Category Archives: Legal – Criminalizing Business

Making sense of Madoff

Posted on by
2

Ponzi Scheme Loren Steffy, the Houston Chronicle’s business columnist, has been having a hard time lately.

You will recall that Steffy was one of the leaders of the mainstream media lynch mob that embraced the myth of the Greed Narrative in calling for harsh criminal prosecutions of former Enron executives, particularly the late Ken Lay and Jeff Skilling.

However, now that pretty much the same thing that happened to Enron has happened to Bear Stearns, Freddie and Fannie, Merrill Lynch, Lehman Brothers, AIG and any number of other trust-based businesses during the current financial crisis, Steffy has had difficulty making sense of it all. We can’t just throw all of those executives in prison, can we?

Now to make things even more confusing for Steffy, Bernard Madoff’s alleged Ponzi scheme has unraveled. Steffy’s column from yesterday bemoans that Madoff, as with Enron, was at least in large part the result of lax regulation:

And so the era of lax regulation that began with Enron ends with the Madoff madness looming as a monument to the SEC’s ineptitude. Already under fire for smelling the flowers while Bear Stearns — to cite one example — charged toward collapse, the SEC’s days may be numbered. Treasury Secretary Henry Paulson introduced a sweeping reform plan earlier this year that would relieve it of much of its oversight role.

But wait a minute. The SEC had been continually warned about Madoff’s company (see Henry Markopolos’ 2005 notice to the SEC here). Moreover, the "lax regulation" that Steffy complains about came at a time of unparalleled growth in the SEC during the supposedly pro-business Bush Administration:

Since 2000 and especially after the fall of Enron, the SEC’s annual budget has ballooned to more than $900 million from $377 million.  .  .  . Its full-time examination and enforcement staff has increased by more than a third, or nearly 500 people. The percentage of full-time staff devoted to enforcement — 33.5% — appears to be a modern record, and it is certainly the SEC’s highest tooth-to-tail ratio since the 1980s. The press corps and Congress both were making stars of enforcers like Eliot Spitzer, so the SEC’s watchdogs had every incentive to ferret out fraud.

Yet, the regulators couldn’t put the pieces of the puzzle together (even Spitzer’s family was a victim of Madoff!). So, Steffy’s solution is the SEC "needs to be put out to pasture." In other words, rearrange the deck chairs on the Titanic.

Look, as J. Robert Brown and Larry Ribstein point out, there are understandable systemic reasons why Madoff was able to slip through the regulatory cracks for decades. Most of those flaws are not going to be fixed by simply creating a Super-SEC. Indeed, the suggestion that such regulatory remedies are the best protection against the next Madoff (and, rest assured, there will be many) actually is counter-productive to understanding the truly best protection from such schemes.

The primary justification for this regulatory retrofitting is the plight of the innocent investors (and it sure is an interesting bunch) who lost millions when Madoff’s company went bust. Although nothing is wrong with compassion for folks who lose money in an investment fraud, it’s important to remember that those investors who lost their nest egg in the Madoff implosion were imprudent in their investment strategy. They should have diversified their Madoff holdings or done some real due diligence into his operation if they were going to bet the farm on it. Even though every one of Madoff investors carry insurance on their homes and cars, one can only speculate why they didn’t attempt to understand the risk of their investment in Madoff’s company better than most did. Most likely, many of the investors simply did not care to truly understand how Madoff claimed to create wealth for them in the first place. Chidem Kurdas’ speaks to this dynamic in his timely study on the demise of the Manhattan Capital hedge fund:

As the failure of the hedge-fund firm Manhattan Capital demonstrates, both government regulators and market players can make mistakes resulting from cognitive biases. Responding to such mistakes by strengthening government watchdogs, although often recommended, reduces both the watchdogs’ and the public’s incentive to learn, thereby creating a vicious spiral of regulation, regulatory failure, and even more regulation.

Thus, as Larry Ribstein has been advocating for years, no amount of increased regulation is likely ever to do a better job than the market in mitigating fraud loss. It’s easy to throw Madoff in prison for the rest of his life, simply attribute the investment loss to him and pledge to do a better job of policing the crooks next time. It’s a lot harder to understand how Madoff’s investors could have hedged their risk of Madoff’s fraud. As this WSJ editorial concludes, "expecting the SEC to prevent a determined and crafty con man from separating investors from their money is no more sensible than putting your life savings with a Bernard Madoff."

A Tuna Wins a Small Lottery Prize

Posted on by
Reply

As a result of the Buffet Rule, the federal government decided to land a bunch of tuna rather than the barracuda in regard to an AIG-General Re finite risk insurance transaction that was not clearly illegal, much less criminal.

Subsequently, after convicting the business executives (sort of like shooting tuna in a barrel these days), the federal prosecutors proposed that the tuna get effective life sentences. For what?

Thankfully, a federal judge in Connecticut showed unusual restraint on Tuesday in rejecting the government’s brutal behavior. He handed the first of the tuna to face sentencing a two-year prison term.

Meanwhile, former Enron executive Jeff Skilling continues serving an effective life prison sentence in Colorado pending his appeal after being convicted (although not fairly) for pretty much the same thing as the tuna above.

So, during a financial downturn when we need to be promoting our best and brightest to be engaging in the business risks that generate jobs and wealth, our federal government continues promoting its corporate criminal lottery.

Why would the best and brightest risk that? Do any investors really feel safer now that Skilling is off the streets? And does anyone really think that keeping Skilling locked up for most of the rest of his life will deter the next Bernie Madoff?

A truly civil society would find a better way.

But What About that Case in which the Threat Worked?

Posted on by
Reply

This Wall Street Journal editorial from earlier in the week rightly notes that the “Department of Justice finally got something right” by electing not to appeal the Second Circuit’s decision earlier this year upholding U.S. District Judge Lewis Kaplan’s dismissal of tax fraud indictments against 13 former KPMG partners.

In the KPMG case, the DOJ made KPMG an offer that it couldn’t refuse — either ignore the firm’s long-standing policy of paying the criminal defense costs of its indicted partners or be prosecuted out-of-business ala Arthur Andersen.

Judge Kaplan concluded that dismissal of the indictments was the only reasonable remedy in the face of the DOJ’s deck stacking. I’m happy for the former KPMG partners, who at least get their lives back (but probably not their careers) from the threat of long imprisonment.

But what about Jamie Olis?

Unlike the KPMG case, the DOJ actually got away with undermining Olis’ criminal defense by threatening Dynegy with indictment unless it quit paying Olis’ criminal defense costs. Dynegy cratered to the DOJ’s threat and a cash-strapped Olis was unable to mount the most effective defense at his trial. The result was a conviction and a barbaric 24 year sentence, later reduced to a merely unconscionable six year term.

Olis is currently scheduled to be released from prison in mid-2009. This man and his family have already been tortured for over five years in one of the most egregious examples of prosecutorial abuse and excess of the misguided post-Enron governmental crusade to punish businesspeople.

Isn’t it about time that the DOJ finally got something right in the sad case of Jamie Olis?

He Should Know

Posted on by
Reply

 

You just never know what those former Enron Task Force prosecutors are going to say.

Last week, one of them was incongruously advocating limitation of corporate criminal liability.

This week, David Westheimer points out that former Task Force prosecutor John Hueston is opining that the Securities and Exchange Commission’s insider trading case against Mark Cuban is so weak that it should not be pursued.

A weak case that shouldn’t be pursued?

Hueston sure ought to know.

Do as I Say, Not as I Do

Posted on by
1

Andrew Weissmann is a rather odd advocate (see here and here) for limiting corporate criminal liability, don’t you think?

Let’s take a look back on Weissmann’s business prosecution scorecard. A unanimous U.S. Supreme Court overturned Weissmann’s dubious prosecution of Arthur Andersen, which was the final blow in putting that hallowed institution of American accounting out of business.

And the Fifth Circuit has largely eviscerated the notorious Nigerian Barge prosecution in which Merrill Lynch served up four executives to Weissmann to avoid an indictment of the firm.

But now, in United States v. Ionia Management, S.A., Weissmann is attempting to persuade the Second Circuit Court of Appeals to limit prosecutors from doing precisely what he did to Arthur Andersen and Merrill Lynch

In view of all this, I wonder whether any of the Second Circuit judges thought to ask Weissmann why he used his stint as a Enron Task Force prosecutor to cause tens of thousands of job losses and enormous wealth destruction?

Or why Weissmann used criminal prosecutions to cause destruction of numerous good business careers of Arthur Andersen partners and Merrill Lynch executives where the only thing that they did wrong was to do business with what became a social pariah, Enron.

Had Weissmann been asked such questions, would he have attempted to defend his conduct at the expense of his current clients?

If so, that would not have been a winning appellate argument.

GM and the Ghosts of Enron

Posted on by
Reply

Ken Lay was prosecuted to death for promoting Enron even though he had a reasonable basis for believing that what he was saying about his company was true.

Fast forward a couple of years. Yesterday, the W$J reported (NYTimes here) that General Motors may not be able to avoid bankruptcy because of political problems involved in obtaining a bailout loan package from the federal government. GM is “rapidly burning through cash reserves as car sales plummet and their access to credit tightens. GM has warned it may run out of money within months without outside help.”

From what I can tell, no one is calling for the scalp of GM CEO Rick Wagoner because of confident public statements that he made just a few months ago about his company.

So, the corporate crime lottery continues. A truly civilized society would find a better way.

The NatWest Three are finally going home

Posted on by
Reply

natwest three 110608The NatWest Three — the three U.K. bankers who were dragged through the Enron mud for the past five years — are finally going home after serving about six months of their sentences in U.S. prisons.

After a hearing in New York yesterday, the three men have completed the prolonged transfer process from the U.S. prison system to the U.K. system. Accordingly, they will fly to England next week to serve the remainder of their three-year sentences there. Hopefully, they will be paroled in short order under the U.K.’s more humane sentencing laws pertaining to white-collar crimes.

Although the treatment of these men by U.S. criminal justice authorities has been mostly scandalous, the mainstream media continues to misrepresent their story (see this earlier example). More recently, see this London Telegraph article that gets just about everything wrong about the case and the plea bargain that the three men struck.

Read this if you want to know what really happened with regard to the NatWest Three. It’s a nuanced and far more interesting story than the mainstream media’s morality play.

The Prince of Regulation

Posted on by
Reply

Andrew Cuomo Get a load of the letter that New York Attorney General Andrew Cuomo, the new Prince of Regulation, sent to about ten Wall Street firms the other day:

We believe that the Board of Directors is most appropriately positioned to respond to our requests as the firm’s top management likely has a significant interest in the size of the bonus pools. In this new era of corporate responsibility we are entering, boards of directors must step up to the plate and prevent wasteful expenditures of corporate funds on outsized executive bonuses and other unjustified compensation.

As my Office has told AIG, now that the American taxpayer has provided substantial funds to your firm, the preservation of those funds is a vital obligation of your company. Taxpayers are, in many ways, now like shareholders of your company, and your firm has a responsibility to them.

Accordingly, we also ask that the Board inform us of the policies, procedures, and protections the Board has instituted that will ensure Board review of all such company expenditures going forward. Please provide this Office with an accounting of the actions the Board plans to take that will protect taxpayer funds.

So, Cuomo charts the same political course as Eliot Spitzer before him and Rudy Giuliani before Spitzer. Embrace the Greed Narrative and then sit back and let the mainstream media do the rest. Before you know it, even both major presidential candidates tout the myth that business failure is always about dastardly villains and innocent victims.

My question for Cuomo and his mainstream media minions is quite simple: What is the likely quality of the management and board members who are willing to stick around and put up with Cuomo’s grandstanding?

My bet is that you won’t see many Hank Greenbergs.

Meanwhile, those less-than-stellar management teams all have tickets to feed at the Fed’s money trough.

Ah, the webs we weave.

Hedging the Enron trial penalty

Posted on by
2

On the heels of this news, and given the mainstream media’s ubiquitous characterization of Enron as the harbinger of the current Wall Street financial crisis, it’s really not surprising that former Enron Broadband co-CEO Joe Hirko opted to cop a plea on Tuesday rather than face a draining re-trial of the notorious Enron Broadband case.

Although Hirko and his co-defendants overcame enormous odds to win acquittals and a hung jury in the initial Broadband trial, Hirko and his family have already endured over five years of uncertainty as the Damoclean Sword of a relentless federal prosecution hung over their heads.

Inasmuch as Hirko could have easily been looking at a decade behind bars if he were to be convicted in the re-trial, a probable sentence of 12-16 months in a plea deal is a reasonable hedge of what has become the draconian trial penalty for business executives.

Refracting Enron Myopia

Posted on by
1

One of the more entertaining aspects of the current Wall Street financial crisis has been reading how some of the business columnists have been interpreting it.

Take, for example, Houston Chronicle business columnist, Loren Steffy.

You may remember him from his acerbic coverage of the trial of former Enron executives, Jeff Skilling and the late Ken Lay, or his perpetuation of the Enron Myth regardless of the circumstances.

Dismissing me as an Enron apologist, Steffy regularly disputed my long-held theory that the run-on-the-bank that felled Enron could well happen to any trust-based business.

Apparently confused by the fact that what happened to Enron has now happened to Bear Stearns, Freddie and Fannie, Merrill Lynch, Lehman Brothers, AIG and any number of other trust-based businesses impacted by the current credit crunch, Steffy reaches for insight from one of the fellows who set the stage for this mess:

Investigators are poring over the failed firms, looking for signs that executives misled shareholders. Some evidence may be found, but Sam Buell, the former prosecutor who led the effort to indict Enron’s Jeff Skilling, doesn’t think we’ll see widespread prosecutions.

“It’s not a conspiracy if everybody’s in on it,” said Buell, who’s now a law professor at Washington University in St. Louis. “In order to have a fraud conspiracy, you’ve got to have some effort by one group to deceive another group.”

In this case, individual investors may not have understood what Wall Street bankers were doing with complex debt securities, but those charged with safeguarding the marketplace were certainly aware. Regulators knew and approved. So did credit rating agencies. And auditors, both internal and external.

With a mouse click, investors could find public documents that described the debt instruments with hundreds of pages of detail. [.   .   .]

“If everybody’s in a bubble mentality, if they’re betting the price of real estate will keep going up, disclosure doesn’t address the problem of what happens when all those assumptions turn out to be wrong,” Buell said. “Everybody knows what they’re doing. They’re just making bad decisions.”

Yes, you read that correctly. Buell implies that Skilling was guilty of criminal conspiracy because not “everybody” was “in on it” at the time Enron was making its supposedly opaque disclosures. However, since “everybody’s in on it” now, Buell doesn’t think there will be widespread prosecutions because “[i]t’s not a conspiracy if everybody’s in on it.”

With such reasoning, is there any doubt now why this outfit generated this record?

For the record, I actually hope Buell is right this time that few businesspeople are prosecuted for misjudging business risk. But for a more rational explanation of how financial regulation fits into the current crisis, check out these Larry Ribstein posts here, here and here and this masterful one by Arnold Kling.