A stroke of insight

This is one of the most fascinating TED lectures. Brain researcher Jill Bolte Taylor describes the experience of having a stroke.

Update: Interestingly, a number of neuroscientists believe that Bolte Taylor’s lecture is misleading. See here and here.

The epic story of technology

Publisher of the Whole Earth Review and former Wired executive editor Kevin Kelly weaves the fascinating tale.

Help for Elk

53343077TL104_2005_PGA_Cham PGA Tour member and long-time Houstonian Steve Elkington is a Clear Thinkers favorite, so I took notice of this Golf.com article reporting that PGA Tour commissioner Tim Finchem had raised the ire of several Tour pros by helping Elk gain entry into several PGA Tour events this season. Elk had been fully exempt on the PGA Tour for 23 consecutive years until he finished 183rd on the money list last year and lost his exempt status.

Of course, none of the pros complaining about Finchemís favor to Elk are on this key list voted on by ìwide-ranging surveyî of golfís ìeliteî:

WHO’S THE BEST JOKE-TELLER ON TOUR?

Todd Hamilton: 17%
Steve Elkington: 13%
Harrison Frazar: 8%
Neal Lancaster: 8%
Others receiving votes: Paul Azinger, Rich Beem, Tim Clark, Carlos Franco, Paul Goydos, Peter Jacobsen, Peter Lonard, Nick Price, Chris Riley, Boo Weekley

Given the decidedly unfunny cloud following the PGA Tour around this year, it looks to me as if Finchem has a darn good reason for recommending Elk to tournament sponsors.

Longhorns Inc.

College Football3 More than a few tongues are wagging around Texas Longhorn athletic circles this week over this blistering Texas Observer op-ed on the UT football program authored by UT professor Tom Palaima, who just happens to serve on the UT Faculty Advisory Committee on Budgets and is UTís representative on the Big 12 steering committee of the Coalition on Intercollegiate Athletics. Hereís a flavor of the article:

The NCAA program at the University of Texas at Austin generated $138 million in revenue last year, $87 million from football. Yet its profit margin is less than $2 million. The programís cumulative debt and debt service are in the high-risk neighborhood.

Longhorns Inc. has wrapped its tentacles around the now-hemorrhaging academic budget. The athletics department gave a $2 million raise to head football coach Mack Brown as colleges across the university are laying off staff. In foreign languages alone, $1.6 million was cut. The head of the student union recently announced the closure of the Cactus CafÈ, a historic music venue, to save just $66,000 over two years.

Worse, the university has ceded trademark and royalty revenues. Longhorns Inc. keeps 90 percent of this income, roughly $10.6 million last year. The yearly debt payment on building bonds for the nearly $300 million in stadium expansions since 1998 is $15 million. The debt run up by the athletics department has risen from $64.4 million in 2004-05 to a staggering $222.5 million in 2008-09.

Unfortunately, Palaima main criticism is how well the UT athletic department and its personnel are doing financially in comparison to the UT academics, whose average salary has increased by ìonlyî 30 percent over the past 20 years or so.

Somehow, however, Palaima utterly misses the most corrupt aspect of big-time intercollegiate athletics. That is, the perverse and discriminatory regulatory scheme that restricts compensation to the players ñ mostly young black men ñ whose talent actually generates most of the wealth for the athletic departments.

As Iíve noted many times, big-time college football and basketball is an entertaining form of corruption. Too bad that someone as bright as Professor Palaima fails to understand the true nature of that corruption.

By the way, below is a video of a lively debate between Professor Palaima and longtime UT Law professor Lino Graglia over college football in which Palaima is actually the defender of the entreprise (a colleague asked Palaima ìDeLoss Dodds must have given you priority seating at [Darrell K. Royal-Memorial Stadium]î. The transcript of the debate is here.

Thoughts on health care finance reform

stethoscope_3 Inasmuch as Americaís fractured health care finance system has been a common topic on this blog since early 2004, many friends and readers have asked my thoughts about the health care reform legislation that was passed yesterday. So here goes.

The legislation is fundamentally flawed because it imprudently foists a top-down reorganization plan on something as complex and disparate as financing health care. But frankly, I have no idea whether it will result in a worse finance system than the current one, which is pretty bad.

My biggest criticism with both the current system and the one contemplated by Obamacare is that the patient is not the customer, at least as it relates to non-catastrophic illness and injury. Without cost control ñ and customer decision-making is the most efficient one available – neither the current system nor Obamacare will be able to maintain delivery of high-quality care to an increasingly aging population.

However, the reality is that we now have two solid generations of Americans now who enjoy having someone else pay for their health care. So, itís unrealistic to think that such a societal shift is going to change anytime soon. But itís still important to understand how we got to this point.

Employer-based health insurance became popular during World War II because it was initially exempted from gross income as a way to circumvent wartime wage and price controls. After the war, marginal income tax rates were high and individual medical expenses were tax deductible, so at least some rational incentives were returned to the medical marketplace.

But all this changed in 1986 when the Reagan Administration made concessions to achieve bipartisan tax reform. Individual medical expenses were no longer deductible until they reached 7.5% of gross income, which virtually eliminated individual incentives in the medical marketplace. Not surprisingly, everyone was incentivized after tax reform to move all medical expenses to third-party-payor health insurance. As a result, individual out-of-pocket expenses in the health care market dropped from 22% in 1985 to less than than 10% of the market now.

So, in essence, the Reagan Administration horse-traded personal tax deductibility of medical expenses away, but figured that was acceptable because at least employer health insurance remained tax-free benefit. Iím sure if we could ask him now, President Reagan would tell you that he expected a future Congress would fix such perverse incentives after the dust settled on the benefits of tax reform. But alas, that never happened.

What happens now? The only certainly is that special interests will be descending upon Washington in droves to do their bidding over the transfers of wealth that will occur under the new legislation. At least it will be entertaining to watch who wins and loses.

But there are two big points that everyone should remember as we embark on this new world of health care finance.

First, the Obama Administrationís rationalization of future cuts in Medicare spending as a funding source for the health care legislation is utterly disingenuous, as Arnold Kling artfully explains:

Imagine that your crazy uncle Fred had bought a dozen cars on credit. As a result, he faces car payments far in excess of what he can afford. He comes to you and says he has a plan that in a couple of years will reduce his car payments by a few thousand dollars. "Now I have the money for a down payment on a boat!" he exclaims, as he runs off to the boat dealer.

The equivalent is for Congress to treat future cuts in Medicare as if they were a newfound source of wealth to be tapped. Once they adopt this precedent, they can increase spending on whatever they want, in unlimited amounts, while claiming deficit neutrality. Future Medicare spending is so high that you can always come up with cuts, as long as they deferred.

Second, as Greg Mankiw notes, projected Medicare cuts in payment rates for physician services portend the rationing of medical services that the promoters of the current legislation contend wonít occur. Because few consumers actually pay for their health care, most folks donít realize that Medicare and Medicaid payment rates for physician services have already been cut by around 30% since the late 1990ís. That has led many doctors to limit substantially the number of Medicare and Medicaid patients who they are willing to treat in their practices. In my view, that trend is likely to continue under the new legislation. Who will tend to the medical needs of consumers who elect to rely on such insurance in the future?

Supporters of Obamacare generally argue that the legislation offers more equality through expanded insurance and redistribution of benefits. But the wealthy will always find ways to get around the rationing and other restrictions of a government-run health care system. On the other hand, the poor will have no choice but to accept the government health care, which is unlikely to be as high a quality as what the rich folks obtain from their private doctors. Accordingly, although the distribution of health care may be a bit more equal in the short term, I’m not sure that means more equality in health care in the long run.

Which leads me to this question: How long will it be before the federal government requires physicians, as a condition to being allowed to engage in private practice, to accept a certain number of patients under government-sponsored insurance plans that limit payments to the physicians far below what the physicians would otherwise accept?

The bad Metro bet

metro-map-2012-revised Following on this post from last week, there were a couple of good pieces from over weekend on the cascading boondoggle that is Houston’s Metropolitan Transit Authority.

In this post, the always-insightful Tory Gattis comments on Randal O’Toole’s Wall Street Journal op-ed from over the weekend in which O’Toole focuses on the short-sighted nature of huge investment in light rail systems. At a time of fast technological innovation, why should a community place a substantial amount of its chips on an increasingly obsolescent form of mass transit such as light rail?

Meanwhile, Bill King followed his fine blog post from last week with this devastating Sunday Chronicle op-ed in which he disassembles each of the primary myths that Metro supporters use when defending the light rail system. In particular, King explains why the 2003 referendum is not a reasonable justification for what Metro is proposing now with regard to its light rail system:

The 2003 referendum had three elements: (1) a $1.2 billion LRT system; (2) a roughly 50 percent increase in bus service; and (3) initiating a plan for commuter rail.

Metro has completely abandoned the bus expansion: We have fewer buses and bus riders today than we did in 2003. It also has done absolutely nothing to further the development of any commuter rail lines and has instead gotten in the way of other groups like Harris County when they have tried to initiate some action. The voters in 2003 did not approve just a light rail plan; they approved a comprehensive, multimodal system. Metro, for its own reasons, has abandoned what the voters approved in favor of its own grandiose vision.

Additionally, it should be noted that the voters specifically restricted Metro to borrowing $640 million to build the light rail system. Metro now plans to subvert that limitation by entering into a sale/lease-back arrangement with a separate subsidiary and actually borrow more than four times what the voters approved. Metro is always quick to invoke the moral authority of the 2003 referendum but casually ignores its inconvenient restrictions.

Meanwhile, the Chronicle editorial board continues to live in a rather odd state of denial with regard to Metro. In this vacuous op-ed, the Chron attempts to put a cheery face on Mayor Parker’s appointment of several new members to the Metro board (one is actually a regular Metro rider — how about that?!) and her negotiations with federal officials regarding funding of further light rail lines.

Without any financial analysis whatsoever, the Chron asserts that Mayor Parker is moving forward with a full build-out of light rail in a fiscally responsible manner. But even a cursory review of the data proves just the opposite.

As Peter Gordon has long maintained, citizens should require their leaders to answer the following basic questions before allowing them to obligate citizens to funding boondoggles such as light rail: 1) At what cost?, 2) Compared to what? and 3) How do you know?

The Chronicle editorial board is taking a pass on asking Metro’s leaders those questions. Thankfully, Bill King and Tory Gattis are not.

Who’s better? Kobe or Clyde the Glide?

houston-clyde-drexler Clear Thinkersí favorite basketball stathead Dave Berri knows. The answer may surprise you:

Drexlerís career averages top Kobeís marks with respect to shooting efficiency, rebounds, steals, blocked shots, and assists.  And yet Kobe is considered by many to be the better player.

There appear to be three explanations for why Kobe is thought to be the better player.  First .  .  . Kobe is the more prolific scorer.  Of course, this is because Kobe leads Drexler in field goal attempts.

Another issue is that Kobe spent his career with the Lakers while Drexler played for Portland and Houston.  In general, players for teams located in LA and New York tend to get more media exposure and therefore are thought of as better players.

And then there is the issue of championships won.  People tend to think players on championship teams are better than those who toil for teams that tend to lose in the playoffs.  Itís easy to point out the absurdity of such logic.  Teams win championships and one can pick up a ring just because you happen to have the right teammates.  After all, does anyone think Luc Longley (three titles) was a better center than Patrick Ewing (0 titles)? Or that Robert Horry (seven titles) was a better forward than Dominique Wilkins or Karl Malone (0 titles)?  Despite such obvious arguments, people will note that Kobeís four titles must mean heís a better guard than Drexler (1 title).

Berri goes on to provide a fascinating analysis of the Olajuwon-Drexler-Barkley Rockets team of the mid-1990ís and explains how close that team came to being really good.

I attended the first game that Clyde the Glide played at the University of Houston as a freshman in the early 1980ís. I was amazed at his all-around talent from that first game and that was well before Drexler developed an outside shot, which he learned to do after he entered the NBA.

Drexler was an outstanding in all phases of the game. Itís pleasing that smart folks such as Berri are teaching us that such a well-rounded player is more valuable than the narrow scorers that NBA teams and their fans have traditionally coveted.