but that others at General Re handled the details of the transaction. The Oracle also stated that he understood that the deal had been properly accounted for, but again, he did not really know much about the details of all that.
By the way, the Oracle agreed to chat with the Lord because the Lord assured him that — unlike the dastardly Mr. Greenberg — the popular Oracle is not a target of the Lord’s investigation. In appreciation for the Lord’s courteous gesture, the Oracle served up some more juicy tidbits of AIG’s involvement in the transaction for the Lord to chew on.
In the meantime, former Enron chairman and CEO Ken Lay’s defense of the criminal charges against him relating to Enron’s structured finance transactions is precisely the same as the Oracle’s above explanation of his role in the transaction with AIG.
Ken Lay2.jpgIn the wake of almost unprecedented negative publicity — much of which has been flamed by prosecutors pursuing him — Mr. Lay is facing the prospect of spending much of the remainder of his life in jail. The same is probably true for Mr. Greenberg.
Meanwhile, another large company that engaged in similar structured finance transactions — and which collapsed at about the same time as Enron — announced yesterday that it had settled civil charges with the SEC over its involvement in such transactions. No criminal charges were ever filed in regard to that matter.
And the Oracle returns to Omaha to work on his next letter to shareholders.
Quare: Is this any way to regulate business?

You don’t say?

eliot_spitzer.jpgEliot Spitzer, the New York AG (i.e., “Aspiring Governor”) made the Sunday talk show circuit yesterday in regard to his campaign against corporate wrongdoing generally and his ongoing investigation of transactions between AIG and a unit of Berkshire Hathaway (earlier posts here) specifically.
The investigation — which has not yet resulted in a single indictment, but has battered AIG’s stock and credit rating — involves scrutinizing complicated financial transactions that were approved by scores of transaction lawyers, accountants, and consultants for both AIG and Berkshire. Indeed, the MSM reporting on Mr. Spitzer’s campaign have not even attempted to obtain an explanation of the transactions from the persons involved in structuring the transactions. Nevertheless, the Lord of Regulation said yesterday that he had strong evidence that former AIG chairman and CEO Maurice “Hank” Greenberg committed fraud in initiating the deal between A.I.G. and General Re, the subsidiary of Berkshire. Mr. Spitzer’s following comments will give you a flavor for the entire interview:

These are very serious offenses, over a billion dollars of accounting frauds that A.I.G. has already acknowledged. . .
That company was a black box, run with an iron fist by a C.E.O. who did not tell the public the truth. That is the problem.

Today, this NY Times article today reports that Mr. Greenberg is probably going to refuse to testify based on his Fifth Amendment privilege at a deposition that Mr. Spitzer has scheduled for Tuesday.
After Mr. Spitzer’s public comments of yesterday, how could Mr. Greenberg responsibly do anything else?
By the way, it’s nice to see that someone else is noting that Mr. Spitzer is manipulating prejudices in an unhealthy manner.

Did Buffett rat out AIG?

warren_buffett.jpgIn an extraordinary development in the unfolding criminal investigation of transactions between American International General, Inc. and Berkshire-Hathaway, Inc., this NY Times article reports that Berkshire chairman Warren Buffett — in an effort to win leniency for Berkshire in an unrelated case — directed Berkshire’s lawyers several months ago to turn over documents describing the transaction between Berkshire unit General Re and AIG that is at the heart of the criminal investigation. Here are the previous posts on the AIG and Berkshire saga.
As a result of Mr. Buffett’s peace offering, former AIG chairman and CEO Maurice “Hank” Greenberg is facing the prospect of giving a deposition next week to the Justice Department, Securities and Exchange Commission, Eliot Spitzer and the New York attorney general’s office, and New York insurance regulators. In comparison, Mr. Buffett will merely be “interviewed” on Monday by the investigators, who consider him merely a witness in the AIG probe at this point.
According to the Times article and this similar Wall Street Journal ($) article, Mr. Buffett and Berkshire served up AIG and Mr. Greenberg on a platter to prosecutors in December when prosecutors were questioning Berkshire officials regarding General Re’s transactions with Reciprocal of America, a failed Virginia-based insurer. The prosecutors are investigating whether General Re had helped Reciprocal disguise loans as reinsurance to hide losses from insurance regulators. Two Reciprocal executives have copped plea deals and began cooperating with investigators, which led prosecutors to inform Berkshire lawyers that General Re and Berkshire executives may face criminal charges in connection with their probe of Reciprocal. A couple of weeks later, the Times and WSJ report that, at Mr. Buffett’s behest, Berkshire lawyers gave investigators documents regarding General Re’s questionable transaction with AIG.
Sort of makes one feel warm and fuzzy about doing business with that American business icon, Warren Buffett, doesn’t it?

Enron-AIG-Berkshire: Regulating earnings management

Holman Jenkins2.jpgDon’t miss Wall Street Journal ($) columnist Holman Jenkins’ Business World piece today. In analyzing the Lord of Regulation’s assault on American International Group, Inc. and its long history of being rewarded by the market for its adroit management of earnings, Mr. Jenkins makes an interesting point about the importance of trust — or, as he dubs it, the “predictability premium” — in AIG’s business, something that was touched on in this earlier post:

That Mr. Greenberg did his accounting as he thought best was no secret to anybody, even before recent revelations. Money Magazine called AIG a “faith stock,” lumping it with other giant, complex money machines such as GE and Citigroup. This newspaper dubbed it one of the economy’s great “black boxes.” Indeed, the whole reason to own AIG in the 1990s was to reap the predictability premium built into its stock price thanks to Mr. Greenberg’s ability to generate uncannily rising earnings from a complex of more than 100 businesses, including not just insurance, but aircraft leasing, commodity trading and much else.
In some ways, this model was already falling out of step with the business mainstream by the 1980s, long before Enron made “transparency” the central virtue of the new corporate value system. But exceptions were granted to AIG and a few others (like GE). Their opacity might have earned them skepticism in the marketplace, but instead they were awarded higher share prices. AIG sold for about 26 times its earnings, compared to 10 or 15 for most insurers.
Let’s dwell on this for a moment: When the market was the arbiter, it unambiguously rewarded Mr. Greenberg and AIG’s shareholders for applying the techniques of earnings management. The market understood that behind the screen lay all the volatility and mishaps that insurance is heir to, but it applauded Mr. Greenberg for using his wiles to create a security (AIG’s stock) that transmuted that volatility into unnaturally smooth reported earnings.
One big albatross for [former AIG chairman and CEO, Maurice “Hank” Greenberg] will be the Enron overhang. By far, the largest factor in AIG’s stock decline is the evaporation of its predictability premium, not the accounting scandal. But that won’t stop trial lawyers, prosecutors or the media from assuming that the distance between AIG’s peak and its ultimate low reflects the damage Mr. Greenberg personally did to investors.

And in closing, Mr. Jenkins notes that it may still be a tad early to be making a play for AIG stock, which is down almost 30% in value from the beginning of the year:

[AIG’s board of directors] no interest in defending any of this, since board members have learned that their personal fates are best served by running up a white flag. Eliot Spitzer, New York’s attorney general, let it be known this week that their compliance had met with his approval.
There’s also a question of whether, in a market where skepticism rather than trust is the rule, it’s possible or sensible to maintain an organization as complex as AIG. Hold onto your seats for the battle over Starr International, a peculiar entity set up years ago and holding much of the incentive wealth of the company’s top executives. We can’t think of a quicker way to destroy the morale of AIG’s remaining leadership, and thus perhaps the company.