Reflecting on Astonishing Abuses of Power

As Congress contemplates an historic extension of governmental control in regard to health care finance, a couple of stories relating to the growth of unrestrained exercise of governmental power in another area grabbed my attention.

First, former Dynegy executive Jamie Olis was formally released from federal prison on Friday.

Along with the egregious prosecution of Arthur Andersen, the prosecution and barbaric sentencing of Olis represents a festering wound for anyone who believes in principles of limited government and innocence until proven guilty.

That the judicial system allowed the executive branch to bully Dynegy into serving Olis up as the initial sacrificial lamb of business corruption in the wake of Enron’s collapse is a frightening example of how little protection citizens have from dubious prosecutions. For whatever purpose, Olis remains on probation for another three years.

Meanwhile, reinforcing the point made above, Mary Flood reports that the Department of Justice — apparently with not enough to do in investigating the meltdown on Wall Street over the past year and a half — is actually considering another Enron-related prosecution of the disgraceful Nigerian Barge case, which has already resulted in the unjust imprisonment of four former Merrill Lynch executives for over a year before the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals threw out their convictions.

As noted in this post from over four years ago (!), the Nigerian Barge prosecution was baseless from the start and, as later developments revealed, trumped-up to boot. That this outrage is allowed to continue is yet another indication that many in the judiciary have ceded their role as an effective check on executive branch excesses.

Finally, the docket of the prosecution of former Enron CEO Jeff Skilling now reflects that the deadline for Skilling’s motion for new trial based on pervasive prosecutorial misconduct has been extended to September 9th.

As noted in this previous post, a reasonable interpretation of the reason for the extensions of the deadline for Skilling’s motion is that the government has turned over massive amounts of exculpatory evidence that the Enron Task Force illegally withheld from Skilling’s defense team during the prosecution of Skilling and the late Ken Lay. Skilling’s Fifth Circuit-ordered re-sentencing that will reduce his inhumane 24-year sentence has been put off indefinitely pending disposition of his motion for a new trial.

The Olis, Nigerian Barge and Skilling prosecutions are the other side of the coin of what happened to Professor Gates.

What protection do we have that the same won’t happen to you and me?

The increasing cost of public equity

frank quattrone google Frank Quattrone, the former CSFB investment banker who has an interesting perspective, notes a dynamic of the now almost decade-long criminalization of business that I have been warning business owners and lawyers about for quite some time now — the increasing cost of public equity:

[W]hy did [public offerings] disappear in the first place?

One reason is the heightened bar for small companies to go public, Mr. Quattrone said. Throughout his career, he said, some of the greatest companies he was associated with had $30 million to $50 million in revenue when they went public. Today, he said, bankers require companies to have $100 million or even $200 million in revenue.

Part of the underappreciated societal impact of prosecutors such as those on the Enron Task Force implementing the criminalization of business lottery is that the days of small companies tapping public equity for relatively cheap venture capital are gone. Moreover, the supply of executives who are willing to work for public companies is smaller because many of the best and the brightest simply do not consider the risk of operating in the public domain worth the draconian downside. The result is that investment alternatives for investors in public markets are declining.

Not exactly a policy to encourage economic revival, now is it?

Update: Along the same lines, Larry Ribstein reviews the destruction of public equity wealth in regard to AIG that resulted in no small part from Eliot Spitzer’s machinations. It’s a risk that I first noted in regard to AIG way back in early 2005. When will we learn?

What’s the purpose of the Madoff sentence?

Madoff When Bernie Madoff was sentenced a few weeks ago, my reaction was that it is utterly absurd to imprison a 72 year-old white collar criminal for 150 years. I mean, really — what’s the point?

Herb Hoelter agrees:

Bernie Madoff’s 150-year prison sentence was an affront to the federal criminal justice system.  .  .  .

I’ve been a professional federal sentencing consultant for more than 32 years. I have worked with hundreds of white-collar offenders over the past 25 years – Madoff, most recently – whose punishments dramatically increased in direct proportion to the government trumpets of justice, punishment and deterrence. Having lived through the past two decades of federal sentencing guidelines (no longer to be "presumed reasonable," ruled the Supreme Court this year), I know that the Madoff sentence was the crown jewel for the government.

In imposing sentence, however, the court ignored virtually all statutory sentencing principles and trumped the defunct federal sentencing guidelines. The sentence was imposed, acknowledged Judge Denny Chin, for symbolic purposes, which violates the supposed blindfolds of our nation’s justice system.

The sentence was, of course, within the law. But being within the law does not always mean a sentence is appropriate. Legal scholars will be hard-pressed to find a first-offender sentence of Madoff proportions – the maximum statutory term imposed on each count, to be served consecutively. [.  .  .]

The court’s responsibility is to deliver justice, not respond to emotional tactics. The Madoff sentence – with its "symbolic" justification – failed a big test.   .   .   .

In the meantime, this even more egregious sentence of a man who didn’t steal a dime from his company or investors continues to fade from our society’s consciousness.

A truly civil society would find a better way.

Why bother with a trial?

81511078TS020_ECB_Sir_R_All

This earlier post noted the troubling indications that R. Allen Stanford and that the federal judiciary to date is doing precious little to check the prosecutorial power of the executive branch as it applies to Stanford. This is not the first time that the prosecutorial power has run amok in a Stanford case.

Now, the motion below reveals that the Department of Justice has placed Stanford under jail conditions that are roughly comparable to those that prisoners endure in third world prisons.

Meanwhile, Stanford essentially has no ability to assist his counsel in the defense of a complicated white collar criminal case.

Increasingly, the U.S. criminal justice system is resembling this one. Yet, after the judiciary and the local media allowed the Enron Task Force to get away with various outrages against Jeff Skilling and various other former Enron executives, it’s as if even the most overreaching actions of the executive branch are now considered acceptable. Or at least not worth the effort of an objection. Or serious media scrutiny.

We live in scary times.

Stanford Mtn Re Jail Conditions

A daunting jury verdict for deal lawyers

Collins Flying a bit under the radar this past weekend was the dreaded "we’re sure as hell not coming back on Monday" verdict that the jury returned on Friday afternoon in the Refco, Inc-related criminal case against Mayer Brown partner, Joseph P. Collins.

Collins was Refco’s outside corporate counsel for ten years or so before Refco disintegrated into bankruptcy in October, 2005. A New York city federal jury found Collins guilty on five of 14 criminal counts, including two counts of wire fraud, two counts of securities fraud and conspiracy, and a mistrial was declared on the other nine counts. Sentencing is scheduled for November 3rd. A previous post on the indictment is here and a copy of the original indictment against Collins is here and previous posts about the Refco case are here.

The jury verdict against Collins crosses the Rubicon in terms of the federal government’s willingness to prosecute an outside deal lawyer for merely advising a client in regard to structuring transactions that are not intrinsically illegal. As is typical of most business prosecutions over the past several years that criminalize questionable business judgment rather than clear white collar criminal acts such as embezzlement, the case against Collins was a jumble of conclusory allegations of fraud without any specific allegations of what Collins did that was criminal.

Heck, it was undisputed at trial that Collins barely worked on the transactions on which the prosecutors based their case against him. Essentially, the prosecution alleged that Collins assisted former Refco CEO and controlling shareholder Phillip Bennett in using Refco’s credit to reduce indebtedness to Refco of an affiliate controlled by Bennett. That’s not a crime, but the government asserted that Collins committed a crime by aiding Bennett in misleading Refco auditors and investors by not telling them about the use of Refco’s credit to reduce the affiliate’s debt to Refco.

It didn’t help Colling that a couple of other former Refco officers who copped pleas testified for the prosecution, although Bennett was not one of them. And the fact that a couple of partners from Weil Gotshal — which replaced Mayer Brown as Refco’s corporate counsel after Thomas H. Lee Partners bought a majority stake in the firm a few months before Refco’s public offering — also testified against Collins. I’d bet that testimony didn’t help relations between the two firms.

What’s curious about all of this is that numerous lawyers, accountants and investment bankers scrutinized and presumably profited from Refco over the past several years in connection with various investments in the firm, including its well-publicized public offering that valued the company at $4 billion five months before it disintegrated into bankruptcy. Not only did those professionals fail to uncover the alleged fraud, but none of them other than Collins was targeted as a criminal. See why these matters are better suited for civil cases in which responsibility for wrongdoing can be allocated among all the responsible parties?

Moreover, as this earlier post notes, if Collins knew about a massive fraud at Refco, then why on earth did he allow the company to be bought by Thomas H. Lee Partners and then go public where discovery of the fraud would likely lead to far more draconian consequences than if Refco had remained private?

Collins testified in his own defense and rightfully contended that it was never the job of Collins — or generally any outside corporate counsel, for that matter — to monitor the company’s transactions, which would be an impossible task for outside counsel. Collins went on to testify that was never informed of the hidden debt and that Refco’s top executives lied to him from the beginning.

At any rate, at the end of the trial, the prosecution contended that none of the specifics really meant much. Collins and Mayer Brown made millions off of Refco, which ultimately tanked. Thus, Collins must have done something wrong, right? Even this apparently divided jury agreed with that twisted logic.

Here’s hoping that the trial judge will set aside the verdict against Collins, but that’s probably wishful thinking in these anti-business times. The problem with this emerging governmental policy of prosecuting transactional lawyers is similar to the policy of criminalizing agency costs against corporate officers. There is a big difference between prosecuting agency costs and prosecuting clear-cut crimes, such as embezzlement. The difference relates primarily to the nature of the evidence involved, the relevance of contracts, and the subtleties of dividing responsibility between corporate actors.

Larry Ribstein has put it this way. Suppose somebody mugs you on the street. There is no question that is a crime. However, what if they ask you first if they can borrow your wallet, you loan it to them, and then they don’t give it back in time? What if they ask your employee who’s running the store for you whether they can borrow some money, the employee loans it to them and then they don’t pay it back? What if the "thief" is another employee who says the manager gave him the money as bonus compensation?

Who is liable in these situations turns on the contracts and the legal relationships among the various parties. Proof depends on who said what to whom. Can we rely on what the witnesses say about this? What if the prosecutor tells the guy who’s minding the store that he’ll not face a prosecution for conspiracy if he spills the beans on the employee?

In the meantime, the Collins verdict sends an ominous message to transactional lawyers everywhere. Rest assured that American business — and ultimately all of us — will endure the additional costs that deal lawyers will charge to endure the risk that the government will prosecute them for a crime that they do not know about.

Marc Dreier’s letter to his sentencing judge

dreier It will take awhile before you will read a more interesting — and really quite extraordinary — letter from a defendant to a sentencing judge than the one below that disgraced New York lawyer Marc Dreier wrote.

It’s hard to imagine, much less understand, the personal hell that Dreier created for himself. Dreier’s letter provides a glimpse of how it happened.

The webs we weave.

Marc Dreier Letter to Judge

Is Allen Stanford being railroaded?

Sir Allen I recognize that he is not the most popular fellow in Houston investment circles these days, but is anyone else but me a tad uncomfotable that the federal government is running roughshod over R. Allen Stanford?

As everyone following the Stanford Financial Group scandal knows by now, at the request of the Department of Justice, U.S. District Judge David Hittner overruled a federal magistrate’s order last week that would have allowed Stanford to remain free on bond pending his trial on business fraud charges. As a result, Stanford is imprisoned in Houston’s Federal Detention Center pending his trial, which will probably not occur until sometime next year.

Meanwhile, the DOJ, the SEC, a federal court-appointed receiver and a British receiver operating in Antigua have frozen all of Stanford’s personal assets, as well as the assets of the Stanford Financial empire. Consequently, Stanford has no funds with which to retain counsel.

And now he doesn’t even have the freedom to help his attorneys prepare his defense.

However, it’s now become reasonably clear that the DOJ and the SEC’s repeated public allegations that Stanford was running a Ponzi Scheme through Stanford Financial are, if not outright false, at least misleading and irresponsible.

Stanford Financial clearly owned substantial assets, including the Antiguan Bank that also owned substantial assets itself. Perhaps those assets were over-valued and perhaps Stanford and his associates misled investors on the bank’s capability of repaying the certificates of deposit that the company promoted and sold. But that’s a far cry from running a Ponzi Scheme.

Moreover, the government’s efforts to prevent Stanford from paying for defense counsel are downright scary.

The fact that Stanford Financial is not in a position to pay them is not particularly surprising. The company would probably be in bankruptcy if it were not already in receivership, and it’s unlikely that either a bankruptcy judge or a U.S. district judge would allow the company to pay for Stanford’s criminal defense.

But putting aside for the moment the issue of Stanford not being allowed to use his personal assets to defend himself, Stanford Financial has a Director’s & Officer’s insurance policy that provides for payment of at least a portion of Stanford’s defense However,  the Stanford Financial receiver has threatened to seek contempt charges against the insurer (Lloyds) if it pays Stanford’s defense costs as it is contractually obligated to do under the policy. At the same time, the receiver, the DOJ, and the receiver are spending millions in preparing the case against Stanford. My conservative estimate is that the government’s tab is more than $25 million already (the receiver alone has a pending request for $20 million in fees).

Finally, Stanford has exhibited absolutely no inclination to flee from the charges against him. He has numerous family ties to Texas and the Houston area, and he has no prior criminal record. And it’s not as if Stanford can just walk away from the charges if he is allowed out on bond. He has no passport and, with the GPS tracking device that the U.S. Marshal’s Office requires criminal defendants to wear these days, the U.S. Marshals know immediately when a defendant is going somewhere that he is not supposed to be.

It’s easy to look the other way when this type of concerted effort by the federal government essentially strips an unpopular businessman of the capacity to defend himself against charges that could imprison him for the rest of his life.

But remember — if it can happen to R. Allen Stanford, then it can certainly happen to you and me.

A copy of Stanford’s motions seeking release of funds for his defense and for reconsideration of his detention order are below.

 

Stanford Mtn to Release Funds

The Chronicle’s Continuing Enron Hypocrisy

Being generally an optimistic sort, I keep thinking that the financial crisis of the past year or so will eventually prompt the Houston Chronicle to reconsider its generally biased coverage of the demise of Enron over the past seven years.

After all, it’s not every day that the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals concludes that a newspaper’s coverage of a particular event was a major factor in the creation of a presumption of community prejudice.

Nevertheless, the local paper’s recent coverage of disgraced financiers R. Allen Stanford and Bernard Madoff reflects that no such soul-searching is likely to emerge anytime soon down on Texas Avenue.

Take this recent Loren Steffy column in which he asks the following: “Why, then, does Madoff get a sentence six times that of [former WorldCom CEO Bernie] Ebbers or Enron’s Jeff Skilling?”

I mean, really. Is the answer to that question all that difficult?

Madoff turns himself in and admits from the outset that he was stealing money from investors for years by running a Ponzi scheme. Any wonder why he was hammered by the sentencing judge?

Ebbers was essentially convicted of covering up accounting fraud at WorldCom, but he at least put up a colorable defense that he was not responsible for such matters and had no knowledge of the fraud.

Moreover, Skilling wasn’t even accused of accounting fraud. He was convicted essentially of making too many rose-colored statements about Enron, notwithstanding that his belief in the truth of those statements was never seriously challenged.

Finally, neither Ebbers nor Skilling stole a dime from the investors of their respective companies. Yet, Steffy insists upon comparing them with the larcenous Madoff. who essentially stole tens of millions. The Greed Narrative prevails again.

But here’s my main point. Now that what happened to Enron has happened to numerous other trust-based Wall Street firms, shouldn’t the Chronicle be advocating that similarly aggressive criminal prosecutions be mounted against numerous executives of the Wall Street firms who made the same type of rosy statements about their wobbling companies as Skilling made about Enron?

Now, I don’t believe that there was widespread criminal fraud at Enron. The only true criminal fraud there was relatively small and isolated in Andrew Fastow’s Global Finance unit. Similarly, I don’t believe that there was widespread criminal fraud at the Wall Street firms that endured the same downward spiral that engulfed Enron.

But inasmuch as the Chronicle fanned the flames of criminal prosecutions against dozens of Enron executives and others involved in transactions with them, shouldn’t the Chronicle be taking the same position with regard to executives at the similarly-situated Wall Street firms?

Or at least shouldn’t the Chronicle be explaining why it threw dozens of Enron executives under the bus even though it now fails to advocate similar treatment for executives of the failed Wall Street firms?

It seems like the least that the local newspaper can do.

Not a good week for freedom

big government First, in the face of a duplicitous government prosecution and a draconian trial penalty, Kevin Howard was forced to plead guilty to a crime that he did not commit.

Then, the executive branch of the federal government, unchecked by feckless legislative and judicial branches, undermined the U.S. Bankruptcy Code by preferring certain Chrysler creditors over others while improperly using the TARP legislation (see also here) — which was expressly limited to financial institutions — as a basis to loan billions to Chrysler. Moreover, the government’s shots in regard to such matters are being called by a rank rookie.

Finally, the federal government seized $34 million of American citizens’ funds without notice or judicial process simply because those citizens enjoy playing poker.

One of the clearest lessons of the 20th century is that large governments have the capacity to cause unspeakable evil. As these injustices unfold with nary a protest from our leaders, is that important lesson already forgotten?

Kevin Howard and the Thin Line of Business Criminality

In this earlier post regarding former Enron Broadband CFO Kevin Howard’s recent plea deal, I predicted that the factual basis for the plea deal would barely describe wrongdoing, much less criminality.

Turns out I was right. Paragraph 14 of the plea agreement at the bottom of page 6 sets forth the factual basis of the deal.

That paragraph describes that Enron had told the market that its Broadband unit had great potential, but that it expected to lose at least $60 million for the year. Inasmuch as Enron’s prediction was turning out to be correct, Howard helped arrange a joint venture transaction that monetized a portion of Broadband’s lucrative deal with Blockbuster. Nothing unusual about that.

So, what’s the problem, you ask?

Essentially, the factual basis provides that Howard did not disclose to Enron’s auditor (Arthur Andersen) that Enron’s joint venture partner was not expecting to be a long-term partner in the joint venture, even though the partner verified by signing the joint venture agreement that it was not relying on any such expectation in connection with entering into the venture.

Nevertheless, the factual statement suggest that if Andersen had known that the partner was really not expecting to be in the venture for the long haul despite the terms of the written agreement, then the auditor may not have allowed Enron to account for the deal in a way that reduced the Broadband unit’s losses to the $60 million level that the company had projected and ultimately reported.

That’s the basis for a crime?

Frankly, U.S. District Judge Vanessa Gilmore should have the same reaction to Howard’s proposed plea deal that U.S. District Judge Lynn Hughes had to the equally vacuous deal that Enron Task Force prosecutors crammed down the throat of former Enron mid-level executive Chris Calger back in 2005. At least the DOJ ultimately threw in the towel on the stinky Calger plea deal.

Based on the foregoing, any business executive who engages in a transaction for the purpose of helping his company achieve earning projections is at risk of being indicted and convicted of a crime, and sentenced to a long prison sentence.

And by a long prison sentence, I don’t mean the 4-12 months of home confinement to which Howard agreed in his deal.

Remember, the foregoing transaction is one for which Jeff Skilling is currently serving 24 years in prison.

A truly civil society would find a better way.