Thoughts on the regulation of minor league football and basketball

Several developments over the past month or so have prompted me to think about the National Collegiate Athletic Association‘s regulation of minor league football and basketball. Although it is an unincorporated association that includes many of the best universities in America, the NCAA has developed into a hulking and bloated bureaucracy that is the poster child for ineffective and misguided regulation.
One of the developments that triggered my thinking was the disclosure this past week that one of the best players on each of the University of Texas’ basketball, football and baseball teams had been declared academically ineligible for the spring semester. That’s not much of a return on the astounding $1.6 million a year that UT is currently spending on academic assistance for its athletes.
This UT academic problems come on the heels of the announcement last month that the NCAA — whose rules and regulations manual already resembles the Internal Revenue Code in terms of size and complexity — approved the first phase of a “landmark” academic reform package under which about 30 percent of Division I football teams (including UT’s) would lose scholarships if the reforms were to be implemented immediately. The demand for professors with expertise in developing basket-weaving curricula is going to increase at more than a few NCAA member institutions in response to this latest NCAA initiative.
Meanwhile, partly as a result of the NCAA’s strict regulation of compensation that can be paid to athletes in intercollegiate football and basketball (i.e., essentially scholarships), salaries for college coaches skyrocket at the same time as a black market for compensating college football and basketball players continues to run rampant, despite the NCAA and now the government‘s efforts to curtail it.
Finally, a college baseball game in Houston over the weekend between Rice and Texas A&M during the Minute Maid Classic Baseball Classic drew almost 20,000 fans. That’s right — a college baseball game, in February, drew almost 20,000 fans.
What are we to make of all of this?
Well, a bit of historical perspective helps. For all of its faults, Major League Baseball is the only one of the three major professional sports (football, basketball and baseball) that has capitalized and subsidized a thorough minor league development system. Oh, the NBA has its development league and the NFL has NFL Europe, but both of these ventures pale in comparison to the depth and success of baseball’s minor league system. As a result, it’s relatively rare for a baseball player to play in the Major Leagues without spending at least some time playing minor league baseball. In comparison, relatively few of the players in the NFL or the NBA ever play in NFL-Europe or the NBADL.
The reason for this is not that professional football and basketball players do not need to develop their skills in a minor league. Rather, the reason is that professional football and basketball simply rely on a ready-made minor league systems to develop most of their players — that is, intercollegiate football and basketball.
This odd arrangement arose partly as a result of how professional sports developed in America over the past century. On one hand, professional baseball was already well-established in the late 19th century when intercollegiate football and basketball started taking root. Thus, MLB developed its minor league system as a necessary means to develop its players decades before intercollegiate baseball became popular on college campuses. Intercollegiate baseball has only become a source of player development for professional baseball over the past couple of decades or so, and it is still rare for a college baseball player to go straight from playing college baseball to playing in the Major Leagues.
On the other hand, despite the popularity of the NFL and the NBA today, the success of of those professional sports is still relatively recent in comparison with MLB’s business success over the past century. Until the 1960’s in regard to football, and the 1980’s in regard to basketball, neither professional sport was particularly vibrant financially or as popular with the public as their intercollegiate counterparts. Thus, until relatively recently, neither the NFL nor the NBA has been in a financial position to capitalize a minor league system of player development similar to MLB’s minor league system.
However, now that the NFL and the NBA owners have the financial wherewithal to subsidize viable minor league systems, they have little economic incentive to do so. Inasmuch as the NCAA and its member institutions have transformed intercollegiate football and basketball into a free minor league system for the NFL and the NBA, the owners of professional football and basketball teams have gladly accepted the NCAA member institutions’ generosity.
The arrangement has been extraordinary successful for professional football and basketball owners, who have seen the value of their clubs skyrocket over the past two decades. A substantial part of that increase in value is attributable to avoiding the cost of developing a minor league system, as well as taking advantage of liberal public financing arrangements for the construction of new stadiums and areanas. That latter point is a subject for another day.
In comparison, the NCAA member institutions’ acceptance of minor league professional status has not been nearly as successful. Yes, the top tier of intercollegiate football and basketball programs have had been successful financially, but the athletic programs of most NCAA member institutions struggle financially.
Moreover, almost every NCAA member institution compromises academic integrity at least to some extent in order to attract the best players possible to play on the institution’s football and basketball teams. As a result, respected academics such as UT Chancellor Mark Yudof regularly have to endure troubling scandals (in Yudof’s case, as president of the University of Minnesota) that underscore the tension between the business of minor league professional sports and the academic integrity of NCAA member institutions. The NCAA member institutions’ reaction to these conflicts has generally been to increase regulation with usually unsatisfactory results.
So, what is the solution to this mess? Well, it’s doubtful that more regulation of college football and basketball is the answer. Rather, my sense is that the model for reform is right in the front of the noses of the NCAA member institutions — i.e., college baseball.
Due to MLB’s well-structured minor league system of player development, a baseball player emerging from high school has a choice: Do I accept a moderate compensation level to play professional ball in the minor leagues in the hope of developing to the point of being a highly-paid MLB player? Or do I hedge the risk of not developing sufficiently to play at the MLB level by accepting a subsidized college education while developing my skills playing intercollegiate baseball?
This simple choice is the key difference between intercollegiate football and basketball, on one hand, and intercollegiate baseball on the other. Except for the relatively few high school basketball players who are sufficiently developed to be able to play professional basketball in the NBA or Europe immediately after high school, high school football and basketball players’ only realistic choice for developing the skills to play at the highest professional level is college football or basketball.
Consequently, each year, the NCAA member institutions fall over themselves trying to accomodate a large pool of talented football and basketball players who have little or no interest in collegiate academics. Rather than placing the cost and risk of these players’ development on the professional football and basketball clubs, the NCAA member institutions continue to incur the huge cost of subsidizing development of these players while engaging in the charade that these professional players are really “student-athletes.”
In comparison, most top college baseball teams are generally comprised of two types of players — a few professional-caliber players combined with a greater number of well-motivated student-athletes. That is an attractive blend of players, and the tremendous increase in popularity of college baseball over the past decade reflects the entertaining competition that results from such a player mix. Heck, the college baseball system is structured so well that even a small academic institution can win the National Championship in college baseball.
Nevertheless, transforming the current minor league system in college football and basketball into the college baseball model is going to take fundamental reforms within the NCAA. Primarily, it’s going to require the courage and resilience of the presidents of the NCAA member institutions, who need to stand up and quit being played as patsies by the NFL and NBA owners who prefer to foist the risk of funding and administering minor league systems on to the NCAA member institutions.
Moreover, such a transformation of college football and basketball from entrenched minor league systems will be risky. The quality of play in college football and basketball will suffer a bit, even though the competition likely would not. In time, such a transformation would force both the NFL and the NBA to expand their minor league systems to develop the skills of the pool of physically-gifted athletes who prefer to develop their skills as minor league professionals rather than as college students. Competition from such true minor league football and basketball teams might result in a decrease in popularity of college football and basketball.
However, such a transformation would remove most of the galling incentives to compromise academic integrity and to engage in the black market for compensating players that are rife under the current system. Likewise, once viable professional minor leagues in football and basketball exist, football and basketball players will have the same choice coming out of high school that has generated the well-motivated mix of players that has made college baseball such an entertaining intercollegiate sport over the past decade.
Now that type of choice — rather than the choice of which basket-weaving course to take in order to remain eligible — is the kind of choice that NCAA member institutions should be encouraging.

Markets and college sports

Before moving to Houston 33 years ago, I was born and raised in Iowa City, Iowa where my late father was a longtime University of Iowa Medical School faculty member.
As with most young folks who grow up in Iowa City, I became immersed in the rather remarkable culture of the University of Iowa Hawkeye sports programs, particularly the football and basketball programs. From 1960 through 1971, I attended virtually every Iowa home football and basketball game. Although I have not found much of a market for my services in this area, I remain one of the relatively few experts on those Iowa programs from that era.
What brings all this up is an interesting situation that has been playing out with regard to the Hawkeye basketball team over the past week. Pierre Pierce, who has started something like 82 or 84 games during his three season career at Iowa, was dismissed from the team because of a squabble with a girlfriend that has resulted in a police investigation. Pierce has not been charged with a crime, but the probable reason that Pierce was dismissed from the team rather than suspended pending the outcome of the investigation is that he had been effectively suspended for a season (i.e., red-shirted for a season) a couple of years ago after copping a plea bargain in connection with aggravated sexual assault charges that had been leveled against him.
In this post, Professor Ribstein — from Hawkeye arch-rival, the University of Illinois — makes the point that markets were already making the UI athletic administration’s job somewhat easier in dismissing Pierce:

It must be tough to drop such a player. A team’s success has huge financial implications for a big-time sports school. But it is, still, a school, and discipline of misconduct is an important part of the educational mission. So there’s a conflict of interest at all management levels (not just the coach), because of conflicting criteria for judging their performance. This sounds to me a lot like the corporate social responsibility debate — profits vs. society.
But I’ve argued that markets sort out these conflicts in the corporate area, and markets seem to be working here, as many at Iowa were expressing displeasure with the school’s failure to act against Pierce.

Professor Ribstein is correct in his analysis, although it is just part of the story. Attendance at Hawkeye basketball games — which has been a tough ticket in Iowa for over 50 years — has diminished to the lowest levels in decades this season, despite the fact that the Hawkeye team is a Top 25 team and, as Professor Ribstein mentions in his post, took number one ranked and undefeated Illinois into overtime last week before losing a close game. As with most markets, a variety of factors is contributing to the declining attendance at Hawkeye basketball games, but no one who knows anything about the Hawkeye culture doubts for a second that the primary reason for the decline is many Hawkeye fans’ disdain for Pierce and his primary supporter, Hawkeye basketball coach Steve Alford. The fascinating element to this is that the Hawkeye fans’ disdain may be as much based on Coach Alford’s limitations in evaluating Pierce’s playing ability as it is on Pierce’s apparent character flaws.
Coach Alford was hired at Iowa six years ago with the promise that he was going to take the traditionally very good Iowa basketball program to the “elite” level of college basketball programs. Unfortunately for Coach Alford, the program has actually gone in the other direction during his tenure, and the latest chapter in the Pierce saga is probably going to be the straw that breaks the camel’s back in pushing the UI administration to buyout his contract and bring in a new coach.
Regardless of whether Coach Alford’s decision to support Pierce was based on alturistic “everyone is entitled to a second chance” principles or more grizzled “the team really needs him” principles, the market for Iowa basketball has firmly rejected Coach Alford’s decision. And interestingly, the market is at least partly rejecting Coach Alford’s competence as an evaluator of basketball talent because, as this excellent analysis points out, the reality is that Coach Alford overrated Pierce as a basketball player and Iowa’s team is likely not going to miss him much:

Pierre Pierce was clearly the focal point of Iowa’s offense through its first seven conference games. Since he scored in such an inefficient fashion, his absence in the offense probably won’t be the crisis some are making it out to be. The team going forward will be more balanced and made up of more efficient scorers, so they should be able to pick up the slack from the fallen star.

Stated simply, Pierce is like the .300 hitter in baseball whose on-base average is only .310 and whose slugging percentage is only .320. Because the non-experts in player evaluation believe that a .300 batting average equates with good hitting, the general public is deceived into thinking that the player is a good hitter despite the fact that the less well known but more important on base average and slugging percentage statistics reflect that the player is far below average. Pierce has a relatively high scoring average because he shoots frequently, but his poor shooting percentage and high turnover rate hurt the team more than his high scoring average contributes to it.
So, not only does the Pierce story intersect, as Professor Ribstein points out, the business of college sports and university corporate governance, it also points to the rather remarkable power of markets in effecting change in the entertainment business. The market for Hawkeye basketball recognizes that Coach Alford’s decision to make the overrated Pierce the focal point of the Hawkeye team reflects his limitations as a coach who will be able to fulfill the market’s expectation that the Iowa program remain at least the traditionally very good program that it has been over the past 50 years. That market is demanding a new (and hopefully better) coach, and it will likely get it.
Meanwhile, the market for Hawkeye football is quite strong as Hawkeye Coach Kirk Ferentz has just hauled in a top recruiting class on the heels of three straight major bowl appearances and Top Ten finishes. Interestingly, Coach Ferentz’s turnaround of the Hawkeye football program has been performed essentially by following the football model of the Super Bowl champion New England Patriots, which emphasizes teamwork and making no player the focal point of the team. Call it the “low risk with high upside” model of building a football program.
Yes, markets truly are in everything.

Galveston’s Jack Johnson

In this NY Times Book Review, David Margolick reviews Geoffrey C. Ward‘s new biography on Galveston’s Jack Johnson, who was the first black heavyweight champion of the world. Johnson’s story is an enthralling and important tale.
When Johnson first won the heavyweight championship at the relatively advanced age (for a boxer) of 30 in 1908, it was one of the most important dates for African-Americans between Emancipation and the Civil Rights movement of the 1960’s. At the time, the mere idea of a black man being the heavyweight champ sent many people into a panic, including more than a few in the press corps. When retired heavyweight champ Jim Jeffries was persuaded to make an unwise comeback to take on Johnson late in 1908, Johnson’s throttling of the over-the-hill Jeffries triggered some of the nation’s worst race riots of the early 20th century.
Inasmuch as Johnson endured a substantial risk of being lynched at some of his fights, his prominence and feats staked new ground for many black Americans, who were still just a half century removed from slavery. During this week in which the modern news media has been expressing outrage at Randy Moss‘ touchdown celebration last Sunday at Green Bay, it is important to remember that such silliness likely would have prompted far worse consequences in America less than a century ago.
Stylistically, Johnson was the precursor of Muhammad Ali. He developed artful footwork and movement to avoid the bull charges of the other heavyweights of the era, which was dominated by brawlers. Although the media of the era acknowledged Johnson’s physical strength, standard racial stereotypes of those times held that black fighters lacked substance and would wilt when truly tested. The fearless and provocative Johnson took that stereotype and stood it on its head.
After he lost the title, Johnson — who died in a car crash in 1946 at the age of 68 — became a frustrated and embittered man, who in his later years even turned on the American legend, Joe Louis. As a result, Johnson alienated himself from even the generally supportive African-American community of the times, which was much more comfortable with the soothing presence of Mr. Louis. It was not until after Ali took a page from Johnson’s free-spirited ways in promoting his boxing career that historians began to reassess the meaning of Johnson’s life and societal impact. That process continues with Mr. Ward’s new book, as well as Ken Burns’ new documentary, The Rise and Fall of Jack Johnson: Unforgivable Blackness, which premieres on PBS on January 17 (next Monday).
Check out this fascinating story about a remarkable Houston-area native. You will not be disappointed.

The Mismanagement of the Houston Rockets

Although I have followed basketball most of my life, I find it difficult to generate any enthusiasm for the Houston Rockets.

It has not always been that way. I moved to Houston in 1972 at about the same time as the Rockets franchise moved to Houston from San Diego, so I have always felt a connection to the club.

My late father and I used to attend Rockets games regularly, even back before the Rockets had their own arena. Until 1975, the Rockets played mostly at Hofheinz Pavilion on the University of Houston campus.

Then, in 1994-5, the magnificent Hakeem Olajuwon led the Rockets to two straight NBA titles, the second of which was achieved with the help of local legend Clyde Drexler, who originally burst on the scene with Olajuwon on the University of Houston’s memorable Phi Slama Jama teams from 1982-84.

With the demise of the Oilers before their exodus to Nashville, and before the Biggio-Bagwell era of the Stros led to multiple MLB playoff appearances, the Rockets were the toast of the town for most of the 1990’s.

However, despite the two NBA titles, Rockets’ management has always had a curious tendency to make poor personnel decisions.

For example, after it was clear that Olajuwon would be a far better player than former number one draft pick, Ralph Sampson, the Rockets delayed trading Sampson until his value had eroded to the point that they could only get Sleepy Floyd and the eminently forgettable Joe Barry Carroll in return.

Even more galling is the fact that Rockets management overlooked talented local players such as Ricky Pierce (Rice), Bo Outlaw (UH), Rashard Lewis (Alief Elsik HS), and Damon Jones (UH), the last three of whom could be playing significant roles on the current Rockets club.

To make matters worse, the Rockets management decisions over the past several years have gone from dubious to just plain horrible.

First, they used a second overall pick in the NBA draft on Steve Francis — a good player who has limitations that will keep him from ever achieving elite stature in the NBA — who they proceeded to trade over this past offseason to Orlando as a part of the deal for the talented but injury-proneĀ Tracy McGrady.

Rockets management used another number one draft choice on power forward Eddie Griffin, who was more interesting in the daily police report than the sports section during his short stay with the club.

Finally, Rockets management either gave or acquired expensive long term contracts on such mediocre role players as Matt Maloney, Moochie Norris, Brent Price, Maurice Taylor, Kelvin Cato, Juwan Howard — the list of bad personnel moves just goes on and on.

Comparing the public’s waning interest in the Rockets to the popularity of the Texans, one Houston businessman put it to me in this way: “How would you like to be trying to sell luxury suites to the Toyota Center?.”

Had Rockets management not at least had the common sense to draft and sign Yao Ming, things might be utterly hopeless at this point.

So, it is against this backdrop that Peter Vecsey, the longtime NBA columnist based in New York, absolutely lays the wood to Rockets management over the team’s latest move:

[I]t’s beyond comprehension what [Rockets General Manager Carroll] Dawson and [Rockets coach] Jeff Van Gundy are thinking.

Acquiring [New Orleans Hornets guard David] Wesley, 34, isn’t as irrelevant as the Mavericks swapping Dan Dickau (again, at least the Hornets got potential) for dead end Darrell Armstrong, but it’s not much better. . . Wesley will take shots away from Tracy McGrady and Yao Ming, and maybe even Hakeem.

. . . Wesley doesn’t loosely qualify as a pure point guard. Wherever he’s roamed he’s been a shoot-first, pass-as-a-last-resort type guard. Meanwhile, Jackson’s a deadlier shooter. Moreover, Wesley doesn’t give it up. I’ll say! He wouldn’t even make a pass at Kobe’s wife.

If Wesley’s arrival in Van Gundy’s starting backcourt isn’t opaque enough, this is the worst he’s played since the bad old days in New Jersey and Boston, his first two pro seasons.

And Vecsey goes on to point out that the Wesley deal isn’t the only bad one the Rockets have made lately:

Not to say Wesley, even in his current state of disrepute, isn’t an improvement on what the Rockets have on playmaking patrol. On second thought, I will say it; at best, he’s a Bob Sura clone and substantially superior to Charlie Ward, whose game is so shabby four houses of worship refused him sanctuary.

These are the two pointless guards management chose to sign last summer as free agents to “complement” Tyronn Lue, exchanged last week for Jon Barry, whose poisonous attitude and bad mouthing of coaches when not playing has led to his last three change of addresses.

Obviously, Van Gundy had some say regarding the recruitment of his perennial pet mistake. Ward got $1.7M and $1.8M guaranteed with a $2.04M team option. Why wait, Jeff? Pick it up right now. Nobody else was offering more than a 10-day contract. But Carroll, who helped Rudy Tomjanovich assemble Houston’s two title teams (’94-’95), has the (last) sway.

Carroll has been groping since, overpaying ineligible receivers as if he were bidding against Warriors whiz Chris Mullin. Maurice Taylor, Shandon Anderson, Howard Eisley, Matt Maloney (on the Rockets’ cap this season, his last, at last, for $3.237,250), Brent Price and Moochie Norris were all rewarded with senseless long-term contracts.

Sura was the latest to strike it rich without earning it, unless you deem last season’s stats (7.5 points, 2.9 assists, 1.3 turnovers and 41 percent from the field) for the hopeless Hawks noteworthy. Thanks to the Rockets’ tainted top talent scout, owner Les Alexander owes the 10-year rent-a-wreck $3.2M/$3.5M/$3.8M this year and the next two . . .

Thanks to Carroll (Van Gundy, too), the Rockets are being forced to restock, if not rethink. That might be asking too much.

So, Rockets owner Les Alexander is in a tough spot.

Both of Houston’s other major professional teams and their owners are more popular among Houstonians than the Rockets and Alexander. While the Texans and Stros play in front of record crowds, the Rockets are regularly having trouble drawing 10,000 people to their games. Although I am a regular target of the Rockets’ season ticket sales staff, I haven’t attended a game in years and have little interest in doing so.

Moreover, given the Rockets management’s dubious track record in player evaluation, it’s hard to be optimistic about the club’s prospects. Yao and McGrady are the only players on the Rockets team around whom a playoff caliber club could be built.

Nearly a decade has passed since the Rockets’ glory years. The club has declined dramatically since then, and the decline has accelerated over the past several years.

Absent considerable improvement in the club’s player evaluation process, my sense is that the Rockets will become even more of an afterthought on the Houston scene than they have already become.

Sports notes on UH bball, Jackie Sherrill, golf, Mack Brown, Gene Conley and Friday Night Lights, Houston style

The Houston Cougars men’s basketball team had a nice win over LSU last night, as new coach Tom Penders continues to make my post on his hiring look bad.
Meanwhile, former Texas A&M, Pittsburgh, and Mississippi State head football coach Jackie Sherrill has teed off on the NCAA in a lawsuit over in Mississippi. The over/under bet on this lawsuit is $1 million.
On a more pleasant note, 55 year old Austin resident Tom Kite — fresh off an impressive performance in the 2004 U.S. Open — plans to rejoin the regular PGA Tour next month and become the oldest exempt player in Tour history.
Also on the golf scene, in concrete evidence that securities regulators do not have enough to do, this recent Wall Street Journal ($) article reports that regulators have embarked on sweeping inquiries into Wall Street gift-and-entertainment practices, particularly golf junkets that Wall Street firms provide to mutual-fund executives and other money managers they are trying to woo for trading business:

NASD regulators, for example, have started to examine golf outings that Bank of America Corp. provided to Fidelity Investments’ head of stock trading, people familiar with the matter said. As the bank worked in recent years to win trading business from Fidelity, it hosted the executive, Scott DeSano, at the annual AT&T Pebble Beach National Pro-Am golf tournament several times, allowing him to play alongside the pros competing in the event, which raises money for charity.

What next? Eliot Spitzer to sue?
Also in the combat department, as the University of Texas football team and its supporters prepare for their trip to L.A. for the Rose Bowl on New Year’s Day, the Dallas Morning News’ Greg Fraley throws down the gauntlet and declares the run for the Roses a make or break game for Longhorn coach Mack Brown:

Texas and Brown must win a game on the main stage for once, or never again demand to play with the big boys.
It will be a real live put-up-or-shut-up game for a team notorious for underachieving in these moments. . .
It will be the Longhorns’ highest-profile bowl appearance since they went into the 1978 Cotton Bowl ranked No. 1 but lost to Notre Dame.
This is not the Pacific Life Holiday Bowl, a regular stop off the main bowl draft for the Longhorns. . .
The only way the Longhorns’ task could have been easier would have been if Pittsburgh had landed in Pasadena.
Michigan is 13th in the BCS standings. Only Pitt, the Big East co-champion, is worse among the eight schools in BCS bowls at No. 21.
Michigan, which shared the championship of the stodgy Big Ten with Iowa, has the name but not the chops this season.
The Wolverines lost to Notre Dame, which has fired its coach, and to Ohio State (7-4). San Diego State came within three points of the Wolverines, at Michigan.
This is not an opponent of the USC-Oklahoma-Auburn level. Michigan is not even Utah, which may be out of coaches before its bowl game.
The Longhorns must cleanly handle Michigan and prove they belong at this level, . . .
Brown asked for this chance. Now, he must do something with it.
And that would be a first, too.
Brown has been a convenient target of barbs because his teams promise so much and deliver so little under the spotlight.
In 17 seasons at North Carolina and Texas, Brown has never won a conference title. That is somewhat understandable at North Carolina, where basketball is king and Florida State was in the conference for part of his tenure.
An 0-for at Texas, flush with resources and talent, is unfathomable.
The bigger the moment, the worse Brown’s Texas teams have played. Look at his big-game resume:

? Five consecutive losses to Oklahoma and uber-coach Bob Stoops.
This is as big a mismatch as there is in the college game. The thought of Stoops throws Brown into a panic. The gap is growing. Texas’ dull offense does not even challenge Stoops and his staff.
? An 0-2 record in Big 12 championship games. Texas lost to Nebraska in 1999 and, with a BCS berth at hand, was upset by Colorado in 2001.
? A 3-3 bowl record. Last year’s 28-20 loss to Washington State represented a dreadful showing by Brown and his staff. Texas acted as if it had no idea Washington State, which led Division I-A in sacks, would blitz. With the offense collapsing in the face of the heavy blitz pressure, Brown removed the mobile quarterback (Vince Young) for the stationary quarterback (Chance Mock).

Reputations are formed by a body of work. There are lots of wins but no landmark triumphs during Brown’s seven seasons with Texas.
A win against Michigan would have substance because of the setting.
A loss to Michigan would make it easy not to take Brown seriously for a long time. . .

Moving to thoughts of Christmas, if you are looking for a gift for a sports-interested family member or friend, this Boston Globe article reviews the new book by Gene Conley, one of the last athletes to play two professional sports (Major League Baseball and the NBA) at the same time for much of his professional career. Conley’s is a remarkable story, as reflected by this snippet from the article:

There was the time he struck out Ted Williams in the All-Star Game. Then there was the time he had to separate Tom Heinsohn from Wilt Chamberlain during a heated exchange in an NBA game. . . No one else ever won a championship ring in two major sports. No one else played against Jackie Robinson, Frank Robinson, and Oscar Robertson. No one else played with Carl Yastrzemski during the summer, then joined Bob Cousy for the winter. No one else lockered next to Hank Aaron and Bill Russell in the same calendar year.

Conley also confirms the truth about the legendary story in which he and a teammate got off the Red Sox team bus and Conley was not seen again for 68 hours. Ah, those were the days.
Finally, this Houston Press article provides an interesting analysis of the evolution of the high-powered suburban high school football programs in the Houston metropolitan area. Call it the natural evolution of Friday Night Lights.

Penders reborn at UH

This Austin-American Statesman article profiles former University of Texas and current University of Houston basketball coach Tom Penders. It’s an interesting story about the grinding nature of college basketball. Check it out.

More on basketball, hockey style

Following on Professor Sauer’s excellent post noted here regarding the recent Pacers-Pistons fight at Auburn Hills, the Washington Post’s Richard Cohen has one of the best op-eds that I have read on the affair to date:

Much attention continues to be paid to Artest, as if he is such a mystery. He is a rough kid from a rough part of the world with what are known as anger management issues. These are the same issues that bedeviled the late Lizzie Borden and now afflict road ragers across the land. Artest has a record when it comes to such matters — this is not his first suspension — and he appears (although I am not personally acquainted with him) a couple of cards short of a full deck. It is authoritatively reported, for instance, that while playing for the Chicago Bulls at the usual multimillion-dollar salary, he applied for a Sunday job at Circuit City so he could get an employee discount.
Be all that as it may, you can surely appreciate the sort of anger that erupts in a man when a fan hits him with a cup full of liquid. . . Sure, Artest should not have reacted the way he did, but you can appreciate what angered him — and why. He deserves to be punished, but he is not all that hard to understand.

But Mr. Cohen finds the people who participated in the brawl almost incomprehensible:

But the fans? What is wrong with them? They are idiots, being played for suckers by a bunch of millionaires who own ball teams. Because they happen to live in a certain area, they root for a certain team. Never mind that the players usually don’t live in the area and they would, for either a buck or a whim, go somewhere else. The fans for some reason identify so passionately with a team that they are willing to risk physical injury on its behalf. Freud, I am sure, had a term for such people: jerks.
Being nicer, I see them differently. They are mere fools being manipulated by teams in ways that would make Pavlov salivate in appreciation. The noise, the choreographed cheering, the booming announcer and, not least, the constant acceptance or encouragement of what used to be called poor sportsmanship — for instance, thunder sticks used to rattle players at the free-throw line — are attempts to bond fans to a team that would, in a flash, desert them for a better arena in another city. It works. Vast numbers of people have turned over a piece of their self-worth to a team. They feel good when it wins and bad when it loses and, in some cases, will risk or inflict injury in a cause so worthless that their children should be raised by foster parents for their own good.
I understand wanting to belong to something and I understand a keen appreciation of the game. But the fan, like “the voter” and “the stockholder,” has become so hypocritically venerated that it has become virtually sacrilegious to call him (or her) a chump and an idiot when they go too far. So, please, sportswriters of the world, spare me any more analysis of Artest and throw some light on the world of the fan. It must be a dim one, indeed.

Read the entire piece.

More on basketball, hockey style

On the heels of this earlier post on the fight that occurred on November 19 at the Pistons-Pacers game, do not miss Professor Sauer’s analysis of the affair, with a Stros twist:

The Pacers’ brawl is not the first instance of a fan being leveled by a player-thrown haymaker. In one memorable incident in 1999, a fan raced onto the field at Milwaukee County Stadium and jumped on Billy Spiers in right field. Spiers’ Astros teamates were quick on the scene to defend him. I recall Mike Hampton landing a series of blows to the head of that bozo. Billy Spiers (a former Tiger in addition to being an Astro) was one of my favorite players. Put me in Hampton’s shoes and I’d have done the same thing, though not so effectively. Thanks for that, Mike.
Now, how different is Hampton’s defense of his teammate from Jermaine O’Neal and Stephen Jackson’s defense of Ron Artest? While there are differences, they are mostly a matter of degree. The common thread between the two incidents is the out of control fan.
Many issues are highlighted by the fight in Detroit. The NBA paid service to the media with swift and draconian punishment for the players involved. But to me, fan control is a more serious and more difficult problem than player control. Each time fans rush the court or the playing field after a game, they illustrate the raw power inherent in a crowd that no level of security short of an armored division can manage. The trick for sports management is to short-circuit the potential for a crowd to turn into a mob.

Definite clear thinking. Read the entire post.

Basketball, NHL style

The Daily Recycler has the video of the hockey game that broke out last night at the Pacers-Pistons NBA game.
The typical reaction to the incident will be outrage and self-righteous indignation. However, I must admit that the riot made me somewhat nostalgic of the bygone days of the NBA when such fights were quite common.
Back in the 1970’s, my late father and I would often go over to The Summit (my folks’ house was nearby) at halftime of the Rockets’ game of the night and get in free to watch the second half of the game (I was a poverty-sticken law student; my father was just, might we say, parsimonious). Even back then, the first halves of NBA games didn’t make much difference.
On one particular evening, we went to the second half of a game between the Rockets of the Calvin Murphy, Rudy Tomjanovich, Mike Newlin era against the Celtics of the Sidney Wicks, Dave Cowens, and Charlie Scott era. It was a close game and by the 4th quarter, the players on both sides were getting a bit chippy. Finally, Wicks threw an elbow at Murphy, and all hell broke loose.
Unfortunately for Wicks, Murphy was a professional caliber fighter and never lost any of his half-dozen or so fights during his NBA career. Combining amazing quickness with a rapid fire delivery, Murphy was on top of Wicks within seconds, had him down on the floor, and was delivering a devastating series of punches to the bridge of Wicks’ nose, opening up a broad cut in the process. It took four players — each taking one of Murphy’s limbs — to extract Murphy from Wicks, who frankly didn’t know what had hit him.
After order was restored and Wicks was carted off to the dressing room for stitches, the game continued in a rather heated fashion. A few minutes later, after a rough exchange under the Rockets’ basket, a big, fat fan sitting in the courtside seats took offense to Cowens’ actions, walked out on to the court, and pushed Cowens. Cowens proceeded to place his right hand on this idiot’s neck and then started hammering him to the chops with a series of lefts that would have made Rocky Balboa proud. Just for good measure, Scott blazed in like a streak of light and did his best Murphy imitation, pummeling several adjacent fans with a deft series of combination blows.
About this time, Wicks returned to the court with a large bandage on the bridge of his nose. My father, a respected Professor of Medicine with a long career at both the University of Iowa and University of Texas Medical Schools, used all of his long years of medical research in analyzing the situation for me: “Murphy really kicked Wicks’ ass, didn’t he?”
After “order” (we’re talking generally here) was restored for the second time, the Rockets went on to score a satisfying victory over the Celtics. None of the combatants in the various brawls were even thrown out of the game as I recall, and certainly no arrests were made and no civil lawsuits were filed.
Ah, those were the days. ;^)

Another Mark Cuban first

Mark Cuban is the young and dynamic owner of the National Basketball Association’s Dallas Mavericks, which he has reshaped into one of the NBA’s winningest franchises over the past several seasons.
Cuban is a live wire, and he undoubtedly leads the NBA in the past few seasons in the amount of fines that the NBA front office has levied against an owner for criticism of various aspects of the league, particularly in the area of referee evaluation.
For several months, Mark has been running an interesting blog called Blog Maverick. In another first, Mark notes in this blog post that the NBA front office has fined him again, this time for criticizing the league in a blog post.