The creative nature of football innovation

case keenum Inasmuch as Texas has always been a hotbed of innovation in football, this guest Freakonomics post by law professors Kal Raustiala and Chris Sprigman caught my eye:

The theory behind copyright is simple – if we allow anyone to copy a good new idea, then no one will come up with the next one.  The theory makes perfect sense – in theory. [.  .  .]

There has been a lot of innovation in football, in both offensive and defensive systems.  But there has been virtually no attempt to copyright or patent these innovations.  There are some serious doctrinal hurdles, but it’s not impossible to imagine the law providing protection. [.  .  .]

So why do football coaches continue to innovate, even when they know that their rivals will study their innovations, take them and use them?  That is, why do football coaches engage in intellectual production without intellectual property?

The authors go on to characterize football as one of the industries in which innovation is best facilitated by intense competition rather than by copyright protection of new ideas. But what is interesting is that, even with the innovations of the pass-happy offenses of the past decade or so, the top teams at the highest levels of college and professional football continue to be the ones that balance an effective passing offense with a solid rushing attack that can wean time off the clock to protect a lead.

Sometimes the more things change in football, the more they remain the same.

Ringing the Bell

cadillac report I enjoyed the first big weekend of college and NFL football as much as anyone, but the probable concussion that star University of Houston QB Case Keenum suffered in the Cougars’ Friday night romp over UTEP reminded me of this Skip Rozin/Wall Street Journal article from awhile back:

Protecting football players from serious head injuries is making news again. Accused for years by outside critics and even Congress of dismissing the danger of concussions, the National Football League has finally installed measures to safeguard players during games and, when they are injured, to treat them more effectively.

The latest effort, a locker-room poster being sent to all NFL teams this month, alerts players to signs of concussion-such as nausea, dizziness and double vision-and urges anyone exhibiting these symptoms to be examined by a doctor. The initiative is supported by both the NFL and the players union.

The message embraces caution in what, for players, is a high-risk environment. Football is a collision sport. At the professional level, collisions occur between the biggest and fastest players and can wreak havoc. A vivid reminder of this came last week when safety Jack Tatum, nicknamed "The Assassin," was back in the news. Tatum, who passed away July 27, made a devastating hit on Darryl Stingley during a 1978 preseason game. The hit turned Stingley into a quadriplegic; no penalty was assessed.

One new rule enacted last season penalizes hits against defenseless players such as quarterbacks and wide receivers. In December, the league banned players who show symptoms of a concussion from returning to play or practice on the same day; they must also be cleared by the team physician and an independent neurologist. The biggest change came this March when the NFL replaced the doctors leading its brain- injury committee-who discredited mounting evidence linking concussions to serious brain damage-with doctors alarmed by the danger.

Welcome changes all, yet the glorification of violence remains a well-entrenched part of football.

In watching a weekend of hard-hitting football, I suspect that there are many more concussions resulting from the games than we even know about from evident injuries such as Keenum’s. As I’ve noted many times in regard to the misdirected governmental criminalization of performance-enhancing drug use, we have promoted a culture that encourages players to take these enormous health risks, but demonize them when they attempt to hedge the risk of the injuries that almost always result from engaging in such high-risk endeavors. What happens to the game of football when players start requiring the owners of that risk to compensate them for their injuries?

My sense is that the games that we watched over this past weekend may be played in a substantially different way in the not- to-distant future.

 

Houston Texans, Year Nine

gary-kubiak Year Nine of the Houston Texans begins this Sunday with a home game at Reliant Stadium against the dreaded Peyton Manning and the Colts, so it’s time for my seventh (!) annual preview of the hometown team.

The Texans finished off their eighth season in grand style by beating the mostly-trying Patriots with an impressive 21-point 4th quarter comeback. The win wasn’t enough to propel the Texans into the playoffs, but it was the Texans’ fourth win in their final five games of the 2009 season, which gave the franchise it’s first winning record (9-7). In the rather barren terrain of accomplishments that is Texansland, that was a major accomplishment.

Nevertheless, from a won-lost record standpoint, the Texans remain one of the worst expansion franchises in the history of the National Football League after eight seasons. As is usually the case in football, a myriad of influences have combined to cause the Texans’ poor overall record, not all of which are the fault of Texans management and players. Nevertheless, with a team as young and relatively unsuccessful as the Texans, it’s always helpful to review the team’s journey in evaluating whether it is probable that the team has made the progress necessary to make the leap into the NFL playoffs.

The Texans were the toast of Houston for their first three seasons during which Houston’s professional football-deprived fans were simply happy to have an NFL team again and didn’t really have much in the way of expectations. Texans management and the local mainstream media trumpeted the party line that Texans were building a playoff contender “the right way” — that is through prudent drafting and development of young players while eschewing the temptation of short-term rewards provided by over-priced veterans who were on the downside of their careers.

The progressively better won-loss records in the first three seasons (4-12, 5-11, and 7-9) — plus the drafting of young stars such as WR Andre Johnson, RB Dominack Davis (or whatever he ended up changing his name to) and CB Dunta Robinson — seemed to indicate that the Texans’ plan was working. The local mainstream media completely bought into that narrative.

Unfortunately, those progressively better won-loss records distracted Texans management from recognizing that the quality of the Texans’ overall roster was not close to that of an NFL playoff contender. The best evidence of that deficiency was that the Texans entered each of their first four seasons with the same two core problems — the Texans’ offensive line could not protect the quarterback and the Texans’ defensive front could not pressure the opposition’s QB.

Former Texans GM Charlie Casserly never could solve the offensive and defensive line problems (remember LT Tony Boselli, the flirtation with LT Orlando Pace, prospects such as Seth Wand and the thoroughly unimpressive DT’s, Anthony Weaver and Travis Johnson?). The 2005 draft was an absolute disaster (DT Johnson as the 15th pick in the first round?) and initial Texans head coach Dom Capers’ changes to the offensive and defensive systems between Years Three and Four proved equally dubious. After the Texans limped home with a desultory 2-14 record in Year Four, Texans owner Bob McNair mercifully cut the Casserly and Capers regime loose.

Reliant Stadium Subsequently, McNair decided to blow up his original management model and surprisingly hired Gary Kubiak, who promptly made (acquiesced to?) a whopper of a blunder in his first major personnel decision as Texans’ coach — retaining QB David Carr even though it was reasonably clear as early as before Year Three that Carr was unlikely to develop into even an average NFL QB.

Kubiak — who is a quick study in evaluating talent — promptly soured on Carr during the early stages of Year Five as Texans fans endured one of the worst offenses in the NFL that season. As a result of that horrible Year Five offense, Kubiak arguably overpaid for QB Matt Schaub before Year Six and clearly overpaid for over-the-hill free agent RB, Ahman Green. Not much changed through 12 games of Year Six as even the local mainstream media cheerleaders were questioning whether Kubiak was the proper coach to right the Texans’ ship.

Then, seemingly out of nowhere, the Texans showed some spark and won three of their last four games to finish with an 8-8 record for Year Six, the first non-losing record in franchise history. The Texans’ offense — even without Schaub and star WR Andre Johnson for five and seven games respectively — improved to 12th in the NFL in yards gained and 14th in points scored, by far the best finish of any Texans offense. That was enough to give long-suffering Texans fans hope that things might finally turn around for the franchise the following season.

Unfortunately, the Texans treaded water in Year Seven. A solid season-ending win over the Bears allowed the Texans to finish at 8-8 again, but the team did not contend for a playoff spot and suffered several demoralizing defeats. Given that the team had a 7-9 record after Year Three, a reasonable case could be made that not much progress had been made from the end of Year Three through Year Seven. The offense was better, but the defense was worse than it was after Year Three. Moreover, the 2007 draft was beginning to look almost as bad as the horrid 2005 draft. Had the deck chairs simply been rearranged on the Texans’ version of the Titanic?

Thankfully, several signs emerged in Year Seven that indicated the Texans were headed in the right direction. The offensive line and the receiving corps were far-improved and had more depth than at any time in franchise history. Despite being somewhat brittle, Schaub showed the talent necessary to be a consistently above-average NFL QB and RB Steve Slaton emerged as a game-breaking running back. Although the Texans’ defense did not improve statistically in Year Seven, the Texans had accumulated a nucleus of young defensive players who — with proper coaching and sensible personnel adjustments — were likely to gel into a reasonably effective unit sometime over the next couple of seasons.

Unfortunately, that progress really did not occur in Year Eight. After yet another loss to the Colts in Week 12, the Texans were 5-6 and already a long shot for the playoffs despite a generally favorable schedule. Slaton had inexplicably turned into a fumbling mess of a running back who ended up going on injured reserve after losing his starting job to a group of journeyman RB’s. So, despite winning four of their last five games to post their first winning record, the Texans’ Year Eight performance had the look of fool’s gold.

Andre-JohnsonAlthough disappointing, that performance was good enough to earn Texans’ coach Gary Kubiak another season at the helm. I’ve been skeptical from the start that Kubiak is the right coach to lead the Texans into the playoffs, primarily because I believe that he was not a good fit for the “strong coach” model that McNair adopted when he fired Casserly and Capers. McNair has endured quite a bit of on-the-job training with Kubiak that he probably would not have experienced with a more seasoned head coach.

On the other hand, each of Kubiak’s teams have improved during his tenure with the Texans and his current team appears on paper to be the strongest that the Texans have fielded in their nine seasons. Thus, even though every other NFL team has either made the playoffs or fired its head coach during Kubiak’s tenure with the Texans, Kubiak supporters can make a decent case that McNair made the right choice in retaining him, at least for Year Nine.

Despite my skepticism about Kubiak’s ability to lead the Texans over the playoff hump, he does have many positive characteristics. The players like him and play hard for him. He handles the players and media well, and I have always been impressed by his willingness to recognize mistakes, cut losses and make changes. Kubiak does not seem to be burdened with the stubbornness that often undermines NFL head coaches.

Moreover, continuity in coaching staffs is an underappreciated factor in the success of NFL teams, so maybe giving Kubiak more rope than most NFL coaches receive will finally produce McNair a winner. McNair certainly deserves it in view of his patient support of the Texans’ football operation.

But what does all of this mean for the Texans in Year Nine?

Given the high number of variables that play into a successful NFL season, picking NFL playoff teams is a highly speculative endeavor, at best. Given that constant change is a fact of NFL life, assessing something as seemingly simple as strength of schedule is a moving target and can literally change overnight, particularly given the high injury risk in the NFL.

My sense is that the Texans have accumulated enough talented football players on offense to be playoff-caliber so long as QB Schaub remains healthy and new PK Neil Rackers doesn’t have a meltdown like Kris Brown had last season. But defensive improvement will probably again be the key to whether this season is a breakthrough season for the Texans or another disappointment.

Inasmuch as one of the Texan’s best defensive players (LB Brian Cushing) is suspended for the first four games and Kubiak elected to go with a young and relatively inexperienced secondary, my sense is that defensive improvement will be slow and probably not evident until later in the season. Accordingly, I’m placing the over/under for Texans’ wins this season at eight, the same number as I predicted last season. Eight wins will not be good enough to make the playoffs.

Oh well, patience is certainly a virtue for anyone who is a Texans fan.

Finally, as with my regular baseball reports on the Stros, I’m dispensing this season with the weekly football game reviews that I’ve done over the past seven years. The blogosphere has grown to the point where virtually every pro and college team has a blog that covers each team far better than I ever could in my once-a-week posts. As with the Stros, I’ll continue to do an occasional post on discrete games or issues during the season, but simply not on a weekly basis anymore.

Moreover, with the maturation of the sports blogosphere, there really is no reason to rely any longer on the mainstream media for football news and analysis. For several years now, Alan Burge has been doing a much better job of covering the Texans on a nuts and bolts basis than the mainstream media, while bloggers Stephanie Stradley, Lance Zerlein and Houston Diehards all provide first-rate analysis of particular issues facing the Texans.

Similarly, on the college football front, both The
Wizard of Odds
and the Pre-Snap Report are excellent resources for keeping up with the college football season overall. With regard to blogs that cover particular teams, Barking Carnival is my favorite for the Texas Longhorns, while I Am the 12th Man does a good job of covering the Texas Aggies.

On the local front, the best sources of information on the Houston Cougars are Steve Campbell’s blog and Fight for Red and White blog, while The Rice Football Webletter does a great job of covering the Owls.

So, with that, let the games begin!

Are you ready for some football?

The draft of Year XXIII of the Fantasy Football League of Houston (yes, that’s year 23 – our league was one of the first) was held last night and a good time was had by all. And thankfully, Norman Tugwater did not show up.

Training camp — A football tradition that needs to die

Nfl-injuriesLast week, this post noted the growing financial implications of injury risk in the National Football League and the utter lunacy of exposing high-priced player assets to such injury risk during the NFL’s grueling pre-season practices and games.

This week, William Rhoden of the NY Times notices the same thing:

The N.F.L. perpetrates two annual frauds: one against the American public, the other against players who give body and blood to make the league a multibillion-dollar enterprise.

The first fraud is preseason football, those empty, glamorized scrimmages that teams force on season-ticket holders as parts of the regular-season package.

The second, more dangerous fraud is training camp, which exposes veteran players to unnecessary risk and perpetuates the myth that football is more complicated than it really is.

Despite the fact that every NFL player engages in year-around training, the tradition of a long and largely useless training camp still survives at the highest level of American football. Thankfully, at least some in NFL management are starting to notice:

“I don’t know if the body has enough time to recuperate because you’re seeing so many soft-tissue injuries,” Jerry Reese, the Giants’ general manager, said. “There’s more opportunity for injury because there’s so much more time on the field. Then you have training camp and you go double during training camp. And you see all across the league there are a bunch of injuries.” [.  .  .]

“It’s a balancing act; I’m not sure how well we’re balancing it right now.” [.  .  .]

Giants linebacker Keith Bulluck said it did not make sense for players to beat one another up in camp “and then when we have to go play a team, we don’t have the player that we need.”

Bulluck recalled that in his rookie season, in 2000, most teams held two-a-day practices with lots of contact. “It was physical, very physical, when I came in,” he said.

Over the years, many teams have evolved toward more classroom work. [.  .  .]

Referring to Giants camp, he added: “Not too many two-a-days here, either. I guess the coaches are beginning to understand that it’s more about the season. Beating the guys up in August doesn’t help in September, October, November and December.”

This much is certain: training camp is an idea that has outlived its usefulness.

There are few athletic endeavors more boring than football practice. Hammering players for a month and a half before a brutal 4+ month season makes no sense at all.

Teams should complete their hardest workouts a couple of months before the beginning of the season and then tailor pre-season work-outs toward maximizing strength, speed and health while emphasizing scheme understanding.

As Rhoden’s article notes, teams are slowly moving that way. But, then again, despite serious training camp attrition already, did you know that Texans Coach Gary Kubiak announced earlier this week that he intended to expose his starters to high injury risk for three quarters in this week’s practice game against the Cowboys?

So it goes.

The financial implications of NFL injury risk

kearse_injury_300As we endure the annual, mind-numbing boredom of NFL pre-season football, my thoughts about football are elsewhere.

That is, why on earth do NFL teams expose their valuable players to such extreme risk of injury when the games do not even count?

The local Texans lost their first second round draft choice to injury for the season this past weekend. And for what?

The elephant in the closet in regard to football overall and the NFL in particular is the increasing recognition of the high injury risk that players are taking. Although this NY Times article involves primarily former MLB star Lou Gehrig and speculation whether he really died of amyotrophic lateral sclerosis, the article provides an overview of new clinical evidence that the brain damage being suffered by NFL players is severe:

Doctors at the Veterans Affairs Medical Center in Bedford, Mass., and the Boston University School of Medicine, the primary researchers of brain damage among deceased National Football League players, said that markings in the spinal cords of two players and one boxer who also received a diagnosis of A.L.S. indicated that those men did not have A.L.S. at all. They had a different fatal disease, doctors said, caused by concussion like trauma, that erodes the central nervous system in similar ways.

The finding could prompt a redirection in the study of motor degeneration in athletes and military veterans being given diagnoses of A.L.S. at rates considerably higher than normal, said several experts in A.L.S. who had seen early versions of the paper. Patients with significant histories of brain trauma could be considered for different types of treatment in the future, perhaps leading toward new pathways for a cure. [ . . .]

A link between professional football and A.L.S. follows recent discoveries of on-field brain trauma leading to dementia and other cognitive decline in some N.F.L. veterans. Dr. McKee and her group identified 14 former N.F.L. players since 1960 as having been given diagnoses of A.L.S., a total about eight times higher than what would be expected among men in the United States of similar ages.

However, the doctors cautioned, the existence of the increased number of A.L.S.-like cases should not create the same level of public alarm as the cognitive effects of brain trauma, which affect hundreds of former professionals and perhaps thousands of boys and girls across many youth sports.

Although even players commonly continue to underestimate injury risk in the NFL, my sense is that such miscalculations are being understood better and will likely recede. With NFL teams facing increasing litigation risk from injured players, will NFL teams be able to use the shield of the collective bargaining process much longer to protect the league members from the possibly severe financial implications of that risk?

And if the NFL is facing potentially dire financial implications from the increasing recognition of high injury risk, what about the implications for college football, where the compensation paid to players is regulated more rigidly than in the NFL?

Finally, will the financial implications of injury risk in football eventually prompt dramatic changes in the way the game is played?

Seems to me that these questions are a lot more interesting than pre-season football.

A Texas Legend Fades

Emory BellardFormer Texas A&M and long-time Texas high school football coach Emory Bellard — who invented the famous Wishbone triple-option offense that transformed college football in the late 1960’s and 70’s — is suffering from amyotrophic lateral sclerosis, more commonly known as Lou Gehrig’s disease. The Chron’s Richard Justice passes along the news along with many nice remembrances of several of his former players.

Coach Bellard is truly a Texas football legend. He was an extraordinarily successful Texas high school coach from 1952 to 1966 at Ingleside, Breckenridge and San Angelo Central — his teams won the 1958 and ’59 state titles at Breckenridge and the 1966 crown at San Angelo Central.

But it’s Coach Bellard’s college coaching career that most folks remember. Darrell Royal hired Bellard as an assistant coach at the University of Texas in 1967 where Bellard developed the Wishbone offense that was instrumental in the success of UT’s 1969 and 1970 national championship teams that won 30 straight games.

Largely on the basis of his success at UT, Coach Bellard was named head coach at Texas A&M in 1972 and appeared to have the Aggie program at the brink of national prominence in 1978. Then, seemingly out of nowhere, a tumultuous two-week period midway through that season resulted in Bellard resigning the head coaching position that he coveted.

Coach Bellard went on to coach at Mississippi State from 1979-85, but this quintessential Texas football coach always looked somewhat out of place in SEC country.

So, after retiring from coaching upon getting the axe at Mississippi State, Coach Bellard returned to his Texas high school roots at the age of 61 and coached for six more years at Spring Westfield High School. Westfield had won four games combined the two seasons prior to Coach Bellard taking over. Under Coach Bellard, Westfield went 41-22-5 and reached the Class 5A Division I quarterfinals his last two seasons. After his Westfield stint, Coach Bellard finally retired from coaching for good and moved to Georgetown north of Austin, where he became a regular at Berry Creek Golf Club.

Emory Bellard is a bright thread in the fabric of Texas that makes this such a fascinating place. May his final days be restful ones. He will be missed.

The Chronicle and the NFL Draft go in opposite directions

McClain Although I continue not to understand the attraction, the National Football League’s annual draft of players over this past weekend garnered record television ratings.

Meanwhile, Kevin Whited notes that the Houston Chronicle continues to bleed badly in terms of circulation. The local daily posted a staggering 13.77% decline in daily circulation, and a 9.76% decline in Sunday circulation in the latest numbers.

Frankly, the Chronicle’s coverage of the NFL draft is a good case study on why it is losing readers rapidly.

Despite the growing popularity of the draft, the Chronicle’s main sportswriters — John McClain and Richard Justice — serve up cheerleading glop about the Texans’ draft each year even though the local club has been arguably the least successful expansion franchise in NFL history. But for Chron bloggers such as Steph Stradley and Lance Zierlein, there really wouldn’t be anything of substance about the draft to read in the Chronicle. Heck, this breathless Justice column from the other day piece is practically the same as his equally fatuous article about the Texans’ 2007 draft at the time.

As the always-insightful Alan Burge points out, it is silly to evaluate an NFL team’s draft until at least three seasons later because of the nebulous nature of selecting prospects who will turn out to be productive NFL players. And as I noted at the time — the Texans’ 2007 draft was not as impressive as Justice’s flowery evaluation at the time. While Burge is charitable in giving the Texans’ effort a C-minus grade, Justice has yet to realize that his glowing report of Texans management’s performance in the 2007 draft was flat wrong.

Thus, while the Chron continues to run the mailed-in work on popular events, bloggers such as Burge are filling the void with substantive analysis. Consumers eventually notice and gravitate toward the substance and away from the blather.

I wonder whether Chronicle management will notice before it’s too late?

How about an NFL auction?

Mel Kiper The most mind-numbing time of the year from a professional sports perspective is clearly the NFL pre-season, but a close second is the NFL Draft, even though some of the reactions that it generates are rather humorous.

But as this Reed Albertotti/WSJ article points out, all this fuss is being made about something that is really obsolescent:

The draft was once an innovative solution for distributing college talent to pro teams, but that was 75 years ago. The economics of pro football have gradually made it less effective, and as the college game becomes increasingly different from the NFL, players have become even more difficult to scout.

What’s surprising is that the NFL, a league with a long history of making sweeping rules changes, hasn’t much changed its draft format since the draft was first held in 1936. Since then, an entire academic-research area known as "market design," a spinoff of the Nobel Prize-winning concept of game theory, has grown exponentially to serve just this purposeóhelping markets operate more efficiently by creating better rules and procedures to govern them.

And the best alternative would actually make the draft much more fun to watch ñ an old-fashioned auction of players:

Three researchers at Harvard Business Schoolówho studied under Alvin Roth, a Harvard professor and a pioneer in market-design theoryóhave proposed an alternative to the NFL draft.

Under their plan, all 32 teams would be given seven picks. They would have to abide by a spending cap that would go higher to lowerówith the worst team (based on its record the previous season) having the most money to spend. When the bidding opened, the most sought-after players would draw multiple bids. Teams could then raise their bid as high as they’d like for a player they coveted.

Theoretically, a team could get any player it wantedóso long as it was prepared to pinch pennies on everyone else. Meanwhile, a team that didn’t want to break the bank on any particular player could pick up lots of useful parts by spreading its money around evenly. Teams could also thrive by focusing on the bidding and looking for bargains.

Management of NFL teams would probably resist an auction because it would complicate the development of their drafting strategy. But itís not as if most teams do all that well drafting players under the current system. And it would sure make it more entertaining for the fans.

The NFL’s big risk

everett_600.jpgThis post from awhile back noted the high risks that NFL football players take relative to their compensation.

Well, it looks as if that risk may be coming home to roost:

Californiaís workersí compensation system provides a unique, and relatively unknown, haven for retired professional athletes among the 50 states, allowing hundreds of long-retired veterans each year to file claims for injuries sustained decades before. Players need not have played for California teams or be residents of the state; they had to participate in just one game in the state to be eligible to receive lifetime medical care for their injuries from the teams and their insurance carriers.

About 700 former N.F.L. players are pursuing cases in California, according to state records, with most of them in line to receive routine lump-sum settlements of about $100,000 to $200,000. This virtual assembly line has until now focused on orthopedic injuries, with torn shoulders and ravaged knees obvious casualties of the playersí former workplace.

Given the dozens and perhaps hundreds of players who could file similar claims, experts in the California system said N.F.L. teams and their insurers could be facing liability of $100 million or more. They identified a wide spectrum of possible effects: these costs could merely represent a financial nuisance for a league that recorded $8.5 billion in revenue last year, or, if insurance costs rise drastically because of such claims, the N.F.L. could be forced to alter its rules to reduce head trauma. Officials already are considering decreased contact in practice and forbidding linemen from using the three-point stance.

Perhaps the NFLís undervaluing of this risk is a product of a false sense of security that the NFL owners have nurtured from a collective bargaining process that has shielded the league from most anti-trust liabilities over the years. But the NFL owners better pay attention to this development. Plaintiffsí lawyers will have a field day against that group.