The only two airline-security measures that really matter — fortified cockpit doors and the awareness of the flying public as to what a hijacking can mean — have been in place virtually since the attacks of September 11, 2001.

Nevertheless, as Patrick Smith explains, the wasteful airport security process that we have allowed the Transportation Security Administration to impose on us continues unabated at a substantial direct cost and an even greater indirect one.

It’s bad enough that the TSA’s procedures do virtually nothing to discourage serious terrorist threats. But what’s even worse is that the incompetent inspection process is really just "security theater" that makes a few naive travelers feel safer about airline travel.

And if all that weren’t bad enough, the worst news is that once a governmental "safeguard" such as the TSA procedures are adopted, Congress is not interested in dismantling it even when it’s clear that process is ineffective, expensive and obtrusive to citizens.

Smith sums up the dilemma well:

The novelty of the Sept. 11 attacks notwithstanding, the primary threat to commercial planes is, was and shall remain the smuggling aboard of explosives, which is what happened on Pan Am 103 [the Lockerbie explosion twenty years ago whose instigator was recently set free]. The bomb came onboard in a suitcase. The hijack paradigm changed forever on 9/11, rendering the inflight takeover concept unworkable for a terrorist. .   .   .

Yet whether by virtue of incompetence or willful ignorance, TSA continues to waste untold time and untold millions of dollars on a tedious, zero-tolerance fixation with blades and sharps. This does nothing to make us safer, and in fact draws security resources away from worthy pursuits.

Yes, TSA scans most bags for explosives. Mandates were put in place after 9/11 that have greatly increased the percentage of bags that are run through high-tech detectors, with a goal of screening all of them. But eight years later, screening is still not fully comprehensive. It does not yet include 100 percent of luggage and cargo, and procedures remain inadequate at many overseas airports from which thousands of U.S.-registered jetliners depart each week. Neither is there widespread screening for explosive materials that somebody can carry on his or her person. Good luck getting a hobby knife through a concourse checkpoint, while a pocket full of Semtex is unlikely to be noticed.   .   .   .

There is a level of inherent risk that we simply must learn to accept. But, if we are going to have an airport security apparatus, and if we are going to devote millions of tax dollars to the cause of thwarting attacks, can we please do it smartly and at least improve our odds? Am I the only one who finds it maddening, and even a little scary, that we can’t get this right? Is it not a national disgrace that TSA should spend its time confiscating butter knives from uniformed pilots rather than focusing on deadly threats with a long historical precedent?

Where are the voices of protest? As I’ve said before, the airlines ought to be speaking out and pressuring TSA to revise its policies. I know it puts them in a tough spot, liability-wise — carriers don’t want to be perceived as opposing security, even when that security isn’t helpful — but much of what people despise about flying pertains to the TSA rigmarole.

And passengers, for their part, are apparently content with, or at least resigned to, the idea of security theater in lieu of the real thing. Indeed, rather than demand or expect change, hundreds of thousands of Americans have paid good money for the chance to simply circumvent the hassle of TSA.

Food for thought as Congress considers the creation of an even larger governmental apparatus as the "solution" to problems in the U.S. health care finance system.