Category Archives: Legal – Criminalizing Business

The Obligation to Throw in the Towel

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So, the shoe finally dropped on the two Bear Stearns executives who managed the two Bear hedge funds that imploded in mid-2007. A copy of the indictment is here.

As I read the indictment, the government is contending that Messrs. Cioffi and Tannin were required to disclose to investors immediately in February and March, 2007 that the two of them feared that the two funds might be “toast” even as Cioffi and other Bear executives were fighting market pessimism toward the funds and urging investors to maintain trust in their ultimate financial merit.

So, with their careers riding on whether the funds would survive, Cioffi and Tannin were supposed to throw in the towel and light a match to the funds by disclosing to the market their concerns about the heightened risk of a meltdown.

Stated simply, according to the Feds, about the time you think your trust-based business might be toast, it’s already too late. Inasmuch as you are required to disclose to the markets that you think the business might be toast, that disclosure will understandably prompt the market to lose trust in your business, which means that your company is kaput.

Thus, the smart thing to do is never to voice (and sure as heck don’t write any emails!) your concern to anyone regarding the downside risk of your business. That lack of communication might dampen internal company analysis regarding risk of loss, but what the hell — at least you won’t get indicted for misleading investors when your company fails.

Just another chapter in the twisted policy implications that result from regulating business through criminalizing businesspeople’s risk-taking. Larry Ribstein has typically insightful observations along the same lines, while Bess Levin muses over the Feds’ suggestion that investors didn’t know exactly what they were buying when investing in Bear’s funds.

Criminalizing Failure

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play_risk As Larry Ribstein reports, the Enron prosecutorial veterans are already picking up the usual suspects in regard to the Bear Stearns meltdown.

Meanwhile, John Carney wonders whether any investors really feel safer as a result of these criminal probes?

And although Bear struck out, do we really want to deter potentially beneficial risk-taking by criminalizing it when it fails?

Finally, wouldn’t it make more sense to allocate the resources spent on criminalizing such risk-taking toward educating investors in trust-based businesses on how to hedge their risk of loss?

Bill King’s Story

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As Republican presidential nominee John McCain is doing his best to stoke public prejudice against job-creators and wealth builders, longtime Houston lawyer and businessman Bill King is promoting his new book, Saving Face (Somerset 2008), which is King’s personal history of the savings & loan crisis of the late 1980’s and early 1990’s.

Ironically, McCain knows quite a bit about the back story to King’s book.

McCain was one of the Keating Five, the Congressional supporters of former Lincoln Savings & Loan chairman and CEO Charles Keating, who was convicted of various corporate fraud crimes and served four years in prison as a result of highly-stoked but substantively-thin prosecutions that were ultimately overturned on appeal.

Keating eventually pled guilty to a single count of bankruptcy fraud to limit further prison time and insulate a family member from prosecution. For a thorough review of the mendacity of the Keating prosecutions, pick up a copy of Dan Fischel‘s book, Payback: The Conspiracy to Destroy Michael Milken and his Financial Revolution (HarperCollins 1995).

King’s story is the Houston version of Keating’s and a precursor of the prosecutorial abuse that the post-Enron criminal prosecutions in Houston generated a decade later.

Not only does King do an excellent job of explaining the financial, economic, regulatory and political underpinnings of the S&L crisis, he explores how the government wielded its prosecutorial power indiscriminately to serve up scapegoats to a salivating mainstream media and an ill-informed public.

King is thinking about running for Houston mayor in 2009 and, based on the depth and perspective that he exhibits in Saving Face, King would probably be a fine mayor. The following is King’s overview of Saving Face, which I recommend highly:

These days I find myself cringing when I hear media accounts that fraudulent and greedy mortgage brokers are responsible for all of the woes of the current housing bubble and the sub-prime defaults. I do so because the recriminations are an all too familiar echo of an earlier debacle. One to which I had a ring-side seat.

Many of you who have known me for some years know that shortly after law school I made the somewhat less-than-fortuitous career decision of joining a law firm that specialized in representing savings and loans.

At the time it did not seem like a bad decision. The Houston real estate market was enjoying an unprecedented boom and the savings and loan industry had just been deregulated. Investors were clamoring to get into the business.Within a few years of joining the law firm, I began investing in savings and loans and related businesses.

By 1986, notwithstanding that I had started with barely two nickels to rub together after working my way through law school, I had built a small, but respectable, business empire consisting of savings and loan holdings, title companies, and real estate investments.

However, within a couple of years, everything I had built evaporated into thin air.The Houston market collapsed when the price of oil fell from over $34 per barrel in 1984 to $9 the next year. It did not recover to above $20 until 2002.

Manufacturing jobs in the region fell by nearly 50% and for the first time in history Texans’ personal income declined. Bankruptcies in Houston tripled between 1983 and 1987. All but one of Texas’ major banking holding companies failed. Harris County’s population actually declined from 1985 to 1989. It was the first and only time in Houston’s history that it has lost population.

If you did not live through these times, the magnitude of melt down is hard to imagine.It is certainly difficult to lose everything that you have worked for, but the environment that existed in the late 1980s and early 1990s had an even more ominous aspect.

As the public became increasingly aware that the savings and loan crisis was going to take a major taxpayer bailout, there were ever more strident cries to hold someone responsible.

The complexity of confluence of interest rates, regulatory policy, oil prices, the Tax Reform Act of 1986, and the collapse of large portions of the real estate market that actually explained the collapse was too great to be reduced to sound bites. Politicians and bureaucrats began pointing the finger at those in the industry, and soon, the “S&L crook” was born.

And there were enough egregious cases for the politicians and bureaucrats to hold up as “proof” of their argument that the “S&L crooks” caused the crisis. The proposition that fraud and insider abuse had sunk the savings and loan industry was eventually discredited.

In 1993, a National Commission concluded that fraud had caused less than 15% of the total problem. But in the heat of the moment, there was little interest in cool, scholarly reflection on the problems of the industry.

As the 1980s came to a close I watched as many friends, associates and former clients in the S&L industry were swept up in a maelstrom of civil and criminal litigation. Naively, it never occurred to me that I might be caught up in such a dispute as well. But I was.

Eventually, I prevailed in my battle with the regulators, but as you might imagine, it was an experience that left an indelible mark and from which it took me many years to recover.

For some time I have been jotting down notes for a book about these experiences. For a couple of reasons, I recently decided to finalize such a book.

First, as many of you know, I am considering a candidacy for mayor of Houston in 2009. We all know too well that “negative campaigning” has become the standard today. Certainly going bankrupt in the savings and loan business will provide potential opponents ready ammunition. So first and foremost, I want to put the issue squarely on the table.

If I decide to become a candidate, there will undoubtedly be some voters who will be troubled by these experiences. Some will believe difficult times such as the ones I went through are a crucible that better prepares a person for leadership. Most, I expect, will simply want to be advised of the facts so that they can be weighed with other issues bearing on their decision.

But beyond the potential political implications, the troubling similarities between what I saw in the S&L collapse of the 1980s and the sub-prime crisis playing out before us now demands some consideration.

It is a well worn adage, but nonetheless true, that if we do not learn from our history, we are doomed to repeat our mistakes. Perhaps relating what I saw during the saving and loan industry collapse will provide some perspective on the current financial crises.

So for these reasons I have written Saving Face: An Alternative and Personal Account of the Savings and Loan Debacle. I have attempted in the book to tell the story of what I experienced during these times, but at the same time, to place my experiences in a larger, national context. I believe my story has some relevance to anyone experiencing trying times generally, and certainly to those in the Houston real estate industry, many of whom lived through these times as I did.

The Refco Question

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refco 061508Ellen Podgor has the sentencing memos in regard to former Refco CEO Phil Bennett’s plea deal. They are interesting reading, but what they do not answer is the most intriguing question that remains unanswered from the entire Refco affair:

Why did Bennett risk taking Refco public in the first place?

An Odd Advocate for Limiting Corporate Criminal Liability

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The always-alert Ellen Podgor notes that former Enron Task Force chief Andrew Weissmann (see also here and here) recently wrote an amicus brief on behalf of various business and defense-oriented organizations in the United States v. Ionia Management, S.A. case currently pending at the Second Circuit.

In the brief, Weissmann advocates that the appellate court “adopt a standard for vicarious corporate criminal liability” . . . that limits “the application of respondeat superior.”

As you may recall, Weissmann promoted precisely the opposite standard while engineering the destruction of enormous wealth and tens of thousands of jobs in prosecuting Arthur Andersen out of business.

It’s better late than never that Weissmann apparently now understands the error of his prior ways. I wonder whether he will admit that to the Second Circuit panel?

What’s the Difference?

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Mel Weiss was sentenced to 2.5 years in prison yesterday for making undisclosed payments to class representatives in class action lawsuits that his firm handled. Weiss really didn’t have much of a choice given the trial penalty that he was facing.

Meanwhile, in return for being the key witness against former Enron CEO Jeff Skilling, Enron Task Force prosecutors “paid” Andy Fastow with a lighter prison sentence than the one the prosecutors disclosed to the jury and the judge during Skilling’s trial.

Those same prosecutors also withheld from Skilling’s defense team exculpatory statements about Skilling that Fastow made before he elected to accept the prosecutors “payment” of a lighter sentence and testify against him.

The lead prosecutors involved in arranging Fastow’s testimony have gone on to lucrative careers in private practice. Skilling is serving an effective life prison sentence.

As Larry Ribstein has long contended, paying kickbacks should not be condoned. However, the hyprocrisy reflected by the above-described state of affairs is not going to be solved by demonizing Mel Weiss.

The Bear Stearns lesson

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Bear Stearns building at night Yesterday brought the final installment of Kate Kelly’s extraordinary three–part W$J series on the fall of Bear Stearns (Kelly also contributed to today’s story on Bear’s final shareholders meeting). My goodness, was Kelly a fly on the wall over at Bear’s office during all of this? Dear John Thain has an interesting critical analysis of the series here, here and here, while Larry Ribstein and John Carney point out that Kelly apparently fell for what has become known as "the loophole legend" in regard to JP Morgan’s buyout of Bear.

Although all the articles in the series are fun reading, Kelly’s most insightful observation comes from the second installment:

It was the beginning of a frantic 72 hours that would bring the Wall Street firm to its knees and threaten the stability of the global financial system.  .  .  . The brokerage’s sudden fall was a stark reminder of the fragility and ferocity of a financial system built to a remarkable degree on trust. Billions of dollars in securities are traded each day with nothing more than an implicit agreement that trading partners will pay up when asked. When investors became concerned that Bear Stearns wouldn’t be able to settle its trades with clients, that confidence evaporated in a flash. Trading partners, eager to avoid losses, began to disappear almost as quickly. That further fueled rumors of trouble. Some partners, spotting a chance to profit, made bets against Bear Stearns, helping accelerate its demise.  .  .  .

Even after the Bear Stearns lesson, our understanding of the pesky trust-based business model is still not what it should be. Improving the investing public’s understanding of how best to hedge the risk of investing in trust-based businesses is a far more productive response to Bear Stearns-type business failures than this. 

The instinct against the money-makers

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southwest planes I swear, you can’t make this stuff up.

As Larry Ribstein cogently explains, Southwest Airlines has taken advantage of futures markets over the past several years to hedge its fuel costs (previous posts on Southwest’s hedging program are here). That hedging program has been one of the major factors in allowing Southwest to remain one of the only profitable U.S. airlines. Along the same lines, Bloomberg’s Matthew Lynn explains how such markets provide an essential function in re-directing resources in the overall economy.

Meanwhile, Congress is trying to hamstring the very markets (see also here) that provided Southwest and many other businesses with the platform on which they hedged fuel-cost and other business risk. The wealth and lower prices generated from those hedges is not inconsequential.

Finally, the Justice Department continues its advocacy of an effective life sentence for one of the men primarily responsible for developing the robust markets that facilitate Southwest and others’ wealth creation for shareholders and lower costs for customers.

And these folks in Congress and the Justice Department are supposed to be representing our interests?

The cost of Spitzerism

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AIGOn Friday, February 11, 2005, shares of American International Group closed at $73.12 per share.

Last Friday, after Eliot Spitzer and the meltdown in the subprime mortgage markets, AIG’s shares closed at $39.34 per share.

James Freeman of the Wall $treet Journal, one of the only mainstream media outlets to expose Spitzer’s extortion of AIG for what it truly was, reports here on the massive reduction of wealth to which Spitzer’s unbridled regulation of AIG contributed greatly. Larry Ribstein, who was one of the first bloggers to shed light on this injustice, surveys the economic carnage here.

My question: Where is the rest of the mainstream media in reporting on this enormous destruction of wealth to AIG shareholders?

Look at what Mary Flood has been reading

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John Kroger 051708 Chronicle legal reporter Mary Flood covered many of the Enron-related criminal trials, so it was only natural for her to pick up a copy of former Enron Task Force prosecutor, law professor and current Oregon attorney general candidate John Kroger‘s new book, which includes several chapters on his work in several Enron-related criminal cases.

You may remember Kroger. He is the fellow who tried early on to broker his experience on the Task Force to make a name for himself in academic circles. He was involved in preparing some of the worst carnage that the Task Force generated — the Arthur Andersen debacle, the Enron Broadband disaster, and the Nigerian Barge abomination.

Ms. Flood reports on her blog that the Enron-related chapters of Kroger’s book are downright bizarre:

[Kroger’s book] is a self-congratulatory look at Kroger’s years as a federal prosecutor. The four somewhat conflicted chapters on Enron talk alternately about his prowess, his lack of knowledge, how careful prosecutors were, how ruthless prosecutors were, how terrific his case against the Enron broadband executives was and how it hasn’t been successful in court. [.  .  .]

What may be most surprising about the book is Kroger’s admission of a lack of knowledge about how to go about these cases, an admission that the DOJ was out for quick scalps, and an admission that they threatened many witnesses. These are especially odd to see in print given that one of the allegations the defense made was prosecutorial misconduct in this case — too much threatening and coercing of witnesses. One witness in the 2005 case even testified a member of the task force tried coerce him out of testifying for the defense.

Kroger frequently brags about his own prowess as an interrogator and lawyer, even guessing the broadband cases might be over now if he’d tried them. And he casts doubt on just about everyone else in the process.

Despite talking about the pressure the task force was under to get scalps and how aggressive they were, he creates a hypothetical conversation to illustrate how a defense attorney might try to trick a witness into saying no crimes were committed.

Amid the sometimes stunning hubris seems to be much angst about the decision of others to charge Lea Fastow in order to get to her husband and thus get to Jeff Skilling and Ken Lay.

He questions his colleagues, not just over the Lea Fastow charging decision (even including a mean-spirited comment a fellow prosecutor made about the Fastow children possibly winding up in foster care) but in general saying, in his career as a prosecutor he learned:

". . . that even well-intentioned prosecutors can present false testimony at trial, that a just process and a just result cannot always be obtained at the same time, that informants are both necessary and deceitful, that a certain small percentage of agents are corrupt, that our law enforcement policies often encourage crime rather than prevent it, and that successful interrogation requires the ethically questionable manipulation of other human beings.”

Just another chapter in the increasingly dubious legacy of the Enron Task Force.