Got to love the way Friedman ignores the contentious introduction to the questions and maintains the integrity of intellectual discourse. H/T Almost Chosen People.
Milton Friedman on freedom, capitalism and colonialism
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Category Archives: Economics
Running into the abyss
17th century philosopher Blaise Pascal observed in his Penses that we run heedlessly into the abyss after putting something in front of us to stop us seeing it.
Neil Barofsky, the Special Inspector General for the Troubled Asset Relief Program, observed something similar in his quarterly report regarding the troubled TARP program:
The government’s bailout of financial institutions deemed "too big to fail" has created a risk that the United States could face a worse fiscal meltdown in the future, an independent watchdog assigned to review the program told Congress on Sunday.
The Troubled Assets Relief Program, known as TARP, has not addressed the problems that led to the last crisis and in some case those problems have festered and are a bigger threat than before, warned Neil Barofsky, the special inspector general at the Treasury Department.
"Even if TARP saved our financial system from driving off a cliff back in 2008, absent meaningful reform, we are still driving on the same winding mountain road, but this time in a faster car," Barofsky wrote.
Barofsky wrote the $700 billion financial bailout has encouraged more risk-taking because bank executives, who are still receiving massive bonuses, figure the government will come to the rescue the next time they steer their ships nearly aground. . . .
None of what Barofsky reports is a surprise to regular readers of this blog. It was not rocket science.
Too Big Even to Consider Failing
As with many folks in the financial and legal world, I’m finishing up Andrew Ross Sorkin’s entertaining new best-seller, Too Big to Fail: The Inside Story of How Wall Street and Washington Fought to Save the Financial System—and Themselves (Viking 2009). Clear Thinkers favorite Arnold Kling has the best analysis of the book that I’ve read to date:
Reading the book leads me to ponder the differences between Chauffered America–Hollywood, investment bankers, and high government officials–and Strip Mall America–people who launch businesses like restaurants, hair salons, and other small enterprises. [. . .]
The obvious sociological point is that the top finance people live in a bubble, with secret entrances, isolated offices, chauffered automobiles, and private jets. Even the top government officials inhabit this world. Sorkin describes Geithner arriving at the airport in DC and losing it over not being met by a driver. Forced to take a taxi, Geithner turns to his colleague and says that he has no cash. Perhaps this would have been a moment to teach the head of the New York Fed how to use an ATM. [. . .]
I do not see how reading this book can help but reinforce a Simon Johnson/James Kwak view of Washington captured by Wall Street. Paulson seems to have no use for anyone who is not a Goldman Sachs alumnus. Geithner seems to have no use for anyone who is not a CEO of a large financial institution. Both of them view the collapse of major Wall Street firms as Armageddon.
The “regulatory overhaul” promised by the Obama Administration is still the same-old, same-old. Chauffered America will be restored to its exalted status, with a few new rules and regulations thrown in.
Instead, somebody should be asking the deeper question about Chauffered America. If Chauffered America were to disappear, would the rest of us miss it? Or could Strip Mall America get along just fine without the big-time bankers and their friends in government?
One comes away from the book with the conclusion that the primary purpose of the government and corporate leaders involved in resolving the crisis was to maintain the elitist culture of Wall Street with regard to financial matters, while at all times making sure that the government protected the maximum number of the folks making the bad bets from ever having to endure the true extent of the risk that they took in placing those bets. That’s why things like this happened.
As I noted after the demise of Lehman Brothers last fall, resolving the crisis was not rocket science. Sorkin’s book establishes that the leaders who were calling the shots were never going to let on that such was the case.
Fat chance
A couple of interesting health care-related items caught my eye today.
First, I went by my internist’s office for my annual physical and noticed that another group of doctors had leased a much larger office across the hall from my doctor’s office.
I peaked inside the new doctors’ office window and noticed that the reception area was nicely furnished with plush leather sofas and chairs, flat screen TV’s, handsome hardwood flooring and tasteful Persian rugs.
The opulence of the office prompted me to find out what kind of doctors were apparently doing so well, so I grabbed one of the doctor’s cards from the reception area. It read (not the real name):
"John Smith, M.D., Laparoscopic Obesity Surgery"
Meanwhile, this NY Times article reveals the utterly unsurprising fact that New York City regulations requiring fast food restaurants to post the caloric content of their food did not induce obese consumers from eating less:
A study of New York City’s pioneering law on posting calories in restaurant chains suggests that when it comes to deciding what to order, people’s stomachs are more powerful than their brains.
The study, by several professors at New York University and Yale, tracked customers at four fast-food chains — McDonald’s, Wendy’s, Burger King and Kentucky Fried Chicken — in poor neighborhoods of New York City where there are high rates of obesity.
It found that about half the customers noticed the calorie counts, which were prominently posted on menu boards. About 28 percent of those who noticed them said the information had influenced their ordering, and 9 out of 10 of those said they had made healthier choices as a result.
But when the researchers checked receipts afterward, they found that people had, in fact, ordered slightly more calories than the typical customer had before the labeling law went into effect, in July 2008.
The findings, to be published Tuesday in the online version of the journal Health Affairs come amid the spreading popularity of calorie-counting proposals as a way to improve public health across the country.
“I think it does show us that labels are not enough,” Brian Elbel, an assistant professor at the New York University School of Medicine and the lead author of the study, said in an interview.
"Labels are not enough?" Makes one wonder what regulation Professor Elbel will suggest next — maybe governmental rationing of fast food?
The argument in favor of these types of absurd governmental intrusions into our lives is that government subsidizes medical insurance, so government should attempt through regulation to decrease obesity, which unfairly heaps a portion of health-care costs relating to obesity on tax-paying citizens who are not obese.
But putting aside for a moment the debatable notion of whether obesity really increases health-care costs all that much, the far more effective regulation to decrease obesity would be to provide a financial incentive for citizens to lose weight. Namely, reduce the governmental subsidy of medical insurance for those who choose to remain obese.
Fat chance of that happening.
Why pay even more?
In addition to being quite frustrating from a purely football standpoint, attending Houston Texans games is incredibly expensive. And as ESPN.com’s Lestor Munson points out, if the NFL has its way in the American Needle case currently pending before the U.S. Supreme Court, then professional franchises will have virtual carte blanche to coordinate high prices with other clubs in their leagues.
A group of sports economists led by Roger Noll have filed the brief below with the Supreme Court explaining how the NFL position in favor of an exemption from anti-trust laws will likely result in a loss of consumer welfare. In short, the economists argue that economic research provides a firm basis for distinguishing between collaborative activities of league members that enhance economic efficiency and benefit consumers, on one hand, from collusive activities that are not essential for the efficient operation of a league and that simply benefit league members by reducing competition among teams.
The owners of professional sports leagues have already received a dramatic financial benefit from the billions of dollars of public financing for stadiums that local governments have thrown their way over the past generation. Providing an unnecessary anti-trust exemption that will provide anti-competitive incentives for league members while providing no economic benefit to the members’ customers will only make matters worse.
Food for thought as Houston leaders prepare to gift-wrap another dubious public subsidy for the owners of a professional sports franchise.
Rationing and health care finance reform
The video below (H/T Professor Bainbridge) of a Milton Friedman lecture on the health care finance system is as timely now as it was in 1978 when he gave it at the Mayo Clinic. I was reminded of the Friedman lecture when a doctor friend of mine passed along the following front-line observations triggered by this article reporting on the recentt death of a young British man who died while waiting on a liver transplant:
Unless we, as a society, decide that we are going to pay for everything for everybody, there will have to be some form of rationing of health care services. And, into the 21st century, we now can do so much (with some having questionable efficacy) that we can no longer afford to do everything for everybody.
We can ration by age — this is what Obama was suggesting when he said that "maybe you’re better off not having the surgery, but taking the painkiller". No more knee or hip replacements if you’re over a certain age. Perhaps the first step toward a "Soylent Green" society?
Or we can ration by disease, which is what happened in the UK to the fellow who died awaiting a liver transplant and here we get into morals and away from science. It’s kind of like the game we played in psychology courses in high school or college — you’re stuck on a desert island with a bunch of folks who represent a cross culture of society, so who do you choose to get on the life raft? Medical care actually was easier when we did not have the technology to do things like liver transplants. Folks such as this guy just died.
Now, as a society, with the finite resources we are willing to spend on health care, we have to decide if we want to spend $250K to give this guy a new liver (which he may or may not trash through further drinking), to which is added the $25K per year for his follow up care and (very expensive) anti-rejection drugs. Or, do we decide that it would be better to treat 1,000 people who have hypertension by giving them cheap generic meds for $250 per year each? Who is more deserving of a "second chance", as the referenced patient’s mother asks — the one or the thousand? There are no right or wrong answers, but remember, it’s now a zero-sum game. When you spend money on one group of patients, there will be less to spend on others.
The Money Pit
Casey Mulligan’s clever post below reminded me of the classic Onion News segment that follows:
In 2008, we were told that each American taxpayer had to spend thousands on bank bailouts in order to avoid utter disaster. We were not supposed to object, because a few thousand is a cheap price to pay for disaster avoidance.
In early 2009, we were told that each American taxpayer had to spend thousands on fiscal stimulus in order to avoid utter disaster. We were not supposed to object, because a few thousand is a cheap price to pay for disaster avoidance.
Now we are told that each American taxpayer has to spend thousands (? amount to be unveiled later) on government health care in order to avoid utter disaster. We were not supposed to object, because a few thousand is a cheap price to pay for disaster avoidance.
We are lucky to have the White House to save us from so many disasters!
In The Know: Should The Government Stop Dumping Money Into A Giant Hole?
Will Obama address this key health care finance issue?
Marginal Revolution‘s Tyler Cowen penned this insightful NY times op-ed over the weekend that addresses the problem of the elephant in the parlor in regard to Obama’s proposed reform of America’s dysfunctional health care finance system:
MEDICARE expenditures threaten to crush the federal budget, yet the Obama administration is proposing that we start by spending more now so we can spend less later.
This runs the risk of becoming the new voodoo economics. If we can’t realize significant savings in health care costs now, don’t expect savings in the future, either.
It’s not the profits of the drug companies or the overhead of the insurance companies that make American health care so expensive, but the financial incentives for doctors and medical institutions to recommend more procedures, whether or not they are effective. So far, the American people have been unwilling to say no.
Drawing upon the ideas of the Harvard economist David Cutler, the Obama administration talks of empowering an independent board of experts to judge the comparative effectiveness of health care expenditures; the goal is to limit or withdraw Medicare support for ineffective ones. This idea is long overdue, and the critics who contend that it amounts to “rationing” or “the government telling you which medical treatments you can have” are missing the point. The motivating idea is the old conservative chestnut that not every private-sector expenditure deserves a government subsidy.
Nonetheless, this principle is radical in its implications and has met with resistance. In particular, Congress has not been willing to give up its power over what is perhaps the government’s single most important program, nor should we expect such a surrender of power in the future. There is already a Medicare Advisory Payment Commission, but it isn’t allowed to actually cut costs. [. . .]
Those cuts alone will not solve the fiscal problem, but if we aren’t willing to take even limited steps to conserve resources, we shouldn’t be spending any more money elsewhere. [. . .]
The demand for universal coverage sounds like a moral imperative to “take care of everybody,” but in reality it would make only a marginal difference when it comes to the overall health of the American population. The sober reality is that universal coverage is another way to spend money, which may or may not be a good idea.
The most likely possibility is that the government will spend more on health care today, promise to realize savings tomorrow and never succeed in lowering costs. It is rare that governments successfully cut costs by first spending more money.
Mr. Obama has pledged to be a fiscally responsible president. This is the biggest chance so far to see whether he means it.
Read the entire op-ed. Any reform of the U.S. health care finance system will not be successful in controlling costs unless or until a consensus is reached on a fundamental issue that most Americans do not even want to discuss — that is, what is the basic level of health care that every individual in the U.S. is entitled to receive regardless of cost? For example, what level of care is an insolvent, uninsured, illegal immigrant entitled to receive? How much care should we be willing to subsidize to extend the life of a seriously-ill 90 year-old? A terminally-ill 50 year-old? These are thorny issues, but they must be addressed if we are ever going to achieve a coherently-financed health care system.
As Arnold Kling has been saying for years, many of us live under the delusion that we cannot possibly afford health care if we pay for it individually, but of course we can afford it if we pay for it collectively. For those of you who think that the government can magically make health care more affordable, just remember what happened after the government directed Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac to make home ownership more affordable.
Update:Charles Kenny makes a good point that better health care is not necessarily expensive.
Update II: Steve Chapman chimes in with a timely observation:
There are only three ways to pay for this expansion of health insurance coverage: increased taxes, reduced benefits, or shiny gold ingots falling out of the sky. Voters emphatically prefer the latter option, so that is the one most likely to be embraced by Congress and the administration.
Update III: Arnold Kling notes the problems with Obama’s “dessert now, spinach later” approach.
The Stand-up Economist on the Financial Crisis
Bad regulation vs. deregulation
Clear Thinkers favorite Niall Ferguson provides this timely reminder to those who believe that the financial turmoil of the past couple of years is the result of lax regulation of financial markets:
Human beings are as good at devising ex post facto explanations for big disasters as they are bad at anticipating those disasters. It is indeed impressive how rapidly the economists who failed to predict this crisis — or predicted the wrong crisis (a dollar crash) — have been able to produce such a satisfying story about its origins. Yes, it was all the fault of deregulation.
There are just three problems with this story. First, deregulation began quite a while ago (the Depository Institutions Deregulation and Monetary Control Act was passed in 1980). If deregulation is to blame for the recession that began in December 2007, presumably it should also get some of the credit for the intervening growth. Second, the much greater financial regulation of the 1970s failed to prevent the United States from suffering not only double-digit inflation in that decade but also a recession (between 1973 and 1975) every bit as severe and protracted as the one we’re in now. Third, the continental Europeans — who supposedly have much better-regulated financial sectors than the United States — have even worse problems in their banking sector than we do. The German government likes to wag its finger disapprovingly at the “Anglo Saxon” financial model, but last year average bank leverage was four times higher in Germany than in the United States. Schadenfreude will be in order when the German banking crisis strikes.
We need to remember that much financial innovation over the past 30 years was economically beneficial, and not just to the fat cats of Wall Street. New vehicles like hedge funds gave investors like pension funds and endowments vastly more to choose from than the time-honored choice among cash, bonds and stocks. Likewise, innovations like securitization lowered borrowing costs for most consumers. And the globalization of finance played a crucial role in raising growth rates in emerging markets, particularly in Asia, propelling hundreds of millions of people out of poverty.
The reality is that crises are more often caused by bad regulation than by deregulation. [. . .]
. . . Taxpayers, therefore, should beware. It is more than a little convenient for America’s political class to blame deregulation for this financial crisis and the resulting excesses of the free market. Not only does that neatly pass the buck, but it also creates a justification for . . . more regulation. The old Latin question is highly apposite here: Quis custodiet ipsos custodes? — Who regulates the regulators? Until that question is answered, calls for more regulation are symptoms of the very disease they purport to cure.
Stated another way, it’s not that rules are unnecessary for markets to perform efficiently. But what type of rules are better?
Rules that politicians enact and government bureaucrats enforce generally are far less efficient than rules that emerge as a result of the voluntary interactions of millions of individuals and companies. The successes and mistakes of those individuals and companies pursuing their own interests create rules that are the product of competition and personal responsibility. When those rules become sufficiently important in the fabric of a market economy, they become formalized as common law and precedent by courts. The distinction between inefficient government-imposed rules and the decentralized rules that facilitate productive market economies is an important one to understand as we wade through this current financial crisis.
The rules that the government is currently making up on the fly in connection with the Chrysler bankruptcy are a good example of rules that are destined to allocate resources inefficiently.