Gil Weinrich has a piece at TCS Central that proposes a different approach to punishment of corporate wrongdoers:

Our society does a poor job of penalizing [corporate] crime. . . In the white-collar arena, the unrequited losses endured by victims of financial crime similarly underscore the fecklessness of the system.
Besides the injustice to victims there is an inherent lack of mercy to criminals who are not given an opportunity to make amends. For the sake of the victims of Enron and other white-collar crimes, we need to shift away from a system based on punishment to one based on restitution.

So, what does Weinrich propose?: A financial debtor’s prison:

When Andrew Fastow pleaded guilty early this year, he agreed to surrender $23.8 million in cash and property, including vacation homes in Vermont and Galveston, Texas. That’s a start. He and those who shared in his crime should be apportioned the part of the losses for which a court deems them responsible, including an extra 10 percent to compensate for the unearned return on the victims’ money, and an additional fine to compensate the government if the perpetrator did not cooperate in the investigation of the crime.
The perpetrators should then spend as long as it takes, up to the rest of their lives if necessary, to repay that debt. Andrew Fastow may be a criminal but he is also a financially savvy corporate executive. Surely his vast talents can be put to some good use for some company somewhere. A court could give him an allowance (based on a percentage of his income so that he would always have an incentive to increase his earnings), with the lion’s share (say, 90 percent) devoted to a restitution fund.

Weinrich then proposes a rather elaborate system of ceremonies involving victims and the perpetrators in which they would either discuss the crimes or welcome the perpetrator back from the financial debtor’s prison once the debt is paid off.
I’m an advocate against the criminalization of business in America that has culminated in absurdly long prison sentences such as the one involved in the sad case of Jamie Olis. However, Weinrich’s proposal strikes me as silly. The civil justice system already provides a financial disincentive for corporate wrongdoing. Moreover, the fact that politicians have arranged for absurdly long prison sentences in business cases to appeal to the public passion to punish wealthy people excessively does not mean that there should be no penal system disincentive whatsoever for engaging in corporate crime. One imagines Bialystock & Bloom in “The Producers” blithely continuing to create Ponzi schemes in perpetuity under Weinrich’s proposed system (and so long as Zero Mostel could continue to play Bialystock, that might not be such a bad thing).
Professor Bainbridge agrees with me.